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United States v. Turvin
517 F.3d 1097
9th Cir.
2008
Check Treatment
Docket

*1 case this over jurisdiction retained pendency. its

throughout over jurisdiction lose we time

noAt awas there times at all case, because us place decision agency final removal. order the IJ’s

review: may point, directly Lolong aof distinction the basis it side-step I dissent ultimately immaterial. determination majority’s

contrary. America, STATES

UNITED

Plaintiff-Appellant, L. TURVIN; Corina T.

Sean Defendants-

Cunningham,

Appellees.

No. 06-30551. Appeals, Court Circuit.

Ninth 8, 2007. Aug. and Submitted

Argued 26, 2008. Feb.

Filed

I. On the evening of November Alaska State Trooper Christensen stopped a white pickup truck based on the truck’s unusually exhaust, loud rapid acceleration around turn involving minor skidding, and driving six miles over the speed limit in snowy conditions. When he approached truck, which had entered a gas station lot, parking the Trooper observed that nei- Cohen, Nelson P. ther occupant appeared to be Attor- wearing a ney, and David A. Nesbett, seatbelt and Assistant that the Unit- truck’s registration ed States Attorney, expired. District Alaska, He asked the occupants for Elizabeth A. Olson, identification; Attorney, U.S. Depart- the driver was Sean T. Tur- ment Justice, vin Washington, DC, and the occupant for the L. Corina Cun- appellant. ningham. The Trooper talked to them for three or four minutes about the Mary Geddes, C. violations Assistant Federal De- he had observed and then fender, returned to his Anchorage, AK, for the appellees. police vehicle, where he radioed headquar-

ters to conduct a warrant and license check. The response informed him that Turvin’s driver’s license was current and valid. About ten minutes Before: J. after CLIFFORD WALLACE, began, JOHN T. Christensen sat NOONAN, in his vehicle writing RICHARD A. out

PAEZ, traffic citations, Circuit Judges. Trooper Powell ar- rived at the scene. Powell had heard Opinion by Judge WALLACE; Dissent Christensen on radio and recog- by Judge PAEZ. nized Turvin’s name because he knew that a “rolling WALLACE, methamphetamine Senior laboratory” Circuit Judge: had been found in Turvin’s vehicle follow- government appeals from the dis- ing a traffic stop earlier year. trict court’s order suppressing evidence When obtained Powell arrived, from the search of he recognized Turvin’s vehi- Turvin cle. While truck, Turvin Turvin’s was waiting for police informed officer Christensen to issue a about citation, incident. questioned Christensen then stopped Turvin out the methamphet- traffic citations, amine and turned on tape obtained his Turvin’s consent record- er, and search his stepped out vehicle to speak contraband. The who district was still in court held truck. posi- Powell ques- officer’s tioned tions about himself at the rear of methamphetamine and Turvin’s truck request assist if conduct a needed. search, unsupported by rea- sonable suspicion, turned an initially rea- Upon approaching truck, Christen- sonable detention into an unconstitutional sen told Turvin that he knew about the one and rendered Turvin’s consent invol- rolling methamphetamine laboratory, untary. We jurisdiction pursuant to which Turvin acknowledged. Christensen § U.S.C. 3731 and we reverse. then observed something in plain view be- judge agreed seat, leave.” The MJ and district Turvin identified

hind asked investigation then violated Turvin’s speaker as box. mind if Christensen if he would rights explained by Fourth Amendment speaker because his vehicle searched *3 Chavez-Valenzuela, us in United States v. said, very odd.” box, “look[ed] (9th Cir.2001). 268 F.3d 719 relaxed, was calm conversation The search, reasoned, to the the MJ sent search with- to the and Turvin consented lawful because it not render the search equivocation. out “an during was obtained extended and an ultimately yielded a sawed- arising The search unlawful detention from a traffic the minimum 1 inches below shotgun off stop.” judge gov- The denied the district containing cup a small legal length and ernment’s motion for reconsideration deter- crystal of a substance packages timely government appealed. methamphet- be by field test to mined custody placed amine. Turvin was II. methamphetamine packages

