THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. PARKER, APPELLEE.
No. 2017-1575
Supreme Court of Ohio
October 9, 2019
Slip Opinion No. 2019-Ohio-3848
KENNEDY, J.
Postconviction relief—Trial court correctly determined that defendant’s petition was untimely and did not meet either exception in R.C. 2953.23(A)—Court of appeals’ judgment reversed.
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State v. Parker, Slip Opinion No. 2019-Ohio-3848.]
NOTICE
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
SLIP OPINION NO. 2019-OHIO-3848
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. PARKER, APPELLEE.
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State v. Parker, Slip Opinion No. 2019-Ohio-3848.]
Postconviction relief—Trial court correctly determined that defendant’s petition was untimely and did not meet either exception in
(No. 2017-1575—Submitted February 19, 2019—Decided October 9, 2019.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 105472, 2017-Ohio-7484.
{¶ 1} In this discretionary appeal from the Eighth District Court of Appeals, we confront a straightforward question of statutory interpretation: Does
{¶ 2}
{¶ 3} Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying appellee Corey J. Parker’s untimely request for postconviction relief. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 4} In 2011, Parker pleaded guilty to aggravated robbery and having a weapon while under a disability. The aggravated-robbery conviction carried a notice-of-prior-conviction specification; pursuant to
{¶ 5} The court of appeals affirmed Parker’s convictions and sentence in 2012, rejecting the argument that
{¶ 6} In 2013, we denied review, 134 Ohio St.3d 1471, 2013-Ohio-553, 983 N.E.2d 370, and denied reconsideration, 135 Ohio St.3d 1417, 2013-Ohio-1622, 986 N.E.2d 32.
{¶ 7} In 2016, this court announced State v. Hand, 149 Ohio St.3d 94, 2016-Ohio-5504, 73 N.E.3d 448, holding that
{¶ 8} Parker then moved to vacate his mandatory sentence, arguing that enhancing his adult sentence based on a prior juvenile-delinquency adjudication was unconstitutional pursuant to Hand. The trial court denied relief.
{¶ 9} On appeal, the Eighth District Court of Appeals construed the motion to vacate as a petition for postconviction relief, 2017-Ohio-7484, 96 N.E.3d 1183, ¶ 10, and explained that the rule announced in Hand is a “new constitutional ‘substantive rule’” that applies retroactively to cases that were final before its announcement, id. at ¶ 22. The appellate court held that “Parker has established, under
{¶ 10} We accepted the state’s discretionary appeal.
Positions of the Parties
{¶ 11} Appellant, the state of Ohio, maintains that although the court of appeals correctly construed Parker’s motion as a petition for postconviction relief, it grafted a new exception onto
{¶ 12} Parker concedes that
{¶ 13} This appeal, then, presents two issues: (1) whether Parker’s motion to vacate his mandatory sentence is barred as an untimely petition for postconviction relief and, if not, (2) whether the new
Law and Analysis
{¶ 14} In 1965, the General Assembly enacted
{¶ 15} Relevant here,
{¶ 16} We have explained that “[c]ourts may recast irregular motions into whatever category necessary to identify and establish the criteria by which the motion should be judged.” State v. Schlee, 117 Ohio St.3d 153, 2008-Ohio-545, 882 N.E.2d 431, ¶ 12. And we have held that pursuant to
{¶ 17} Parker’s motion to vacate was filed subsequent to his direct appeal and sought to vacate his mandatory sentence on the basis that it was unconstitutional in light of this court’s decision in Hand. It therefore was properly recast as a petition for postconviction relief.
{¶ 18}
{¶ 19} A trial court lacks authority to grant an untimely or successive petition unless one of two statutory exceptions applies.
