STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MORLO M.*
(AC 41474)
Appellate Court of Connecticut
Considered April 1—officially released August 10, 2021
Bright, C. J., and Alvord and Norcott, Js.
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Syllabus
Convicted of the crimes of assault in the first degree, risk of injury to a child and unlawful restraint in the first degree in connection with the beating of the victim, who was the mother of his four minor children, the defendant appealed to this court, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. The defendant had dragged the victim by her hair down stairs into the basement of their home, where he kicked, punched and choked her on three consecutive nights while the children, who ranged in age from fifteen months to thirteen years, were alone on the upper floors of the home. After the defendant left the house on the third day, the victim was brought to a medical center, where staff members observed bruising on her scalp, face, chest, back, legs, arms and left side. The victim also was determined to have had a subconjunctival hemorrhage in her left eye, a broken rib and fluid in her pelvic region. Held:
- The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the state failed to prove that he caused the victim serious physical injury and, thus, that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of assault in the first degree: the jury reasonably could have found that the defendant caused the victim to suffer either serious disfigurement or a serious loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ and, thus, a serious physical injury, as the victim and C, a medical center staff member, testified consistently with one another as to the extensive bruising that covered much of the victim‘s body, the noticeable injuries to her head and face, and that the victim had lost consciousness during one of the defendant‘s beatings of her, which the jury was free to credit or to disregard; moreover, C testified that the bruising was literally everywhere on the body of the victim, who had a subconjunctival hemorrhage in her left eye, and a police officer who took the victim‘s statement at the medical center saw that she was missing hair and had a swollen face and a bloodshot eye.
- The defendant‘s claim that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of risk of injury to a child was unavailing; the jury reasonably could have inferred that the defendant put the children at risk of impairment of their health or morals, as the children had no access to parental care during the three nights when he beat the victim in the basement and did not permit her to leave the basement until the morning, the jury was free to credit a psychologist‘s testimony that the children may have been traumatized as a result of having observed the extensive physical injuries to the victim, and the state did not have to prove actual harm to the children, as the defendant was charged under the portion of the risk of injury statute (
§ 53-21 (a) (1) ) that required that he have the general intent to perform an act that created a situation that put the children‘s health and morals at risk of impairment. - The evidence was sufficient to support the defendant‘s conviction of unlawful restraint in the first degree, as the defendant‘s intent to unlawfully restrain the victim was independent from his intent to assault her: the jury reasonably could have found that the defendant evinced an intent to restrict the victim‘s liberty to move freely within the house when he seized her by her hair and dragged her into the basement and separately could have reasonably found that he evinced an extreme indifference to human life on the basis of his independent acts of kicking, punching and choking the victim in the basement for three consecutive nights; moreover, the jury reasonably could have found that the defendant‘s act of dragging the victim down a full flight of stairs by her hair subjected her to a substantial risk of injury, as it presented a real or considerable opportunity for her to have suffered an impairment to her physical condition or to have suffered pain.
- The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting prior misconduct evidence pertaining to two other incidents in which the defendant wasalleged to have assaulted the victim, as that evidence was relevant to the charges of unlawful restraint and tampering with a witness, and its probative value was not outweighed by its prejudicial impact: the prior misconduct evidence was relevant to and probative of the defendant‘s intent to restrain the victim and to tamper with a statement she had given to the police, as both unlawful restraint in the first degree and tampering with a witness are specific intent crimes, and the prior misconduct evidence was not likely to arouse the jurors’ emotions and sympathy toward the victim, and was not distracting in terms of its severity and the amount of time and focus that it involved; moreover, the two incidents of prior misconduct did not involve gruesome details, facts or photographs, whereas the crimes of which the defendant was convicted involved conduct and injuries that were substantially more gruesome in nature, and the court provided a limiting instruction to the jury on the first day of evidence, coincident with the admission of the prior misconduct evidence, which restricted the parameters of the state‘s use of the evidence to limit its prejudicial effect.
Procedural History
Two substitute informations charging the defendant, in the first case, with five counts of the crime of risk of injury to a child and with one count of the crime of tampering with a witness, and, in the second case, with the crimes of assault in the first degree, unlawful restraint in the first degree and strangulation in the first degree, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Fairfield, where the court, Kavanewsky, J., granted the state‘s motion for joinder; thereafter, the matter was tried to the jury before Pavia, J.; subsequently, the court denied the defendant‘s motion to preclude certain evidence; verdicts and judgments of guilty of five counts of risk of injury to a child, tampering with a witness, assault in the first degree and unlawful restraint in the first degree, from which the defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Judie Marshall, assigned counsel, with whom, on the brief, was David J. Reich, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).