when for clear error the dis were discovered. We review underlying of fact and findings trict court’s Cunningham were cited Turvin and on a ruling de novo the district court’s seatbelts, Turvin was cit- wearing suppress. motion v. Mi Cunning- exhaust. ed for his truck’s loud randa-Guerena, 1233, 1236 445 F.3d on her proximity based ham was arrested Cir.2006). only ap on disputed issue A of drugs cup. in the search found is whether Christensen violated Tur peal La- in cash. Cunningham revealed $773 at the ter, Cunningham’s the cash Fourth Amend police when examined vin’s and station, among mixed in they found police rights by asking ment a bag containing sub- plastic a the bills of the that unreason methamphetamine. suspected to be stance ably extended stop. lawful traffic Cunningham indicted were methamphetamine to traffic conspiracy intent to distribute possession A. methamphetamine. of grams or more five analysis of the district court deci- Our possession Turvin was also indicted our recent and primarily sion is based a mo- firearm. Turvin filed prohibited in United States Men- on-point decision Cunningham suppress, tion which dez, (9th Cir.2007), we no joined, arguing that “the had court’s final rul- the district decided after de- for the reasonable Mendez, rejected ing. In we tention,” consent to the and that Turvin’s despite claim the fact involuntary. search of truck had, case without police officers granted Turvin’s mo- The district court ques- asked Mendez suspicion, reasonable adopting magistrate suppress, tion to initial- tions unrelated (MJ) that, though recommendation judge’s at 1081. In so ly stop. lawful traffic based stop was lawful and the initial traffic deciding, acknowledged Su- cause that a traffic violation probable portions those had overruled preme Court occurred, Christensen “exceeded (the upon case of Chavez-Valenzuela stop” “investi- scope of the court’s decision was which the district be- gating] suspected drug into activities based) to have required police during of the traffic yond scope be- to ask was not free the time that Turvin (internal yond scope stop. Id. at 125 S.Ct. 1465 omitted). quotation marks We concluded that “the officers’ questioning of Mendez Detectives Jaensson and did not extend the duration of a lawful stopped Bracke had Mendez because his stop” expanded and so “the plate tempo- car did not have a license rary need not have been registration tag. supported by separate Id. at 1078. While suspicion.” Bracke conducted a records check in the Id. at 1081. car, patrol Jaensson waited at the curb The Mendez and Muehler reasoning is with Mendez and asked him ques- several persuasive appeal, reject and we *4 plate tions unrelated to his license vehi- the dissent’s reliance Cha- registration. cle Id. at 1078-79. Once vez-Valenzuela; contrary to the dissent’s check, Bracke completed the records he assertion, none of aspects of Chavez- started back toward the curb to inform Valenzuela that are relevant to this appeal Mendez that his temporary registration survive Muehler. plate route, en expired; he overheard telling Mendez “try- Jaensson that he was disagree We with the dissent’s charac- ing away to get gang from the life” and terization of primary in holding Cha- spent he had time in an prison. Illinois vez-Valenzuela. The dissent asserts the at curb, Id. 1079. As he approached the primary holding was “that an officer can- why Bracke asked Mendez he had been not ask that extend the duration imprisoned; replied Mendez that he had of a traffic stop beyond its initial purpose of weapons convicted violation. Id. having without suspicion reasonable Bracke then asked whether Mendez had doing Op. so.” Diss. at 1107. The dissent weapons in any the car and Mendez even- errs as the issue before this court in Cha- tually having admitted to a firearm in the vez-Valenzuela was whether nervousness driver’s door handle. Id. The ar- alone provided the suspicion reasonable rested vehicle, Mendez and searched the (at time) required justify an officer’s loaded, caliber, finding a small semi-auto- continued suspect matic after he pistol. sup- Mendez moved to had satisfied the press handgun, purpose stop. of the but the 268 district court denied his motion. Id. F.3d at 726. question of whether suspicion reasonable necessary jus- was pled guilty preserved Mendez but tify questioning that prolonged the dura- right appeal from the district tion of stop simply not relevant motion, court’s denial of his arguing that (and addressed) certainly not in Chavez- the officers lacked reasonable Valenzuela, because at the time it was interrogate him about beyond matters any decided questioning unrelated to the purpose stop of the and that the officers stop, regardless of its effect unreasonably prolonged the stop. Id. We on the stop, needed to be rejected arguments, Mendez’s relying on supported by suspicion. reasonable See Supreme Court’s decision Muehler id. at 724. That underlying assumption Mena, 544 125 S.Ct. no longer good Mendez, law. See (2005), L.Ed.2d held that “mere (“To at the extent that questioning Chavez-Valen- does not constitute seizure” and zuela ... thus no that such questioning holdfs] reasonable required justify questioning supported by must be does suspi- cion, Muehler”) an lawful stop. [it Men has] been overruled dez, Muehler, at quoting Mendez is the law on police questioning appeal, pause Christensen’s brief un- it is Mendez that stop, and during a traffic stop reasonably prolong facts of this case. the traffic to the apply we must thus violate Turvin’s Fourth Amendment B. right to sei- be free from unreasonable However, a factual must now address we zure? this case and Mendez between distinction We have never considered whether post- our yet been resolved that has not pointed As out

