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STATE OF CONNECTICUT v . JASON WILLIAM DECICCIO (SC 19104) Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald, Espinosa and Vertefeuille, Js.
Argued October 23, 2013—officially released December 23, 2014 Michael Zariphes , assigned counsel, for the appel- lant (defendant).
Nancy L. Walker , special deputy assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, was Brian Kennedy senior assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion
PALMER, J. The defendant, Jason William DeCiccio, has an extensive weapons collection that includes a dirk knife and a police baton. A jury found him guilty of two counts of having a weapon in a motor vehicle, in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2009) § 29-38 (a), [1] for using his Jeep Cherokee (Jeep) to transport those items from his former residence in Connecticut to his new residence in Massachusetts. The defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered by the trial court in accordance with the jury’s verdict, contending, inter alia, that § 29-38 is unconstitutional as applied to his conduct in the present case. Specifi- cally, he claims that § 29-38: (1) is impermissibly vague because the terms ‘‘dirk knife’’ and ‘‘police baton’’ are not defined with sufficient clarity; and (2) violates the second amendment to the United States constitution insofar as it precluded him from using a vehicle to transport those weapons for the purpose of moving from one residence to another. We conclude that § 29- 38 is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to the facts of this case. We also conclude, however, first, that the possession of a dirk knife and a police baton in a per- son’s home is protected by the second amendment and, second, that our statutory scheme, which categorically bars the transportation of those weapons by motor vehi- cle from a former residence to a new residence, imper- missibly infringes on that constitutional right. Because the state acknowledges that the jury found that the defendant was transporting those weapons between residences when the police discovered them in his vehi- cle, his conviction cannot stand. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.
The record reveals the following facts, which the jury reasonably could have found, and procedural history. In 2010, the United States Veterans Health Administration hired the defendant, a member of the United States Army and the Army National Guard who had served overseas in numerous locations and capacities, to work as a medical claims processor at a Veterans Administra- tion (VA) hospital in Massachusetts. On July 22, 2010, the defendant was in the process of moving his belong- ings from his residence at his mother’s home in the town of Clinton to his new residence, a room in a private home in Bolton, Massachusetts, that he had rented. While driving on West Main Street in Clinton, at approxi- mately 4:30 p.m., the defendant’s Jeep struck another sport utility vehicle that was stopped at a traffic light, causing that vehicle to strike the vehicle in front of it. The defendant then reversed his Jeep and drove into a parking lot located across the street from the accident scene. After emergency personnel arrived, the defen- dant, who could not recall his own name, informed police that he had suffered a head injury, and he appeared disoriented and combative. The defendant *4 was subsequently transported by ambulance to Yale- New Haven Hospital (hospital), where he was admitted and treated for head injuries and post-traumatic stress disorder.
While assessing the damage to the defendant’s Jeep, Gregory Matakaetis, a Clinton police officer who had responded to the accident, observed two machete knives in plain view in the back seat of the Jeep. Mata- kaetis also discovered an expandable police baton, a belt clip holder for the baton, a sword and holder, a large knife with a brass knuckle handle that had a depiction of a dragon on it (dragon knife), and a dirk knife. Mata- kaetis found a military dog tag, lead weights, and a black ‘‘duty bag’’ in the Jeep, as well. The defendant had kept all of these items as mementos of his military service overseas in Afghanistan, Germany, and Kosovo, and was in the process of moving them to his new residence in Massachusetts when he was involved in the automobile accident.