Linda F. Currie-Zeffiro, assistant state‘s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were John C. Smriga, state‘s attorney, and Colleen Zingaro, supervisory assistant state‘s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion
The following facts, which the jury reasonably could have found, and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. In the early morning hours of November 28, 2016, the victim, who is the mother of the
At nighttime on November 28, 2016, the defendant commanded the victim to return down into the basement. The victim obeyed the defendant‘s command because she was already hurt and did not want to defy him. The children were upstairs and in their beds when the victim and the defendant went down into the basement. Once they were in the basement, the victim again was beaten by the defendant. The defendant hit and choked the victim, and ripped out parts of her hair.
In the early morning of November 29, 2016, the victimemerged from the basement after a second night of being beaten. The victim‘s children were still asleep when the victim came up from the basement. The victim spent that day as she spent the day before, resting on the couch. Although she did not know the extent of her injuries, the victim was in pain and thought that she might have broken ribs. Following the return of the older children from school, all of the children were fed and then went upstairs. The victim again was beaten on November 29 for a third night in a row. On one of the three nights during which she was beaten, the victim lost consciousness. Following the beatings, the victim‘s side and head in particular were hurting her.
When the defendant left the house on the third day, the victim contacted a friend, F, who picked up the victim, her seven children, and her nephew, and took them all to a hotel. The victim left the house in a rush, fearing that if she remained there any longer, she would die. The victim‘s injuries were visible and seen by her children. While at the hotel, the victim, a veteran of the armed forces, called her peer counselor at the United States Veterans Administration Hospital. The victim informed her counselor that she was in pain, had a limited amount of money, and needed to travel to her foster mother in Georgia. The victim‘s counselor first encouraged the victim to seek treatment at the Veterans Affairs Medical Center in West Haven (medical center). On December 2, 2016, after encouragement from her counselor and because she remained in pain, wanted to know the extent
The victim told medical center staff that over the last few days she had been kicked, punched, dragged by her hair, choked, and that she lost consciousness. Initially, the victim did not disclose who caused her injuries to medical center staff. Eventually, however, the victim did tell the staff that the defendant caused her injuries. The police and the Department of Children and Families (department) were summoned to the medical center and, upon their arrival, took sworn, written statements from the victim. Officer Jonathan Simmons, of the Bridgeport Police Department, who took the victim‘s statement at the medical center, observed the victim as having parts of her hair missing, a swollen face, and a bloodshot eye.
The victim was evaluated by Julia Chen, a resident at the medical center who specialized in vascular and general surgery. Imaging revealed that one of the victim‘s ribs on her left side was fractured and that there was indeterminate fluid in her pelvic region. On the basis of the location of the victim‘s bruising and the fluid in her pelvic region, Chen and other staff at the medical center were concerned that the victim might have had an injury to her spleen. There also was concern that the victim might be bleeding internally. It was recommended to the victim that she be evaluated at Yale-New Haven Hospital (hospital) because the hospital had a trauma center and the medical center did not. Although Chen was not concerned that the victim faced an immediate risk of death, she recommended further evaluation because she was concerned that the victim had very serious internal injuries. Moreover, although Chen could not conclusively determine that the victim‘s spleen was injured, her concern prompted a recommendation that the victim pursue further evaluation because “a splenic hemorrhage could be very bad.”
Contrary to the medical advice given to her, the victim did not seek further evaluation at the hospital and discharged herself from the medical center. The victim did not seek further evaluation at the hospital because she could not take her children with her. Following her discharge from the medical center, the victim received assistance from a battered women‘s shelter that enabled her, her children, and her nephew to stay at a hotel. On December 5, 2016, they all checked out of the hotel and rode a bus to the home of the victim‘s foster mother in Georgia.
While in Georgia, F contacted the victim and urged her to speak with the defendant. F told the victim that the defendant wanted to speak with their twin children because it was their birthday. The victim spoke with the defendant several times while she was in Georgia. During one of their conversations, the victim told the defendant that she had made a statement to the police that identified him as the cause of her injuries. The defendant told the victim that she had to return to Connecticut to “fix” her statement so that he would not get into any trouble.