{¶ 20} The first exception provided by
(a) Either the petitioner shows that the petitioner was unavoidably
prevented from discovery of the facts upon which the petitioner must rely to present the claim for relief, or, subsequent to the period prescribed in division (A)(2) of section 2953.21 of the Revised Code or to the filing of an earlier petition, the United States Supreme Court recognized a new federal or state right that applies retroactively to persons in the petitioner’s situation, and the petition asserts a claim based on that right.(b) The petitioner shows by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error at trial, no reasonable factfinder would have found the petitioner guilty of the offense of which the petitioner was convicted or, if the claim challenges a sentence of death that, but for constitutional error at the sentencing hearing, no reasonable factfinder would have found the petitioner eligible for the death sentence.
(Emphasis added.) The second exception applies when the results of DNA testing establish by clear and convincing evidence the petitioner’s “actual innocence” of a felony offense of which the petitioner was convicted or of an aggravating circumstance that is the basis of a death sentence.
{¶ 21} Whether one of these exceptions applies in this case presents a question of statutory interpretation. Our duty in construing a statute is to determine and give effect to the intent of the General Assembly as expressed in the language it enacted. State v. J.M., 148 Ohio St.3d 113, 2016-Ohio-2803, 69 N.E.3d 642, ¶ 7. If the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, then there is no need for this court to resort to the rules of statutory interpretation; rather, we apply the statute as written. State v. Kreischer, 109 Ohio St.3d 391, 2006-Ohio-2706, 848 N.E.2d 496, ¶ 12.
{¶ 22} Neither statutory exception applies in this case. Parker did not assert the discovery of new evidence, the recognition of a new federal or state right by the Supreme Court of the United States, or his exoneration by DNA testing. Rather, Parker sought to vacate the mandatory sentence imposed on him “in light of the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Hand.” The General Assembly, however, has not provided any exception for an untimely or successive petition that seeks relief based on a new state or federal right recognized by this court. And contrary to the holding of the Eighth District Court of Appeals, 2017-Ohio-7484, 96 N.E.3d 1183, at ¶ 17, there is no exception in the statute for a petitioner who was “unavoidably prevented” from succeeding on a preserved constitutional claim by an erroneous decision of the court of appeals. Accordingly, the trial court lacked statutory authority to grant Parker’s untimely request for postconviction relief.
{¶ 23} The analysis of the dissenting jurists cannot be squared with the plain meaning of
{¶ 24} The first dissenting opinion presents a novel theory—one so novel that it was neither presented to the court of appeals nor argued in this court. This court depends on the adversarial process to frame the issues for review; ” ‘ “appellate courts do not sit as self-directed boards of legal inquiry and research, but [preside] essentially as arbiters of legal questions presented and argued by the parties before them.” ’ ” (Brackets added in Bodyke.) State v. Quarterman, 140 Ohio St.3d 464, 2014-Ohio-4034, 19 N.E.3d 900, ¶ 19, quoting State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424, 933 N.E.2d 753, ¶ 78 (O’Donnell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), quoting Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C.Cir.1983). As we observed in Sizemore v. Smith, 6 Ohio St.3d 330, 333, 453 N.E.2d 632 (1983), fn. 2. All three are lacking here.
{¶ 25} These principles do not mean that we must permit an obvious error to go uncorrected when it has affected the outcome of the proceeding and would create a manifest miscarriage of justice. We have discretion to notice and correct plain error. State v. Rogers, 143 Ohio St.3d 385, 2015-Ohio-2459, 38 N.E.3d 860, ¶ 22.
