The record reveals the following procedural history and facts that the trial court found or that are undisputed. In 2012, the defendant's wife, Tanya Taupier, initiated an action to dissolve their marriage. Among the contested issues was the custodial status of the couple's two minor children. In August, 2013, the trial court, Carbonneau, J. , ordered that the children reside with Tanya Taupier and attend school in Ellington, where she resided.
In the spring of 2014, Judge Bozzuto, who was responsible for managing the docket of the family court in Hartford, became involved in the defendant's dissolution proceeding. Judge Bozzuto assumed sole responsibility for the management of the case in order to ensure that it would be adjudicated in a timely manner.
On May 23, 2014, Judge Bozzuto ordered the Family Services Unit of the Court Support Services Division (family services unit) to conduct a comprehensive custody evaluation. Shortly thereafter, the family services
On August 20, 2014, the defendant informed his wife that he had enrolled their children in school in Cromwell, where he resided, in violation of the court order that they attend school in Ellington. On August 22, 2014, counsel for Tanya Taupier sent the defendant drafts of a contempt motion and an application for an emergency ex parte order of custody that she planned to file in court. The defendant, who was representing himself in the divorce proceeding, then sought the advice of several acquaintances who had experience in family court, including Anne Stevenson and Michael Nowacki. At 11:24 p.m. that night, in response to e-mails that he had received from Stevenson, Nowacki, and Jennifer Verraneault regarding the court motions, the defendant sent an e-mail containing threatening statements toward Judge Bozzuto to Stevenson, Nowacki, Susan Skipp, Sunny Kelley, Paul Boyne, and Verraneault, all of whom had been engaged with the defendant for some time in efforts to reform the family court system. Specifically, the defendant's e-mail contained the following statements: (1) "[t]hey can steal my kids from my cold dead bleeding cordite filled fists ... as my [sixty] round [magazine] falls to the floor and [I'm] dying as I change out to the next [thirty rounds]"; (2) "[Bo]zzuto lives in [W]atertown with her boys and [n]anny ... there [are] 245 [yards] between her master bedroom and a cemetery that provides cover and concealment"; and (3) "a [.308 caliber rifle] at 250 [yards] with a double
In response to the defendant's e-mail, on the morning of August 23, 2014, Nowacki sent an e-mail to the defendant stating: "Ted, [t]here are disturbing comments made in this [e-mail]. You will be well served to NOT send such communications to anyone." The defendant then sent another
After reading the defendant's first e-mail on August 23, 2014, Verraneault immediately communicated her concern about it to several people. On the afternoon of August 27, 2014, Verraneault learned of an incident earlier in the day during which Tanya Taupier had gone with a police escort to the school in Cromwell in which the defendant had enrolled their children and removed
Judge Bozzuto testified at trial that, after she learned about the e-mail, "every night when I [got] home ... as soon as ...
The defendant was arrested in connection with his first e-mail and ultimately was charged with threatening in the first degree in violation of § 53a-61aa (a) (3) ;
Before trial, the defendant moved to dismiss all of the charges. With respect to the threatening charges, the defendant contended that the e-mail did not contain speech that was punishable under the first amendment because the threat was not "so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and specific as to the person threatened, as to convey a gravity of purpose and imminent prospect of execution ...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Krijger ,
After the trial, the defendant filed another motion to dismiss the charges, claiming that the threatening
Relying on Justice Alito's concurring opinion in Elonis v. United States , --- U.S. ----,
The trial court then addressed the question of whether the state had proved the elements of threatening in the second degree in violation of § 53a-62 (a) (3). The trial court disagreed with the defendant's claims that the state had failed to prove that he acted recklessly because "(1) he did not send the e-mail directly to Judge Bozzuto, and (2) those to whom he did send it were seen
The trial court then noted that, with regard to the charge of threatening in the first degree in violation of § 53a-61aa (a) (3), the state was required to prove that the defendant had committed threatening in the second degree and, in committing that offense, had represented by his words that he possessed a firearm. The trial court concluded that the defendant's reference in the e-mail to the .308 caliber rifle satisfied that element. Accordingly, the trial court found the defendant guilty of threatening in the first degree.