Muehler cases. stop separate unnecessarily stop “the ticket-writing process prolongs ques- Id. at 1079. Jaensson’s prolonged.” may duration of the be nonetheless check- while Bracke was tioning occurred under Muehler’s identification, so “the ing on Mendez’s analysis. Nor have cir other would, event, lasted until after any squarely addressed this factual situa cuits completed.” Id. the check had been However, Supreme tion. Court’s check was com- Once the records teaching that “the touchstone of the Bracke, had overheard Men- plete, who *5 reasonableness,” Fourth Amendment is membership gang" dez’s comments about Jimeno, 250, 248, Florida v. 500 111 time, his two jail “immediately asked (1991), 1801, gives 114 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 297 pointed Id. also out that We questions.” important guidance. us The Court has up to the arrest stop from the time of the emphasized fact-specific that a reasonable minutes. Id. only eight appropriate inquiry ness for case, in this Turvin contends that v. Robi questions. See Ohio unnecessarily The prolonged. stop was 39, nette, 33, 417, 117 519 U.S. S.Ct. 136 specifically point, address this MJ did not (1996). Therefore, L.Ed.2d 347 questions un- were determining case, we must examine the “totali present they were merely because constitutional ty surrounding the of the circumstances” stop, of the a conclusion scope outside the whether stop, and determine Christen After clearly foreclosed Mendez. now sen’s conduct was reasonable. Id. however, reconsideration, motion for Mendez, the overall we identified report that “the in his final MJ did state observing that stop, length of stop ... was extended or traffic eight-minute stop beyond was not the time arriving late of the comments because a citation. 476 normally required issue Although Trooper Powell.... Trooper out that pointed at 1079-80. We also traffic writing had been Christ[e]nsen tick- intentionally did not Jaensson and ticket-issuing pro- stopped ets ... he Bracke their pursued but delay diligently solely for tape used a recorder cess and investigation purpose stop. into the drugs about asking his vehicle.” at 1080. consent to search [ ] sur- the circumstances As in then, this: does question, The pause here were rea- rounding the brief his ticket- paused fact that Christensen stop up duration of the sonable. The total process to ask a few point which Turvin consented to to the at of the traffic was, according the search least a few stop, thereby prolonging, for at testimony, fourteen uncontested moments, otherwise the duration of that an ordi- longer no than minutes. This is stop into stop, turn the lawful legal take, reasonably is, stop could nary traffic That unlawful detention? based an with the dissent agree and we do not underlying circumstances the factual reasonable, evidentiary findings necessary are to dem- of a traffic stop is see United Stewart, 1265, onstrate the sensible observation four- 473 F.3d unreasonably is not long Cir.2007), teen minutes United States v. Alcaraz- time, it took stop. Arellano, Of Chris- 441 F.3d Cir. perhaps speak 2006). tensen four minutes to The Tenth Circuit has declined to Powell and then to walk to Turvin’s vehicle study “make time and motion of traffic rolling and ask him about the metham- stops” in order to the precise determine phetamine laboratory and for consent to effect that has on the duration search. This was reasonable for him to do a stop, reasoning instead courts arrival based Powell’s and information must “consider the detention as a whole.” rolling methamphetamine about a labora- Patterson, States v. tory involving the same vehicle and the (10th Cir.2006). person. same Eighth similarly The Circuit has held Moreover, that Christensen observed that a probable based on cause speaker requesting box driving speed excessive was not sent search buttresses the conclusion made unreasonable when an officer request that his under was reasonable “ask[ed] three brief related to circumstances. Christensen knew a pri- possible drug amidst trafficking his other rolling methamphetamine laboratory, inquiries traffic related and tasks.” Unit which could have contained in some- Olivera-Mendez, ed States v. 484 F.3d box, speaker thing justifying like the fur- (8th Cir.2007). (We pass upon do not inquiry. speaker ther box observation adoption that court’s of a de minimis ex *6 significant. is findings The initial MJ’s ception justifying questions.) brief fact indicated that Christensen did not see Indeed, required officers are not to the box behind Turvin’s seat until after he top speed move at when a executing lawful