{¶ 26} But the first dissent does not rely on the plain-error rule—presumably because even Parker does not dispute that a petition for postconviction relief would be untimely in his circumstances. Nonetheless, it asserts that
{¶ 27} The first dissent’s reliance on the absurdity doctrine is misplaced. The absurdity doctrine is a limited exception to the plain-meaning rule, applying when the unambiguous language of a statute would yield an obviously unintended result—that is, “a disposition that no reasonable person could intend.” Scalia & Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 237 (2012). But it is not obviously unintended that
{¶ 28} But even if the plain-language application of a statute would yield an absurd result, the absurdity doctrine does not permit a court to correct the absurdity unless it is “reparable by changing or supplying a particular word or phrase whose inclusion or omission was obviously a technical or ministerial error * * *. The doctrine does not include substantive errors arising from a drafter’s failure to appreciate the effect of certain provisions.” Id. at 238. That is, the absurdity doctrine does not grant a court free reign to rewrite the substance of the statute. But the first dissent would change the meaning of
{¶ 29} But more importantly, the first dissent cannot say what the General Assembly obviously intended and can only guess at what statute it would have written had it been aware of the alleged absurdity; although the legislature might have added the eight words that the first dissent favors, it just as easily might have narrowed the statute by deleting two words—“or state“—or it might have expanded the
{¶ 30} The first dissent also contends that “[b]ecause it is well established that we seek to give meaning to every word in a statute, we should avoid the majority’s view, which would render
{¶ 31} Our role in the exercise of the judicial power granted to us by the Ohio Constitution is to say what the law is. It is the legislative branch of government that has the power to enact, amend, and repeal statutes,
{¶ 32} We therefore reject the first dissenting opinion’s invitation to rewrite
{¶ 33} The second and third dissenting opinions fare no better. The second dissent would construe Parker’s motion to vacate as a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to
{¶ 34} The third dissenting opinion would allow Parker to avoid the statutory bar by applying our void-sentencing doctrine, asserting that a sentence entered in violation of the United States Constitution is void. It relies on Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 136 S.Ct. 718, 731, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016), for the proposition that “if the federal Constitution grants a state prisoner a postconviction remedy, a state court is obligated to provide such relief.” Dissenting opinion, Stewart, J., at ¶ 85. But that is not what the United States Supreme Court said in
{¶ 35} This court has never held that a motion to correct a void sentence provides a vehicle for correcting a sentence that allegedly violates the protections of the United States Constitution. Rather, our void-sentencing doctrine applies only when a trial court has entered a sentence that is not authorized by statute, see State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332, ¶ 26, and therefore, a proceeding to correct a void sentence is not “open to a claim controlled by federal law,” Montgomery at 136 S.Ct. at 731. The sentencing court in this case did not fail to impose a statutorily mandated term in sentencing Parker but, rather, complied with the applicable statute. And in any case, contrary to the third dissenting opinion’s assertion, Parker’s sentence is not void on its face—the entry does not state that the prior conviction was a juvenile adjudication, and resort to other evidence in the record is needed to reach that conclusion.
{¶ 36} In the end, Parker had a prior opportunity to litigate his constitutional claim on direct appeal but was unsuccessful. His convictions and sentence are now final, and principles of res judicata bar relitigation of the same constitutional claim in a collateral attack on his sentence, notwithstanding a new decision of this court. State v. Szefcyk, 77 Ohio St.3d 93, 95-96, 671 N.E.2d 233 (1996) (“There is no merit to [the] claim that res judicata has no application where there is a change in the law due to a judicial decision of this court“).
Conclusion
{¶ 37} The General Assembly provides an offender with a limited time period to collaterally attack his or her judgment of conviction, and
{¶ 38} Upon review of the language enacted by the General Assembly, it is manifest that neither of the exceptions for an untimely or successive petition for postconviction relief applies in this case. The trial court properly denied Parker postconviction relief, and we therefore reverse the
Judgment reversed.
DEWINE, J., concurs.
FRENCH and FISCHER, JJ., concur in judgment only.
O’CONNOR, C.J., dissents, with an opinion.
DONNELLY, J., dissents, with an opinion.
STEWART, J., dissents, with an opinion.
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. PARKER, APPELLEE.
No. 2017-1575
Supreme Court of Ohio
October 9, 2019
Slip Opinion No. 2019-Ohio-3848
O’CONNOR, C.J., dissenting.