Turning to the other charges, the trial court concluded that the state had established the elements of disorderly conduct toward Judge Bozzuto and Verraneault. With respect to the count involving disorderly
On appeal, the defendant first challenges the constitutionality of § 53a-61aa (a) (3) under the free speech provisions of the first amendment to the federal constitution and article first, §§ 4, 5 and 14, of the Connecticut constitution on the grounds that (1) the statute does not require the state to prove that an individual who engaged in threatening speech had the specific intent to terrorize the target of the threat, and (2) even if the statute is constitutional as applied to threatening speech directed at a private individual, proof of specific intent is required when the speech is directed at a public official. He next claims that the trial court improperly considered evidence of certain events, namely, the seizure of firearms from his residence one week after he sent the e-mail concerning Judge Bozzuto, and his second e-mail to Nowacki, in which he again threatened Judge Bozzuto and her family, to support its conclusion that his e-mail was a punishable true threat. Finally, the defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient
I
FREE SPEECH CLAIMS
We first address the defendant's claims that § 53a-61aa (a) (3) is unconstitutional under the free speech provisions of the first amendment to the United States constitution, and article first, §§ 4, 5 and 14, of the Connecticut constitution because the statute does not require the state to prove that the person who engaged in the threatening speech had the specific intent to terrorize the target of the threat.
A
We first address the defendant's claim that the first amendment required the state to prove that he had the specific intent to terrorize Judge Bozzuto before he could be punished for the threatening speech in his e-mail.
We begin with a review of the first amendment principles applicable to statutes that criminalize threatening speech. "The [f]irst [a]mendment, applicable to the
"The protections afforded by the [f]irst [a]mendment, however, are not absolute, and we have long recognized that the government may regulate certain categories of expression consistent with the [c]onstitution.... The [f]irst [a]mendment permits restrictions [on] the content of speech in a few limited areas, which are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality....
"Thus, for example, a [s]tate may punish those words [that] by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.... Furthermore, the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a [s]tate to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except [when] such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.... [T]he [f]irst [a]mendment also permits a [s]tate to ban a true threat....
"True threats encompass those statements [through which] the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.... The speaker need not actually intend to carry out the threat. Rather, a prohibition on true threats protect[s] individuals from the fear of violence and from
"Thus, we must distinguish between true threats, which, because of their lack of communicative value, are not protected by the first amendment, and those statements that seek to communicate a belief or idea, such as political hyperbole or a mere joke, which are protected." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Krijger , supra,
Until 2003, the objective foreseeability test, under which the state must prove that a reasonable person would interpret the defendant's threatening speech as a serious threat before the defendant may be punished for the speech, was universally acknowledged by federal courts as the proper constitutional standard for identifying punishable true threats under the first amendment. See
As we recognized in State v. Krijger , supra,
A plurality of the court also held, however, that a provision of the Virginia statute stating that "[a]ny such burning of a cross shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate a person or group of persons" was unconstitutional on its face because it did not differentiate between cross burnings that were intended to intimidate and other cross burnings and, therefore, "would create an unacceptable risk of the suppression of ideas."