Following this conversation, the defendant drove to Georgia. After arriving at the home of the victim‘s foster mother in
Thereafter, on December 21, 2016, police officers travelled to the apartment. The police officers were met by an adult male and female, who provided no information regarding the whereabouts of the defendant, the victim, or the victim‘s children. As the police officers were leaving, they observed a child in the living room area of the apartment through a window. At approximately 4:30 p.m. on December 22, the police officers returned to the apartment with a warrant for the defendant‘s arrest. The victim, who was outside as the police arrived, ran into the apartment, gathered her children, and brought them down into the basement. The police officers located the defendant outside the apartment, in the process of moving a television, and executed the arrest warrant. The police officers then entered the house and found the victim and her children in the basement.
Subsequently, the defendant was charged in two consolidated informations with assault in the first degree, unlawful restraint in the first degree, strangulation in the first degree, five counts of risk of injury to a child, and tampering with a witness. The jury found the defendant guilty of all counts with the exception of strangulation in the first degree, of which he was found not guilty. The defendant received a total effective sentence of fifteen years of incarceration, execution suspended after ten years, followed by five years of probation.5 This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
I
The defendant first claims that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of assault in the first degree because the state failed to prove that he caused serious physical injury to the victim. We disagree.
At the outset, we set forth the following established review principles relevant to each of the defendant‘s insufficiency of the evidence claims raised in this appeal. “In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction we apply a [two part] test. First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [jury] reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .
“We also note that the jury must find every element proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find the defendant guilty of the charged offense, [but]
“Additionally, [a]s we have often noted, proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all possible doubt . . . nor does proof beyond a reasonable doubt require acceptance of every hypothesis of innocence posed by the defendant that, had it been found credible by the [jury], would have resulted in an acquittal. . . . On appeal, we do not ask whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We ask, instead, whether there is reasonable view of the evidence that supports the [jury‘s] verdict of guilty.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Taupier, 330 Conn. 149, 186–87, 193 A.3d 1 (2018), cert. denied, U.S. , 139 S. Ct. 1188, 203 L. Ed. 2d 202 (2019).
We conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury‘s finding that
“‘Serious disfigurement’ is an impairment of or injury to the beauty, symmetry or appearance of a person of a magnitude that substantially detracts from the person‘s appearance from the perspective of an objective observer. In assessing whether an impairment or injury constitutes serious disfigurement, factors that may beconsidered include the duration of the disfigurement, as well as its location, size, and overall appearance. Serious disfigurement does not necessarily have to be permanent or in a location that is readily visible to others.” State v. Petion, 332 Conn. 472, 491, 211 A.3d 991 (2019).
In State v. Barretta, 82 Conn. App. 684, 846 A.2d 946, cert. denied, 270 Conn. 905, 853 A.2d 522 (2004), the following evidence was presented concerning the victim‘s injuries: “[T]he victim sustained numerous severe bruises, abrasions and contusions across the trunk of his body. He also had an imprint and welts on his back that caused his skin to be a varied color of purple and blue, with additional visible injuries to his upper left shoulder and neckline. Further abrasions were visible on his collarbone, and there were bruises on his breastbone. Additionally, the medical testimony, given by an attending physician‘s assistant, described extensive and severe bruising that covered more of the victim‘s body than the photographs reflected and caused the victim to be tender to pressure across his back and left side.” Id., 690. This court noted that “the term ‘serious physical injury’ does not require that the injury be permanent,” “a victim‘s complete recovery is of no consequence,” and “the fact that the skin was not penetrated [is not] dispositive.” Id., 689–90. On the basis of the evidence in the Barretta record, this court could not conclude that the jury unreasonably found that the victim suffered serious physical injury, namely, serious disfigurement. Id., 690.
