*1 UNITED STATES JOHNSON February Argued No. 1982 Decided 80-1608. June *2 Court, Brennan, Blackmun, J., opinion of the which delivered the Powell, Stevens, joined. Brennan, J., filed a Marshall, and JJ. White, J., dissenting opinion, concurring post, p. 563. . filed opinion, Rehnquist O’Connor, JJ., Burger, J., joined, post, and which and C. p. 564.
Elliott Schulder the cause for the argued United States. Lee, briefs were Solicitor General Assistant him on With Jensen, Solicitor General Attorney Deputy Frey, General Stemler. Patty Merkamp and F. Walter,
John Court, of the U. S. appointment the cause and a brief 1028, argued respondent. filed the Court. opinion delivered the Blackmun Justice York, New Payton this Court from held that the Fourth Amendment1 the police prohibits into a sus- entry a warrantless and making nonconsensual 1The Fourth Amendment reads: houses, right papers, people persons,
“The of the to be secure in their seizures, be vio- effects, against shall not and unreasonable and searches lated, cause, issue, supported upon probable no Warrants shall and but searched, affirmation, particularly describing place Oath or persons things to be and the or seized.” felony arrest. The a routine
pect’s make home to present is whether the rule case announced in us in before place Payton applies took before an arrest that decided.
I Pickering Hemenway Agents Special respondent Raymond suspected Eu- States Secret Service Joseph gene codefendant, Dodd, Oscar of at- and his Johnson Tréasury negotiate tempting misdelivered United States May Proceeding warrant, an arrest without check.2 respondent’s Angeles agents Los went to home 1977,the two Shortly respondent thereafter, and his outside. and waited *3 house. and entered the wife arrived weapons, approached agents their the door- The drew by way identifying themselves fictitious names. knocked, and respondent opened agents door, the he saw the two When badges guns Respondent drawn and their with their raised. agent permitted agents the to enter the house. While one respondent living room, stood with the the other searched premises. agents respondent the The his then advised rights interrogated respond- constitutional and him. When taking ent his revealed involvement of the misdeliv- agents formally Respondent check, ered arrested him. signed admitting later a written statement his involvement with the check. respondent sought suppress
Before trial, oral and his sup- written statements as fruits of an unlawful arrest not 30, 1977, mistakenly On March the United States Postal deliv Service Kearney $4,681.41, ered to Lena Treasury a Pe payable check for to Elihu Kearney terson. and sought cashing her sister-in-law Dodd’s assistance Accompanied man, the check. by respondent Johnson and another Dodd Kearney’s went to cashing residence to discuss methods of the check. The eventually three men departed, taking the check with them. Kearney After and foregoing Spe- her sister-in-law related the events Agent Hemenway,
cial He, he obtained how- a warrant for Dodd’s arrest. ever, did not obtain respondent. a warrant 2d to arrest See 626 F. (CA9 1980). 754-755 District States The United cause. ported probable ar- found respondent’s District California for the Central 7. A the evidence. App. admitted rest to be proper ob- aiding abetting respondent then convicted jury §§2 in violation of S. C. struction of correspondence, sentence was sus- respondent’s The and 1702.3 imposition five years’ probation. favor pended 19, 1978, December filed anBy opinion unreported for the Ninth Circuit af- of Appeals States Court Acknowledging of conviction. “[i]t firmed the judgment had the obtained agents have been preferable would certainly resi- arrest before his entering for respondent’s warrant” “if ex- ruled that cause dence, probable court nonetheless arrest, constitutional were rights [respondent’s] ists for arrest, there though warrantless even violated a war- to have obtained agents] have been time [for may to Pet. for Cert. 26a-27a. rant for his arrest.” App. 1980, while for rehear- respondent’s petition
On April
Ninth Circuit,
before the
this Court
was still
ing
York,
New
supra.4
September 2,
On
decided
aiding
jury acquitted respondent
separate
count
and abet
The
2,§§
property.
S. C.
641.
ting
receipt
of stolen
See U.
Government
un
Respondent’s
Dodd
on both counts.
an
codefendant
was convicted
*4
decision,
summarily
appeal,
reported
was affirmed
on
Dodd’s conviction
(CA9
Dodd,
States Feb.
United
is not
us. See
No. 79-1030
and
before
1980),
4,
denied,
rehearing
Mar.
1980.
Payton
1978.
probable jurisdiction
The Court
in
on December
noted
5, 1979,
on
Ninth
deferred decision
The Government Court. effect, if any, the retrospective certiorari consider Payton. 454 U. S. rule announced Fourth Amendment (1981).6 here, ruling a differ issued three before its initial a decision months holding “absent anticipated Payton, the Ninth panel ent Circuit had felony circumstances, probable cause to arrest a exigent police who have carry dwelling out suspect entering must obtain a warrant before (1978). Prescott, Upon F. arrest.” States v. 2d United case, respondent’s petition rehearing denial of the for Government’s respondent’s -Payton reversal of Appeals post Court of made clear that its our decision chiefly upon principles conviction “rests common to basic App. to Pet. Supreme Payton.” Prescott ruling in already its Cert. 13a. The court also noted that it had held that Blake, 2d 632 F. apply retroactively. Prescott should States case, purposes the correctness For of this the Government assumes facts, Payton would that, Appeals’ ruling applied of the Court of if to these United States require respondent’s exclusion of Brief for statements. conclu 12-13, Appeals’ n. 6. We therefore need not examine the Court sion on that issue.
542
II upon subject” the no voice has constitution “[T]he federal R. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Northern retrospectivity. Great (1932). 1965, Before 364 when Refining 358, S. Co., 618, 381 U. S. “both Walker, v. Linkletter decided this Court recognized general a our own decisions and common law the retrospective constitutional decisions of for the effect rule exceptions.” [certain] Rob- subject limited . to . this Court. (1973), citing Norton v. 507 505, 409 U. S. Neil, inson v. (1886), County County, Shelby 442 and Chicot U. S. (1940).7 Drainage Bank, State U. S. v. Baxter Dist. the Court concluded “that Con- however, the Linkletter, retrospective requires [that] prohibits nor stitution neither any given constitutional rule. 381 U. “new” effect” a Linkletter, announcement of the Court’s 629. Since procedure has of criminal in the realm constitutional rule separate explaining frequently a decision followed been pend- past, applies rule extent, that whether, and to what generally Beytagh, ing, Ten Years and future cases. Non-Retroactivity: Critique Proposal, L. a 61 Va. A (1975). Rev. 1557 whether itself addressed the
Linkletter
Mapp
exclusionary
v.
