STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MORLO M.
AC 41474
Appellate Court of Connecticut
Officially released July 7, 2020
Alvord, Bright and Norcott, Js.
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STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MORLO M.*
(AC 41474)
Alvord, Bright and Norcott, Js.
Syllabus
Convicted of the crimes of assault in the first degree, risk of injury to a child and unlawful restraint in the first degree in connection with the beating of the victim, who was the mother of his four minor children, the defendant appealed to this court, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. The defendant had dragged the victim by her hair down stairs into the basement of their home, where he kicked, punched and choked her on three consecutive nights while the children, who ranged in age from fifteen months to thirteen years, were alone on the upper floors of the home. After the defendant left the house on the third day, the victim was brought to a medical center, where staff members observed bruising on her scalp, face, chest, back, legs, arms and left side. The victim also was determined to have had a subconjunctival hemorrhage in her left eye, a broken rib and fluid in her pelvic region. Held:
- The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the state failed to prove that he caused the victim serious physical injury and, thus, that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of assault in the first degree: the jury reasonably could have found that the defendant caused the victim to suffer either serious disfigurement or a serious loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ and, thus, a serious physical injury, as the victim and C, a medical center staff member, testified consistently with one another as to the extensive bruising that covered much of the victim‘s body, the noticeable injuries to her head and face, and that the victim had lost consciousness during one of the defendant‘s beatings of her, which the jury was free to credit or disregard; moreover, C testified that the bruising was literally everywhere on the body of the victim, who had a subconjunctival hemorrhage in her left eye, and a police officer who took the victim‘s statement at the medical center saw that she was missing hair and had a swollen face and a bloodshot eye.
- The defendant‘s claim that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of risk of injury to a child was unavailing; the jury reasonably could have inferred that the defendant put the children at risk of impairment of their health or morals, as the children had no access to parental care during the three nights when he beat the victim in the basement and did not permit her to leave the basement until the morning, the jury was free to credit a psychologist‘s testimony that the children may have been traumatized as a result of having observed the extensive physical injuries to the victim, and the state did not have to prove actual harm to the children, as the defendant was charged under the portion of the risk of injury statute (
§ 53-21 (a) (1) ) that required that he have the general intent to perform an act that created a situation that put the children‘s health and morals at risk of impairment. - The evidence was sufficient to support the defendant‘s conviction of unlawful restraint in the first degree, as the defendant‘s intent to unlawfully restrain the victim was independent from his intent to assault her: the jury reasonably could have found that the defendant evinced an intent to restrict the victim‘s liberty to move freely within the house when he seized her by her hair and dragged her into the basement and separately could have reasonably found that he evinced an extreme indifference to human life on the basis of his independent acts of kicking, punching and choking the victim in the basement for three consecutive nights; moreover, the jury reasonably could have found that the defendant‘s act of dragging the victim down a full flight of stairs by her hair subjected her to a substantial risk of injury, as it presented a real or considerable opportunity for her to have suffered an impairment to her physical condition or to have suffered pain.
Argued March 10—officially released July 7, 2020
Procedural History
Two substitute informations charging the defendant, in the first case, with five counts of the crime of risk of injury to a child and with one count of the crime of tampering with a witness, and, in the second case, with the crimes of assault in the first degree, unlawful restraint in the first degree and strangulation in the first degree, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Fairfield, where the court, Kavanewsky, J., granted the state‘s motion for joinder; thereafter, the matter was tried to the jury before Pavia, J.; verdicts and judgments of guilty of five counts of risk of injury to a child, tampering with a witness, assault in the first degree and unlawful restraint in the first degree, from which the defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Judie Marshall, assigned counsel, with whom, on the brief, was David J. Reich, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).
Linda F. Currie-Zeffiro, assistant state‘s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were John C. Smriga, state‘s attorney, and Colleen Zingaro, supervisory assistant state‘s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion
The following facts, which the jury reasonably could have found, and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. In the early morning hours of November 28, 2016, the victim, who is the mother of the defendant‘s four minor children, called the defendant from a gas station to ask that he pick her up and drive her back to the house where they both resided. The victim had been out drinking with someone other than the defendant. Soon after the victim and the defendant arrived at the house, the defendant seized the victim by her hair, dragged her down to the basement of the house, and proceeded to beat her. The defendant kicked, punched, and choked the victim. During this time, the victim‘s seven children were asleep on upper floors of the house2 and, thus, did not witness the victim being dragged down into the basement by the defendant. The victim could not leave the basement until the defendant ceased beating her. Subsequently, in the morning of November 28, the victim and the defendant emerged from the basement and sat on their living room couch. The victim remained on the couch throughout the daytime hours of November 28 because of the injuries she sustained from the defendant‘s beating of her. While the victim remained on the couch, her older children were at school, and her sixteen year old nephew assisted her by caring for her young children. Following the older children‘s return from school, all of the children were fed and went upstairs.
