THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. CHAPPELL, APPELLEE.
No. 2009-2131
Supreme Court of Ohio
Submitted September 28, 2010—Decided December 15, 2010.
127 Ohio St.3d 376, 2010-Ohio-5991
O‘CONNOR, J.
Judgment accordingly.
BROWN, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O‘CONNOR, O‘DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur.
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Carol A. Costa, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator.
Jeffery Alan Zapor, pro se.
{11} This appeal involves the construction of the term “criminally” in
{12} Conversely, appellee, Welton Chappell, contends that the state cannot use intended violations of federal criminal statutes or municipal ordinances to prove that the defendant intended to use the item “criminally.” Chappell maintains that the purpose to use must be limited to offenses defined in the Ohio Revised Code and that the state lacks jurisdiction to prosecute a defendant under a federal statute.
{13} We hold that, in accordance with the plain and ordinary meaning of the term “criminally,” as the term is used in
Relevant Background
{14} Chappell was indicted on two counts of criminal simulation in violation of
{15} The matter proceeded to trial, and after granting Chappell‘s motion for acquittal on the receiving-stolen-property count, the trial court declared a mistrial on the remaining counts after the jury was unable to reach a verdict. Chappell subsequently moved to dismiss the indictment, and the trial court dismissed all of the charges with the exception of possessing criminal tools.
{17} The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion and rejected Chappell‘s arguments pertaining to the specificity of the indictment and preemption. The trial court, however, found Chappell‘s remaining argument to be persuasive and held that the purpose to use an item criminally must come from an intended violation of state law, not federal law. The trial court then granted Chappell‘s motion to dismiss the charge of possessing criminal tools.
{18} The state appealed, and the Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed. State v. Chappell, 8th Dist. No. 92455, 2009-Ohio-5371, 2009 WL 3217907. Relying on
{19} The case is now before us on our acceptance of a discretionary appeal to determine whether the state may use violations of federal criminal law to prove that a person possesses items to use the items criminally in violation of
Analysis
{¶ 10}
{¶ 11} “No person shall possess or have under the person‘s control any substance, device, instrument, or article, with purpose to use it criminally.
{¶ 12} “* * *
{¶ 13} “(C) Whoever violates this section is guilty of possessing criminal tools. Except as otherwise provided in this division, possessing criminal tools is a misdemeanor of the first degree. If the circumstances indicate that the substance, device, instrument, or article involved in the offense was intended for use in the commission of a felony, possessing criminal tools is a felony of the fifth degree.”
{¶ 15} The state advances an expansive definition, contending that the plain and ordinary meaning of “criminally” includes any social harm that the law makes punishable, which encompasses intended violations of federal as well as state law. Conversely, Chappell urges this court to adopt a more restrictive construction, limiting the term to violations of offenses defined in the Ohio Revised Code.
{¶ 16} The primary goal in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. State v. Hairston, 101 Ohio St.3d 308, 2004-Ohio-969, 804 N.E.2d 471, ¶ 11. In interpreting a statute, this court has held that “the intent of the law-makers is to be sought first of all in the language employed, and if the words be free from ambiguity and doubt, and express plainly, clearly and distinctly, the sense of the law-making body, there is no occasion to resort to other means of interpretation.” Slingluff v. Weaver (1902), 66 Ohio St. 621, 64 N.E. 574, paragraph two of the syllabus. Where the meaning of the statute is clear and definite, it must be applied as written. Bailey v. Republic Engineered Steels, Inc. (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 38, 40, 741 N.E.2d 121. However, where the words are ambiguous and are subject to varying interpretations, further interpretation is necessary. Id.
{¶ 17} The term “criminally” is not defined in the statute. Therefore, it must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. State v. Anthony, 96 Ohio St.3d 173, 2002-Ohio-4008, 772 N.E.2d 1167, ¶ 11, quoting Sharp v. Union Carbide Corp. (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 69, 70, 525 N.E.2d 1386;
{¶ 18} The term “criminally” has varying definitions, including (1) according to criminal law, (2) in a criminal manner, i.e., in violation of law, and (3) reprehensibly, disgracefully, or shamefully. Webster‘s Third New International Dictionary (1986) 537. The most relevant of the three definitions in today‘s case are “according to criminal law” and “in a criminal manner, i.e., in violation of law.” When either definition of “criminally” is used in the context of possessing criminal tools under
{¶ 20} “(A) No conduct constitutes a criminal offense against the state unless it is defined as an offense in the Revised Code.
{¶ 21} “(B) An offense is defined when one or more sections of the Revised Code state a positive prohibition or enjoin a specific duty, and provide a penalty for violation of such prohibition or failure to meet such duty.”
{¶ 22} The offense for which Chappell is being prosecuted is possessing criminal tools, which
{¶ 23} Any reliance on
{¶ 24} Chappell‘s emphasis on the directive in division (A) that sections of the Revised Code defining offenses shall be strictly construed against the state discounts the entirety of the legislature‘s directives in
{¶ 25}
{¶ 26} Chappell also argues that he was never indicted by the grand jury for intending to violate federal copyright law and that the state lacks jurisdiction to prosecute him under federal copyright laws that preempt any state-law action. The trial court rejected both of these arguments, and Chappell did not appeal those aspects of the trial court‘s decision. Nor were these issues addressed by the court of appeals, and Chappell did not seek this court‘s discretionary jurisdiction over these issues. Accordingly, Chappell‘s arguments are not properly before this court, and we will not consider them. Niskanen v. Giant Eagle, Inc., 122 Ohio St.3d 486, 2009-Ohio-3626, 916 N.E.2d 595, ¶ 34.
Conclusion
{¶ 27} For the foregoing reasons, we hold that, in accordance with the plain and ordinary meaning of the term “criminally,” as the term is used in
{¶ 28} Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
LUNDBERG STRATTON, O‘DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur.
BROWN, C.J., and PFEIFER, J., dissent.
{¶ 29} The majority concludes that the language of
{¶ 30}
{¶ 31}
{¶ 32} For the purposes of the Revised Code,
{¶ 33} Indeed, if
{¶ 34} Finally, general rules of statutory construction of criminal statutes weigh in favor of a narrower definition of “criminally.”
{¶ 35} The majority‘s reliance upon
{¶ 37} Perhaps more troubling than the majority‘s disregard for the plain language of the relevant statutory provisions is the majority‘s encroachment on the jurisdiction of the federal courts. It is undisputed that Ohio courts lack jurisdiction over federal criminal prosecutions and the enforcement of federal criminal laws. Yet the majority‘s holding poises Ohio courts to encroach upon the federal arena in cases involving Ohio defendants charged with possessing criminal tools.
{¶ 38} The facts of the case before us present just one example of how a state court prosecution for possessing criminal tools based upon an intended violation of federal law may include improper forays into issues of federal law. In order to prove that Chappell committed the offense of possessing criminal tools, the state must prove that his purpose in using the tools at issue was to violate federal copyright law. In few cases will the state be presented with a neat confession from such a defendant that it was his purpose to violate federal copyright law or that it was his purpose to violate
{¶ 39} This court and other Ohio courts have no authority or expertise in federal criminal law. Therefore, this court ought to avoid an interpretation of
PFEIFER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Thorin Freeman, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.
Joseph T. McGinness, for appellee.
Richard Cordray, Attorney General, Benjamin C. Mizer, Solicitor General, and Emily S. Schlesinger, Deputy Solicitor, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Attorney General.