Lead Opinion
{¶ 1} In this case, we are asked to determine whether it is a violation of due process to treat a juvenile adjudication as the equivalent of an adult conviction for purposes of enhancing a penalty for a later crime. We hold that it is.
Case Background
{¶ 2} Appellant, Adrian Hand Jr., entered no-contest pleas in Montgomery County Common Pleas Court in case No. 2012-CR-00650/2 to three first-degree felonies—aggravated burglary in violation of R.C. 2911.11(A)(2), aggravated robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(1), and kidnapping in violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(2)—and two second-degree felonies—felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) and (A)(2). Each count had a three-year firearm specification attached to it, and Hand also entered no-contest pleas to the specifications.
{¶ 3} During the plea hearing, the trial court noted that the parties agreed to a total six-year prison term with three of the years being mandatory because they are related to the merged firearm specifications, R.C. 2929.14 and 2941.145, but that the parties disputed whether the three years for the other offenses was also a mandatory term. The question was whether Hand’s prior juvenile adjudication for aggravated robbery under R.C. 2911.01(A)(3) should operate as a first-degree-felony conviction to enhance his sentence. R.C. 2929.13(F)(6) requires a mandatory prison term for a first- or second-degree felony if the offender has previously been convicted of or pled guilty to a first- or second-degree felony.
{¶ 4} After the parties briefed the sentencing issue, the trial court relied on R.C. 2901.08(A) and ruled that Hand’s prior juvenile adjudication required imposition of mandatory prison terms under R.C. 2929.13(F). The trial court merged the allied offenses and sentenced him to a mandatory three-year prison
{¶ 5} Hand appealed his sentence. He agreed that the three-year term for the firearm specification was a mandatory term, but he argued that the three-year term for the other offenses should not be mandatory. The Second District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court, in a two-to-one decision, rejected Hand’s arguments that treating his juvenile adjudication as a prior conviction violated his due-process rights because he was not afforded the right to a jury trial in juvenile court. The court also did not find a violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey,
{¶ 6} Hand appealed to this court, and we accepted jurisdiction on the following proposition of law:
The use of a prior juvenile adjudication to enhance an adult sentence violates a defendant’s right to due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution, and the right to trial by jury as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 5 of the Ohio Constitution.
Analysis
{¶ 7} The question here is whether a statute that permits a previous juvenile adjudication to count as a prior conviction that enhances a later adult sentence by requiring a mandatory prison term violates due process under Apprendi. The statutory language must be examined along with existing case law before we turn to the constitutional question of due process.
The Statutes Involved: R.C. 2929.13(F)(6) and 2901.08(A)
{¶ 8} For Hand’s first-degree- and second-degree-felony convictions, the trial court was required to impose a mandatory prison term if Hand had previously been convicted of a first- or second-degree felony. R.C. 2929.13(F) provides:
Notwithstanding divisions (A) to (E) of this section, the court shall impose a prison term or terms under sections 2929.02 to 2929.06, section 2929.14, section 2929.142, or section 2971.03 of the Revised Code and * * * shall not reduce the term or terms pursuant to section 2929.20, section*97 2967.19, section 2967.193, or any other provision of Chapter 2967. or Chapter 5120. of the Revised Code for any of the following offenses:
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(6) Any offense that is a first or second degree felony and that is not set forth in division (F)(1), (2), (3), or (4) of this section, if the offender previously was convicted of or pleaded guilty to aggravated murder, murder, any first or second degree felony, or an offense under an existing or former law of this state, another state, or the United States that is or was substantially equivalent to one of those offenses.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶ 9} R.C. 2929.13 does not define the term “convicted,” so in determining whether Hand’s prior juvenile adjudication should be counted as a prior conviction, the trial court relied on R.C. 2901.08(A), which provides:
If a person is alleged to have committed an offense and if the person previously has been adjudicated a delinquent child or juvenile traffic offender for a violation of a law or ordinance, * * * the adjudication as a delinquent child or as a juvenile traffic offender is a conviction for a violation of the law or ordinance for purposes of determining the offense with which the person should be charged and, if the person is convicted of or pleads guilty to an offense, the sentence to be imposed upon the person relative to the conviction or guilty plea.
(Emphasis added.) Thus, when read together, the two statutes say a juvenile adjudication counts as a previous conviction that can enhance either the degree of a later offense or a subsequent sentence to include mandatory prison time.