At nighttime on November 28, 2016, the defendant commanded the victim to return down into the basement. The victim obeyed the defendant‘s command because she was already hurt and did not want to
In the early morning of November 29, 2016, the victim emerged from the basement after a second night of being beaten. The victim‘s children were still asleep when the victim came up from the basement. The victim spent that day as she spent the day before, resting on the couch. Although she did not know the extent of her injuries, the victim was in pain and thought that she might have broken ribs. Following the return of the older children from school, all of the children were fed and then went upstairs. The victim again was beaten on November 29 for a third night in a row. On one of the three nights during which she was beaten, the victim lost consciousness. Following the beatings, the victim‘s side and head in particular were hurting her.
When the defendant left the house on the third day, the victim contacted a friend, F, who picked up the victim, her seven children, and her nephew, and took them all to a hotel. The victim left the house in a rush, fearing that if she remained there any longer, she would die. The victim‘s injuries were visible and seen by her children. While at the hotel, the victim, a veteran of the armed forces, called her peer counselor at the United States Veterans Administration Hospital. The victim informed her counselor that she was in pain, had a limited amount of money, and needed to travel to her foster mother in Georgia. The victim‘s counselor first encouraged the victim to seek treatment at the Veterans Affairs Medical Center in West Haven (medical center). On December 2, 2016, after encouragement from her counselor and because she remained in pain, wanted to know the extent of her injuries, and desired treatment, the victim went to the medical center with her children and nephew. At the medical center, the victim had her injuries photographed, vitals measured, and body imaged. A blood test was also performed. Staff at the medical center observed that the defendant had bruising on her scalp, face, chest, back, legs, arms, and left side. Some of the bruises were more recent than others. The victim also had a subconjunctival hemorrhage in her left eye, parts of her hair torn out, and tenderness in sections of her body, particularly her left chest and left abdomen.
The victim told medical center staff that over the last few days she had been kicked, punched, dragged by her hair, choked, and that she lost consciousness. Initially, the victim did not disclose who caused her injuries to medical center staff. Eventually, however, the victim did tell the staff that the defendant caused her injuries. The police and the Department of Children and Families (department) were summoned to the medical center and, upon their arrival, took sworn, written statements from the victim. Officer Jonathan Simmons, of the Bridgeport Police Department, who took the victim‘s statement at the medical center, observed the victim as having parts of her hair missing, a swollen face, and a bloodshot eye.
The victim was evaluated by Julia Chen, a resident at the medical center who specialized in vascular and general surgery. Imaging revealed that one of the victim‘s ribs on her left side was fractured and that there was indeterminate fluid in her pelvic region. On the basis of the location of the victim‘s bruising and the fluid in her pelvic region, Chen and other staff at the medical center were concerned that the victim might have had an injury to her spleen. There was also concern that the victim
Contrary to the medical advice given to her, the victim did not seek further evaluation at the hospital and discharged herself from the medical center. The victim did not seek further evaluation at the hospital because she could not take her children with her. Following her discharge from the medical center, the victim received assistance from a battered women‘s shelter that enabled her, her children, and her nephew to stay at a hotel. On December 5, 2016, they all checked out of the hotel and rode a bus to the home of the victim‘s foster mother in Georgia.
While in Georgia, F contacted the victim and urged her to speak with the defendant. F told the victim that the defendant wanted to speak with their twin children because it was their birthday. The victim spoke with the defendant several times while she was in Georgia. During one of their conversations, the victim told the defendant that she had made a statement to the police that identified him as the cause of her injuries. The defendant told the victim that she had to return to Connecticut to “fix” her statement so that he would not get into any trouble.
Following this conversation, the defendant drove to Georgia. After arriving at the home of the victim‘s foster mother in Georgia, the defendant picked up the victim and five children and proceeded to drive back to Connecticut.3 They arrived in Connecticut on December 20, 2016, and stayed at the apartment of the defendant‘s sister. On December 21, the defendant drove the victim to the police station, where she changed her statement to the police at the defendant‘s behest. The victim changed her statement to allege that another male was the cause of her injuries. The victim and the defendant then returned to the apartment.