{¶ 39} Appellee, Corey J. Parker, was convicted of aggravated robbery and having a weapon while under a disability. He had a prior juvenile adjudication of delinquency, which was treated as a prior conviction under
{¶ 40} Parker now understandably seeks relief based on Hand. But the majority shuts the door on him before he can even have the merits of his claim considered by a court. It does so based on a materially flawed view of a statute, and overall, its conclusion reflects a mistaken view of this court’s authority in relation to that of the United States Supreme Court.
{¶ 41}
{¶ 42} The statute’s reference to a “state right” makes no sense if
{¶ 43} An individual’s constitutional rights are guaranteed by both the United States and Ohio Constitutions, and this court interprets both. The majority improperly reads
{¶ 44} I would interpret
{¶ 45} For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals. I respectfully dissent.
I. R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a)
{¶ 46}
A. The Majority’s View of R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a) Is Absurd
{¶ 47} In interpreting a statute, we first look to the language of the statute. State v. Chappell, 127 Ohio St.3d 376, 2010-Ohio-5991, 939 N.E.2d 1234, ¶ 16. “Where the meaning of the statute is clear and definite, it must be applied as written.” Id. But an exception to the plain-meaning rule applies when application of the plain language of the statute would lead to an absurd or unreasonable result. See State v. White, 142 Ohio St.3d 277, 2015-Ohio-492, 29 N.E.3d 939, ¶ 29, quoting State v. Wells, 91 Ohio St.3d 32, 34, 740 N.E.2d 1097 (2001) (” ‘statutes will be construed to avoid unreasonable or absurd consequences’ “). In White, for example, we declined to apply a firearm specification to the defendant, who was a police officer at the time of the crime, because doing so would not have been just or reasonable given his obligations as a police officer. Id. at ¶ 33-34.1
{¶ 48} The majority’s view of
{¶ 49} The United States Supreme Court may recognize a new federal right, thereby changing state law. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Edn., 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954). But that is not the same as recognizing a new state right; the new federal right overrides inconsistent state law through the Fourteenth Amendment or the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. In the rare situation in which the United States Supreme Court does rule on the meaning of a state law that has not already been addressed by the state’s highest court, it seeks only to predict how that state’s highest court would interpret the state law. See West at 236-238. And even then, the state’s highest court may subsequently override the United States Supreme Court’s decision by interpreting the law differently. See id. at 237-238.2
{¶ 50} These concepts lie at the heart of our federal system of government. The majority’s view of
B. R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a) Permits Parker’s Petition
{¶ 51} In light of the above, it is necessary to turn to principles of statutory interpretation. “The primary goal in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature.” Chappell, 127 Ohio St.3d 376, 2010-Ohio-5991, 939 N.E.2d 1234, at ¶ 16.
{¶ 53} The best indicator of the General Assembly’s intent in enacting
{¶ 54} By contrast, the majority turns
decisions of this court would preserve the substantive scope of the statute, as defined by the General Assembly, which intended the statute to apply when a new “federal or state right” has been recognized.
{¶ 56}
C. The Lead Opinion‘s Reasons for Refusing to Apply the Absurd-Results Exception Are Unconvincing
{¶ 57} Nobody would disagree with the lead opinion‘s observation that “[o]ur role in the exercise of the judicial power granted to us by the Ohio Constitution is to say what the law is,” lead opinion at ¶ 31. But as a practical matter, this means that we are required to address difficult issues head-on. Here, that requires us to take a fair look at the statute. In doing so, we are required to recognize relevant precedent of this court and address whether—and, if so, how—it should be applied to the statute. The lead opinion chooses to sidestep important aspects of that work here.
