STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JOHN MAIETTA
(SC 19524)
Supreme Court of Connecticut
Argued December 16, 2015—officially released March 15, 2016
Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald, Espinosa and Robinson, Js.
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Sandra J. Crowell, senior assistant public defender, with whom, on the brief, were Martin Zeldis, former public defender, and Jacob Pezzulo, certified legal intern, for the appellant (defendant).
Timothy F. Costello, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Brian Preleski, state’s attorney, and Christian Watson, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion
ESPINOSA, J.
The following facts, as found by the trial court, are relevant to the resolution of this appeal. Following a complaint to the police by the defendant’s former girlfriend, D,1 the defendant was arrested in April, 2012, and charged with, inter alia, harassment in the second degree in violation of
On October 25, 2012, D contacted Robert Moreau, a probation officer with the Court Support Services Division (adult probation services), and informed him that she was concerned for her personal safety because she believed that the defendant was in possession of firearms. D told
Moreau contacted Detective Barbara Mattson of the state Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection (department) who confirmed that the three handguns were still registered in the name of the defendant’s father. Mattson also informed Moreau that in 2009, when the defendant’s father had been involuntarily conserved, the predecessor to the department had informed the defendant’s father that he was ineligible to possess firearms. State police records confirmed that the defendant was appointed his father’s conservator on March 16, 2009, and that the Harrington handgun had been transferred to the defendant. The records did not indicate that that particular gun was ever registered in the defendant’s name. On this information, Moreau received approval from his superiors in adult probation services to undertake a planned probationary search of the defendant’s garage in Newington. In accordance with the policy of adult probation services, Moreau received the assistance of Inspectors Michael Sullivan and Jay St. Jacques of the Office of the Chief State’s Attorney, certain members of the Greater New Britain Shooting Task Force, and an officer with the Berlin Police Department (collectively, search team).
On November 1, 2012, Moreau, accompanied by three other probation officers and the other members of the search team, traveled to the defendant’s apartment in New Britain to first locate the defendant prior to initiating the planned search of the Newington garage. Upon arriving at the defendant’s apartment, Moreau rang the doorbell and asked the defendant whether he had any firearms at that location. The defendant denied possessing any firearms at his apartment and allowed the probation officers into his apartment to search the immediate area for guns. When Moreau asked the defendant if he possessed any of his father’s firearms, he first indicated that he did not but later stated that there might be a gun stored within a dresser drawer at the Newington garage. The defendant agreed to a search of the garage and voluntarily accompanied Moreau to the site.
After arriving at the Newington garage, the defendant opened the building with his personal key and allowed Moreau and the other members of the search team inside. The defendant directed Moreau to a side room where the dresser allegedly containing the gun was located and indicated a particular dresser among several in the room. When the probation officers opened the drawer of the dresser that the defendant had identified, they located a Harrington & Richardson .22 caliber handgun. The serial number on that gun matched that of the Harrington handgun that was registered to the defendant’s late father. The defendant was thereafter charged with criminal possession of a weapon pursuant to
The defendant first argues that the searches of his apartment and garage were conducted for law enforcement, not probationary, purposes, and that the trial court therefore erred in not applying the exclusionary rule to suppress the evidence. Additionally, the defendant suggests that the presence of members of the Greater New Britain Shooting Task Force at the search violates the separation of powers doctrine. In response, the state notes that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable to probation revocation proceedings and that the defendant lacks standing to present a separation of powers claim, or alternatively, that the trial court’s findings preclude such a claim. As the exclusionary rule is indeed inapplicable to probation revocation proceed-ings and the record precludes the defendant’s separation of powers claim, we conclude that the trial court properly admitted the Harrington handgun and the defendant’s statements into evidence.
In reviewing a trial court’s decision on a motion to suppress, ‘‘[a] finding of fact will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous in view of the evidence and pleadings in the whole record . . . . [When] the legal conclusions of the court are challenged, [our review is plenary] . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kalphat, 285 Conn. 367, 374, 939 A.2d 1165 (2008). It is a well settled tenet of our fourth amendment jurisprudence that ‘‘unlike criminal trials, in which the exclusionary rule typically applies, in probation revocation hearings, the exclusionary rule typically does not apply.’’ State v. Jacobs, 229 Conn. 385, 392, 641 A.2d 1351 (1994); see also State v. Foster, 258 Conn. 501, 507, 782 A.2d 98 (2001); Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 364, 118 S. Ct. 2014, 141 L. Ed. 2d 344 (1998). We have observed that the exclusionary rule would only provide a ‘‘ ‘marginal deterrent’ ’’ to illegal police activity in the probation context; State v. Foster, supra, 508; given that, in probation revocation proceedings ‘‘the government has an interest in accurate fact-finding that is likely to be impaired when otherwise reliable and relevant evidence is excluded from the proceeding.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 507–508. Likewise, we recognize that probationers have ‘‘a diminished expectation of
In the present case, the defendant offers no compelling reasons as to why the exclusionary rule should apply under the circumstances of his case. The defendant attempts to circumvent the inapplicability of the exclusionary rule by claiming that the probation search conducted by Moreau and his search team was in actuality a thinly veiled law enforcement search orchestrated by the police. The trial court’s findings, however, plainly belie the defendant’s argument. The searches of the defendant’s apartment and the garage were planned probationary searches organized under the auspices of adult probation services. Contrary to the defendant’s characterization of the searches, the trial court specifically found that Moreau was ‘‘acting in his capacity as a probation officer’’ when he conducted the searches and questioned the defendant. The trial court specifically found that the searches were conducted by the probation officers and not the law enforcement personnel who were present. Indeed, nothing in the underlying record indicates that Moreau and the other probation officers were conducting the searches at the behest of the police or for reasons other than to ensure that the defendant was in compliance with the terms of his probation. As the trial court noted, because probation officers are unarmed, probation policy requires police officers to accompany probation officers on searches for safety reasons.
