STATE OF OHIO v. RICHARD FRANKLIN
Case No. 11-CA-128
COURT OF APPEALS LICKING COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
June 29, 2012
2012-Ohio-3089
W. Scott Gwin, P.J., Sheila G. Farmer, J., Julie A. Edwards, J.
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal Appeal from Licking County Municipal Court Case No. 11 TRC 08419; JUDGMENT: Reversed and Remanded
For Plaintiff-Appellee: JONATHAN C. DIERNBACH, Assistant Law Director, 40 W. Main Street, Newark, Ohio 43055
For Defendant-Appellant: ROBERT CALESARIC, 35 South Park Place, Suite 150, Newark, Ohio 43055
{1} Defendant-appellant, Richard Franklin, appeals from the denial by the Licking County Municipal Court of his Motion to Suppress. Plaintiff-appellee is the State of Ohio.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
{2} On August 13, 2011, appellant was arrested and charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol in violation of
{3} Subsequently, on September 13, 2011, appellant filed two Motions to Suppress. Appellant, in one of the motions, argued, in part, that he was illegally stopped. A hearing on such motion was held on October 27, 2011. At the hearing, the sole issue for determination was whether or not the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop appellant‘s vehicle.
{4} Trooper Jermaine Thaxton of the Ohio State Highway Patrol testified that he was on duty in uniform in a marked cruiser on August 13, 2011. As he was patrolling the City of Newark, Trooper Thaxton observed appellant‘s car, a 2004 Cadillac CTS, go over the double solid yellow pavement lines. According to the Trooper, after going over the line approximately a half a tire width, аppellant “swayed back into his lane.” Transcript at 6. Trooper Thaxton pulled appellant over at approximately 2:42 a.m.
{5} On cross-examination, the Trooper testified that the only basis for the traffic stop was the marked lanes violation.
{7} Pursuant to a Judgment Entry filed on November 15, 2011, the trial court denied appellant‘s Motion to Suppress. The trial court, in its Judgment Entry, indicated that the video from Trooper Thaxton‘s cruiser revealed that the tires of appellant‘s vehicle touched the far right line of the double solid center line traffic marking and that tires crossed the double center line by “approximately 3 inches or one half of a tire width.” The trial court, in its Judgment Entry, stated, in relevant рart, that “[w]hile it would appear that this is an extremely de-minimis violation of the code the Court believes that when a vehicle‘s tire crosses onto the painted center line that the vehicle is no longer driven within a single lane or line of traffic.”
{8} Thereafter, aрpellant pleaded no contest to the charges and was found guilty by the trial court. Pursuant to a Judgment Entry filed on December 2, 2011, appellant was sentenced to 90 days in jail with 60 days suspended, was fined $500.00 and was placed on probation for a period of one year. In addition, appellant‘s driver‘s license was suspended for a period of one year.
{9} Appellant now raises the following assignment of error on appeal:
{10} “APPELLEE DID NOT MEET ITS BURDEN AND ESTABLISH THAT TROOPER LANNING [SIC] HAD REASONABLE ARTICULABLE SUSPICION TO STOP APPELLEE‘S MOTOR VEHICLE.”
I
{11} Appellant, in his sole assignment of error, argues that the trial court erred in denying appellant‘s Motion to Suppress. Appellant specifically contends that the trial
{12} Appellate review of a trial court‘s decision to grant a motion to suppress involves a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Long, 127 Ohio App.3d 328, 713 N.E.2d 1 (4th Dist.1998). During a suppression hearing, the triаl court assumes the role of trier of fact and, as such, is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and to evaluate witness credibility. State v. Mills, 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 582 N.E.2d 972 (1992). A reviewing court is bound to accept the trial court‘s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. State v. Metcalf, 111 Ohio App.3d 142, 675 N.E.2d 1268 (4th Dist. 1996). Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court must independently determine as a matter of law, without deference to the trial court‘s conclusion, whether the trial court‘s decision meets the applicable legal standard. State v. Williams, 86 Ohio App.3d 37, 619 N.E.2d 1141 (4th Dist. 1993).
