UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, v. BRAYAN GOMEZ, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 16-181-cr
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit
Decided: December 5, 2017
Argued: May 16, 2017
United States Court of Appeals
For the Second Circuit
August Term, 2016
No. 16-181-cr
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
BRAYAN GOMEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Connecticut.
No. 14-cr-63 — Janet C. Hall, Chief Judge.
ARGUED: MAY 16, 2017
DECIDED: DECEMBER 5, 2017
Before: PARKER, WESLEY, and DRONEY, Circuit Judges.
GEOFFREY M. STONE (Marc H. Silverman, of counsel), Assistant United States Attorneys, for Deirdre M. Daly, United States Attorney for the District of Connecticut, New Haven, CT, for Appellee.
MATTHEW W. BRISSENDEN, Garden City, NY, for Defendant-Aрpellant.
This appeal arises out of a traffic stop of Defendant-Appellant Brayan Gomez. During surveillance in connection with a heroin-trafficking investigation in Hartford, Connecticut, officers observed Gomez commit several traffic violations and stopped his car. During the five-minute traffic stop, the officers prolonged the seizure by asking Gomez narcotics-related questions not pertinent to the traffic violations. After the questioning, Gomez consented to the search of a closed bag in the car’s trunk, which contained nearly a half-kilogram of heroin and drug-packaging materials.
Gomez moved to suppress this evidence, arguing that, inter alia, his seizure violated the Fourth Amendment because the officers measurably extended the stop for investigatory reasons unrelated to the traffic violations. Applying this Court’s holding in United States v. Harrison, 606 F.3d 42, 45 (2d Cir. 2010) (per curiam)—that questioning unrelated to traffic violations during a five-to-six
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the Supreme Court’s decision in Rodriguez abrogates our holding in Harrison.1 We also conclude that Gomez’s seizure, albeit only five minutes in length, contravenes Rodriguez’s holding and therefore violates the Fourth Amendment. Nevertheless, we conclude that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies because, at the time of the
BACKGROUND
I. The Heroin-Trafficking Investigation
In March 2014, Hartford police detective James Campbell and Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) special agent Michael Schatz—members of a DEA task force—were investigating a large-scale heroin-trafficking organization operating out of Hartford.2
On March 19, Campbell and Schatz began surveillance of two addresses associated with Alex Ortiz-Gomez—one in Hartford and another in East Hartford. The following morning, Campbell observed Brayan Gomez exit the Hartford address and drive away in a white Acura.4 Schatz followed Gomez to the East Hartford
With Campbell and Schatz (in separate vehicles) covеrtly following, Gomez drove to a nearby Ramada Inn hotel in East Hartford and parked the black Honda. Although Campbell and Schatz did not arrive in time to see Gomez enter the hotel, Campbell saw him exit the Ramada Inn a few minutes later carrying a “weighted” black duffel bag. After placing the bag in the Honda’s trunk, Gomez drove away again, this time towards the highway; Campbell and Schatz continued to follow.
When Campbell saw Gomez place the duffel bag in the car’s trunk and drive away, he notified Schatz and other nearby officers via radio transmissions that he planned to execute a pretextual stop of the Honda if Gomez committed a traffic violation. Gomez then
II. The Traffic Stop
Shortly after Gomez exited the highway, Campbell used his unmarked car’s lights and sirеn to pull Gomez over. Schatz arrived at the scene shortly thereafter and parked his car in front of the black Honda, which was on the road’s shoulder. While Schatz remained in his car, Campbell approached the Honda on the driver’s side and
Shortly after Gomez turned off the engine, Campbell’s questioning detoured from traffic violations to the subject of heroin:
Question: After [Gomez] shut the car off, what interaction did you have with him at [that] point?
Campbell: Once he complied and shut the vehicle off, he again asked me why he had been stopped. I told him that we were conducting an investigation into bad heroin as well as firearms within the city of Hartford. Then I also told him that, you know, I observed him travel[l]ing at a high rate of speed as well as travel[l]ing through the red lights.