sought consent to search. agree We with traffic stop. As the Eleventh Circuit has government the finding clearly that this is stated, erroneous; recordings the audio of the A traffic for speeding can doubt- stop show that Christensen did observe lessly long enough police last for the to the requesting box before consent to questions ask about the reasons for search. This fact is in relevant establish- speeding a variety and to conduct ing in the circumstances which Christen- licenses, checks registration, about in- sen asked consent to search. it Just as and surance so on. underline was in We reasonable Mendez for to police the are questions constitutionally ask not re- based on information to during quired top speed learned the move at or as stop, course of the fast as question possible. police For the request vigilant and to to be is, broadly search were about crimes speak- reasonable based on facts at least learned ing, good and a thing. observations made after he at a stop, And traffic stopped police Turvin. the can occasionally pause for a breath, moment to take a to think about Sister circuits have adopted the same heard, they what have seen and and to analysis: pauses brief questions to ask question ask a police or so. The are during stops, if questions even those authorized to detain traffic violators for are stop, unrelated to the a reasonable amount of time. may permissible be under Muehler. The Hernandez, Tenth Circuit held that that United States v. 418 F.3d 1206, Cir.2005) (internal does not “appreciably” extend the duration 1212 n. 7 See, as well. circuits by other considered v. States also United omitted); see citation Soriano-Jarquin, e.g., S.Ct. Sharpe, (“In 495, 501 a de- 492 (holding (1985) L.Ed.2d identifica request Trooper’s] case,[the offi- where unreasonable not tention it oc stop, diligent not down, tion were slowed cers, though checked trainee while curred investigation). their pre and registration license driver’s particular applies analysis This follow, citations”). not does It pared proba- have here, officers where, like force only circum are the however, that those violation. a traffic know to cause ble ask to is reasonable it in which de- stances Circuit, a pre-Muehler The Seventh Court Supreme The questions. where reasoned cision, persuasively rule, nei narrow a sup- such not set violation does aof cause probable who asks officer An we. not do ther does driver a stop, a ports likely will a ticket physically instant released be to right ha[ve] who as an just down license, registration, slowed be check steps prin is no There so. do to write warrants, briefly pauses outstanding is situation second why It completed. reason cipled been ticket, ha[ve] first. not determine but necessary unconstitutional therefore added conduct officers’ whether irration- illustrates case present time minimum or so minute dis- distinction ality of the ac- been have could steps these bright- proposed their Under offer. sent Constitution What .... complished may rule, Christensen’s line re- process entire requires of sce- number ain permissible hold Questions reasonable. main indistinguishable materially narios crime, create yet detecting potential had if Christensen here: happened what turn inconvenience, do no or little originally he when drugs asked unreasonable into handing the he Turvin, or as stopped detention. if ticket *7 947, 953- Childs, F.3d 277 v. United ticket the writing continue Powell asked banc). agree (en We (7th 54 Powell ifor approached he while result. reasoning this Christensen questions asked ticket- pause brief Christensen’s those scenar- Permitting the ticket. wrote reasonable, was process that actions reasonable not but ios consent until draw would to take chose bright-line accept a willWe given. between line unjustified arbitrary and if the unreasonable are rule that conduct. unconstitutional stitutional ticket-writing process in the pauses simplification, bright-line than Rather Court Supreme them. ask in order a reasonableness requires Constitution bright-line eschewed “consistently has analysis. context], [in rules na fact-specific emphasizing instead III. Robi inquiry.” reasonableness ture that conclusion Mendez’s holdWe It 39, S.Ct. 117 at U.S. nette, 519 reasonable need do officers managed Mendez, true ask si drivers detained question ticket be- here applies lawful anof F.3d 476 See multaneously. request question Christensen’s cause in situations true been has That 1078-79. 1104 for consent to search did not unreasonably (citing United Perez, States v. 37 510, F.3d prolong the duration of the stop. Because 513 Cir.1994)). See also United