{¶ 10} This court has mentioned R.C. 2901.08 in its opinions only four times, and the statute was actually at issue in only one of them. See State v. Adkins,
Due Process and the Juvenile Court
{¶ 11} Hand asserts that his right to due process was violated when his past juvenile adjudication was used to make his prison term mandatory. Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution provides: “All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and shall have justice administered without denial or delay.” The “due course of law” provision is the equivalent of the “due process of law” provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Direct Plumbing Supply Co. v. Dayton,
{¶ 12} “For all its consequence, ‘due process’ has never been, and perhaps can never be, precisely defined.” Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Servs. of Durham Cty., North Carolina,
{¶ 13} The court of appeals rejected Hand’s due-process claims with little analysis. The dissenting appellate judge, however, commented that “[t]here are a significant number of law review articles which question on due process grounds whether juvenile court adjudications should be considered the equivalent of criminal convictions for purposes of sentence enhancement statutes.” 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25840,
{¶ 14} Juvenile courts hold a “unique place in our legal system.” In re C.S.,
{¶ 15} Although juvenile-court proceedings are civil in nature, In re Anderson,
{¶ 16} We have recognized that juveniles have the right to counsel during juvenile proceedings, In re C.S. at ¶ 79, and that the state may not use a prior, uncounseled juvenile adjudication to enhance a sentence for a later violation of R.C. 4511.19, unless there is evidence of a valid waiver of counsel, State v. Bode,
{¶ 17} We have held that automatic imposition of the most serious sex-offender classification, Tier III, on a juvenile offender who received a serious-youthful-offender disposition undercuts the rehabilitative purpose of Ohio’s juvenile system and violates due process. In re C.P. at ¶ 85. We recently held that the statutory presumption of voluntariness of a recorded custodial statement is unconstitutional as applied to juveniles. State v. Barker,
{¶ 18} Our state’s jurisprudence does not run afoul of the United States Supreme Court’s. “[NJeither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone.” In re Gault,
{¶ 19} But even though juveniles have been afforded many constitutional safeguards, there is still one important right that is not required in juvenile proceedings under the federal constitution-—-the right to trial by jury. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,
{¶ 20} Hand argues that this lack of a right to a jury trial for juveniles is the reason why using his adjudication against him is a due-process violation. He contends that the use of a juvenile adjudication in a later adult criminal proceeding to require a mandatory sentence “undermines the careful balance of due-process rights required in the juvenile justice system” and denies a key protection that underlies Apprendi—the right to a jury trial. Although the state acknowledges that the juvenile and adult systems are different, the state focuses on recidivism and contends that the legislature should be allowed to factor a prior juvenile adjudication into an adult sentence. However, there is a significant difference between allowing a trial judge to consider an adjudication during adult sentencing and requiring a mandatory prison term to be imposed because of it.
Apprendi and Juvenile Adjudications
{¶ 21} In Apprendi, the United States Supreme Court determined that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”
{¶23} Two Ohio appellate courts have addressed whether R.C. 2901.08(A)’s treatment of juvenile adjudications as adult convictions violates due process and Apprendi. The Eighth District determined that there was no violation because there was no indication that the defendant was not afforded the appropriate due process in his juvenile proceeding and thus the juvenile adjudication was sufficiently reliable to satisfy the Apprendi exception for prior convictions. State v. Parker, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97841,
{¶ 24} The Second District in this case and in State v. Craver, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25804,
{¶ 25} Federal circuit courts have also considered whether nonjury juvenile adjudications can be characterized as prior convictions. See Welch v. United States,
{¶ 26} The majority of the federal circuit courts that have considered the issue have held that the lack of a right to a jury trial in juvenile proceedings does not prevent a court from using an adjudication to enhance a sentence under 18 U.S.C. 924(e). See Welch at 426; Wright at 264; Crowell at 750; Burge at 1190; Jones at 696; Smalley at 1032. These courts reasoned that Apprendi specifically excluded prior convictions from its general rule that sentence enhancements could not be premised on facts not determined by a jury, because procedural safeguards—the right to a jury trial and the right to have guilt proved beyond a
{¶ 27} The Ninth Circuit, however, held that nonjury juvenile adjudications may not be considered prior convictions that satisfy the Apprendi exception. Tighe at 1191-1195. In Tighe, the Ninth Circuit quoted the following language from Apprendi:
“There is a vast difference between accepting the validity of a prior judgment of conviction entered in a proceeding in which the defendant had the right to a jury trial and the right to require the prosecutor to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and allowing the judge to find the required fact under a lesser standard of proof.”