Ohio,
Fourth Amendment
that had
should
to state convictions
Mapp
outset,
final
At
become
before
was decided.8
re-
on direct
noted that cases still
Linkletter Court
already
Mapp
received
view when
was handed down had
full retro
pre-1965 requirement
receive
The
that all constitutional rules
duty of
“that
active
derived from the Blackstonian notion
law,
expound
‘pronounce
was
new
but to maintain
court
(1965), citing
Walker,
618, 622-623
the old one.’” Linkletter v.
381 U. S.
(15th
1809).
Blackstone,
1 W.
ed.
Commentaries 69
rendered,
“By
judgment of
we mean
conviction
final
where
had
exhausted,
petition for certiorari
availability
appeal
and the time for
denied,
our decision
finally
before
elapsed
petition
[or
all]
for certiorari
Walker,
also
n. 5. See
Mapp v.
Linkletter
Ohio.”
Shott,
3n.
ex rel.
Tehan
States
*6
Mapp’s
benefit of
rule.
See 381 U.
at
n. 4, citing
Fahy
Ker v. California,
The
following Term,
Shott, 406 (1966),
the Court
Linkletter’s
applied
v. Cali-
to hold the Fifth
analysis
Amendment rule of
Griffin
fornia,
Stovall Denno, (1967), however, S. 293 Court departed from that basic that, Those cases held principle. the interest of justice, balance three factors may determine whether a “new” be ret- constitutional rule should “(a) purpose applied: prospeetively respectively or (b) extent of reliance standards, the new be served (c) standards, and the old authorities enforcement law justice of a retroactive administration effect on the Id., at 297. See also new standards.” *7 Jersey, the out- 728. Because S., at 384 U. v. New Johnson might balancing process call for different de- of that come retroactivity the Court cases, concluded grees in different of justified now final convictions between is that “no distinction stages of trial and direct re- at various . . . and convictions v. 300. U. at See Johnson Denno, v. 388 view.” Stovall Jersey, S., at 732. 384 U. New inevitably the three Stovall factors
Because the balance hardly surprising case, that, it is from case has shifted subsequent as course of Linkletter became almost some, “the prey in made a beast of as the tracks difficult to follow Mackey v. United 401 States, victim.” of its intended search (1971) J.). (separate opinion At Harlan, 667, 676 U. S. regularly given complete has retroac extreme, one the Court major purpose whose rules tive effect to new constitutional aspect of the criminal trial that substan “is to overcome an tially impairs truth-finding and so raises serious its function past accuracy guilty questions trials.” verdicts about (1971) (plural 646, v. 401 653 Williams United U. S. ity opinion). v. Louisi id., 653, 6; at n. Brown See also (1980) (plurality opinion); Hank ana, 447 S. 323, U. 328-330 (1977); Carolina, 233, erson v. North 432 S. 243 Gosa U. (1973) opinion); Mayden, (plurality 665, v. 413 U. S. 679 (1972). City v. 203, V. New 205 York, Ivan 407 U. S. applied At some extreme, the other the Court has stand- only denying cases, ards to future benefit new Morrissey parties g., See, even e. before the Court. (1972) (establishing basic re- Brewer, v. 408 U. S. 490 parole”). quirements only applicable revocations of to “future Jersey, England citing Cf. Johnson v. New atS.,
545 Examiners, v. Louisiana Board Medical State (1961). and James has applied change As an intermediate the Court position, but to the retroactively only law to all future litigants, Denno, e. Stovall v. at g., See, bar. parties Woods, Adams (1968); v. 392 U. S. 301; DeStefano (1972) Illinois, 278, 284-285 (plurality opinion); S.U. v. S. 47 Payne, Michigan since Link- stream of separate opinions In a consistent have selec- letter, Members argued against uniformly Those have retroactivity. opinions tive awards of whose minimum, all defendants cases that, at a asserted the time of the law- appeal on direct were still pending the new rule.9 entitled to invoke should be decision changing (1980) (Powell, J., g., Louisiana, e. Brown 9 See, 447 U. S. *8 judgment); Harlin v. Mis J., joined, concurring in Stevens, with whom souri, (1979) (Powell, J., judgments); concurring in 459, 460 439 U. S. Carolina, (1977) (Marshall, J., 233, Hankerson v. North 245 432 U. S. id., J., judgment); concurring in (Powell, at 246 concurring judgment); in Peltier, (1975) J., dissenting); 531, States v. (Douglas, United 422 U. S. 543 Louisiana, (1975) J., 31, 33, (Douglas, Daniel dissent and n. 420 U. S. v. (1974) Tucker, 417 U. S. J., ing); Michigan v. 433, (Douglas, dissent 461 (1973) J., dissenting); Michigan Payne, 47, (Douglas, 58 412 S. ing); U. v. Illinois, 278, id., dissenting); Adams S. J., 405 U. (Marshall, v. at 59 concurred, (1972) J., dissenting); J., Marshall, (Douglas, with whom 286 States, (1971) opinion of Mackey v. 667, (separate United 401 675 U. S. Harlan, J.); id., concurred, Black, J., dis J., (Douglas, whom 713 with at States, (1971) (Marshall, 646, 665 William.s United senting); 401 U. S. v. Alabama, 399 Coleman J., concurring v. part dissenting part); in and (1970) part); dissenting in 1, (Harlan, J., concurring part 19 U. S. (1969) Jersey, J., concurring (Harlan, Von New 814, 395 U. S. 817 Cleef v. (1969) J., Delaware, (Harlan, dis 213, Jenkins v. result); 222 S. 395 U. J., (1969) (Douglas, States, senting); Desist 244, 255 S. 394 U. id., J., id., (Fortas, dis (Harlan, J., dissenting); at 269 dissenting); 256 at (1968) J., dissent