In this case, the victim and Chen testified consistently with one another as to the extensive bruising that covered the victim‘s body. The victim‘s scalp, face, chest, back, legs, arms, and left side were all bruised. Chen testified that the victim‘s bruising was “literally everywhere . . . .” Moreover, the victim had a subconjunctival hemorrhage in her left eye, had portions of her hair torn out, and experienced tenderness in various parts of her body. Simmons corroborated the visibility of the victim‘s injuries, noting that when he met with her at the medical center, he observed her as having missing hair, a swollen face, and a bloodshot eye. In addition, photographs of the victim‘s injuries were admitted into evidence for the jury to view during its deliberations. Although there was no evidence that the victim‘s injuries left permanent scarring, there was ample evidence as to the visibility of the bruising that covered much of the victim‘s body and of the noticeable injuries to her head and face. Under the factors set forth in Petion, and in light of the guidance of Barretta, we cannot conclude that there was insufficient evidence from which the jury could find that the victim suffered serious disfigurement and, thus, serious physical injury.7
We now turn to whether the jury reasonably could have concluded that
II
The defendant next claims that there was insufficient evidence to convict
“Under the situation portion of
In a substitute information, the state charged the defendant with five counts of risk of injury to a child in connection with conduct “beginning on or about November 27, 2016 through December 22, 2016,” that “wilfully and unlawfully cause[d] a child under sixteen (16) years of age . . . to be placed in a situation that his health and morals were likely to be impaired.”11 The
On three consecutive nights, the defendant, by forcing the victim down into the basement, beating her, and not permitting her to leave the basement until morning when they went up together, rendered the victim inca-pable of caring for her children, who ranged in age from fifteen months to thirteen years and were located alone on the upper floors of their home. In so doing, the defendant risked the health of the minor children, as they had no access to parental care during these three nights. See State v. Branham, 56 Conn. App. 395, 398–99, 743 A.2d 635 (evidence that defendant left three young children unattended in apartment for approximately one hour deemed sufficient for jury to find that physical well-being of children was put at risk), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 937, 747 A.2d 3 (2000); State v. George, 37 Conn. App. 388, 389–90, 656 A.2d 232 (1995) (affirming defendant‘s conviction of risk of injury to child for leaving seventeen month old infant unattended in car between 8 and 9 p.m.).12
Moreover, the defendant‘s beating of the victim left her with numerous, visible physical injuries that were observed by the children. At trial, Wendy Levy, a clinical psychologist, testified that children witnessing a caregiver with physical injuries caused by abuse can be traumatized because they could develop a fear that they, too, will be subjected to abuse. The jury was free to credit Levy‘s testimony and to infer that, because the children in this case observed the extensive physical injuries to the victim, their mother and caregiver, they may have been traumatized. See, e.g., State v. Thomas W., 115 Conn. App. 467, 475, 974 A.2d 19 (2009), aff‘d, 301 Conn. 724, 22 A.3d 1242 (2011); see id., 475–76 (“[I]t is within the province of the jury to draw reasonable and logical inferences from the facts proven. . . . The jury may draw reasonable inferences based on other inferences drawn from the evidence presented.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). Because the defendant‘s beating of the victim established this potential sequence, the jury reasonably could have inferred that he put the children at risk of impairment of their health and morals.
III
The defendant‘s next claim is that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of unlawful restraint in the first degree because there was no evidence presented to the jury of (1) a substantial risk of injury to the victim or (2) an intent to unlawfully restrain that was independent from his intent to commit assault under
Under
“Unlawful restraint in the first degree is a specific intent crime. . . . A jury cannot find a defendant guilty of unlawful restraint unless it first [finds] that he . . . restricted the victim‘s movements with the intent to interfere substantially with her liberty. . . . [A] restraint is unlawful if, and only if, a defendant‘s conscious objective in . . . confining the victim is to achieve that prohibited result, namely, to restrict the victim‘s movements in such a manner as to interfere substantially with his or her liberty.” (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jackson, 184 Conn. App. 419, 433–34, 194 A.3d 1251, cert. denied, 330 Conn. 937, 195 A.3d 386 (2018). “To convict a defendant of unlawful restraint in the first degree, no actual physical harm must be demonstrated; the state need only prove that the defendant exposed the victim to a substantial risk of physical injury.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Cotton, 77 Conn. App. 749, 776, 825 A.2d 189, cert. denied, 265 Conn. 911, 831 A.2d 251 (2003).
We reject the defendant‘s argument that, under the circumstances of this case, the intent to commit unlawful restraint under
IV
The defendant‘s final claim is that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of his prior misconduct on the ground that it was relevant and that its probative value outweighed its prejudicial tendencies. In response, the state maintains that the trial court acted well within its discretion in admitting the prior misconduct evidence after finding it relevant and not unduly prejudicial. We agree with the state.