we decide basis, on this we do not reach States v. Murillo, 1169, 255 the issue of whether reasonable suspicion Cir.2001). We had emphasized that an supported Christensen’s questioning. officer could expand the scope of question- As ing the stop “only if was at all he notices times particularized, lawful ob- detention, jective Turvin’s voluntary factors consent arousing ren- suspicion.” dered Christensen’s Chavez-Valenzuela, search legal. (cita- See F.3d at 724 omitted). States v. tion Torres-Sanchez, 83 Muehler, After this line of (9th Cir.1996). Therefore, reasoning could not pass constitutional evidence obtained as muster, a result of we so held in Mendez. We search is admissible and the district therefore court’s concluded that: “[t]o the extent order to suppress is REVERSED. that Chavez-Valenzuela, Murillo, and Per- ez hold that such questioning must be sup-

PAEZ, Circuit Judge, dissenting: ported by separate reasonable suspicion, I Because do not they believe that have been overruled by Muehler.” suspicion supported Trooper Mendez, 476 F.3d at 1080. Recognizing decision to prolong his traffic stop of Tur- new legal landscape, rejected Men- vin, I would affirm the district dez’s court’s or- Fourth Amendment challenge to his der granting Turvin’s motion to arrest, suppress. explaining that, “because ... I therefore respectfully dissent. officers’ questioning did not prolong the stop, we First, are compelled I agree with hold that majority expanded after the Supreme questioning need not Court’s decision supported by Muehler Mena, separate suspi- S.Ct. cion.” Id. at 161 L.Ed.2d 1080-81. (2005), our analysis of the Fourth Amendment issues in this Here, to the extent the district case must guided be by our recent decision court’s suppression ruling relied on the in United States v. Mendez, 476 F.3d 1077 portion of Chavez-Valenzuela that was (9th Cir.2007). There, we recognized that overruled by Mendez, it was incorrect. As in Muehler, the Court decided that “mere the majority recognizes, however, this was police questioning does not constitute a not the only basis for the district court’s seizure unless it prolongs the detention of ruling. In the magistrate judge’s Final the individual, and, thus, no reasonable Recommendation Regarding Defendant’s suspicion is required to justify questioning Motion to Suppress, he explained: *8 that does not prolong the stop.” Mendez, [As the [Initial] Recommendation con- (internal F.3d at 1080 quotation marks cluded the traffic stop of Turvin and his omitted). Although Muehler did not arise passenger Cunningham was extended or in the context of a traffic stop, we further prolonged because of the comments recognized that the Court’s reasoning ap- late arriving Trooper Powell who ad- plied to such an encounter. vised Trooper Christiansen [sic] of a pri- In several eases to Muehler, or police contact with Turvin involving a had held that during the course of a traffic rolling meth lab. Although Trooper stop “[a]n officer must initially restrict the Christiansen [sic] had been writing traf- questions he asks ... to those that are fic to tickets Turvin and Christiansen reasonably related to justification the (for for [sic] not wearing a belt), seat he the stop.” United States v. Chavez-Valen- stopped his ticket-issuing process and zuela, 268 used a tape recorder solely for pur- the about Turvin asking of purpose the for and drugs about Turvin asking of