Alaska, senting); Fuller v. 80, (Douglas, 82 393 U. S. (1968) J., with Woods, (Douglas, 631, ing); S. v. DeStefano Denno, 293, 302 Stovall Black, J., 388 U. dissenting); joined, whom v. (Black, J., dissenting); Johnson id., (1967) J., (Douglas, dissenting); at 303 (1969)(dissent- 244, 256 States, 394 U. S. v. Desist United Mackey ing opinion), S., at 675 v. United presented comprehen- (separate opinion), a Harlan Justice principle. analysis support view, In his failure of that sive newly apply rule at to constitutional least cases to a declared at the time of decision violated on direct review adjudication. three norms constitutional argued, “ambulatory Court’s ret- Harlan First, Justice roactivity the norm of doctrine,” id., at conflicts with decisionmaking. principled members of the Court, “Some initially regret among I was them, I and have come way limiting grasped a as the reach deci- this doctrine fundamentally unsound. Others that seemed to them sions prospectivity ‘technique’ as resort to rationalized this implementation long provided ‘impetus ... for the an practicably could not be reforms, overdue which otherwise citing at Id., Delaware, Jenkins effected.’” upshot “The of this confluence viewpoints,” at was that the coalitions favor- S.,U. ing nonretroactivity realigned to case, had from case inev- itably generating “incompatible rules a welter of and incon- principles,” 258. sistent Desist v. United Michigan Payne, J., See also (Marshall, dissenting) (“principled adjudication requires the Court countervailing carefully balancing abandon the charade of retroactivity”). deciding considerations when accept it Second, Justice Harlan found difficult “ judicial body, a ‘new* notion that the as could Court, *9 entirely making prospectively, an constitutional rule while exception only particular litigant case was for the whose establishing v. as Desist chosen the vehicle for that rule.” (1966) J., J., Jersey, v. New (Black, Douglas, 384 with whom U. 736 (1966) J., Georgia, (Douglas, Whisman joined, dissenting); v. 384 U. S. Shott, S., (Black, Tehan v. States ex rel. dissenting); United U. at Walker, Linkletter v. J., J., dissenting); Douglas, joined, with whom J., dissenting). S., (Black, J., joined, Douglas, at 640 with whom (dissenting opinion). States, S., at 258 United. A “wholly legislature partially makes its new rules or retro- only prospective Mackey as it active or deems wise.” (Harlan, dissenting). S., 401 U. at 677 J., United Court, however, This
“announcefs] only new constitutional rules . . . as a cor- duty relative our dual to decide those cases over which jurisdiction we have and to the Federal Constitu- governing legal tion as one source of the matrix of rules. Simply fishing appellate . . . one case from the stream of using pronouncing review, it as a vehicle for new con- permitting standards, stitutional and then a stream of subsequently by similar cases to flow unaffected departure new constitute an indefensible from this judicial Id., model of review.” at 678-679.
Third, Justice Harlan asserted that the Court’s selective application departed of new constitutional rules from the principle treating similarly similarly:10 situated defendants similarly
“[W]hen another situated defendant comes be- grant give princi- fore we must us, the same relief or pled acting differently. depart reason for We from judicial simply pick basic tradition when we and choose among similarly from situated defendants those who justice similarly litigants principal Evenhanded situated was the dissenting opinions theme sounded of Justices Black Douglas. 9, supra. in n. The views of diverged See cases cited these Justices from Harlan, however, those of Justice on the whether equal treatment newly requires also retroactive announced constitutional Desist v. arising Compare rules to all cases on collateral attack. id., S., J., (Douglas, dissenting), 394 U. at 255 with at 260-269 Illinois, J., See also Adams (Harlan, dissenting). J., (Douglas, dissenting). and n. Members of the Court continue to offer Hankerson North Caro Compare question. views on this troublesome lina, (Marshall, J., and n. concurring in judgment), (Powell, id., J., concurring judgment). with at 248 *10 rule of constitu- a ‘new’ the benefit receive will alone S., at 258- Desist United law.” tional (dissenting opinion). satisfy simple all rule to suggested one Harlan Justice Linkletter was that “I concluded have his concerns. three of constitutional law insisting rules of all ‘new’ right applied which are to all those cases minimum, must, at at the time this Court subject review to direct still proper “[A] Id., at 258. down.” is handed ‘new’decision apply- charged with law, perception a court duties as of our dispute every legal within our ing resolve Constitution apply the that we law jurisdiction review, mandates on direct Mackey v. it was.” not as once time, as it is at the opinion). (separate S., at 681 “‘[rjetroactivity’ agree Justice Harlan with nowWe rethought,” States, 394 U. Desist v. United must be (dissenting opinion). examine the circum- We therefore presents it a retro- whether of this case to determine stances clearly by past precedents, activity question controlled approach application if of the Harlan would not, whether retroactivity principled presented in a issue resolve equitable manner.