As we observed in State v. Krijger , supra,
Several courts have also concluded that the plurality in Black held that the prima facie evidence provision of the cross burning statute was unconstitutional because the plurality was concerned that cross burning could be punished under that provision even when it was not reasonably foreseeable that anyone would be intimidated or terrorized, not because the statute failed to require proof of specific intent. Thus, these courts have reasoned, the plurality in Black was focused more on the Virginia cross burning statute's failure to differentiate between different levels of intent than on the specific mens rea that is constitutionally required before a person may be punished for threatening speech. See United States v. Martinez , supra,
Finally, one state court that has rejected the claim that Black adopted a subjective intent requirement reasoned that the purpose underlying the true threats doctrine, namely, protecting the targets of threats from the fear of violence, would not be "served by hinging constitutionality on the speaker's subjective intent ...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Stanley , supra,
We are persuaded by the reasoning of the courts that have concluded that Black did not adopt a subjective intent standard. Indeed, nothing in Black itself suggests that the court intended to overrule the preexisting consensus among the federal circuit courts of appeals that threatening speech may be punished under the first amendment when a reasonable person would interpret the speech as a serious
Having rejected the defendant's claim that the first amendment requires proof of a subjective intent, we need not determine whether the objective foreseeability
B
We next address the defendant's claim that the free speech provisions of article first, § 4, 5 and 14, of the Connecticut constitution provide greater protection than does the first amendment, and require the state to prove that an individual had the specific intent to terrorize the target of the threat before that person may be punished for threatening speech directed at a private individual. Specifically, the defendant relies on this court's statement in State v. Linares ,
"[I]n determining the contours of the protections provided by our state constitution, we employ a multifactor approach that we first adopted in [ State v. Geisler ,
In the present case, because neither the constitutional text nor the relevant federal
Nothing in either Linares or Leydon v. Greenwich , supra,
C
We next address the defendant's claim that threatening speech that is directed at a public official is subject to a higher standard than speech directed at a private
1
We first consider whether the first amendment imposes a higher mens rea standard on threatening speech directed at public officials. The defendant contends that, because a statute criminalizing political advocacy of the use of force or of lawlessness violates the first amendment unless "such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action"; (emphasis added) Brandenburg v. Ohio ,
2
We next address the defendant's contention that the free speech provisions of the Connecticut constitution require the state to prove that the defendant had a specific intent to terrorize when threatening speech is directed at public officials. In support of this claim, the defendant relies on the text of article first, § 14, of the Connecticut constitution, which provides that citizens have a right "to apply to those invested with the powers of government, for redress of grievances ... by petition, address or remonstrance." The defendant contends that his e-mail regarding Judge Bozzuto was a "remonstrance" within the meaning of this provision and, therefore, it was constitutionally protected. We disagree.
Without additional analysis explicating the term "remonstrance," we find it difficult to reconcile the
II
EVIDENTIARY CLAIMS
We next address the defendant's claim that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of events that occurred after he sent the e-mail to support its conclusion that the defendant violated § 53a-61aa (a) (3). Specifically, he contends that the trial court improperly admitted (1) evidence that firearms were seized from the defendant's residence one week after he sent the e-mail, and (2) the defendant's second e-mail to Nowacki, in which he reiterated his threats against Judge Bozzuto, because this evidence was irrelevant. We agree with the defendant's first claim, but conclude that the impropriety was harmless. We disagree, however, with his second claim.
"Our standard of review for evidentiary claims is well settled. To the extent [that] a trial court's admission of evidence is based on an interpretation of the Code of Evidence, our standard of review is plenary. For example, whether a challenged statement properly may be classified as hearsay and whether a hearsay exception properly is identified are legal questions demanding plenary review.... We review the trial court's decision to admit [or exclude] evidence, if premised on a correct view of the law, however, for an abuse of discretion.... The trial court has wide discretion to determine the relevancy of evidence and the scope of cross-examination.... Thus, [w]e will make every reasonable presumption in favor of upholding the trial court's [rulings on these bases]." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Davis ,
A
We first address the defendant's claim that the trial court improperly considered evidence that firearms were seized from his home approximately one week after he sent the threatening e-mail to support its conclusion that the defendant violated § 53a-61aa (a) (3). The record reveals the following additional relevant facts. The state presented evidence that, during their investigation of the defendant, the police obtained a "risk warrant" pursuant to General Statutes § 29-38c, authorizing them to enter the defendant's residence and to seize any firearms and ammunition that they found there. Upon executing the warrant, the police found and seized fifteen firearms and multiple rounds of ammunition. The police subsequently learned that, in March, 2013, the family court had issued an order prohibiting the defendant from possessing any firearms. In accordance with that order, the defendant had surrendered a number of firearms to a friend. When the police went to that friend's residence on September 2, 2014, he confirmed that he had received thirteen firearms from the defendant in March, 2013. During the summer of 2014, however, the defendant had indicated that he wanted them back. On August 27, 2014, five days after sending the e-mail, the defendant went to his friend's residence and retrieved six of the firearms. The friend turned over the remaining firearms to the police. Thereafter, the police examined the fifteen firearms that had been seized from the defendant's residence and determined that four of them
In Krijger , however, this court concluded only that knowledge by the target of a threat that the defendant had the means to carry out the threat can support the inference that the target would reasonably interpret the threat to be serious. See
The defendant also claims that the trial court improperly relied on his second e-mail to Nowacki to support the conclusion that the defendant was aware that there was a significant and unjustifiable risk that his initial e-mail would be interpreted as a serious threat. Specifically, the trial court concluded that the fact that the defendant expressed no surprise that Nowacki had interpreted the e-mail as a serious threat of violence and made no attempt to clarify his intent or retract the threat but, instead, reiterated his threats against Judge Bozzuto and also threatened her children, showed that
This court, however, has expressly recognized that "evidence of the conduct of a defendant subsequent to the commission of a crime is admissible to show the defendant's state of mind at the time of the crime." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Croom ,
III
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE CLAIMS
A
We next address the defendant's contention that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of threatening in the first degree in violation of § 53a-61aa (a) (3). Specifically, the defendant contends that the state failed to satisfy the constitutional requirement that (1) it was
"The standard of review we apply to a claim of insufficient evidence is well established. In reviewing the
"We also note that the jury must find every element proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find the defendant guilty of the charged offense, [but] each of the basic and inferred facts underlying those conclusions need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.... If it is reasonable and logical for the jury to conclude that a basic fact or an inferred fact is true, the jury is permitted to consider the fact proven and may consider it in combination with other proven facts in determining whether the cumulative effect of all the evidence proves the defendant guilty of all the elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt....