At Cаmpbell’s request, Gomez provided him with the car’s registration, which listed Joan Sanchez as the owner. At that time, Campbell did not also ask for Gomez’s license. Campbell then asked Gomez where he was coming from, and Gomez responded, untruthfully, that he had come from home. After Campbell inquired where he was travelling, Gomez replied that he was going to the home of his sister-in-law Joan Sanchez—the owner of the black Honda—but he did not know her exact address. Then, Campbell
After this initial questioning with Gomez in the driver’s seat, Campbell asked him to exit the car and walk around to the passenger side.8 At that point, Schatz exited his car and joined Gomez and Campbell in a grass area on the side of the road. While they stood in the grass, Campbell again told Gomez that they were investigating “bad heroin that had been laced with Fentanyl and firearms” in Hartford, and Gomez replied that he did not “know anything about that.” App’x 250; see also App’x 48.
According to Campbell, he then asked whether Gomez “mind[ed]” if Campbell searched the car, and Gomez replied “no, you can go ahead . . . [t]here’s nothing in there.” App’x 250; see also
After Campbell found the receipt, he approached Gomez and asked “if he had anything on his person.” App’x 253. Gomez replied that he did not. Campbell then conducted a pat-down and asked him to remove the items from his pockets. Gomez removed his wallet, which contained his license, and two Ramada Inn room keys from his pants pocket. With the receipt and room keys in hand, Campbell asked Gomez if he had stayed at the Ramada Inn. Gomez initially responded that he was not staying at the hotel, but that his
Campbell then asked Gomez whether he had anything in the car’s trunk, and whether he “mind[ed]” if Campbell opened it. See App’x 256–58; see alsо App’x 58–59. According to both Campbell and Schatz, Gomez replied with words to the effect of “go ahead.” App’x 257–58, 312; see also App’x 58–59, 176. When Campbell opened the trunk, he saw the black duffel bag that Gomez had carried out of the hotel earlier, a large cardboard box, and several smaller cardboard boxes stamped with the words “City Vibe.”12
With the trunk open, Campbell asked whether Gomez “mind[ed]” if he opened the duffel bag. App’x 256–58; see also
An East Hartford police officer who had arrived at the scene a few minutes earlier arrested Gomez. Gomez never received a citation for the traffic violations that he committed before the stop.
Campbell and Schatz testified that the entire stop—from the moment Campbell pulled Gomez over to the momеnt he opened the duffel bag—lasted about five minutes. App’x 271, 318.
III. District Court Proceedings
In March 2014, a federal grand jury in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut returned an indictment charging Gomez with one count of possession with intent to
In November 2014, the district court (Burns, J.) held a suppression hearing during which Campbell and Schatz testified; Gomez did not testify.14 With the district court’s permission, Gomez
In June 2015, after the case was transferred to a different district judge (Hall, C.J.), the district court held a second suppression hearing. Two months before that resumed hearing, the Supreme Court decided Rodriguez v. United States, — U.S. —, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015), but neither Gomez nor the Government filed a supplemental brief concerning Rodriguez before or after the second hearing. During the second hearing, Campbell and Schatz testified again, and the court heard oral argument. The parties and the district court did not discuss Rodriguez during the hearing, but they did discuss this
In late June 2015, the district court issued a ruling denying Gomez’s motion to suppress. See United States v. Gomez, No. 14-cr-63, 2015 WL 3936397, at *1–3 (D. Conn. June 26, 2015). First, as to Gomez’s argument that the initial stop was unlawful, the district court credited the testimony of Campbell and Schatz, concluding that there was probable cause or reasonable suspicion to believe that Gomez drove through a red light before entering the highway and was speeding on the highway.15 Id. at *2. Second, the district court rejected Gomez’s argument that he did not consent to the searches notwithstanding his affidavit, again finding the testimony of Campbell and Schatz credible and “largely consistent with each
Third, the district court concluded that Campbell did not unreasonably extend the traffic stop in violation of the Fourth Amendment, even though it acknowledged that he questioned Gomez about matters unrelated to the traffic violations. See id. at *2–3. The district court relied on this Court’s holding in Harrison:
The Second Circuit has previously found a stop of five to six minutes was not unlawfully prolonged, United States v. Harrison, 606 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2010), and other circuits have upheld longer intervals . . . .
There is no evidence on the record to contradict testimony by Detective Campbell and Special Agent Schatz that the stop lasted five minutes at most until Gomez was arrested. Based on the record before it, the court finds that, while Gomez was questioned about matters unrelated to the traffic violation during this time period, such questioning did not unreasonably prolong the stop so as to render it unconstitutional.