III A respondent’s At the case outset, we must first ask whether presents retrospectivity problem clearly controlled ex- isting precedent. post of the -Linkletter de- Re-examination categories of cases, cisions convinces us that in three narrow effectively retroactivity question the answer to the has been by factors, determined, but Stovall through application rather, of a threshold test.11 analysis “readily susceptible These proved eases therefore have not Neil, Linkletter of cases.” Robinson under the line (1973). The “most categories dissent’s exclude the accusation that these truth-finding obvious” line announcing relating to the cases —those rules *11 merely applied has of Court decision when a First, situations, factual different precedents new and settled the later decision whether as to has arisen no real a cases, it has been retrospectively. In such should applies in later case rule of the foregone the conclusion in altered has not fact decision the later cases, because earlier Dunaway g., way. New e. v. any See, material that rule (1979)(reviewing application the of 206 200, 442 U. S. York, (1975));Spinelli v. 590 422 S. Illinois, Brown v. (1969) (“further explicat- 412 States, 393 U. Aguilar 108 Texas, v. 378 U. S. principles [ing]” of (Harlan, J., (1964)); S., at States, 394 U. Desist v. United dissenting). expressly
Conversely, declared a rule has the Court where past,” De- procedure with the clear break to be “a criminal invariably it almost atS., 394 U. v. sist United principle newly nonretroac- gone minted such a on to find has n. Peltier, U. S. v. United States tive. See cases). (1975) dissenting) (collecting In this J., (Brennan, particular type constitutional case, the traits second express thresh- than the Court’s been less critical rule have interpreta- that the “‘new’ constitutional old determination arguably change[s] prospectivity is tio[n]... the law that so S., at proper States, 401 U. v. United course,” Williams opinion). (plurality found that has Once unanticipated, third Stovall the second new rule was authorities law enforcement factors—reliance justice the administration old standards and effect on virtually application of the new rule—have a retroactive retroactivity function, cases, post, point. at 567—misses our those of the Stovall fac- has fact turned on a traditional decision major purpose tors, dispute being with the central issue in often Louisiana, Brown v. 447 U. S. Compare the new standard. served (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (dis- (1980) id., (plurality opinion), with at 337 jury rule of “major six-person agreeing purpose” over the of the unanimous (1979)). Louisiana, Burch v. e. Gosa g., See, nonretroactivity. finding a compelled 672-673, (plurality opinion); 682-685 Mayden, at 55-57.12 Michigan Payne, a retroactivity full as nec- recognized has Third, the Court a court lacked author- trial ruling to a essary adjunct first criminal defendant or punish to convict ity inconsistent prior judg- has invalidated The Court place. guaran- constitutional particular reading where its ments see, from punishment, conduct a defendant’s immunizes tee *12 Currency, Coin & 401 v. United States e. United States g., (1971) of Fifth assertion against (penalty 724 715, self-incrimination), or serves against privilege Amendment all, rather taking place trial from than “to [his] prevent the conduct of govern [that] that rules prescribe procedural (double Neil, S., v. 409 at 509 trial,” Robinson jeopardy). U. has relied less on the technique In cases, such in- prior than on the notion that the retroactive application void ab initio. See, or sentences were consistent judgments (retroactive (1972) Illinois, e. Moore g., 786, 408 U. S. 800 v. Furman Geor- in v. ruling Amendment application Eighth Swenson, Ashe v. 436, 397 S. gia, (1972)); 408 S. 238 U. U. (retroactive (1970) n. 1 of double 437, jeopardy (1969)). in Benton 784 Maryland, ruling v. S. Gosa v. dis- Mayden, 413 at 693 also U. (Marshall, J., Payne, v. 412 Michigan senting); S.,U. 61 (Marshall, are retroactive when the “Court dissenting) (rulings fully J., context, contrast, usually principle In the has civil the “clear break” determining been as a decision stated the threshold test for whether or not See, Huson, applied nonretroactively. should be v. g., e. Chevron Oil Co. (1971). 97, S. has U. Once it been that decision has determined “establish(ed] law, principle overruling past a new clear either precedent an litigants may by deciding on which issue have relied... or impression foreshadowed,” clearly first whose the Court resolution was not gone rule, has history, on to as purpose, examine the effect of new application. well as inequity would imposed its retroactive Id., Shoe, Machinery at 106-107. See also Hanover Inc. v. Shoe United (1968). 481, Corp., 392 U. S. lacked in the tradi- jurisdiction the trial court held that has sense”). tional fits none of these three neatly catego case
Respondent’s
New York did
set
simply
v.
First,
ries.
Payton,
In
set of facts.
the Court
a new
tled precedent
constitutional question
the “important
acknowledged
left
a number
open
had been “expressly
there
presented”
n.
at 574
citing
U.
opinions.”
of our prior
Watson,
n. 6
411, 418,
(1976);
United States
S.
v.
Coolidge
Pugh,
v.
(1975);
n. 13
103, 113,
Gerstein
S.
v.
Hampshire,
and Jones
New
(1971);
474-481
403 U. S.
States, United
499-500
Payton also did not announce
however,
token,
the same
By
of law.
gen
principle
new and unanticipated
an entirely
decision to work
read a
has not subsequently
the Court
eral,
Wainwright,
Milton law,”
web of the
break
a “sharp
(1972)
un
(Stewart, J., dissenting),
n. 2
371, 381,
407 U. S.
shift
and fundamental
“such an abrupt
thai
caused
ruling
less
rule which in
new
entirely
an
as to constitute
doctrine
Shoe, Inc. Hanover
one,”
an older
effect replaced
*13
Machinery Corp.,
(1968).
Shoe
498
Such a
481,
392 U. S.
explicitly
a decision
when
recognized only
has been
break
g., Desist v.
e.
Court, see,
of this
a past precedent
overrules
v. United
(1969); Williams
States, 394
United
S. 244
U.
States,
this
a
(1971),
practice
v. wright, (Stewart, J., 2 381-382, dissenting) n. U. overrules clear past “decision occurs when (“sharp break” accepted a long ... disrupts practice or precedent relied widely upon”). Payton
Payton no expressly overruled did none of these. which litigants may this Court on past precedent clear Payton an established disapprove prac- relied. Nor did have sanctioned. To the extent had previously tice that to the conduct engaged earlier had spoken that the Court Payton, it had it of doubt- deemed officers police analysis The Court’s own ful constitutionality.13 its rested on both long-recognized makes it clear that ruling law and the of his- weight of Fourth Amendment principles had torical as it the Framers authoiity appeared Payton overturned no Finally, long- Fourth Amendment.14 (1886), States, 616, v. Boyd At least since S. special acknowledged accords Court had the Fourth Amendment 451, protection to the home. McDonald United 335 U. S. pass requires magistrate Constitution on the stated that “the police they privacy desires of the violate the of the home.” See also before ultimately 13-15 While Johnson v. United 333 U. S. arrest, necessary home declining to decide whether a warrant is to effect a (footnote (1971) Coolidge omit v. New 474-475 Hampshire, suspect’s ted), or on a had declared that “a search seizure carried out unreasonable, can premises per police is se unless without warrant exceptions based carefully it of a defined set show that falls within one presence States v. 'exigent See also United circumstances.’” (1972) Court, entry of (“physical United States District 407 U. S. wording the Fourth Amend against is chief evil which the home directed”); Martinez-Fuerte, is 428 U. S. ment United States (“the (1976) sanctity ordinarily private afforded most dwellings [is] *14 stringent protection”). Fourth Amendment “ Payton principle The Amendment Court relied on the ‘basic of Fourth pre are law’ that searches and seizures inside home without a warrant a 586, S., citing Coolidge v. New sumptively unreasonable.” at S., ex- recognized at that the Hampshire, 477. The Court further body approved a near-unanimous practice standing Payton authority.15 therefore into does not fall court lower nonretroactivity whose is effec- decisions class narrow that drawn a firm line at the en- “has Amendment the Fourth language of press property apply equally to seizures of that in “terms house” to the trance examining After com- at 590. persons.” seizures of and to authority suspect to arrest a in his of an officer’s understanding mon-law weight author- 591-598, that “the id., concluded home, the Court at own to the Amendment] the Fourth was Framers [of ity appeared it as arrest], or at the mini- a home required [before warrant was that a effect Id., without one.” at proceeding risks in substantial that were mum there 596. Payton support in some had found practice invalidated While “by the kind of virtual una courts, evinced no means decisions those state past. id., 600, break with the make a clear nimity,” required to decision, “‘[o]nly 24 of that at the time of its Payton, noted the Court In sanction, into to ar currently warrantless entries the home the 50 States California, declining Ibid. In rest, obvious trend.” . . . and there is an arose, Supreme had the State present respondent’s ease where that, under Fourth year arrest respondent’s than a before held more counterpart, warrantless arrests and its state constitutional Amendment exigent circum per se unreasonable in the absence the home were within 275-276, 1333, Ramey, 545 P. 2d People stances. v. 16 Cal. 3d 1340-1341, denied, 429 cert. Appeals considered the Of the seven United States Courts of had Payton, warrantless expressed five had the view that before n. 4. Three home arrests were unconstitutional. assumed, expressly deciding, that such searches other Circuits had without decisions, Depart- were unlawful. Ibid. After one of those agencies to follow the ment of Justice instructed law enforcement federal practice procuring entering suspect’s arrest before home to warrants exigent arrest him without States circumstances. Brief United n. 20. Circuit, arrested, respondent
In the Ninth
it has been said
where
“law
enforcement officials knew that
circuit’s law was unsettled
th[e]
but that
requirement.”