pose his search to consent a for drugs and Nor- vehicle. Ms to search a consent for and (3) vehicle his exited vehicle,” and traffic in a engaged mally, an Powell truck, while Turvin’s Tr. to returned tape recorder. a use not will stop of Turvin’s rear at the his himself reaffirms positioned judge magistrate The this At backup. by as the stand to vehicle police the finding that anything seen not and had troopers of Turvin the point, lawful otherwise might it they that for which indicate to grounds truck on in the passenger his for and Turvin that or methamphetamine have tain not did meth. with involved were companion doing so.] his reason- that court truck, the district Christen- with agree I to returning After to exist not did standing outside Turvin, was able who told sen It is companion. his and rolling Turvin stop of about knew vehicle, he that his testimo- Trooper Christensen’s acknowledged. clear Turvin lab, which meth on arrived Powell Trooper until that ny something see he could stating that After any did scene, Christensen said Turvin seat, which Turvin’s behind his Turvin or either that suspect reason Tur- asked box, Christensen speaker awas in engaged were or been had companion vehicle. his search could he if vin activity. drug illegal any towas consent Turvin’s seeking truck Turvin’s stopped had Christensen contraband. for search accelera- exhaust, rapid its loud because magis- faults majority Although and skidding corner, minor tion around erroneously finding judge for trate approached Christensen As speeding. to search for consent asked Christensen occupant neither truck, observed he box, agree I speaker observing before and a seatbelt wearing to be appeared whether his determination with After expired. registration truck’s Chris- or after before occurred observation war- and a license conducted Christensen immaterial. consent, is for asked tensen was informed he check rants that, when my view in important isWhat valid. current license Turvin’s pri- his about Christensen informed Powell issue decided then Christensen Trooper in earlier Turvin encounter compan- his Turvin citations traffic “briefly pause” just Christensen ion. he so that citations writing the began, after minutes About ten his to search consent ask could his vehicle sat Christensen completely Rather, Christensen truck. Powell citations, Trooper out decided citations writing the stopped heard had Powell scene. at the arrived In- investigation. drug upon embark recog- radio on the recorder tape his deed, turned he he knew name, because Turvin’s nized drugs asking Turvin found lab” meth “rolling Be- vehicle. search consent following a traffic vehicle correctly judge magistrate cause, as *9 earlier endeavor found, new this scene, he arrived Powell When needed stop, Christensen of length in- truck his recognized do so. suspicion inci- prior Christensen formed not exist. did Here, reasonable (1) “stopped dent, then “particu requires Reasonable (2) turned process,” ticket-issuing suspecting basis objective larized “solely vehicle in his recorder tape the person stopped of criminal activity.” 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968))); Chavez United States v. Tiong, 224 1136, F.3d -Valenzuela, 268 F.3d at 724 (“Conversely, (9th Cir.2000) (internal quotation an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion omitted). marks There was nothing about or ‘hunch’ cannot withstand scrutiny under the traffic infractions or Turvin’s conduct the Fourth Amendment.” (quoting United after the stop provided an objective v. Sokolow, 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. basis for a reasonable officer to suspect 1581, 104 (1989))). L.Ed.2d 1 that illegal drug activity was afoot. More sum, In I agree with the district court’s over, Christensen did not immediately see determination that reasonable suspicion anything in the truck that aroused his did not exist to prolong the traffic stop. suspicion. It was not until Powell arrived The majority does not directly address at the scene with information about his this issue. Maj. Opin. (“[W]e at 1104. do prior contact with Turvin that Christensen not reach the of issue whether reasonable even considered inquiring about illegal suspicion supported Christensen’s ques- drug activity. This new information that tioning.”). Instead, the majority, while in- centered on criminal record, voking fact-specific Fourth Amendment itself, was insufficient to support rea reasonableness inquiry, concludes