Id. at *3. The district court did not address the Government’s alternative argument that independent reasonable suspicion of a
After the district court denied his motion, in September 2015 Gomez conditionally pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement that allowed him to appeal the district court’s suppression ruling. In January 2016, the district court sentenced Gomez to sixty months’ imprisonment, the statutory minimum under
DISCUSSION
“On appeal from a denial of a suppression motion, we review a district court’s findings of fact for clear error, and its resolution of questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact de novo.” United States v. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71, 94–95 (2d Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). In reviewing a district court’s findings of fact for clear error, we also “pay special deference to the district
Gomez raises three arguments on appeal. First, he contends that the officers unconstitutionally prolonged his traffic stop, a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Second, Gomez argues that the district court clearly erred in finding that the initial stop was based on valid probable cause or reasonable suspicion to believe he committed a traffic violation. Third, he challenges the veracity of the officers’ testimony and the district court’s factual finding that he verbally consented to the searches of the car, its trunk, and the closed duffel bag in the trunk.
I. Duration of the Traffic Stop
A. Traffic Stops after Rodriguez v. United States
The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their рersons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .”
1. Pre-Rodriguez Supreme Court Decisions
A decade before Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015), the Supreme Court explained in Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) that even when a traffic stop is based on probable cause or reasonable suspicion at the outset, “[i]t is nevertheless clear that a
In Caballes, the Court considеred a ten-minute traffic stop for speeding where one officer led a narcotics-detection dog around the driver’s car while a second officer simultaneously “was in the process of writing a warning ticket.” Id. at 406. The dog alerted to the presence of marijuana, and the driver was arrested and subsequently convicted of a state narcotics offense. Id. at 406-07. The Court affirmed the Illinois Supreme Court’s “conclusion that the duration of the stop . . . was entirely justified by the traffic offense and the ordinary inquiries incident to such a stop,” and held that no
A few years later, in Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009), the Court further considered “[a]n officer’s inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop.” Id. at 333. The Court explained in Johnson that a stop remains lawful so long as such inquiries do not “measurably extend the duration of the stop.” Id. (emphasis added). In Johnson, during the time necessary for an officer to complete the processing of a traffic stop for a suspended vehicle registration, a different officer оn the scene
2. Circuit Courts Applying Johnson and Caballes
After Johnson and Caballes, several of our sister circuits determined whether unrelated investigations during otherwise lawful traffic stops “measurably extend[ed]” such stops or prolonged them beyond the time “reasonably required” to issue a ticket. See Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333; Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407. Rather than adopt a per se rule that any extension of a traffic stop for an unrelated investigation is unlawful, several circuits assessed the
In particular, the Eighth Circuit developed a de minimis rule: a brief, minutes-long extension of a traffic stop to conduct an unrelated investigation, such as a dog sniff, is a de minimis intrusion on a driver’s personal liberty that does not violate the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Alexander, 448 F.3d 1014, 1017 (8th Cir. 2006) (upholding four-minute delay as de minimis intrusion);
In United States v. Harrison, 606 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2010), we applied Johnson and Caballes in the context of a traffic stop (for a defective license plate light) that was extended by officer questioning; a search of the car revealed a gun and, ultimately, crack cocaine. See Harrison, 606 F.3d at 44-45 (per curiam). After the officer recognized the driver from previous traffic stops that had uncovered narcotics, he inquired about the driver’s travels that night, then separately questioned the passengers to “see if they would
Even though we acknowledged that the officer testified that he “had all of the information needed to issue the traffic ticket before he first approached” the car’s passengers to ask questions unrelated to the defective light, we explained that the stop’s extension was reasonable because “the time elapsed between the stop and the arrest was only five to six minutes, and the questions about the passengers’ comings and goings were subsumed in that briеf interval.” Id. at 45. Furthermore, while we did not expressly adopt the de minimis rule, we cited decisions from other circuits for the proposition that “[l]onger intervals than five to six minutes have been deemed tolerable.” Id. (collecting cases).18 Accordingly, we held that the unrelated questioning during the five-to-six minute
3. Rodriguez
In Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015), the Supreme Court rejected the Eighth Circuit’s de minimis rule, holding that “a police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures.” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 350. Rodriguez involved a seven or eight minute delay between the completion of a traffic stop, which had ended with a written warning, and a dog sniff that ultimately uncovered methamphetamine in the car. See id. at 352-53.