"Additionally, [a]s we have often noted, proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all possible doubt ... nor does proof beyond a reasonable doubt require acceptance of every hypothesis of innocence posed by the defendant that, had it been found credible by the [finder of fact], would have resulted in an acquittal.... On appeal, we do not ask whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We ask, instead, whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports the [finder of fact's] verdict of guilty." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Morgan ,
To convict a defendant of threatening in the first degree in violation of § 53a-61aa (a) (3), the state must
"Recognizing the difficulty in proving by direct evidence that an accused subjectively realized and chose to ignore a substantial risk ... we have long held that the state of mind amounting to recklessness ... may be inferred from conduct." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
With these principles in mind, we first consider whether the evidence was sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was aware that there was a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the recipients of his e-mail would interpret it as a serious threat. In making this determination, we consider the language used by the defendant; State v. Krijger , supra,
We turn first to the contents of the defendant's first e-mail. That e-mail stated: "The court is dog shit and has no right to shit they don't have a rule on"; "there [are] 245 [yards] between [Judge Bozzuto's] master bedroom and a cemetery that provides cover and concealment"; "[t]hey could try and put me in jail but that would start the ringing of a bell that can be undone"; "[s]omeone wants to take my kids better have an [F-35 fighter jet] and smart bombs ... otherwise they will be found and adjusted ... they should seek shelter on the ISS ( [international] space station)"; "a [.308 caliber rifle] at 250 [yards] with a double pane drops [one-half inch] per foot beyond the glass and loses [7 percent] of [foot pounds] of force [at] 250 [yards]-nonarmor piercing ball ammunition"; and "unless you sleep with level [three] body armor or live on the [international space station] you should be careful of actions." Judge Bozzuto testified that the descriptions of her residence and the surrounding area were
Indeed, the reactions of Nowacki, who called the e-mail disturbing, warned the defendant to refrain from making such statements, and admonished him that violence was not a solution, and Verraneault, who immediately contacted several people to express her concern and ultimately took steps to warn Judge Bozzuto, indicate that
The history between the defendant and Judge Bozzuto, along with the events immediately preceding the e-mail, also support the conclusion that the defendant was aware that there was a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the recipients of the e-mail and Judge Bozzuto would interpret it as a serious threat. One of the recipients of the e-mail, Kelley, testified that, during her dealings with the family court system, her feelings ran the "full gamut of every horrible thing that you can imagine. I've been angry, I've been sad, I've been despondent. There [are] no words. Apoplectic. I mean, it's the full gamut of terror. It's absolute terror." Kelley testified that she expressed those feelings to the defendant "[b]ecause he was experiencing something similar." The trial court reasonably could have inferred from this testimony that the other e-mail recipients, all of whom had been engaged with the defendant in efforts to reform the family court system, were equally aware that the defendant harbored such feelings toward the family court system, which Judge Bozzuto represented.
The state also presented evidence in the form of testimony by Tanya Taupier that the defendant's demeanor throughout the course of the divorce proceeding had been contentious and adversarial to all court personnel involved in the case. In addition, there was evidence that, on June 18, 2014, Judge Bozzuto had admonished the defendant in court to stop interjecting his political views into the custody evaluation that was being performed by the family services unit.