Following his release from the hospital, the state charged the defendant in a substitute information with six counts of having a weapon in a motor vehicle in violation of § 29-38 (a). Each count alleged the unlawful possession of one of the seized items, specifically, the police baton, the two machete knives, the dirk knife, the sword, and the dragon knife. The case was tried to a jury, which found the defendant guilty of unlawfully having the police baton and the dirk knife in his vehicle, and not guilty with respect to the other four counts. [3] The trial court rendered a judgment of conviction in accordance with the jury’s verdict and sentenced the defendant to a total effective sentence of three years imprisonment, execution suspended after fifteen months, and three years probation with special condi- tions. The trial court subsequently denied the defen- dant’s postverdict motion for a judgment of acquittal, rejecting his claims that § 29-38 is unconstitutionally vague as applied and violates the second amendment. This appeal followed. [4]
On appeal, the defendant claims that § 29-38 is uncon- stitutionally vague as applied to the facts of the present case because he had inadequate notice that the weapons that formed the basis of his conviction fall within the proscription of that statutory provision. The defendant also contends that, as applied to his conduct, § 29-38 contravenes his second amendment right to bear arms because it afforded him no lawful means of transporting his dirk knife and police baton to his new residence, thereby effectively precluding him from possessing those weapons at his new residence. We reject the defendant’s claim that § 29-38 is unconstitutionally vague. We agree, however, first, that the second amend- ment protects the defendant’s right to possess the dirk knife and police baton in his home and, second, that the statute’s complete ban on transporting those items *5 between residences unduly burdens that right. The defendant’s conviction, therefore, must be reversed. [6]
I WHETHER § 29-38 IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE AS APPLIED We begin with the defendant’s contention that § 29- 38 is unconstitutionally vague as applied, first, because the terms ‘‘dirk knife’’ and ‘‘police baton,’’ which are not statutorily defined, do not otherwise have a sufficiently clear or definite meaning and, second, because § 29-38 is impermissibly ambiguous as to whether the moving exception of § 29-38 (b) (5) (D), which does not expressly include within its terms dirk knives and police batons, nevertheless extends to those items. We are not persuaded by either of the defendant’s vagueness arguments.
Before addressing the merits of the defendant’s
claims, we set forth the legal principles applicable to
those claims. ‘‘The determination of whether a statutory
provision is unconstitutionally vague is a question of
law over which we exercise de novo review. . . . In
undertaking such review, we are mindful that [a] statute
is not void for vagueness unless it clearly and unequivo-
cally is unconstitutional, making every presumption in
favor of its validity. . . . To demonstrate that [a stat-
ute] is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him, the
[defendant] therefore must . . . demonstrate beyond
a reasonable doubt that [he] had inadequate notice of
what was prohibited or that [he was] the victim of
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. . . . [T]he
void for vagueness doctrine embodies two central pre-
cepts: the right to fair warning of the effect of a govern-
ing statute . . . and the guarantee against standardless
law enforcement. . . . If the meaning of a statute can
be fairly ascertained a statute will not be void for
vagueness since [m]any statutes will have some inher-
ent vagueness, for [i]n most English words and phrases
there lurk uncertainties.’’ (Citation omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.)
State Winot
,
Finally, even though a statutory term that is suscepti-
ble to a number of differing interpretations may be
impermissibly vague as applied to some situations, the
term is not necessarily vague as applied in all cases;
rather, whether the statute suffers from unconstitu-
tional vagueness is a case-specific question, the resolu-
tion of which depends on the particular facts involved.
*6
See, e.g.,
State ex rel. Gregan Koczur
,
A Whether the Statutory Terms ‘‘Dirk Knife’’ and ‘‘Police
Baton’’ Are Unconstitutionally Vague We begin with the defendant’s claim that § 29-38 is unconstitutionally vague because the terms ‘‘dirk knife’’ and ‘‘police baton’’ are not statutorily defined and their meaning is not otherwise sufficiently clear or definite to satisfy the requirement of fair notice. To resolve this claim, we must determine whether the process of statutory interpretation reveals a core meaning for those terms such that a person of ordinary intelligence would be able to understand what class or type of weapon the legislature intended to ban by its prohibi- tion against having a dirk knife or a police baton in a motor vehicle. In performing this task, we first consider the language of § 29-38 (a), which provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any person who knowingly has, in any vehicle owned, operated or occupied by such person, any weapon . . . shall be fined not more than one thou- sand dollars or imprisoned not more than five years or both, and the presence of any such weapon . . . in any vehicle shall be prima facie evidence of a violation of this section by the owner, operator and each occupant thereof. . . .’’ For purposes of § 29-38 (a), the word ‘‘weapon’’ includes ‘‘any police baton or nightstick’’ and ‘‘any dirk knife . . . .’’ Because it is apparent that the language of § 29-38 provides no ready answer to the constitutional question raised by the defendant’s claim, we must use other available tools of statutory construc- tion to resolve that claim.