The following additional facts and procedural history are relevant to the defendant‘s claim. On September 20, 2017, pursuant to
In response to the defendant‘s arguments, the prosecutor maintained that the prior misconduct evidence demonstrates the defendant‘s “ongoing abusive relationship” with the victim, which is “threaded through all of these particular charges” at issue in this case and tends to demonstrate “the reasons for [the victim‘s] actions.” Specifically, the prosecutor argued that the prior misconduct evidence is relevant to “the coercive nature” of the defendant‘s relationship with the victim, “[the victim‘s] fear of whether or not she was consenting to going down in the basement and being restrained by the defendant,” “whether or not [the victim is going] to try and recant her statement,” as well as other “significant and essential elements that the state needs to prove,” such as the “fear of [the defendant] and [his] coercive nature that this victim was suffering from” and the defendant‘s “malice, motive [and] intent.”
Citing
The court first concluded that the prior misconduct evidence was not relevant to the charges of risk of injury to a child or assault in the first degree. Next, the court
Finally, the court concluded that “the probative value [of the prior misconduct evidence] does outweigh any prejudicial impact.” In making this determination, the court stated: “I will give an instruction to the jury talking about the [para]meters that they may use as misconduct and talking about the fact that it does not apply to certain counts. And I will ask the defense to let [the court] know if [he] want[s] that done at the time that the testimony is given specifically. And again, it‘s probably going to be multiple times. Or to save it for the end of the day or to save it for the jury charge in total.”20 Moreover, in
At trial, the state offered, and the court admitted, prior misconduct evidence pertaining to the first assault and the second assault.21 During the prosecutor‘s direct examination of the victim, the victim testified specifically with respect to the first assault that her “neck was broken” by the defendant, and, with respect to the second assault, that the defendant “beat [her] with a dog chain . . . .” In her closing arguments, the prosecutor referenced specifically the prior misconduct evidence, and referenced generally the history of domestic violence between the victim and the defendant. Of the counts for which the prior misconduct evidence was admitted, the jury found the defendant guilty of unlawful restraint in the first degree in violation of
We begin by setting forth the applicable standard of review and principles of law that guide our analysis. “We review the trial court‘s decision to admit evidence, if premised on a correct view of the law . . . for an abuse of discretion. . . .
“As a general rule, evidence of prior misconduct is inadmissible to prove that a defendant is guilty of the crime of which he is accused. . . . Nor can such evidence be used to suggest that the defendant has a bad character or a propensity for criminal behavior. . . . In order to determine whether such evidence is admissible,
“Under the first prong of the test, the evidence must be relevant for a purpose other than showing the defendant‘s bad character or criminal tendencies. . . . Recognized exceptions to this rule have permitted the introduction of prior misconduct evidence to prove intent, identity, malice, motive, common plan or scheme, absence of mistake or accident, knowledge, a system of criminal activity, or an element of the crime, or to corroborate crucial prosecution testimony.”
“The official commentary to
On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of his prior misconduct for the state‘s proof of unlawful restraint in the first degree and tampering with a witness because “[t]he probative value of the prior misconduct evidence on the unlawful restraint and tampering with a witness charges is at best tenuous, if not nonexistent, and is not sufficient to survive the balancing test with its prejudicial tendencies.” Specifically, with respect to the probative value of the prior misconduct evidence, the defendant contends that the evidence was not probative of intent, identity, absence of mistake or motive because the prior misconduct and the charges of unlawful restraint in the first degree and tampering with a witness were not factually similar enough in nature. We are not persuaded.
We first consider the probative value of the prior misconduct evidence with respect to the count of unlawful restraint in the first degree. The court found that the prior misconduct evidence was relevant to, inter alia, the defendant‘s intent to restrain the victim. In admitting the prior misconduct evidence for this purpose, the court relied on State v. Franko, 142 Conn. App. 451, 64 A.3d 807, cert. denied, 310 Conn. 901, 75 A.3d 30 (2013).
In Franko, the defendant appealed from his conviction of one count of kidnapping in the second degree in violation of
In the present case, the court correctly noted that unlawful restraint in the first degree is a specific intent crime. In accordance with the state‘s burden to prove the essential element of unlawful restraint in the first degree that the defendant restrained the victim, the state was required to prove that the defendant “restrict[ed] [the victim‘s] movements intentionally and unlawfully in such a manner as to interfere substantially with [the victim‘s] liberty . . . without consent.” (Emphasis added.)