We conclude this evidence was sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that, as the trial court stated, "a reasonable person not only could foresee, but readily would foresee, that the language in the e-mail would be interpreted by those to whom it was communicated as a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of violence [against] Judge Bozzuto ...." (Emphasis in original.) As we have explained, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a reasonable person would interpret threatening
2
We next address the defendant's claim that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he was aware that there was a substantial and unjustifiable risk that Judge Bozzuto would be terrorized by the e-mail
To the extent that the defendant contends that threatening speech that is not communicated directly to the target of the speech cannot, as a matter of law, constitute a punishable true threat, we disagree.
In the present case, we agree with the trial court that, even if the recipients of the e-mail were " 'like-minded individuals' who understood and shared [the defendant's] frustration with the family court system" and his desire to reform it, the language of the e-mail was so extreme that the defendant had to have been "aware of and consciously disregarded the substantial and unjustifiable risk that ... it would be disclosed to others and cause terror to Judge Bozzuto." Indeed, there was no credible evidence that would support, much less compel, a finding that the defendant believed that all of the recipients would either support or be indifferent to a serious threat to kill a family court judge. To the contrary, the reactions of Nowacki and Verraneault to the defendant's first e-mail support the inference that
Moreover, when Skipp was asked if all of the recipients of the e-mail were "of a like mind when the issue was family court in Connecticut," she agreed that they were with the exception of Verraneault, who had "no children that were endangered by the state's actions." We conclude that this evidence
B
Finally, we address the defendant's contention that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he engaged in disorderly conduct directed at Verraneault. To prove this charge, the state was required to establish
We have concluded, however, that the defendant's e-mail was indeed a true threat. We further conclude that, when a speaker communicates a true threat to a person other than the target of the threat, and there is no evidence that the speaker believed that the third party would share or be indifferent to the speaker's desire to inflict violence on the target, the communication constitutes offensive conduct and creates a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the person will be inconvenienced, annoyed and alarmed. The defendant placed Verraneault in a position requiring her to either keep quiet about the threat, thereby making herself partially responsible-at least morally, if not legally-in the event it was carried out, or to instead communicate the threat to Judge Bozzuto, thereby taking the risk that the defendant's homicidal anger would be directed at her. Indeed, the trial court expressly found that Verraneault "harbored [fears] about her own safety if [the defendant] were to learn that she was the person who had disclosed the e-mail to law enforcement authorities ...." Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of disorderly conduct directed at Verraneault.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
Notes
The first amendment to the United States constitution provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
Article first, § 4, of the Connecticut constitution provides: "Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty."
Article first, § 5, of the Connecticut constitution provides: "No law shall ever be passed to curtail or restrain the liberty of speech or of the press."
Article first, § 14, of the Connecticut constitution provides: "The citizens have a right, in a peaceable manner, to assemble for their common good, and to apply to those invested with the powers of government, for redress of grievances, or other proper purposes, by petition, address or remonstrance."
General Statutes § 53a-61aa (a) provides in relevant part: "A person is guilty of threatening in the first degree when such person ... (3) commits threatening in the second degree as provided in section 53a-62, and in the commission of such offense such person uses or is armed with and threatens the use of or displays or represents by such person's words or conduct that such person possesses a pistol, revolver, shotgun, rifle, machine gun or other firearm ...." We note that the legislature has amended § 53a-61aa since the events underlying the present appeal. See, e.g., Public Acts 2016, No. 16-67, § 6. Those amendments have no bearing on the merits of this appeal. In the interest of simplicity, we refer to the current revision of the statute.
General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 53a-62 (a), in turn, provides: "A person is guilty of threatening in the second degree when ... (3) such person threatens to commit [any] crime of violence in reckless disregard of the risk of causing ... terror ...." We note that the legislature has also made certain amendments to § 53a-62 that are not relevant to the present appeal. See, e.g., Public Acts 2016, No. 16-67, § 7 (changing internal designations). For the sake of consistency with the record in the present case, all references to § 53a-62 in this opinion are to the 2013 revision of the statute.
The defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.