{¶ 58} First, the lead opinion avoids acknowledging the actual absurdity in the statute—i.e., the notion that the United States Supreme Court would recognize new state rights. Of course, the lead opinion could not plausibly take the position that believing that the United States Supreme Court might conclusively recognize new rights under Ohio law is reasonable, because that position has been expressly rejected by the United States Supreme Court itself. See West, 311 U.S. at 236, 61 S.Ct. 179, 85 L.Ed. 139; Johnson, 520 U.S. at 916, 117 S.Ct. 1800, 138 L.Ed.2d 108. Instead, the lead opinion attempts to dispel any absurdity concerns by stating that “it is not obviously unintended” for the statute to permit petitions based only on decisions of the United States Supreme Court, because the statute mentions only decisions of that court. Lead opinion at ¶ 27. This fails to acknowledge, much less resolve, the actual absurdity in the statute.
{¶ 59} Second, the only material relied on by the lead opinion for its understanding of the absurdity doctrine is a book on statutory interpretation written by the late Justice Antonin Scalia and Bryan Garner. See Scalia & Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts (2012). The lead opinion completely ignores our precedent on the doctrine, discussed above, which does not match the views expressed in the book. E.g., White, 142 Ohio St.3d 277, 2015-Ohio-492, 29 N.E.3d 939, at ¶ 29-34 (applying the absurdity doctrine to recognize a substantive exception to a statutory
{¶ 60} Third, even if our precedent on the absurdity doctrine did match the contours of the view preferred by the lead opinion—applying it to correct only technical or ministerial errors rather than substantive ones—the doctrine would still properly be applied here. The recognition of a new “federal or state” right is what provides the substantive basis for granting relief to an inmate in Parker‘s position. The statute‘s identification of the court that would recognize the right serves only a technical function: it limits the decisions warranting the entertaining of a petition to those issued by the United States Supreme Court, a court of last resort. By incorrectly presupposing that the United States Supreme Court, rather than this court, is the court of last resort that would recognize new rights under state law, the General Assembly has made a technical error that may be corrected by applying the absurdity doctrine. Doing so is necessary to “make sense of the text.” (Emphasis omitted.) Scalia & Garner at 235.
{¶ 61} Ultimately, the lead opinion believes that the General Assembly has made a “policy” choice, lead opinion at ¶ 37, but it cannot explain what that policy choice is without rendering part of the statute meaningless. The absurdity doctrine is the only way for this court to “say what the law is,” id. at ¶ 31. It is regrettable that a majority of this court does not do so.
II. Whether Hand Applies Retroactively
{¶ 62} As its second proposition of law, the state asserts that Hand, 149 Ohio St.3d 94, 2016-Ohio-5504, 73 N.E.3d 448, does not apply retroactively. Specifically, it acknowledges that Hand would apply to cases not yet final at the time it was announced—that is, to cases that were pending on direct appeal and cases in which the defendant could still file a timely petition for postconviction relief—but it contends that Hand does not apply to cases, such as Parker‘s, that were already final.
{¶ 63} In briefing this proposition of law, both parties cite federal case law on retroactivity in support of their respective positions. In assessing retroactivity, this court is not required to apply federal case law on retroactivity, but we may do so if we wish. State v. Elmore, 122 Ohio St.3d 472, 2009-Ohio-3478, 912 N.E.2d 582, ¶ 28-29. Nonetheless, because the parties rely on federal law, I would proceed on that basis. I express no opinion on whether Ohio should adopt a different rule of retroactivity if one is presented to us by the parties in a future case.
{¶ 64} The United States Supreme Court has stated that new rules of criminal law ordinarily do not apply retroactively to cases that are already final, but there are two types of rules that are not subject to the bar on retroactivity: one, “substantive” rules, and two, “watershed rule[s] of criminal procedure.” Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (plurality opinion); Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351-352, 124 S.Ct. 2519, 159 L.Ed.2d 442 (2004).