Thereafter, on December 21, 2016, police officers travelled to the apartment. The police officers were met by an adult male and female, who provided no information regarding the whereabouts of the defendant, the victim, or the victim‘s children. As the police officers were leaving, they observed a child in the living room area of the apartment through a window. At approximately 4:30 p.m. on December 22, the police officers returned to the apartment with a warrant for the defendant‘s arrest. The victim, who was outside as the police arrived, ran into the apartment, gathered her children, and brought them down into the basement. The police officers located the defendant outside the apartment, in the process of moving a television, and executed the arrest warrant. The police officers then entered the house and found the victim and her children in the basement.
Subsequently, the defendant was charged in two consolidated informations with assault in the first degree, unlawful restraint in the first degree, strangulation in the first degree, five counts of risk of injury to a child, and tampering with a
At the outset, we set forth the following established review principles relevant to each of the defendant‘s insufficiency of the evidence claims raised in this appeal. “In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction we apply a [two part] test. First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [jury] reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .
“We also note that the jury must find every element proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find the defendant guilty of the charged offense, [but] each of the basic and inferred facts underlying those conclusions need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . If it is reasonable and logical for the jury to conclude that a basic fact or an inferred fact is true, the jury is permitted to consider the fact proven and may consider it in combination with other proven facts in determining whether the cumulative effect of all the evidence proves the defendant guilty of all the elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .
“Additionally, [a]s we have often noted, proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all possible doubt . . . nor does proof beyond a reasonable doubt require acceptance of every hypothesis of innocence posed by the defendant that, had it been found credible by the [jury], would have resulted in an acquittal. . . . On appeal, we do not ask whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We ask, instead, whether there is reasonable view of the evidence that supports the [jury‘s] verdict of guilty.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Taupier, 330 Conn. 149, 186-87, 193 A.3d 1 (2018), cert. denied, U.S., 139 S. Ct. 1188, 203 L. Ed. 2d 202 (2019).
I
The defendant first claims that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of assault in the first degree because the state failed to prove that he caused serious physical injury to the victim. We disagree.
We conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury‘s finding that the defendant caused serious physical injury to the victim. The jury reasonably could have concluded that the defendant caused the victim either serious disfigurement or serious loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ.
“‘Serious disfigurement’ is an impairment of or injury to the beauty, symmetry or appearance of a person of a magnitude that substantially detracts from the person‘s appearance from the perspective of an objective observer. In assessing whether an impairment or injury constitutes serious disfigurement, factors that may be considered include the duration of the disfigurement, as well as its location, size, and overall appearance. Serious disfigurement does not necessarily have to be permanent or in a location that is readily visible to others.” State v. Petion, 332 Conn. 472, 491, 211 A.3d 991 (2019).
In State v. Barretta, 82 Conn. App. 684, 846 A.2d 946, cert. denied, 270 Conn. 905, 853 A.2d 522 (2004), the following evidence was presented concerning the victim‘s injuries: “[T]he victim sustained numerous severe bruises, abrasions and contusions across the trunk of his body. He also had an imprint and welts on his back that caused his skin to be a varied color of purple and blue, with additional visible injuries to his upper left shoulder and neckline. Further abrasions were visible on his collarbone, and there were bruises on his breastbone. Additionally, the medical testimony, given by an attending physician‘s assistant, described extensive and severe bruising that covered more of the victim‘s body than the photographs reflected and caused the victim to be tender to pressure across his back and left side.” Id., 690. This court noted that “the term ‘serious physical injury’ does not require that the injury be permanent,” “a victim‘s complete recovery is of no consequence,” and “the fact that the skin was not penetrated [is not] dispositive.” Id., 689–90. On the basis of the evidence in the Barretta record, this court
In this case, the victim and Chen testified consistently with one another as to the extensive bruising that covered the victim‘s body. The victim‘s scalp, face, chest, back, legs, arms, and left side were all bruised. Chen testified that the victim‘s bruising was “literally everywhere . . . .” Moreover, the victim had a subconjunctival hemorrhage in her left eye, had portions of her hair torn out, and experienced tenderness in various parts of her body. Simmons corroborated the visibility of the victim‘s injuries, noting that when he met with her at the medical center, he observed her as having missing hair, a swollen face, and a bloodshot eye. In addition, photographs of the victim‘s injuries were admitted into evidence for the jury to view during its deliberations. Although there was no evidence that the victim‘s injuries left permanent scarring, there was ample evidence as to the visibility of the bruising that covered much of the victim‘s body and of the noticeable injuries to her head and face. Under the factors set forth in Petion, and in light of the guidance of Barretta, we cannot conclude that there was insufficient evidence from which the jury could find that the victim suffered serious disfigurement and, thus, serious physical injury.