Next, we consider the probative value of the prior misconduct evidence with respect to the count of tampering with a witness. The court found that the prior misconduct evidence was relevant to, inter alia, the defendant‘s intent to tamper with the victim‘s statement to the police. In admitting the prior misconduct evidence for this purpose, the court relied on State v. Kantorowski, 144 Conn. App. 477, 72 A.3d 1228, cert. denied, 310 Conn. 924, 77 A.3d 141 (2013).
In Kantorowski, this court determined that prior misconduct evidence of the defendant‘s two prior assaults of the victim was relevant to the defendant‘s intent in making subsequent harassing and threatening phone calls. Id., 483, 487. Specifically, this court determined that, “[t]o obtain a conviction for [harassment in the second degree in violation of
In the present case, the court correctly noted that tampering with a witness is a specific intent crime. As our Supreme Court has stated, ”
Finally, we consider the trial court‘s determination that the probative value of this evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect. ”
The defendant contends that “[t]he probative value of the prior misconduct evidence was not so strong as to outweigh the significant prejudicial tendencies and their effects on the jury.” In support of this argument, the defendant maintains that the misconduct evidence was “unduly prejudicial because the history [of domestic violence] noted by the state on numerous occasions was likely to arouse the jurors’ emotions and sympathy towards [the victim].” Furthermore, the defendant argues that the misconduct evidence “was distracting in the severity and the amount of time and focus it took in the case,” and that “it did not apply to over half the counts . . . .” The defendant‘s arguments are unavailing.
In the present case, the court admitted evidence of two incidents of prior misconduct. With respect to the evidence of the defendant‘s first assault of the victim, the victim testified specifically that her “neck was broken” by the defendant. With respect to the evidence of the defendant‘s second assault of the victim, the victim testified specifically that the defendant “beat [her] with a dog chain . . . .” Our review of the record indicates that no additional evidence was adduced that further elaborated on the details of the first assault and the second assault. As the court correctly noted, the two incidents of prior misconduct did not involve gruesome details, facts or photographs.
In contrast, the crimes of which the defendant was convicted in the present case, although similar to the incidents of prior misconduct, involved conduct and injuries that were substantially more gruesome in nature. Specifically, in light of the evidence presented at trial, the prosecutor described in her closing argument the nature of the defendant‘s conduct and the victim‘s injuries as follows: “[B]eginning in November of 2016, [the victim] described to you a series of days where she indicated that [the defendant] beat her. He brought her down the basement where he repeatedly beat her. . . . She described how she was restrained by her hair, dragged down there for a period of three consecutive evenings. . . . In the course of the beating, [the defendant] ripped out large portions of her hair . . . kicked her in the head, choked her to the point of loss of consciousness, beat her by her legs, her back. And as you saw in the photographs that the[s]tate showed and that were taken at the [veterans administration] [h]ospital of her injuries, she had quite a few as described by the doctor. . . . Dark bruises the doctor indicated from head to toe.” The prosecutor further argued that “you‘ll see these photos again of the external injuries that are going on, there‘s also internal injuries that she‘s describing; a broken rib, this hemorrhage that you can see in the photograph to her eye. She also described some blurriness and loss of vision and problems with her eye.”
Given the limited scope of the prior misconduct evidence and the particularly violent nature of the crimes at issue in the present case, we cannot conclude that the prior misconduct evidence was likely to arouse the jurors’ emotions and sympathy toward the victim or that it was distracting
Furthermore, the court provided a limiting instruction to the jury on the first day of evidence, coincident with the admission of prior misconduct evidence. The instruction restricted the parameters of the state‘s use of the prior misconduct evidence to limit its prejudicial effect. See footnote 20 of this opinion. In his principal appellate brief, the defendant acknowledges the court‘s limiting instruction to the jury and that “the jurors are presumed to have followed such instruction.”
For the aforementioned reasons, the court properly determined that the probative value of the prior misconduct evidence is not outweighed by its prejudicial impact. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the prior misconduct evidence pertaining to the first assault and the second assault for the state‘s proof of unlawful restraint in the first degree and tampering with a witness.
The judgments are affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
* This opinion supersedes the opinion of this court in State v. Morlo M., 198 Conn. App. 748, 234 A.3d 1137 (2020), which was officially released on July 7, 2020. See footnote 2 of this opinion. In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the victims of the crime of risk of injury to a child, we decline to use the defendant‘s full name or to identify the victims or others through whom the victims’ identities may be ascertained. See