1
Dirk Knife
We first address the defendant’s contention that the
term ‘‘dirk knife’’ is unconstitutionally vague and, as a
result, § 29-38 ‘‘impermissibly delegates the resolution
of the definition of [the term] to be determined by
[police officers], judges and juries on [an] ad hoc and
subjective basis.’’ By way of illustration, the defendant
notes that,
in contrast to Connecticut’s statutory
scheme, which contains no definition of the term, Cali-
fornia has enacted legislation that expressly defines the
term ‘‘dirk’’; Cal. Penal Code § 16470 (Deering 2012);
[7]
*7
an action by the California legislature that remedied
flaws identified by court decisions applying previous
versions of the California statute. The defendant also
maintains that there is ambiguity in the word ‘‘dirk’’
because, although common usage treats the terms
‘‘dirk’’ and ‘‘dagger’’ as synonyms, the technical meaning
of the term, as explicated by various cutlery treatises,
demonstrates that a dirk is not necessarily a dagger,
but may also be a knife with a single-edged blade. In
this regard, the defendant also asserts that numerous
dictionary definitions of the term ‘‘dirk’’ do not specifi-
cally identify a dirk as a double-edged knife. The state
contends that the meaning of the term ‘‘dirk knife,’’
namely, a knife designed primarily for stabbing and
featuring a sharp tapered blade, is readily accessible
from numerous online and print sources, including sis-
ter state case law. See, e.g.,
Summerall State
, 41 So.
3d 729, 736–37 (Miss. App. 2010);
In re Jesse QQ.
, 243
App. Div. 2d 788, 789–90,
We commence our analysis of the defendant’s claim with a description of the knife at issue, which is com- prised of a black handle and a metal blade. The handle is four and one-half inches long and one inch wide, and terminates with a two inch guard. The dagger like blade of the knife, both edges of which are sharpened, is approximately one and one-half inches wide and five and one-half inches long. A distinctive feature of the knife is that, two and one-half inches from the hilt, the blade forks into two distinct parallel prongs with a small space between them that taper to independent sharp points.
We turn next to the term ‘‘dirk knife.’’ Because Gen-
eral Statutes § 1-1 requires us to construe statutory
words and phrases ‘‘according to the commonly
approved usage of the language,’’ we look to the diction-
ary to determine the commonly understood meaning
of the term. E.g.,
Sams Dept
.
of Environmental Pro-
tection
,
Because, for present purposes, these dictionary defi- nitions of the term ‘‘dirk’’ are not entirely elucidating, we turn to extrinsic evidence of the intended meaning of the term. Although there is no recorded legislative history providing direct insight into the legislature’s contemplation of the meaning of the term ‘‘dirk,’’ it bears noting that the legislature added it to the statutory scheme in 1953 with the enactment of Public Acts 1953, No. 205, §§ 1 and 2, which amended the dangerous weapons statutes, now codified at § 29-38 (a) and Gen- eral Statutes § 53-206 (a), by expanding the definition of the term ‘‘weapon’’ to include ‘‘any dirk knife or switch knife or any knife having an automatic spring release device by which a blade is released from the handle, having a blade of over one and a half inches in length . . . .’’ The scant legislative history accompa- nying the enactment of that public act reflects the fact that the legislature was concerned with a proliferation of stabbings caused by dangerous knives, particularly those with long blades and switchblades. See 5 S. Proc., Pt. 3, 1953 Sess., pp. 1073–75, remarks of Senators Joseph S. Longo and Patrick J. Ward.
The case law of other states invariably construes the term ‘‘dirk knife’’ in statutes similar to § 29-38 as a knife designed or primarily intended for use as a stabbing weapon. For example, in Summerall State , supra, 41 So. 3d 729, the Mississippi Court of Appeals engaged in an extensive discussion of the meaning of the term and concluded that, ‘‘to qualify as a dirk knife, the weapon must . . . be designed primarily for use as a stabbing weapon,’’ and, to that end, it also must ‘‘have a blade with at least one sharpened edge which tapers to a point . . . .’’ Id., 737. In adopting this definition, the court in Summerall was persuaded by the analysis undertaken by the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court in In re Jesse QQ. , supra, 243 App. Div. 2d 788, which had reached the same conclusion regarding the meaning of the term ‘‘dirk.’’ Id., 789 (explaining that ‘‘test for a dirk is whether the instru- ment has a blade with at least one sharpened edge [that] tapers to a point and is primarily intended for use as a stabbing weapon’’).