Adopting findings made by a magistrate judge, the district court in Rodriguez found that the officer lacked independent reasonable suspicion of a drug offense to extend the detention once he issued the written warning, but it nevertheless denied the
The Supreme Court vacated the Eighth Circuit’s judgment, beginning by explaining that “[l]ike a Terry stop, the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure’s mission––to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to related safety concerns.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Acknowledging Caballes (dog sniff) and Johnson (questioning of a passenger by a different officer)––in which the Court “concluded that the Fourth Amendment tolerated certain unrelated investigations that did not
To be sure, the Court recognized that an officer “may conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop.” Id. at 355. But “he may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual.” Id. Therefore, officers may conduct certain ordinary inquiries related to a traffic stop, such as “checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance,” without independent
In so holding, the Court emphasized that the “critical question” is not whether the unrelated investigation “occurs before or after the officer issues a ticket,” but whether conducting the unrelated investigation “prolongs––i.e., adds time to––the stop.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, the Court specifically rejected the Government’s contention that an officer may “incrementally” prolong a stop to conduct an unrelated investigation “so long as the officer is reasonably diligent in pursuing the traffic-related purpose of the stop, and the overall duration of the stop remains reasonable in relation to the duration of other traffic stops involving similar circumstances.” Id. (alteration omitted). The Court explained that an officer does not “earn bonus
The Court remanded to the Eighth Circuit, leaving open “[t]he question whether reasonable suspicion of criminal activity justified detaining Rodriguez beyond completion of the traffic infraction investigation . . . .”19 Id. at 356-57.
On remand, the Eighth Circuit again affirmed, but it did not address reasonable suspicion of a drug offense. See United States v. Rodriguez, 799 F.3d 1222, 1223-24 (8th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1514 (2016). Rather, it concluded that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied because officers conducted the extended traffic stop in objectively reasonable reliance on binding
B. Analysis
1. Rodriguez Abrogates Harrison
We begin by addressing Gomez’s contention that the district court erred by applying Harrison rather than Rodriguez,20 which the Supreme Court decided two months before the June 2015 suppression hearing.21
Although at least one district court in this Circuit has recognized Rodriguez’s abrogation of Harrison,22 we have not yet had
We held in Harrison that unrelated questioning “subsumed” in a five-to-six minute traffic stop does not measurably prolong a stop so as to render it unconstitutional. See Harrison, 606 F.3d at 45. We explained that the Constitution demands only that a seizure remain reasonable, and that the five-to-six minute seizure was “brief”––shorter than intervals that “have been deemed tolerable” in other circuits. Id.
In Rodriguez, however, the Court held that a police stop “exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made” violates the Fourth Amendment absent independent reasonable suspicion of another offense. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 350. Moreover, the “reasonableness of a seizure . . . depends on
Accordingly, we conclude that Rodriguez abrogates Harrison, and that the district court therefore erred by applying Harrison in denying Gomez’s motion to suppress. See Gomez, 2015 WL 3936397, at *3 (noting that this Court “found a stop of five to six minutes was not unlawfully prolonged” in Harrison, and that there was no evidence to contradict the testimony of Campbell and Schatz that the stop lasted “five minutes at most”).
2. Gomez’s Traffic Stop is Unconstitutional
We conclude that Gomez’s traffic stop violates the Fourth Amendment because Campbell’s investigative inquiries unrelated to the traffic violations “prolong[ed]––i.e., add[ed] time to––the stop.” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 356 (internal quotation marks omitted). In applying Rodriguez, we look to what Campbell “in fact d[id],” not whether “the overall duration of the stop remains reasonable in relation to the duration of other traffic stops involving similar circumstances.” Id.
Although both Campbell and Schatz testified that the stop lasted no longer than five minutes, the district court’s factual findings confirm that “Gomez was questioned about matters unrelated tо the traffic violation[s] during this time period.” Gomez, 2015 WL 3936397, at *3 (emphasis added). The district court concluded, by applying Harrison, that these unrelated questions did not “unreasonably” prolong a concededly brief stop, but we have no
From the moment that Campbell first approached the black Honda, his questioning “detour[ed] from th[e] mission” of the stop (Gomez’s traffic violations) to the DEA’s heroin-trafficking investigation. See Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 356. As Campbell stated on direct examination:
Once [Gomez] complied and shut the vehicle off, he again asked me why he had been stopped. I told him that we were conducting an investigation into bad heroin as well as firearms within the city of Hartford. Then I also told him that, you know, I observed him travel[l]ing at a high rate of speed as well as travel[l]ing through the red lights.