General Statutes § 53a-182 (a) provides: "A person is guilty of disorderly conduct when, with intent to cause inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, such person ... (2) by offensive or disorderly conduct, annoys or interferes with another person ...."
To the extent that the defendant contends that none of the statutes under which he was convicted is constitutional as applied to threatening speech, he effectively concedes on appeal that, if this court concludes that his conduct in sending the e-mail constitutionally may be subject to punishment pursuant to § 53a-61aa (a) (3), the other criminal statutes under which he was charged are also constitutional as applied to him. Accordingly, we limit our analysis to the constitutionality of § 53a-61aa (a) (3).
This e-mail reads as follows: "Facts: JUST an FYI ....
"[1] [I'm] still married to that POS ... we own our children, there is no decision ... its 50/50 or whatever we decide. The court is dog shit and has no right to shit they don't have a rule on.
"[2] They can steal my kids from my cold dead bleeding cordite filled fists ... as my [sixty] round [magazine] falls to the floor and [I'm] dying as I change out to the next [thirty rounds] ....
"[3] [Bo]zzuto lives in [W]atertown with her boys and [n]anny ... there [are] 245 [yards] between her master bedroom and a cemetery that provides cover and concealment.
"[4] They could try and put me in jail but that would start the ringing of a bell that can be undone ....
"[5] Someone wants to take my kids better have an [F-35 fighter jet] and smart bombs ... otherwise they will be found and adjusted ... they should seek shelter on the ISS ( [international] space station) ....
"[6] BTW a [.308 caliber rifle] at 250 [yards] with a double pane drops [one-half inch] per foot beyond the glass and loses [7 percent] of [foot pounds] of force [at] 250 [yards]-nonarmor piercing ball ammunition ....
"[7] Mike may be right ... unless you sleep with level [three] body armor or live on the ISS you should be careful of actions.
"[8] Fathers do not cause cavities, this is complete bullshit.
"[9] Photos of children are not illegal ....
"[10] Fucking [n]annies is not against the law, especially when there is no fucking going on, just ask [Bo]zzuto ... she is the ultimate [n]anny fucker."
The defendant's second e-mail reads as follows: "Hi Mike ... the thoughts that the courts want to take my civil rights away is equally disturbing, I did not have children, to have them abused by an illegal court system.
"My civil rights and those of my children and family will always be protected by my breath and hands.
"I know where she lives and I know what I need to bring about change ....
"These evil court assholes and self appointed devils will only bring about an escalation that will impact their personal lives and families.
"When they figure out they are not protected from bad things and their families are taken from them in the same way they took yours then the system will change.
"This past week in [Ferguson] there was a lot of hurt caused by an illegal act, if it were my son, shot, there would be an old testament response.
"[Second] amendment rights are around to keep a police state from violating my [family's] rights.
"If they-courts ... need sheeple they will have to look elsewhere. If they feel it's disturbing that I will fiercely protect my family with all my life ... they would be correct, I will gladly accept my death and theirs protecting my civil rights under my uniform code of justice.
"They do not want me to escalate ... and they know I will gladly ....
"I've seen years of fighting go [unnoticed], people are still suffering .... Judges still fucking sheeple over. Time to change the game.
"I don't make threats, I present facts and arguments. The argument today is what has all the energy that has expended done to really effect change, the bottom line is-insanity is defined as doing the [same thing] over and over and expecting a different outcome ... we should all be done ... and change the game to get results ... that's what Thomas Jefferson wrote about constantly.
"Don't be disturbed ... be happy there are new minds taking up a fight to change a system.
"Here is my daily prayer:
"I will never quit. I persevere and thrive on adversity.
"My [n]ation and [f]amily expects me to be physically harder and mentally stronger than my enemies.
"If knocked down, I will get back up, every time.
"I will draw on every remaining ounce of strength to protect my [family and] teammates and to accomplish our mission.
"I am never out of the fight ...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
All of the charges against the defendant arose from his conduct in sending the first e-mail, which, according to the trial court's factual findings, was the only e-mail that had been provided to law enforcement before the defendant's arrest and the only e-mail that came to the attention of Judge Bozzuto.
All subsequent references to the trial court are to Judge Gold.
General Statutes § 53a-3 (13) provides: "A person acts 'recklessly' with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or that such circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregarding it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation ...."