Statutory provisions and case law from other states,
as well as reference treatises on cutlery, are generally
consistent with
Summerall
and
In re Jesse QQ
. See,
e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 16470 (Deering 2012) (‘‘[a]s used
in this part, ‘dirk’ or ‘dagger’ means a knife or other
instrument with or without a handguard that is capable
of ready use as a stabbing weapon that may inflict great
bodily injury or death’’);
Walthour
, 876 So. 2d
*9
594, 597 (Fla. App. 2004) (‘‘ ‘Dirk’ and ‘dagger’ are used
synonymously, and consist of any straight stabbing
weapon. The test is its capacity for use [as] a stabbing
weapon.’’);
Commonwealth Miller
, 22 Mass. App. 694,
697,
In contrast to
Summerall
and
In re Jesse QQ.
, Virginia
courts have indicated that a knife does not fall within
the meaning of the term ‘‘dirk’’ unless both edges of its
blade are sharpened. See
Thompson Commonwealth
We therefore conclude that § 29-38 is not void for vagueness as applied to the defendant because the core meaning of the term ‘‘dirk knife’’ may be ascertained from case law in other states and available print refer- ence materials on cutlery. The authorities to which we have cited make clear that, whatever else the term ‘‘dirk’’ may describe, at the very least, it applies to a knife that is designed primarily for stabbing purposes, rather than utilitarian purposes, has a blade with sharp- ened edges that tapers to a point, and has a handle with guards intended to facilitate the act of stabbing or thrusting. See, e.g., Knight State , supra, 116 Nev. 146; cf. N. Strung, An Encyclopedia of Knives (1976) p. 94. Accordingly, although we acknowledge the possibil- ity that the statutory reference to dirk knives might be vague as applied to some knives, we are satisfied that a person of ordinary intelligence would be on notice that a knife that has all of the foregoing characteristics falls within the statute’s ‘‘unmistakable core of prohib- ited conduct . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) State ex rel. Gregan Koczur , supra, 287 Conn. 156; see also id., 156–57 (‘‘[a] defendant whose conduct clearly comes within a statute’s unmistakable core of prohibited conduct may not challenge the statute because it is vague as applied to some hypothetical situation’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]). Further- more, this definition is consistent with the general pur- pose of §§ 29-38 and 53-206, namely, to prohibit the carrying of knives that are primarily designed as stab- bing weapons, and not for some other legitimate pur- pose. Because the defendant does not contend that the state failed to establish that the knife at issue in the present case had all of the characteristics that we have identified or that the evidence was otherwise insuffi- cient, we now turn to his claim with respect to the police baton.
2 Police Baton The defendant contends that he reasonably could not have known that the metal instrument that he carried in his Jeep and for which he was prosecuted, which is approximately one and one-half feet in length and consists of a ten inch long handle that connects to a telescoping metal rod, approximately one-half inch in diameter, which terminates with a semicircle metal bulb, is an expandable police baton within the meaning of § 29-38 (a). The defendant argues that the term is unconstitutionally vague because ‘‘an ordinary diction- ary fails to even give a definition of a police baton.’’ [9] *11 The state disputes the defendant’s vagueness claim, relying on images obtained from the Internet that the state characterizes as ‘‘nearly identical’’ to the item seized from the defendant’s Jeep, as well as dictionary definitions for the terms ‘‘baton’’ and the related ‘‘billy club.’’ We agree with the state that the statute’s ban on having a police baton in a vehicle is not void for vagueness as applied to the defendant in the present case.
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary defines the word ‘‘baton’’ in relevant part as: ‘‘1. Cudgel, truncheon; specif[ically]: billy club . . . .’’ [10] (Emphasis omitted.) Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, supra, p. 103. A ‘‘billy club’’ is defined as ‘‘a heavy, usu[ally] wooden club; specif[ically]: a police officer’s club . . . .’’ (Emphasis omitted.) Id., p. 122; see also id., p. 303 (defining ‘‘cudgel’’ as ‘‘a short heavy club’’); id., p. 1343 (defining ‘‘truncheon’’ as obsolete term for ‘‘club’’ and ‘‘bludgeon,’’ and as ‘‘baton’’ or ‘‘a police officer’s billy club’’). We also note that the related term ‘‘nightstick,’’ which is used in § 29-38 (a) along with ‘‘police baton,’’ is defined synonymously as ‘‘a police officer’s club . . . .’’ Id., p. 837. Although the dictionary definition of ‘‘baton’’ indicates that the term is commonly or fre- quently used to refer to an instrumentality made of wood, there is nothing in that definition that excludes such an instrumentality from its purview solely because it is made of something else. We therefore turn to extra- textual sources to ascertain whether the expandable metal instrument seized from the defendant’s vehicle is a police baton.