App’x 248 (emphasis added). After Campbell asked for the car’s registration (but notably not Gomez’s license––necessary to write a ticket), he asked Gomez who Joan Sanchez–– the car’s owner––was married to, and Gomez responded that she was married to Alex Ortiz-Gomez (the suspected leader of the heroin-trafficking
These undisputed facts demonstrate that Campbell spent much of the time of the stop, if not most of it, asking questions and executing searches related to the heroin investigation rather than conducting “ordinary inquiries incident to the traffic stop”––such as checking Gomez’s license, determining whether there were
The Government does not appear to dispute this conclusion, arguing only in passing that Campbell and Schatz “simultaneously pursued the traffic violations and the heroin trafficking
The Government’s principal argument, however, is that the extended traffic stop is lawful under Rodriguez because the officers possessed independent reasonable suspicion that Gomez was
“In general, ‘a federal appellate court does not consider an issue not passed upon below.’” Booking v. Gen. Star Mgmt. Co., 254 F.3d 414, 418 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976)); accord Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 90 (2d Cir. 2004) (“In general, we refrain from analyzing issues not decided below . . . .”). This general rule, however, is a prudential one, and we therefore have “broad discretion” to consider issues that “were raised, briefed, and argued in the [d]istrict [c]ourt, but
The existence of reasonable suspicion is not a purely legal issue; rather, it is a mixed question of law and fact dependent on the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Freeman, 735 F.3d 92, 95–96 (2d Cir. 2013). Here, in its opinion and order, the district court made only four factual findings, which related exclusively to the traffic violations, Gomez’s consent to the searches, the duration of
3. The Good-Faith Exception Applies
Although we conclude that Gomez’s traffic stop was unlawfully extended under Rodriguez, we nevertheless also conclude
“To safeguard Fourth Amendment rights, the Supreme Court created ‘an exclusionary rule that, when applicable, forbids the use of improperly obtained evidence at trial.’” United States v. Bershchansky, 788 F.3d 102, 112 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 139 (2009)). “The exclusionary rule’s ‘prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974)). Accordingly, the rule is intended to prevent “deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence.” Herring, 555 U.S. at 144. But “[s]uppression is ‘our last resort, not our first
The good-faith exception provides, among other things, that “searches conducted in objectively reasonable rеliance on binding appellate precedent are not subject to the exclusionary rule” because “suppression would do nothing to deter police misconduct in these circumstances, and because it would come at a high cost to both the truth and the public safety.”28 Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 232 (2011); accord United States v. Aguiar, 737 F.3d 251, 260 (2d Cir. 2013).
The Government argues, for the first time on appeal, that the good-faith exception applies because Harrison—which upheld a five-to-six minute traffic stop extended by unrelated questioning—was
It is notable that the Eighth Circuit applied the good-faith exception on remand after the Supreme Court rejected the de minimis rule in Rodriguez: “[u]nder Davis . . . the exclusionary rule does not apply because the circumstances of Rodriguez’s seizure fell squarely within our case law and the search was conducted in objectively reasonable reliance” on the then-binding de minimis rule. Rodriguez, 799 F.3d at 1224, cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1514 (2016); see also United States v. Ahumada, 858 F.3d 1138, 1140 (8th Cir. 2017) (same). The Fourth Circuit also applied the good-faith exception in a similar situation after Rodriguez. See United States v. Hill, 849 F.3d 195, 200–01 (4th Cir. 2017) (applying good-faith exception to seizure conducted in rеliance on Fourth Circuit’s pre-Rodriguez rule).
“It is well settled that arguments not presented to the district court are considered waived [or forfeited] and generally will not be considered for the first time on appeal.” Anderson Grp., LLC v. City of Saratoga Springs, 805 F.3d 34, 50 (2d Cir. 2015).
We generally exercise this discretion to consider an otherwise forfeited argument “where necessary to avoid a manifest injustice or where the argument presents a question of law and there is no need for additional faсt-finding.” Bogle-Assegai v. Connecticut, 470 F.3d 498, 504 (2d Cir. 2006) (alteration omitted). We will generally not, however, exercise our discretion where the forfeited argument was “available to the parties below and they proffer no reason for their failure to raise the arguments below.” Id. (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).30
After the first hearing, Gomez filed a supplemental brief in February 2015 (a month after the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Rodriguez) contending, for the first time, that Campbell unreasonably prolonged the stop.32 In his supplemental brief, however, Gomez once again did not mention Rodriguez or argue that
After the case was transferred to a different district judge with Gomez’s motion pending, the district court held a second suppression hearing in June 2015, two months after the Supreme Court decided Rodriguez. In advance of the hearing, Gomez did not file a supplemental brief, nor did he discuss the Supreme Court’s decision during the hearing. When the district court twice questioned his counsel about Harrison during the hearing, his counsel did not raise Rodriguez.
Simply put, the first time Gomez argued that Harrison was no longer controlling precedent—or even cited Rodriguez—was in his opening brief on appeal. We therefore conclude that the Government’s failure to raise the good-faith exception prior to its brief on appeal was understandable. See In re Nortel, 539 F.3d at 133
Accordingly, under these circumstances, we will exercise our discretion to consider the Government’s good-faith argument, and we conclude that the exception applies because the officers conducted Gomez’s five-minute traffic stop in objectively reasonable reliance on our then-binding precedent in Harrison. Therefore, although Rodriguez abrogates Harrison, and Gomez’s traffic stop was unlawfully extended absent independent reasonable suspicion in violation of Rodriguez, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies.
II. Legality of the Initial Stop
Gomez also contends that the traffic stop was unlawful at its inception because Campbell did not have valid probable cause or reasonable suspicion to believe he committed a traffic violation. See Stewart, 551 F.3d at 191. Although we “analyze de novo the ultimate
Based on our review of the testimony during both suppression hearings and the contemporaneоus radio communications, we conclude that the district court committed no error, clear or otherwise, in finding that Campbell had probable cause or reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop. Campbell and Schatz testified consistently with each other across both hearings that
Faced with this evidence, Gomez raises two arguments to challenge the district court’s credibility determination. See Jiau, 734 F.3d at 151 (explaining that we “pay special deference” to a district court’s factual determinations “going to witness credibility”).
First, Gomez points to certain radio transmissions Campbell made (before Gomez even ran the red light entering the highway) indicating that the officers “definitely” needed to stop him. See App’x 202 at 13:39–14:46. Based on Campbell’s statements, Gomez argues that the officers intended to stop him “no matter what—even if they had to manufacture a traffic violation in order to do sо.” Appellant’s Br. 30. This argument is unpersuasive. As an initial
Everybody was aware of the nature of our investigation. When we saw [Gomez] leave with a bag, I wanted everybody to be available if an opportunity to conduct a traffic stop or anything else presented itself. Meaning if he conducts any violations that we [a]re going to conduct a motor vehicle traffic stop for everybody to be aware.
App’x 236 (emphasis added). The district court, which listened to the radio communications, did not clearly err in crediting Campbell’s explanation. See United States v. Delva, 858 F.3d 135, 160 (2d Cir. 2017) (noting that where “there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous”).
Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the district court erred in finding that Gomez’s traffic stop was based on valid probable cause or reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation.
III. Consent to the Searches
Finally, Gomez argues that the district court committed clear error in crediting the officers’ testimony and finding that Gomez verbally consented to Campbell’s searches of (i) the interior of the
It is “well settled that one of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent.” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). The existence and scope of a defendant’s consent is a question of fact we review for clear error, and the “[G]overnment has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the consent to search was voluntary.” United States v. Gandia, 424 F.3d 255, 265 (2d Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Guerrero, 813 F.3d 462, 467 (2d Cir. 2016) (“We do not reverse a finding of voluntary consent except for clear error.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Here, based on the record of the suppression hearings and the district court’s credibility findings, we encounter no such error. See Gomez, 2015 WL 3936397, at *2 (“The court finds [the officers’]
CONCLUSION
We conclude that the Supreme Court’s decision in Rodriguez abrogates our holding in Harrison, and that the extension of Gomez’s