that “we sonable suspicion. Burrell v. McIlroy, 464 must examine the “totality of the circum- F.3d (9th 858 n. Cir.2006) (“Al stances” surrounding the stop, and though deter- a prior criminal history cannot mine whether Christensen’s alone conduct was establish reasonable suspicion or Maj. reasonable.” Opin. at probable 1101. Ulti- cause to support a detention or mately, the majority holds that arrest, it is “Mendez’s permissible to consider such conclusion that officers do fact part need rea- total calculus infor sonable suspicion to ask questions mation in these unrelat- determinations.”). See ed to the purpose of an also lawful stop States v. Chamberlin, 644 applies here because Christensen’s ques- Cir.1980); United tion and request States v. Santos, consent to search 403 F.3d Cir.2005). unreasonably prolong the duration of the stop.” Maj. Opin. at 1103-1104. The majority finds it significant the context of case, this this approach can Christensen did not ask for consent until not be sanctioned Mendez, or Chavez- after he observed the speaker box behind Valenzuela, byor the district court’s find- Turvin’s seat. The majority’s emphasis on ings. observation, however, minimizes As I response read (and Mendez information Muehler), provided by when a police Powell. It seems obvious, asks that, with this new information, exceed the purposes of Christen a traffic stop, such sen had a hunch that if he were to “does not search constitute a seizure the truck he might well unless it find drugs, prolongs the drug the in- paraphernalia, or even a dividual.” “rolling meth 476 F.3d at 1080 lab.” hunch, A while it might (emphasis added) (internal reflect good quotation police intuition, does not omitted). amount to marks reason When the expanded able suspicion. See United States v. questioning prolongs the duration of an Thomas, 211 1186, 1191 (9th initially lawful stop, however, such ques- (“Reasonable suspicion must be based tioning must be supported by reasonable more than an officer’s ‘inchoate and unpar suspicion. Id. Although Mendez over- ’” ticularized suspicion or ‘hunch.’ (quoting ruled portions of Chavez-Valenzuela, id. Terry *10 Ohio, v. 392 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. at 1080, it left intact its primary hold- Amendment Fourth lowers approach new ask cannot an officer ing—that notch. another protection stop traffic aof duration the extend that having without from initial of cases its beyond discussion majority’s Cha- so. doing suspicion persua- not is circuits reasonable sister our of several 725-26. at F.3d vez-Valenzuela, Stewart, v. States In United sive. discussed, critical the I Thus, as county sher- Cir.2007), the (10th F.3d 1265 sus- reasonable whether is here question while occurred questioning expanded iffs and stop, extended for the existed picion of retriev- process the inwas motorist the duration extended the not whether and, the defen- license, as driver’s ing his circumstances. the all under reasonable ap- not did conceded, the dant majority the holding, United its In of support stop. the In preciably Pow- provided Alcaraz-Arellano, F.3d the information to points v. States with contact expanded his Cir.2006), the ell about (10th 1256-58 ticket in the interruption the characterizes the officer while occurred Christensen’s brief, emphasizes as pro- information verifying and gathering Tur- behind box speaker the of observation Nota- of the vehicle. the driver vided of the that seat, finds and vin’s license the returned officer the bly, when con- at point to the stop the addi- ask began to then driver, and four- approximately the to sented search— that determined court the questions, tional ordi- an than longer no minutes —“is teen could stop, which the prolonged officer the take.” reasonably stop could nary traffic reason- had officer the if justified only be nothing in is There at Opin. Maj. con- After at 1259-60. Id. suspicion. able finding. the latter support to record the the that information the all of sidering evi- any present not did The Government of course the during acquired had officer court district issue, the dence the that held court stop, the the ais This finding. such make not did the detain further to to left best is that determination factual Id. driver. event, because any In court. district the Patterson, v. States In United that approach adopts majority the alleged Cir.2006), Patterson 767, 777 Chavez-Va- Mendez with inconsistent detention the trooper the that assess- by its