there was some drift
United
toward warrant
Blake,
2d,
Phillips,
v.
States
632 F.
at 736.
497 F. 2d
United States
(CA9
1131, 1135
1974),
suggested
required
had
warrants are
dictum that
may
private dwelling
before officers
enter a
arrest.
to effect an
(CA9
Calhoun,
1976),
1094, 1102
States
542 F. 2d
cert. denied stib nom.
Stephenson v. United
It plain is equally retroactivity ques- difficult do not pose that of cases category Payton lacked author- the trial court hold that did not tions. Payton’s nor did Payton, Theodore sentence to or convict ity conduct Payton’s immunize Fourth Amendment reading Payton in did prevent The holding from punishment. rather, it reversed place; from taking trial the defendant’s and remanded judgment of Appeals’ York Court the New unconstitutionally conducted without a trial to be new evidence. obtained
B here is not retroactivity question determined that Having next must our we ask precedents, controlled by prior clearly resolved fairly applying would be question whether Payton to on direct all cases still pending Payton was decided. Answering at the time when appeal would each of the three concerns affirmatively satisfy Mackey. Desist stated Justice Harlan’s opinions First, all previously retroactive to a nonfinal convictions would of decisionmak- provide principle with our original consonant retroactiv- ing understanding Linkletter and Shott. ity Moreover, such principle would be one Jus- capable satisfying general applicability, tice Harlan’s central concern: new constitu- “Refusal tional rules all cases review . . . tends arising on direct cut allowing this Court from the us loose force precedent, that, exigent circumstances, agreed Government had absent a warrant- illegal. entry suspect’s less and nonconsensual into home would Prescott, United States 2d, squarely such ar- 581 F. then held supra. rests unconstitutional. See n. those artificially expectations
to restructure cre- legitimately law and thereby mitigate ated extant practical force of *16 stare decisis ... a force which ought properly to bear on the Mackey United of any legal problem.” resolution judicial States, S., 401 at 680-681 (separate opinion). U. Payton of to cases
Second, direct application with our review would “to do comport judicial responsibilities Desist on the merits of his own case,” to each litigant justice United (Harlan, 394 at 259 S., J., v. U. dissenting), cases before us on direct review in and to “resolve all of light of our constitutional understanding governing princi- best Mackey 401 S., v. U. at 679 (separate ples.” J.). The Court of held that the Harlan, Appeals of opinion Payton, arrest violated and respondent’s circumstances n. 6, does not that contention. See dispute the Government supra. It would be ironic indeed were we now reverse a Payton Payton’s rule, when we itself, applying judgment New York directly contrary judgment reversed Harlan noted in Desist: “If a As Justice Court Appeals. we should not ‘new’ constitutional doctrine is truly right, nor should we it; reverse lower courts which have accepted we affirm those which have rejected very arguments at 259. have embraced.” U.
Third,
respondent’s
Harlan
approach
situated de-
similarly
case would further the
goal
treating
fendants
contends that respond-
The Government
similarly.
Payton
before
ent
not invoke
because he was arrested
may
Payton
that Theo-
was decided. Yet it
without
goes
saying
Payton
decided,
was
dore
also was arrested
Payton
before
Further-
and he received the benefit of
rule in his case.
was not
more, at least one other defendant whose conviction
Payton’s
Payton
rule,
final when
issued benefited from
Payton
decided.16
he, too,
although
was arrested before
along
conviction
Payton’s
16 TheNew York
of Appeals
affirmed
York,
with
that of Obie Riddick.
v. New
See
nonfinal
under the
all
convictions
that resolved
An approach
this Court
possibility
law
lessen
rule of
would
same
to defend-
protection
constitutional
mete out different
might
conduct.17
police
to identical
subjected
simultaneously
ants
jurisdiction
appeal,
in Riddick’s
con-
probable
noted
This Court
578-579.
Id.,
reversed both convictions.
at 603.
Payton’s, then
it with
solidated
jurisdictional statement
have held Riddick’s
theory, the Court could
case, then
Payton’s
vacated
remanded the
disposition
pending the
Payton.
course was taken
light
Such a
case
reconsideration
York,
v. New
cases.