Id. at 1194, quoting Apprendi,
{¶ 28} The Ninth Circuit interpreted this language to require that “the ‘prior conviction’ exception to Apprendi’s general rule must be limited to prior convictions that were themselves obtained through proceedings that included the right to a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. Accordingly, the court held that the defendant’s sentence could not stand, because he had not been afforded the right to trial by jury in one of the prior adjudications relied upon to enhance his sentence. Id. at 1194-1195.
{¶ 29} The dissenter in Welch agreed with Tighe’s holding and stressed the differences between the juvenile and adult systems:
The constitutional protections to which juveniles have been held to be entitled have been designed with a different set of objectives in mind than just recidivist enhancement. So the mere fact that a juvenile had all the process he was entitled to doesn’t make his juvenile conviction equivalent, for purposes of recidivist enhancements, to adult convictions.
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* * * And because the philosophy on which the juvenile court system was founded emphasizes protecting the “best interests of the child” and rehabilitating rather than punishing the child, the culture of the juvenile courts discourages zealous adversarial advocacy even though in its current form the juvenile justice system is much more punitive than its founders*103 envisaged. Lawyers also appear to be reluctant to appeal juvenile cases and to seek postconviction relief; heavy caseloads, a prevalent view that appeals undermine the rehabilitation process, and an absence of awareness among juveniles of their appeal rights are the likely reasons for this reluctance.
Welch,
{¶ 30} State supreme courts also are divided on this issue. Compare State v. Harris,
{¶ 31} We do not agree with the view adopted by the majority of courts in other jurisdictions and find the reasoning in Tighe to be more persuasive. Under Apprendi, a fact cannot be used to increase the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum unless it is submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt or is admitted to by the defendant. Id.,
{¶ 32} The significant expansion of Apprendi’s prior-conviction exception to include juvenile adjudications is at odds with the United States Supreme Court’s
{¶ 33} The right to a jury trial “is no mere procedural formality, but a fundamental reservation of power in our constitutional structure.” Blakely v. Washington,
{¶ 34} Given the United States Supreme Court’s emphatic pronouncements on the importance of the right to a jury trial, it is logical to conclude that the court meant to limit the prior-conviction exception to prior proceedings that satisfied the jury-trial guarantee. Because a juvenile adjudication is not established through a procedure that provides the right to a jury trial, it cannot be used to increase a sentence beyond a statutory maximum or mandatory minimum.
{¶ 35} In his amicus curiae brief, the Ohio Attorney General argues that if treating a juvenile adjudication as a conviction under R.C. 2901.08(A) violates due process, the remedy is to present the fact of the prior juvenile adjudication to the jury, not to declare R.C. 2901.08(A) unconstitutional. The determination that a jury trial is not constitutionally necessary in juvenile-court proceedings is predicated on the juvenile system’s purpose to “ ‘combine flexible decision-making with individualized intervention to treat and rehabilitate offenders rather than to punish offenses.’ ” In re Anderson,
{¶ 36} We already have limited the use of prior convictions in other scenarios. An uncounseled prior conviction may not be used to enhance the penalty for a violation of R.C. 4511.19 without evidence of a valid waiver of counsel. State v. Brooke,
{¶ 37} For the foregoing reasons, we hold that R.C. 2901.08(A) violates the Due Process Clauses of Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution because it is fundamentally unfair to treat a juvenile adjudication as a previous conviction that enhances either the degree of or the sentence for a subsequent offense committed as an adult.
Conclusion
{¶ 38} Treating a juvenile adjudication as an adult conviction to enhance a sentence for a later crime is inconsistent with Ohio’s system for juveniles, which is predicated on the fact that children are not as culpable for their acts as adults and should be rehabilitated rather than punished. It is widely recognized that juveniles are more vulnerable to outside pressures, including the pressure to admit to an offense. Under Apprendi, using a prior conviction to enhance a sentence does not violate the constitutional right to due process, because the prior process involved the right to a jury trial. Juveniles, however, are not afforded the right to a jury trial. Quite simply, a juvenile adjudication is not a conviction of a crime and should not be treated as one.
{¶ 39} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Montgomery County Court of Appeals is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for resentencing.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
{¶ 40} Respectfully, I dissent.