Furthermore, the present case contains no ‘‘ ‘egregious, shocking or harassing police misconduct’ ’’ that would merit the application of the exclusionary rule. State v. Foster, supra, 258 Conn. 509. The trial court found that there was ‘‘no evidence that the defendant was restrained in any way . . . [or] that force was used. There was no evidence of overbearing conduct, coercions or duress of any kind. There was no pushing, arguing, or harassing the defendant.’’ Rather, the record shows that the defendant voluntarily allowed Moreau and his search team into his apartment and the garage and cooperated with the searches. Accordingly, the defendant’s argument that the exclusionary rule should apply to the present case is unpersuasive, and we conclude that the trial court properly admitted the Harrington handgun and the defendant’s verbal statements into evidence.2
We briefly observe that the defendant’s claim that the searches violated the separation of powers doctrine3 is unavailing. Essentially, the defendant argues
Having determined that the trial court properly admitted the Harrington handgun and the defendant’s verbal statements into evidence, we turn to the defendant’s claim that the evidence was itself insufficient to establish that he violated his probation. In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence, ‘‘[a]ll that is required in a probation violation proceeding is enough to satisfy the court within its sound judicial discretion that the probationer has not met the terms of his probation. . . . [A] challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is based on the court’s factual findings. The proper standard of review is whether the court’s findings were clearly erroneous based on the evidence. . . . A court’s finding of fact is clearly erroneous and its conclusions drawn from that finding lack sufficient evidence when there is no evidence in the record to support [the court’s finding of fact] . . . . In making this determination, every reasonable presumption must be given in favor of the trial court’s ruling.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Maurice M., 303 Conn. 18, 26–27, 31 A.3d 1063 (2011).
We conclude that the evidence adduced at the hearing was sufficient for the trial court to determine that the defendant violated the terms of his probation. The evidence reveals that, following his guilty plea on September 26, 2012, the defendant reviewed and signed the terms and conditions of his probation, thereby manifesting his understanding of the necessity to abide by those conditions. The defendant subsequently reviewed the conditions of his probation with a probation officer on both October 1 and 11, 2012. One of the conditions of the defendant’s probation required him to comply with the court’s standing criminal protective order of September 26, 2012, which barred him from contacting D or possessing any firearms. The defendant had signed a state police ‘‘Firearm Compliance Statement,’’ reiterating his understanding that he could not possess firearms and representing that he currently
We briefly address the defendant’s remaining claims. First, the defendant alleges that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed Moreau and Mattson to testify to a statement made by a sergeant with the New Britain Police Department regarding the purported record of transfer of the Harrington handgun from the defendant’s father to the defendant. The defendant moved to strike this testimony as hearsay and the trial court denied the defendant’s motion. The defendant further argues that the trial court abused its discretion in not allowing into evidence a memorandum that, the defendant claims, would have rebutted Moreau’s and Mattson’s hearsay testimony. The defendant purports that these rulings denied him the right to present a defense.
We note at the outset that the rules of evidence do not apply to probation revocation hearings and, thus, relevant hearsay evidence is admissible at the discretion of the trial court.
Finally, the defendant advances the novel argument that the condition of his probation barring him from possessing firearms contravenes the second amendment right to bear arms. The second amendment to the United States constitution guarantees to citizens ‘‘the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation’’; District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 171 L. Ed. 2d 637 (2008); although that right is ‘‘not unlimited . . . .’’ Id., 595; State v. DeCiccio, 315 Conn. 79, 109, 105 A.3d 165 (2014). Specifically, the second amendment does not prevent ‘‘[long-standing] prohibitions on the possession of firearms . . . .’’ District of Columbia v. Heller, supra, 626; McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 786, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 177 L. Ed. 2d 894 (2010) (Alito, J.).
We conclude, however, that the defendant waived his second amendment right when he agreed to the condition of his probation barring him from possessing firearms. It is well established that ‘‘a waiver of constitutional rights must be voluntary . . . [under] the totality of circumstances.’’ (Citation omitted.) State v. Ross, 273 Conn. 684, 702, 873 A.2d 131 (2005); see Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461 (1938). We have long recognized that ‘‘while a potential probationer may reject the offer of probation, if he accepts it, he must accept all the conditions sought and cannot accept some and reject others.’’ State v. Smith, supra, 207 Conn. 169. As a result of their probationary status, probationers ‘‘do not enjoy the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only . . . conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special [probation] restrictions.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 165. In the present case, the defendant voluntarily accepted the terms of his probation and manifested his assent on several occasions to the condition that he could not possess firearms, most notably by signing the acknowledgment that he was to refrain from possessing firearms. The defendant cannot now claim that the conditions of his probation unconstitutionally infringe upon his second amendment right when he himself voluntarily agreed to the temporary restriction on the exercise of his second amendment right imposed by the condition barring him from possessing or having access to firearms. Had the defendant been fundamentally opposed to that particular condition, he was free to reject the offer of probation presented to him.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.