Gonzalez
seven other nonfinal
Florida,
(1980);
Florida,
Busch
(1980);
Douglas when the Court (1966): U. S. 436 raising question. the same We took four presented 80 cases were “[S]ome four, applying of each of disposed rest then the
of them and held the retroactively. respects procedural But as the rest of the the new it any ... Yet was sheer coincidence that pending cases we denied relief. group any Any single case in the or precise were chosen. other
those four purposes.” Desist v. United sufficient for our other four would have been States, (dissenting opinion). at 255 long problem appear- argues ago The that “we resolved the dissent reach of a we limit the retroactive inequity ance of that arises whenever Post, But dissent mischaracterizes principle new of law.” at 566. the problem is not of it. The problem both the and this Court’s treatment inequity that results merely when, appearance inequity, but the actual many similarly situated defendants the Court chooses which of retroactively applied rule. As the beneficiary of a should the chance “ambulatory retroactiv- persistently with the Court’s voiced dissatisfaction has not ity revealed, now this Court supra, doctrine” has see n. until The time to tolerate it. problem “resolved” this so much as it has chosen has to end. toleration come an aware, course, a defendant’s many We are affect that considerations appellate re progress through judicial system, speed and that State, Circuit, to case. will and case view differ from State Circuit similarly approach, may it that some Even under our be unavoidable
IV
Government
approach,
raises
Against adoption
Peltier,
States v.
United
on
four
based
U. S.
arguments
is
None
persuasive.
Peltier’s,
first cites
The
that
holding:
Government
Almeida-Sanchez v.
rule announced
Fourth Amendment
States,
United
S. 266
should not
retroac-
apply
Almeida-Sanchez
when
to a case
tively
appeal
so
By
holding,
was announced.
Government suggests,
Cf. Williams United
differently.
will be treated
situated defendants
(plurality opinion).
and n. 9
however,
suggests
approach,
virtually
The Government
an
that
ensures
such
will occur.
anomalies
The Government concedes that
pre-Payton
any
arising
rule should
case
in a Circuit where
Appeals already
authoritatively
United States Court
had held
Payton-type searches were unlawful. Brief for United States 22-26.
arrested,
respondent
When
Appeals
two Courts of
had invalidated
exigent
warrantless home arrests conducted in the
absence
circum-
stances. See Dorman App.
D. C.
435 F.
(CA6
(1970);
1974).
Shye,
United States
Thus,
2d 385
The dissent takes a Arguing different tack. that “inherent arbitrari- ness” arises area, whenever lines are suggests drawn in this the dissent way that the “best problem” deal with this is make to continue to retro- activity by picking choosing similarly decisions among from situated post, view, dissent, defendants. By clinging See at 568. to this the Court, not the itself.” Ibid. This Court has no fooling “is power speed up or slow down appellate process many throughout the in the tribunals the country to similarly ensure similar treatment of situated defendants. The does, however, power have the unfairness to eliminate obvious that results when it gives only conveniently situated the most defendant retrospective newly benefit of a declared rule. issue of retro- principle controls the Peltier declared rulings.18 activity Amendment Fourth all retroactivity question however, the Upon examination, presented in Peltier. As the posed from that here differs neither a statute concedes, overturned Government history approving judicial noneonsensual, any nor consistent Brief for United States entries. See home warrantless nonretroactivity preordained under is not its Thus, n. 18. principles In in con- Peltier, stated above. break” the “clear had invalidated that Almeida-Sanchez noted trast, the Court validly by previously “a enacted sanctioned a form search by longstanding regula- supported administrative statute, judicial approval.” 422 at 541. S.,U. continuous tions and at 278 S., U. also Almeida-Sanchez (“While concurring) is one first (Powell, J., practice disapproved impression had “been Court,” the in this judiciary”); consistently approved id., 298-299, at (35 dissenting) judges in 20 of 36 Court of n. (White, J., practice). approved Appeals the invalidated had cases longstanding had overturned Because Almeida-Sanchez spoken, practice but which a this Court had not to which authority body approved, near-unanimous of lower court had represented past. it For that rea- a “clear break” with the retroactivity precedents, controlling son alone, under application would have nonretroactive Almeida-Sanchez been if involved no Fourth appropriate even the case had question. respect, Amendment In that Peltier resembles Fourth Amendment several earlier decisions that held “new” claim, impression. support 18 The of its dissent shares this mistaken Peltier's Court in suggestion every the dissent decision cites applica volving exclusionary only prospective rule has been “accorded Post, Peltier with citing recognized tion.” at 535. As Linkletter discomfort, however, retroactiv first of the modern itself —the ity exclusionary rule to Mapp acknowledged cases — Mapp was de cases that were on direct review at the time that cided. See 422 n. 5.
559
ground
not on
that all
nonretroactive,
Fourth
doctrine
only
rulings apply
prospectively, but
Amendment
because
being applied
change[d]
particular
“so
decisions
law
arguably
proper
prospectivity [was]
course.” Wil
that
(plurality opinion)
401
659
States,
S.,U.
liams v. United
retroactively
(refusing
apply
Chimel
395
California,
(1969),
States v.
which overruled United
Rabino
752
U. S.
(1950),
States,
Harris v.