{¶ 65} A rule is substantive if it is a “constitutional determination[] that place[s] particular conduct or persons * * * beyond the State‘s power to punish.” Schriro at 351-352. Specifically, substantive rules “include ‘rules forbidding criminal punishment of certain primary conduct,’ as well as ‘rules prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense.’ ” Montgomery v. Louisiana, __ U.S. __, 136 S.Ct. 718, 728, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016), quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989). Notably, “the retroactive application of substantive rules does not implicate a State‘s weighty interests in ensuring the finality of convictions and sentences.” Id. at __, 136 S.Ct. at 732. ” ‘There is little societal interest in permitting the criminal process to rest at a point where it ought properly never to repose.’ ” Id., quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693, 91 S.Ct. 1171, 28 L.Ed.2d 404 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
{¶ 66} By contrast, a rule is procedural if it is concerned with the accuracy and fairness of the proceeding and if it regulates “only the manner of determining the defendant‘s culpability.” (Emphasis deleted.) Schriro at 353. “Such rules alter ‘the range of permissible methods for determining whether a defendant‘s conduct is punishable.’ ” Welch v. United States, 578 U.S. __, 136 S.Ct. 1257, 1265, 194 L.Ed.2d 387 (2016), quoting Schriro at 353. ” ‘They do not produce a class of persons convicted of conduct the law does not make criminal, but merely raise the possibility that someone convicted with use of the invalidated procedure might have been acquitted otherwise.’ ” Id., quoting Schriro at 352. A “watershed” rule of procedure is one that “implicat[es] the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.” Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495, 110 S.Ct. 1257, 108 L.Ed.2d 415 (1990).
{¶ 67} Both Hand and the present case involve the constitutionality of
{¶ 68} On appeal in Hand, we considered whether
R.C. 2901.08(A) violates the Due Process Clauses ofArticle I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution and theFourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution because it is fundamentally unfair to treat a juvenile adjudication as a previous conviction that enhances either the degree of or the sentence for a subsequent offense committed as an adult.
Hand, 149 Ohio St.3d 94, 2016-Ohio-5504, 73 N.E.3d 448, at paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶ 69} I would hold that Hand applies retroactively. Hand does not state a procedural rule. That is, it does not state a rule concerned with the accuracy and fairness
III. The Lead Opinion‘s Reliance on Res Judicata Is Both Incorrect and Dictum
{¶ 70} Finally, the lead opinion incorrectly relies on res judicata as an independent reason for barring Parker‘s claim. For res judicata to apply here, Parker would have to be raising a claim that he either did raise or could have raised on direct appeal. State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 175, 226 N.E.2d 104 (1967), paragraph nine of the syllabus. The claim Parker raised on direct appeal (that
{¶ 71} The lead opinion cites State v. Szefcyk, 77 Ohio St.3d 93, 95-96, 671 N.E.2d 233 (1996), but that decision does not support application of res judicata here. The petition for postconviction relief at issue in Szefcyk was not seeking retroactive application of a new substantive rule of constitutional law. Rather, the petition in that case sought retroactive application of a new decision interpreting a statute based on this court‘s view of the General Assembly‘s intent. But by the time we decided Szefcyk, the General Assembly had amended the statute at issue to clarify that our view of its intent was incorrect, superseding the decision the petitioner sought to have applied retroactively. Id. at 94-95, fn. 1. We therefore applied res judicata to the petition, and we did not consider the law on retroactivity. That is a far cry from what occurred here. In any event, because it is simply an alternative holding, the lead opinion‘s application of res judicata is dictum and should not be viewed as binding.
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 72} For all these reasons, I would hold that
{¶ 73} The General Assembly should correct the error made by the majority‘s application of the statute, and eliminate any confusion, by amending
DONNELLY, J., dissenting.
{¶ 74} When appellee, Corey J. Parker, was sentenced in 2011, he had a prior adjudication of delinquency, which caused
{¶ 75} Four years after Parker‘s argument was rejected, this court adopted the rule of law that he had proposed. In State v. Hand, 149 Ohio St.3d 94, 2016-Ohio-5504, 73 N.E.3d 448, paragraph one of the syllabus, we held that “it is fundamentally unfair to treat a juvenile adjudication as a previous conviction that enhances either the degree of or the sentence for a subsequent offense committed as an adult.” Under Hand, Parker‘s sentence would not be mandatory and he would be eligible to apply for judicial release.