{13} There are three methods of challenging a trial court‘s ruling on a motion to suppress on appeal. First, an appellant may challenge the trial court‘s finding of fact. In reviewing a challenge of this nature, an appellate court must determine whethеr the trial court‘s findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence. See State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982); and State v. Klein, 73 Ohio App.3d 486, 597 N.E.2d 1141 (4th Dist. 1991). Second, an appellant may argue that the trial court failed to apply the appropriate test or correct law to the findings of fact. In that case, an appellate court can reverse the trial court for committing an error of law. See Williams, supra. Finally, an appellant may argue the trial court has incorrectly decided
{14} At issue in the case sub judice is whether or not Trooper Thaxton had reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop appellant‘s vehicle. An investigative stop of a motorist does not violate the Fourth Amendment if the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the individual is engaged in criminal activity. Maumee v. Weisner, 87 Ohio St.3d 295, 299, 1999-Ohio-68, 720 N.E.2d 507, citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868 20 L.Ed.2d 889. Before a law enforcement officer may stop a vehicle, the officer must have a reasonable suspicion, based upon specific and articulable facts that an occupant is or has been engaged in criminal activity. State v. Gedeon, 81 Ohio App.3d 617, 618, 611 N.E.2d 972 (11th Dist. 1992). Reasonable suspicion constitutes something less than probable cause. State v. Carlson, 102 Ohio App.3d 585, 590, 657 N.E.2d 591 (9th Dist. 1995). The propriety of an investigative stop must be viewed in light of the totality of the circumstances. State v. Bobo, 37 Ohio St.3d 177, 524 N.E.2d 489 (1988), paragraph 2 of the syllabus.
{15} In the case sub judice, the trial court found that Trooper Thaxton had reasonable, articulable suspicion that appellant, by driving three (3) inches onto the double yellow center line, had violated
{16} In State v. Mays, 119 Ohio St.3d 406, 2008-Ohio-4539, 894 N.E.2d 1204, the Ohio Supreme Court held that, because
{17} In State v. Richardson, 5th Dist. No. 00-CA-A-01-003, 2000 WL 1055917 (July 14, 2000), the appellee was pulled over after an officer observed his vehicle drive on top of the center line a total of four times. After the appellee was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol, driving under suspension and a marked lanes violation, he filed a Motion to Suppress. In his motion, the appellee argued that the officer did not
{18} In affirming the decision of the trial court, this Court, in Richardson, stated, in relevant part, as follows: “Appellee in the case sub judice was cited for violating
{19} In State v. Messick, 5th Dist. No. 06CAC090065, 2007-Ohio-1824, the appellee, who had been stopped and arrested for operating a motor vehicle while under
{20} More recently, in State v. Grigoryan, 8th Dist. No. 93030, 2010-Ohio-2883, the appellаnt was stopped after his vehicle drifted to the left, drifted to the right and drove on the yellow lane line on the left. After the appellant filed a Motion to Suppress, the trial court granted the same and the State appealed. In affirming the decision of the trial court, the court, in Grigoryan, held that the drifting followed by brief driving on the left yellow edge line constituted “‘inconsequential movement within a lane’ that does not give rise to articuable suspicion to make an investigatory stop...” Id at paragraph 25. See also City of Mentor v. Phillips, 11th Dist. No. 99-L-119, 2001 WL 20736 (Dec. 29, 2000), in which the court held that there was no probable сause to stop the appellant for a marked lanes violation. In such case, the appellant was observed driving onto the
{21} As is stated above, in the casе sub judice, the trial court found that the videotape showed that the left tires of appellant‘s vehicle touched the far right line of the double solid center line traffic marking. The trial court further found that the tires crossed onto that portion of the double center line by approximately 3 inches. There was no testimony or evidence that appellant crossed the center line, but rather that appellant drove on the marked center line. Based on the foregoing, we find that Trooper Thaxton did not have reasonable, articuable suspicion that appellant was violating
{22} Appellant‘s sole assignment of error is, therefore, sustained.
By: Edwards, J.
Gwin, P.J. and
Farmer, J. concur
JUDGES
JAE/d0425
{24} I respectfully dissent from the majority‘s opinion.
{25} I would find that crossing onto the double center line by three inches was an indication of impaired or inattentive driving warranting a stop. I would also defer to the trial court‘s analysis of the videotape in its role as the trier of fact.
{26} I would affirm the trial court‘s decision denying the motion to suppress.
HON. SHEILA G. FARMER
STATE OF OHIO Plaintiff-Appellee -vs- RICHARD FRANKLIN Defendant-Appellant
JUDGMENT ENTRY
CASE NO. 11-CA-128
For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion on file, the judgment of the Licking County Municipal Court is reversed and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Costs assessed to appellee.
JUDGES