United
The Government does not activity ruling given should turn of a Fourth Amendment arresting solely subjective particular offi- state “objective” that law test: Instead, cer’s mind. it offers an “may charged properly knowl- with enforcement officers edge” Under of all law. “settled” Fourth Amendment theory, Amend- of Fourth Government’s because the state regarding “unset- law arrests ment warrantless home Payton, ruling retroac- tled” before should tively appeal when even to cases on direct 34-38. 14-19, was decided. See Brief for United States *20 reading Peltier would reduce its of Yet the Government’s absurdity. “retroactivity view, this Under test” to an own rulings worthy only of retroactive Fourth Amendment arresting vio- application which the officers are those prior clearly guidelines pre-existing established lated involving simple ap- above, cases have seen But we cases. as guidelines pre-existing plication Fourth Amendment clear, of Literally retroactivity questions read, of all. no raise real automatically theory all would eliminate the Government’s rulings from for retroac- consideration Fourth Amendment application. tive logic sug- is that Peltier’s third claim
The Government’s application gests of Fourth Amendment deci- retroactive on direct review— to cases sions like —even exclusionary policies underlying the would serve the light Yet viewed at 536-542. rule. Cf. sug- holding, Peltier this assertion also fails. Peltier’s only gested a Fourth Amend- that retroactive “sharp ruling law, a in the like ment break” that worked effect, have deterrent because Almeida-Sanchez, would little rarely from en- officers would be deterred law enforcement they expected gaging practice in a never invalidated. 541-542. S., See Payton, ruling logic that re-
This a like does not point previously Fourth Amendment unsettled a solved every unsettled law. this Court cannot rule Because question, years may pass before the Fourth Amendment finally police practice constitu- a of dubious Court invalidates tionality. g., States, See, e. Desist v. United (Fortas, “physical- dissenting) (arguing that the J., at wiretap trespass” United rule of Olmstead years it before moribund for U. S. 438 had been overruled). example, Payton, formally Long before constitutionality questioned warrantless had supra. Furthermore, the Court’s arrests. n. home that, in light of con- had consistently emphasized opinions to the accorded traditionally privacy stitutional protection resolve doubts any should regarding officers home, police in favor of obtaining warrant. a home arrest validity g., (1948) See, e. Johnson 333 U. S. sufficient to support magis- that evidence (“Any assumption *21 to issue a search warrant determination trate’s disinterested a search without a warrant in making officers will the justify and leave the to a nullity péo- Amendment reduce the would officers”). discretion of police the only secure homes ple’s unset- all argues, rulings resolving If, as the Government nonretroactive, should be Amendment questions Fourth tled would have enforcement officials cases, law then, in close behavior.19 the side of constitutional to err on little incentive of a constitutionality prac- dubious awareness of the Official that, official so certainty would be counterbalanced tice law the area remained Fourth Amendment as the long the prac- unsettled, through questionable evidence obtained resolv- definitively in the one case only would be excluded tice any retroactive Failure to accord the unsettled question. ing “encourage police Amendment would rulings effect to Fourth of our decisions courts to disregard plain purport or other Desist approach.” and to let’s-wait-until-it’s-decided adopt (Fortas, J., dissenting). at 277 that retroactive finally The Government argues Payton, would ac- on direct appeal, even to a case pending of a Justice wrongdoer. but the nothing discharge complish not re- “We do answer to this assertion. Harlan gave so, or because from we like to do jail lease a criminal because so, because the only government we think it wise to do but of his in the conduct has offended constitutional principle comes when another situated defendant similarly case. And case, explain why respondent’s example, 19 The in this does not record for arrest, they when did arresting officers a warrant for his failed obtain 2, supra. n. a warrant to arrest his eodefendant. obtain principled give a grant or same relief must us, we before differently.” v. United Desist acting reason Payton Applying to con- (dissenting opinion). at 258 S.,U. yet issued would when final not were victions accomplish “turning on our backs step toward first our decisions far characterized approach so that has hoc ad proceeding the doc- to administer retroactivity field S., at 224 Delaware, 395 U. principle.” Jenkins trine (Harlan, dissenting). J.,
V today’s necessary we case, embrace decide To extent Mackey. We therefore Desist views Harlan’s Justice exceptions below, a decision subject stated to the that, hold construing is to be Fourth Amendment of this Court yet retroactively final applied that were all convictions was rendered. the time the decision prece By holding, our leave undisturbed however, we so *22 today af not First, decision does our in other areas. dents clearly exist controlled our that would those cases fect ing respondent’s retroactivity precedents. Second, because retroac address the review, on we need not case arises direct those cases decisions to reach Fourth Amendment tive of our may on collateral Amendment issues still raise Fourth that express supra. on no view Third, n. we attack.20 Cf. construing any application con of decisions the retroactive provision Amendment.21 than the Fourth stitutional other Powell, raising 20 After Stone only cases S. ha- challenges are federal Fourth Amendment on collateral attack those prisoner corpus provide state beas in which the has failed to cases State claim, analogous fed opportunity litigation with an his for full and fair pris challenges by § state eral cases under 28 and collateral C. that postconvietion oners to their state relief statutes convictions under recognize continue Fourth Amendment claims. prece our logic ruling, however, The of our is with not inconsistent pur giving complete dents rules whose retroactive effect to constitutional substantially impairs pose aspect is to overcome an of the criminal trial that Carolina, g., e. Hankerson North truth-finding See, its function. York, V. (1977); City Ivan New U. S. 233 De- S.U. retroactivity of civil continue all to be Finally, questions in Chevron enunciated the standard Oil Co. v. governed n. 106-107. See supra. at Huson, on direct case was when pending appeal Respondent’s Because the Court of York was decided. Ap- v. New Payton should that the held correctly peals is affirmed.22 its case, judgment respondent’s
It is so ordered. Brennan, concurring. Justice on that the de- my understanding opinion I the Court’s join retroactivity our as precedents ap- leaves undisturbed cision involved, may additional provision factors on the constitutional pending ruling beyond effect those cases particular retroactive giving warrant Carolina, Hankerson v. North direct review. See pending on J., concurring judgment). n. (Powell, limiting ruling only our to the Curiously, dissent faults us Amendment— presented by this case—the Fourth only properly context overruling, clearly controlling retro- preserving, rather than but also for post, 568. The dissent then recasts those activity precedents. way, arguing rules related to truth- precedents simplistic in its own that effect, all automatically implying while finding receive full retroactive none. including receive other Fourth Amendment rules —should rules — First, are, however, deci- problems with this. Court’s There two truth-finding rules regularly giving complete sions retroactive effect rulings way newly in no Fourth Amendment required have declared stated, already retroac- all retroactive reasons be denied effect. For the to cases tive of Fourth Amendment rules at least exclusionary rule. Sec- policies underlying review furthers the direct by the dis- ond, important, urged “rule” and more the Fourth Amendment *23 shown, already “perfectly As we have good” sent is far from a one. Ibid. similarly situated obviously inequitable “rule” condones treatment of that litigants judicial injustice litigants. to individual encompassed one other question granted
22 The on which we certiorari its own deci correctly that Appeals issue: whether the Court of concluded (1978), applies retroac Prescott, sion in United States v. 581 F. 2d hold that the Because we tively respondent’s supra. arrest. n. retroactively respondent’s Payton apply our principles of decision retro regarding the case, ruling Appeals’ we need not disturb the Court of application prior active of its own decision. g., See, of decision. e.
plied
final
the time
convictions
(1967).
U. S. 293
Denno,
Stovall
Justice,
The Chief
Justice
whom
White, with
Justice
join, dissenting.