{¶ 41} A statute authorizing the use of a prior juvenile delinquency adjudication to enhance an adult sentence from a nonmandatory to a mandatory term does not violate due process or run afoul of Apprendi v. New Jersey,
{¶ 42} The General Assembly has denoted in R.C. 2929.13(F)(6):
Notwithstanding divisions (A) to (E) of this section, the court shall impose a prison term or terms under sections 2929.02 to 2929.06, section 2929.14, section 2929.142, or section 2971.03 of the Revised Code and * * * shall not reduce the term or terms pursuant to section 2929.20, section 2967.19, section 2967.193, or any other provision of Chapter 2967. or Chapter 5120. of the Revised Code for any of the following offenses:
* * ⅜
(6) Any offense that is a first or second degree felony and that is not set forth in division (F)(1), (2), (3), or (4) of this section, if the offender previously was convicted of or pleaded guilty to aggravated murder, murder, any first or second degree felony, or an offense under an existing or former law of this state, another state, or the United States that is or was substantially equivalent to one of those offenses.
{¶ 43} Because juvenile offenders are not convicted of offenses by juvenile courts but rather are adjudicated as delinquent, some confusion exists as to whether a juvenile adjudication should be used to enhance an adult criminal sentence imposed by a sentencing judge. That confusion however, is addressed by the legislature in R.C. 2901.08(A), which provides:
If a person is alleged to have committed an offense and if the person previously has been adjudicated a delinquent child or juvenile traffic offender for a violation of a law or ordinance, * * * the adjudication as a delinquent child or as a juvenile traffic offender is a conviction for a violation of the law or ordinance for purposes of determining the offense with which the person should be charged and, if the person is convicted of or pleads guilty to an offense, the sentence to be imposed upon the person relative to the conviction or guilty plea.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶ 44} The plain language of this statute is unambiguous in my view and resolves any question that a prior juvenile delinquency adjudication is a prior
{¶ 45} In Apprendi, the United States Supreme Court held that “Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis added.)
{¶ 46} A majority of federal and state court decisions agree and have held that a juvenile delinquency adjudication can be used to enhance a sentence under 18 U.S.C. 924(e), the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), even though there is no right to a jury trial in juvenile proceedings. See United States v. Jones,
{¶ 47} In Crowell, the Sixth Circuit held that “the use of procedurally sound juvenile adjudications as ACCA predicates does not violate due process.”
*108 [j]uvenile adjudications, where the defendant has the right to notice, the right to counsel, the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and the right to a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, provide sufficient procedural safeguards to satisfy the reliability requirement that is at the heart of Apprendi
Id.
{¶ 48} And the majority in today’s decision is at odds with decisions on this issue from state supreme courts in Kansas, Indiana, Minnesota, Washington, and California. State v. Hitt,
{¶ 49} No right to a jury trial exists in juvenile proceedings under the United States or Ohio Constitutions. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,
numerous constitutional safeguards normally reserved for criminal prosecutions are equally applicable to juvenile delinquency proceedings. [In re Anderson,92 Ohio St.3d 63 ] 66,748 N.E.2d 67 [2001], citing In re Gault,387 U.S. 1 , 31-57,87 S.Ct. 1428 ,18 L.Ed.2d 527 [1967] (holding that various Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections apply to juvenile proceedings), and In re Winship (1970),397 U.S. 358 , 365-368,90 S.Ct. 1068 ,25 L.Ed.2d 368 (holding that the state must prove juvenile delinquency beyond a reasonable doubt); see, also, Breed [v. Jones ],421 U.S. 519 ,95 S.Ct. 1779 ,44 L.Ed.2d 346 [1975] (holding that a delinquency proceeding places a juvenile in jeopardy for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause); In re Melvin J. (2000),81 Cal.App.4th 742 , 759-760,96 Cal.Rptr.2d 917 (relying on Gault, Winship, and Breed to hold that ex post facto principles apply to juvenile proceedings).
{¶ 50} Accordingly, imposing a mandatory sentence under R.C. 2929.13(F) based on a prior nonjury juvenile adjudication does not violate due process or run afoul of Apprendi, and therefore, the trial court did not violate Hand’s right to due process by imposing a mandatory term based on his prior delinquency adjudication for an offense that would have been aggravated robbery if he had been convicted of it as an adult.
{¶ 51} Hand acknowledges that Ohio law and case authority from the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals do not support his position that using a juvenile adjudication as a prior conviction for purposes of enhancing an adult sentence from a nonmandatory to a mandatory term violates due process and Apprendi and urges that he is arguing for a change in existing law. That change, however, involves a policy consideration involving Ohio law and is not appropriate for judicial decree, but rather should emanate, if at all, from the policy making branch of government, the General Assembly in the state of Ohio.
{¶ 52} Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the decision of the majority in this case, and I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
Kennedy and French, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion.