Following a routine traffic stop, a consent search of Willie McBride’s car turned up crack cocaine, marijuana, and a loaded handgun. An indictment followed, and McBride was charged with possession of controlled substances with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and possession of a firearm during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). McBride moved to suppress the evidence recovered from his car on the ground that the officer who performed the search obtained his consent only after unreasonably prolonging the traffic stop. The district сourt conducted an evidentiary hearing and denied the motion. McBride then pleaded guilty to both counts, reserving the right to challenge the suppression ruling on appeal, and the court sentenced him to consecutive 60-month terms. The only question presented by this appeal is whether the police officer violated McBride’s rights under the Fourth Amendment — thus vitiating his consent to search' — by detaining him beyond the time needed to complete the traffic stop. We conclude that he did not and affirm the judgment.
I. Background
At the hearing on McBride’s suppression motion, Officer James Gasvoda of the Allen County Sheriffs Department recounted the details of the traffic stop that led to McBride’s arrest. Gasvoda testified that on February 2, 2009, he stopped McBride and a passenger heading westbound out of Fort Wayne, Indiana. McBride was missing the rear license plate on his Chevrolet Monte Carlo and was speeding and changing lanes without signaling. Gasvoda initiated a traffic stop, a recording of which was taped by a squad-car camera and admitted into evidence.
Some 25 minutes elapsed from the time McBride was stopped until he consented to the vehicle search. The stop began routinely enough; Gasvoda approached and asked McBride for his license, registration, and proof of insurance. He also asked *881 McBride’s passenger for identification. McBride provided an Illinois identification card and proof of insurance but no license, while his passenger had nothing in the way of identification. Gasvoda noticed that both McBride and his passenger were avoiding eye contact and appeared nervous, their hands shaking and “carotid arteries ... pulsing.”
Approximately four minutes into the stop, Gasvoda asked McBride to step out of the Monte Carlo and stand in front of the squad car. Gasvoda testified that this was a routinе safety measure. When McBride got out, Gasvoda obtained his permission to conduct a pat-down search, which turned up nothing, though Gasvoda testified that McBride remained “overly nervous” throughout. Gasvoda explained the reasons for the stop and asked McBride basic questions about his driving status. McBride admitted that he was driving on an expired license. Gasvoda then askеd several questions about McBride’s and his passenger’s travel plans: Where were they coming from and how long had they been there, where were they going, and did they have any luggage? McBride identified his passenger as his cousin and said they were returning to Chicago from Fort Wayne, where for the past three weeks they had been visiting relatives. He also said he had a bag of laundry in the trunk. This line of questioning lasted less than one minute. During the exchange, a second officer arrived with a dog to conduct a canine sniff of the vehicle, which was negative.
While McBride waited near the squad car, Gasvoda returned to the Monte Carlo and spoke with the passenger. After explaining why he had stopped the car, Gasvoda asked the passenger similar questions about the trip. The passenger said they had visited his sister in Fort Wayne for two days but brought no luggage. This exchange lasted over a minute. Before returning to the squad car to run the vehiсle information, Gasvoda briefly followed up with McBride about the trip to Fort Wayne. This time McBride said they had stayed for two weeks and were visiting his cousin’s mother. Before returning to his squad car, Gasvoda offered to retrieve McBride’s coat from the Monte Carlo. McBride, who had been standing in the cold since the stop began, accepted this offer. Another minute or sо passed while Gasvoda fetched the coat, and with McBride’s consent, searched the pockets. Gasvoda then spent the next ten minutes in his squad car calling in the license and vehicle information and writing a ticket. When he finished, he handed McBride a speeding ticket and explained his payment responsibilities.
It was then that the traffic stop took an unexpected turn. Gasvoda asked McBride whether he had “any dead bodies or anything” in his car. McBride, laughing, replied, “No, would you like to search?” Gasvoda said that he would, and again asked, this time more directly, for consent to search. McBride consented, and the search turned up the gun and a drink can containing crack cocaine and marijuana.
The district court concluded that the seizure did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The court found that Gasvoda had spent the better part of the stop controlling the scene and gathering information about the Mоnte Carlo, McBride, and his passenger. The few additional questions, the court observed, were negligible when considered in relation to the entire stop and thus did not unreasonably extend thе duration of the detention.
II. Discussion
The argument McBride makes on appeal is basic enough: He contends that Gasvoda detained him beyond the time *882 necessary to issue a traffic citаtion. He does not dispute that Gasvoda had probable cause to stop his car, or that he voluntarily consented to both the pat-down search and the vehicle search that ultimately led to his arrest. Rather, he argues that by the time he consented to the vehicle search, the stop had already been unreasonably drawn out with investigatory questions unrelаted to the purpose of the traffic violations.
A detention following a traffic stop, like any seizure, must satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of reasonableness.
Illinois v. Caballes,
Our decision in
Childs
forеcloses a challenge to the reasonableness of this traffic stop. Gasvoda had a grace period following the completion of the stop during which he could ask investigatory questions provided they did not cause “inconvenience.”
Id.
The additional questioning here did not amount to an inconvenience, adding only minutes to the stop.
Id.
Moreover, Gasvoda had reasonable grounds, independent of the traffic violations, to believe that his questions held the potential for detecting crime.
See Estrada v. Rhode Island,
One of the first things Gasvoda noticed when he approached the Monte Carlo wаs that its occupants were visibly nervous. And while the appearance of anxiety may not by itself form an objective basis for suspecting criminal activity,
see United States v. Broomfield,
For completeness we note that MсBride’s challenge would fail under a
*883
traditional “scope and duration” analysis. In their content and duration, Gasvoda’s questions are hard to distinguish from inquiries by officers under similar circumstances that we have upheld as reasonable.
See Taylor,
Affirmed.