{¶ 76} One purpose of appellate courts is to right wrongs—for example, to vacate a mandatory sentence that was not required by law. The lead opinion explains its conclusion that no court in Ohio has jurisdiction to hear Parker‘s otherwise constitutionally sound argument, going to great pains to ensure that justice is not done. This court, like the Eighth District Court of Appeals, treats Parker‘s motion to vacate his sentence as a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to
{¶ 77}
{¶ 78}
{¶ 79} When this court recognizes a new right grounded on the Ohio Constitution, as it did in Hand, we should pave the road to assertion of that right, not fill it with obstacles. On direct appeal, Parker asserted the same right that we ultimately recognized under the Ohio Constitution. It is fundamentally unfair to subject him and others similarly situated to a mandatory sentence that this court‘s current interpretation of constitutional law does not permit. In the interests of justice, I would consider Parker‘s motion to vacate his sentence to be a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to
STEWART, J., dissenting.
{¶ 80} The court‘s decision today creates a dilemma: appellee, Corey J. Parker, is serving a void sentence under our precedent, yet a majority of this court is telling him that he has no legal means of challenging that void sentence and that this court has no authority to enforce our own precedent.
{¶ 81} It is a given that Parker‘s sentence is void. In State v. Hand, 149 Ohio St.3d 94, 2016-Ohio-5504, 73 N.E.3d 448, paragraph one of the syllabus, we held that
{¶ 82} Being unconstitutional,
{¶ 83} Parker‘s problem is that this court has held that “[w]here a criminal defendant, subsequent to his or her direct appeal, files a motion seeking vacation or correction of his or her sentence on the basis that his or her constitutional rights have been violated, such a motion is a petition for postconviction relief as defined in
{¶ 84} As the lead opinion notes, Hand was issued by this court, not the United States Supreme Court, so that decision does not trigger
{¶ 85} This, however, does not end the analysis. In Montgomery v. Louisiana, ___U.S.___, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016), the United States Supreme Court held that at a minimum, “[i]f a state collateral proceeding is open to a claim controlled by federal law, the state court ‘has a duty to grant the relief that federal law requires.’ ” Id. at __, 136 S.Ct. at 731, quoting Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 211, 218, 108 S.Ct. 534, 98 L.Ed.2d 546 (1988). In other words, if the federal Constitution grants a state prisoner a postconviction remedy, a state court is obligated to provide such relief.
{¶ 86} We should narrow our application of Reynolds and Schlee to acknowledge that motions to vacate void sentences are not petitions for postconviction relief that fall within
{¶ 87} The lead opinion protests that this court has “never held that a motion to correct a void sentence provides a vehicle for correcting a sentence that allegedly violates the protections of the United States Constitution,” instead reserving that right for statutory violations only. Lead opinion at ¶ 35. Surely, the lead opinion is not adopting the position that a defendant who suffers a constitutional deprivation is to be treated with less solicitude than a defendant who has suffered a statutory deprivation? And the lead opinion‘s assertion that the judge who sentenced Parker complied with the applicable
{¶ 88} In the end, the lead opinion seems content to invoke principles of res judicata to keep Parker in prison. But principles of res judicata apply only to valid final judgments, and in similar contexts, we have held that they do not apply to void sentences. See State v. Simpkins, 117 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-1197, 884 N.E.2d 568, ¶ 30. Void is void: it matters not whether a sentence is statutorily void or constitutionally void. To hold otherwise is to refuse to ensure that the law as we have defined it is enforced. I therefore vehemently dissent.
Michael C. O‘Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Mary M. Frey, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.
Mark A. Stanton, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and Erika B. Cunliffe, Assistant Public Defender, for appellee.