persuaded lenzuela, not I am documents obtaining conduct. Trooper of ment waited trooper the him versing will it approach, majority’s the With vehi- license Patterson’s of verification to invoke very little take the argued He registration. cle strate infamous Columbo’s Detective T.V. time deliberately extended trooper question.” more “just one asking of gy so stop complete necessary Chavez-Valenzuela, See drug awith arrive could trooper another 1n. 897, 897-98 vehi- Patterson’s inspect dog detection of denial from dissenting J., (O’Scannlain, ten approximately place took cle, which there banc). long as So rehearing en 773, 777. at Id. stop. into minutes stop, even briefly prolong basis some stop the reasonableness evaluating ended, has when issuance initial viola be no will there held court ticket, the much take it does Although tion. unreasonably prolong did trooper stan satisfy the Patter- fact upon relied facts objective particularized dard — talking. majority son majority’s is afoot—the activity criminal *11 777. As the trooper finished writing a era-Mendez, id. at and the Sixth ticket, warning a drug dog detection alert- United States v. Burton, 334 F.3d 514, ed to a scent on the vehicle. Id. at 773. (6th 518-19 Cir.2003), have also adopted After the dog alerted several times, more the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Childs. trooper searched the vehicle and found In our circuit, however, the majority illegal drugs in a hidden compartment. does not write on a clean slate. As I read Id. The dog alert provided reasonable sus- Chavez-Valenzuela picion when an for the troopers to prolong their officer prolongs a traffic stop expan- detention of Patterson from the alert to sive questioning, the arrest. extended Id. at 776. must be supported by suspi- Patterson, the court disagreed with cion. Although we concluded proba- argument defendant’s that the trooper ble cause existed to stop Chavez-Valenzue- prolonged the stop by taking too long to la for speeding, we proceeded to complete examine those actions necessary to issue a whether the extended detention ticket; sup- the court further held that ported by reasonable suspicion. the shift in focus to Chavez- drug investigation Valenzuela, F.3d at 725-727. In but was supported Men- dez, the validity suspicion. of the initial stop was not 777-78. Here, disputed. Christensen did Nonetheless, not extend clearly de- held tention of Turvin while he obtained infor- extends the duration mation from Turvin of a stop immediately must after be supported by reasonable stop or while he waited for suspicion. See Mendez, warrants 476 F.3d at 1080. check and verification of Turvin’s That license. holding is consistent with part Nor do the facts suggest that Turvin was Chavez-Valenzuela that good remains law. overly talkative. Only after Powell arrived In my view, the majority’s approach to this scene, did Christensen stop writing important Fourth Amendment issue is at the traffic citations and refocus the stop odds with Chavez-Valenzuela and with our into drug investigation, thus prolonging bottom line holding in Mendez. it. He did so without reasonable suspi- For all the above reasons, I would affirm cion. the district court’s suppression ruling. I Without much explanation or analysis, therefore respectfully dissent. the majority persuaded by and adopts the Seventh Circuit’s approach in Childs,

States v. F.3d 947 Cir. 2002) (en banc). There, the court held

“that where a seizure of a person is based

on probable cause to believe that a traffic violation was committed, an officer does PACIFIC MERCHANT SHIPPING AS not violate the Fourth ask SOCIATION, a California Mutual Ben ing a few about matters unrelat efit Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, ed to the traffic violation, even if this conversation briefly extends the length of the detention.” United States v. Olivera- James GOLDSTENE,* Executive Offi

Mendez, Cir.2007). cer of the California Air Resources Several other circuits, the Eighth in Oliv Board, Defendant-Appellant, * James Goldstene is substituted prede- for his of the California Air Board, Resources pursu- cessor, Cackette, Thomas as Executive Officer ant to Fed. R.App. 43(c)(2). P.

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Turvin
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date Published: Feb 26, 2008
Citation: 517 F.3d 1097
Docket Number: 01-35150
Court Abbreviation: 9th Cir.
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