We now turn to whether the jury reasonably could have concluded that the defendant caused the victim serious loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ.7 In State v. Rumore, 28 Conn. App. 402, 613 A.2d 1328, cert. denied, 224 Conn. 906, 615 A.2d 1049 (1992), this court held that the jury reasonably could have con- cluded that the victim suffered serious impairment of the function of any bodily organ on the basis of evidence that the victim became unconscious after the defendant grabbed her by her ankles, causing her to fall to the ground. Id., 405, 415. More specifically, the court stated that
II
The defendant next claims that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of five counts of risk of injury to a child. The defendant argues that his conviction of those counts was predicated on the children having been found by the police in the basement of the apartment and that he “did nothing to encourage or orchestrate the children being placed in the basement.” (Emphasis omitted.) The state responds that “the cumulative force of the evidence established that the defendant‘s conduct—beating the children‘s mother—led to a series of situations inimical to the children‘s psychological or mental health.” We agree with the state and, accordingly, reject the defendant‘s claim.
“Under the situation portion of
In a substitute information, the state charged the defendant with five counts of risk of injury to a child in connection with conduct “beginning on or about November 27, 2016 through December 22, 2016,” that “wilfully and unlawfully cause[d] a child under sixteen (16) years of age . . . to be placed in a situation that his health and morals were likely to be impaired.”10 The information thus reflects that the state charged the defendant under the “situation” portion of
On three consecutive nights, the defendant, by forcing the victim down into the basement, beating her, and not permitting her to leave the basement until morning when they went up together, rendered the victim incapable of caring for her children, who ranged in age from fifteen months to thirteen years and were located alone on the upper floors of their home. In so doing, the defendant risked the health of the minor children, as they had no access to parental care during these three nights. See State v. Branham, 56 Conn. App. 395, 398-99, 743 A.2d 635 (evidence that defendant left three young children unattended in apartment for approximately one hour deemed sufficient for jury to find that physical well-being of children was put at risk), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 937, 747 A.2d 3 (2000); State v. George, 37 Conn. App. 388, 389–90, 656 A.2d 232 (1995) (affirming defendant‘s conviction of risk of injury to child for leaving seventeen month old infant unattended in car between 8 and 9 p.m.).11
Moreover, the defendant‘s beating of the victim left her with numerous, visible physical injuries that were observed by the children. At trial, Wendy Levy, a clinical psychologist, testified that children witnessing a caregiver with physical injuries caused by abuse can be traumatized because they could develop a fear that they, too, will be subjected to abuse. The jury
III
The defendant‘s final claim is that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of unlawful restraint in the first degree because there was no evidence presented to the jury of (1) a substantial risk of injury to the victim or (2) an intent to unlawfully restrain that was independent from his intent to commit assault under
Under
“Unlawful restraint in the first degree is a specific intent crime. . . . A jury cannot find a defendant guilty of unlawful restraint unless it first [finds] that he . . . restricted the victim‘s movements with the intent to interfere substantially with her liberty. . . . [A] restraint is unlawful if, and only if, a defendant‘s conscious objective in . . . confining the victim is to achieve that prohibited result, namely, to restrict the victim‘s movements in such a manner as to interfere substantially with his or her liberty.” (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jackson, 184 Conn. App. 419, 433-34, 194 A.3d 1251, cert. denied, 330 Conn. 937, 195 A.3d 386 (2018). “To convict a defendant of unlawful restraint in the first degree, no actual physical harm must be demonstrated; the state need only prove that the defendant exposed the victim to a substantial risk of physical injury.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Cotton, 77 Conn. App. 749, 776, 825 A.2d 189, cert. denied, 265 Conn. 911, 831 A.2d 251 (2003).
We reject the defendant‘s argument that, under the circumstances of this case, the intent to commit unlawful restraint under
We further reject the defendant‘s argument that there was insufficient evidence of a substantial risk of injury to the victim. On the basis of the evidence presented at trial, the jury reasonably could have found that the defendant‘s act of dragging the victim down a full flight of stairs by her hair subjected her to a substantial risk of injury because it presented a “real” or “considerable” opportunity for her to have suffered an impairment to her physical condition or to have suffered pain. See
The judgments are affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
ALVORD, J.
BRIGHT, J.
NORCOTT, J.