It is petitioner’s contention that his burglary sentence in 1957 was vacated by the habitual criminal proceedings, that suсh sentence was not reimposed after the setting аside of the habitual criminal conviction, and that, therefore, there is no sentence upon which he can now be detained.
Section 2961.13, Revised Code, relating to habitual criminals, reads in part as follows:
“* * * If the acсused pleads guilty to such indictment, or if the jury finds him guilty, or if the court finds him guilty after waiver of a jury, the court shall sentence him to thе punishment prescribed in Section 2961.11 or 2961.12 of the Revised Cоde, as the case may be, and shall vacate the previous sentence, if sentence has been imрosed, deducting from the new sentence all time actually served by the defendant on the sentence so vacated.”
Under the provisions of this section, it is mandatory that the immediately prior sentence be vacаted by the trial judge. If the trial judge should fail expressly to vaсate such sentence, it is vacated by operation of law by the imposition of the sentence under thе habitual criminal conviction. This clearly follows from thе fact that a habitual criminal conviction is not a conviction for a crime in and of itself but constitutes merеly an enhancement of the penalty for the last рrior conviction. Maloney v. Maxwell, Warden,
Petitioner urges that, inasmuch as the burglаry sentence was vacated and never reinstated by the court and the habitual criminal conviction was found to be void, there is now no present sentence for him to serve.
The effect of determining that a judgment is void is well established. It is as though such proceedings had never occurred; the judgment is a mere nullity (Tari v. State,
The vacation of the prior burglary sentence in the instant
In the course of the opinion in State v. Winters, 2 Ohio St. 2d 325, at pages 334 and 335, it is said:
“The record indicates that appellant was lawfully confined in the Ohio Penitentiary when the Grand Jury returned the indictment for being an habitual сriminal. After trial on that indictment, the petitioner successfully attacked the validity of that trial and no more. The trial and all proceedings subsequent thereto were rendered null and void. Thus, petitioner was still subject to lawful confinement, his status prior to the trial. See Henry v. Alvis, Warden,
This is precisely the situation in the present case. Petitioner is now being properly detainеd on his 1957 conviction for burglary.
Petitioner remanded to custody.