In his brief, the defendant contends that the trial court improperly applied Krijger 's objective foreseeability standard and that the court "altogether neglect[ed] the issue of scienter." The trial court did not neglect the issue of scienter, however, but applied the statutory recklessness standard, which it previously had concluded was constitutional. Nevertheless, because the defendant contends that the state and federal constitutions require the state to prove that he had the specific intent to terrorize Judge Bozzuto, that contention necessarily includes the position that the statutory recklessness standard is also unconstitutional.
We note that the defendant did not preserve before the trial court his state constitutional claim or his claim suggesting that proof of specific intent is required when the threatening speech is directed at a public official. Accordingly, we review those claims pursuant to State v. Golding ,
We recently stated in State v. Kono ,
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens and Breyer agreed with the portion of Justice O'Connor's opinion holding that the prima facie evidence provision was unconstitutional. The plurality noted, however, that the Supreme Court of Virginia had not authoritatively interpreted the meaning of the prima facie evidence provision, and it was theoretically possible that "the court, on remand, could interpret the provision in a manner different from that so far set forth in order to avoid the constitutional objections we have described." Virginia v. Black , supra,
See United States v. Heineman ,
See United States v. Martinez ,
Although the defendant relies on the federal precedent Geisler factor, we concluded in part I A of this opinion that persuasive federal precedent does not require proof of subjective intent. Accordingly, that factor favors the state's position that the recklessness standard of § 53a-61aa (a) (3) comports with the state constitution.
See Watts v. United States ,
Judge Bozzuto testified that, when she received the copy of the defendant's e-mail, she was aware that the family court previously had issued an order requiring the defendant to surrender all of his weapons. She also testified that, when she read the e-mail, she "took it that he had a weapon." There is no evidence, however, that Judge Bozzuto had any reason other than the reference in the e-mail to a .308 caliber rifle to believe that the defendant possessed weapons in violation of the family court order.
See part I A of this opinion.
This point may also have been missed by the Appellate Court in State v. Krijger ,
We acknowledge that, in Elonis v. United States , supra,
Whether the defendant actually intended to harm Judge Bozzuto or, instead, the statements in his e-mail were, as he claims, merely hyperbolic bluster, has no bearing on our analysis. The question before us is whether the defendant knew that there was a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the recipients of the e-mail would interpret it as a serious threat.
The defendant contends that the fact the Verraneault did not immediately communicate the contents of the e-mail to Judge Bozzuto or to others who could warn her shows that a reasonable person would not interpret the e-mail as a serious threat of harm. The trial court found, however, that the fact that Verraneault took the threat seriously was established by evidence showing that she sought guidance from a number of people as to how to proceed immediately after reading the e-mail. The trial court also found that Verraneault's delay in warning Judge Bozzuto was explained in part by the fact that "she harbored genuine concerns as to how the defendant would react if he was to learn that she was the person who had reported the e-mail to authorities." It would, indeed, be ironic to conclude that a delay in reporting caused by a genuine fear of the person who made the threat could be used to infer that the recipient did not interpret the threat to be serious.
The state presented evidence, on which the trial court relied, that, after Judge Bozzuto admonished the defendant in court on June 18, 2014, the defendant sent out multiple e-mails and Facebook postings criticizing Judge Bozzuto. There is no direct evidence, however, that either the recipients of the defendant's e-mail or Judge Bozzuto were aware of these specific communications. Nevertheless, the trial court reasonably could have concluded that the members of the informal family court reform group, which included the recipients of the e-mail, were generally aware of the defendant's negative attitude toward the family court and its personnel.
See United States v. Turner , supra,
As the trial court recognized, Skipp testified that the group of people interested in reforming the family court system had exchanged communications that were similar in intensity and hyperbole to the statements in the defendant's e-mail. The only examples that she could provide, however, were her own statements that "I wish I could mail [the guardian ad litem in her family court case] a box of dog poop" and "I wish [the guardian ad litem] would [self-immolate] ...." Kelley characterized the defendant's e-mail as a "hyperbolic [rant]." The trial court concluded, however, that there were serious questions as to whether Skipp and Kelley "were objective and unbiased witnesses [that] significantly undermined the value and credibility of their testimony" on this issue.