O’Connor
Rehnquist,
and Justice
my
States v. Pel
controlled United
view, this case is
(1975).
proposi
two
Peltier established
tier,
Peltier was rulings extending reach of the of whether given exclusionary retroactive effect. We should be every ad- “in in which the Court has noted there that case retroactivity problem exclu- the context dressed any sionary that such new rule . . . the Court has concluded only prospective principle would constitutional be accorded suggested application.” there at 535. We pattern ánd consistent of decisions were two reasons justifica- directly to the two were related these reasons exclusionary tions for the rule. traditionally serve two understood to
That rule has been integrity”; purposes: preserves “judicial second, it first, it police Nei- conduct. as a deterrent to unconstitutional acts purposes, retroactive however, is furthered ther of these “if the law First, the rule. new extensions of good reasonably faith that officers believed enforcement ‘impera- they trial, the evidence had seized admissible at *24 judicial integrity’ is not offended the tive of introduction Id., of material.” Second, into 537. a de- evidence only purpose can be served the terrence when evidence to be suppressed from search law is derived a which the enforce- or should have was ment officers knew known unconstitu- Amendment. at 542. Id., tional under Fourth purpose exclusionary focusing of the In on the rule in retroactivity, question of the Court was order to decide following principles. In Linkletter v. Walker, settled majority agrees is which the first U. S. 618 retroactivity cases, the Court set forth three- modern analysis retroactivity question pre- pronged model for there: sented purpose Mapp
“[W]e of the the re- rule; must look to placed upon the and the on doctrine; effect liance Wolf justice retrospective applica- the administration Mapp.” Id., at 636. tion analysis consistently applied three-prong in the This was Shott, ex followed, Tehan v. United States rel. cases which (1966); Jersey, 384 U. S. 382 U. S. Johnson New (1966); Denno, Stovall specifically announced that Indeed, the Court Stovall, purpose reliance rule, three of the new these considerations— justice— rule, on the old and effect on the administration retroactivity prob generally guide were of all resolution relating procedure. lems rules of constitutional criminal purpose new rule was of these cases, each made first That was not accidental consideration. absolutely clear in Desist v.
(1969): among purpose to be “Foremost factors is the these on went rule.”* And as we served the new constitutional relied that we have *See also 394 U. 251: “It be noted also is to consequent burden heavily on the extent of reliance and factors of the only purpose of the justice the administration of when the clearly retroactivity prospectivity.” did favor either or *25 prospectivity strongly supports “[t]his say criterion there, to evidentiary exclusionary amplifying rule.” the for a decision Ibid. today’s up it clear that decision was these until
Moreover, principles governed of whether a new deci- the same appeal retroactively apply pending cases on sion should just Peltier itself this the of its announcement. time appeal on at the time of case was the of case: Peltier’s sort in Almeida-Sanchez v. United of the decision announcement the Indeed, we reversed Court States, 413 U. S. holding . . . Appeals’ case that the “rule announced in that applied . . should be v. United States. in Almeida-Sanchez Supreme appeal on the date similar cases Peltier, United States v. decision was announced.” Court’s omitted). (CA9 1974) (footnote I had F. 2d long ago problem appear- thought resolved the that we inequity whenever we limit the retroactive that arises ance of principle As new of law. reach of a Brennan Justice supra, Stovall, at 301: for the stated arguably according “Inequity results the benefit from parties it in the case in which is an- a new rule to the similarly litigants situated nounced but not to other process appellate the same the trial or who have raised parties regard involved issue. But we the fact that insignificant ad- chance beneficiaries as an cost for are decision-making.” principles herence to sound require principles reversal are All of these well settled Appeals. majority, judgment The of the Court of confusing opinion disagrees. reasons Two an intricate and presented. disagreement to be seem for its reading majority our consistent discerns no First, (“Hav- Ante, case. precedents control this that would retroactivity question is ing here that the determined .”). precedents clearly prior . . Given the our controlled applicable previously clarity set out the have with which we principles principles of those consistent and the exclusionary involving rule, extensions of in cases Eschewing straight- surely strange conclusion. is reading pri- which above, cases set forth looks of the forward purpose marily relevant law, rule of the substantive exceedingly majority replaces with an formal set of it catego- categories. 549-551. Because these Ante, at three only, they merit little dicta comment. turn out to be ries inadequacy say is obvious from that their even a it to Suffice *26 category majority to which the That moment’s reflection: regularly given complete agrees has retroactive “the Court an- in this formal scheme—cases nowhere included effect” is “ major purpose nouncing rules whose ‘is new constitutional substantially aspect trial that an of the criminal to overcome truth-finding ques- impairs so raises serious function and its accuracy past guilty in verdicts trials.’” tions about quoting v. United Ante, Williams major- opinion). (plurality It is little wonder that the at 653 ity when it has failed to learn the difficult, finds this case previous of the cases. most obvious lessons majority problems think Second, the seems to struggled principle in with his dissent that Justice Harlan any supra, under Desist v. are unanswerable give rul- the benefits of a new constitutional rule that fails to ap- ing whose cases are to all criminal defendants problems peal are time the announcement. These at the by adequately were, believe, not new and answered Jus- I majority’s approach, how- Stovall. The tice Brennan simply problems; it ever, does not resolve these theoretical necessarily arbitrary in a somewhat dif- what is an line draws upon. place previously settled ferent than the Court had retroactivity necessarily appear Anything less than full will unjust provide it different treatment instances; some will majority recognizes similarly situated individuals. The to vagaries appellate process will cause this same that the of the reappear proposed problem rule: “Even under under its 5(18 similarly may some situ- approach, be unavoidable it
our differently.” Ante, at 556- treated will be defendants ated way to deal previously that the best held n. 17. We had abide problem arbitrariness of inherent with majority principles in Stovall. The outlined the substantive today fooling suggestion is if itself it be- no better makes response problem proposal to this is a reasoned its lieves that line-drawing. than an exercise rather arbitrariness, analysis insubstantiality majority’s proposal of the The Despite appearance is its conclusion. well illustrated apparent injus- problem having the difficult resolved retroactivity, any partial the Court announces rule of tice of today applies only to its decision decisions at the end that “construing is Amendment” and asserts that it Fourth retroactivity precedents. any disturbing Ante, our ap- procedural it returns from its abstract is, 562. That proach the rule of law at There are two substantive issue. problems First, with there no this, however. is connection analysis Second, between the and the conclusion. and more already perfectly good resolving important, we had retroactivity problems involving the Fourth Amendment.
Accordingly, I dissent.