The legislative history of § 29-38 is silent as to the
specific type of instruments that the legislature envi-
sioned would fall within the definition of police baton
or nightstick. Statutes should be construed, however,
to effectuate the legislature’s intent, consistent with the
ordinary meaning of the words used, as technologies
evolve. See, e.g.,
Rutledge State
,
Furthermore, as the state notes, readily available descriptions and images of expandable batons are strik- ingly similar to the baton that the defendant in the present case possessed, a fact that supports the conclu- sion that a person of ordinary intelligence would or reasonably should be aware that possessing such an item in a motor vehicle violates § 29-38. See, e.g., Galls: The Authority in Public Safety Equipment and Apparel (online catalog displaying numerous models of expand- able batons), available at http://www.galls.com/ expandable-batons (last visited November 28, 2014); see also California Dept. of Consumer Affairs, Bureau of Security and Investigative Services, ‘‘Baton Training Manual: Student Text’’ (March, 2006) p. 13 (describing characteristics of straight, expandable baton), available at http://www.bsis.ca.gov/forms_pubs/bat_stuman.pdf (last visited November 28, 2014). Indeed, it would be unreasonable, and incompatible with the statute’s obvi- ous public safety purpose, to conclude that § 29-38 can- not be read as encompassing expandable metal batons, particularly in view of the fact that these devices—like other weapons subject to the statute, such as dirks, stilettos, and certain martial arts weapons—may readily be reduced to an easily concealable size.
Finally, a construction of the term ‘‘police baton’’ as
including metal expandable batons is consistent with
the case law of other jurisdictions. See
Shahit Tosqui
United States District Court, Docket No. 04-71538 (E.D.
Mich. June 1, 2005) (noting that ‘‘extendable baton fits
comfortably within the dictionary definitions of’’ terms
‘‘billy’’ and ‘‘bludgeon,’’ which are not defined by Michi-
gan criminal statutes), aff’d,
B
Whether § 29-38 Is Unconstitutionally Vague
with Respect to the Application of
the Moving Exception in
§ 29-38 (b) (5) (D)
The defendant next claims that § 29-38 is void for
vagueness in the absence of a ‘‘clarification [of] the
moving exception’’ contained in § 29-38 (b) (5) (D). The
defendant, who characterizes the existing statute as
‘‘clearly susceptible to arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement,’’ claims that we should place a judicial
gloss on the moving exception of § 29-38 (b) (5) (D)
and extend that exception to dirk knives and police
batons. In support of this contention, the defendant
maintains that we should follow our interpretation of
the nearly identically worded § 53-206 (b) (3) (D) in
Campbell
,
The defendant’s claim is belied by the plain language of § 29-38. Subsection (a) of § 29-38 prohibits certain conduct, including, of course, the vehicular transporta- *14 tion of dirk knives and police batons, and subsection (b), which is comprised of numerous subdivisions and subparagraphs that operate as affirmative defenses to be pleaded and proven by the defendant, contains no language that even arguably would authorize the defendant’s transportation of a dirk knife or a police baton. Indeed, § 29-38 (b) does provide for certain exceptions to the general prohibition against having a dirk knife or a police baton in a vehicle. For example, under § 29-38 (b) (2), a security guard may have a police baton in a vehicle while engaged in the pursuit of his official duties, and § 29-38 (b) (5) permits the transpor- tation of knives, the edged portion of which is four inches or more in length, in a vehicle under certain enumerated circumstances. The defendant has identi- fied no such exception, however, that might be con- strued as permitting his transportation of a dirk knife or police baton in his vehicle. Consequently, there is nothing in the statutory language to support the con- tention that it is unclear whether the defendant’s con- duct in the present case was exempt from prosecution under § 29-38 (b).
The defendant’s reliance on
State Campbell
, supra,
We concluded that the statutory exception pertaining
to the carrying of knives, namely, § 53-206 (b) (3), which
is identical to § 29-38 (b) (5) in all material respects,
does not apply to weapons other than long knives. Id.,
378. Observing that the pre-1999 version of § 53-206 (b)
had maintained a broader ‘‘exception for ‘any .
.
.
*15
weapon or implement’ listed in the prohibitory clause,’’
we ‘‘conclude[d] that the exceptions set forth in sub-
paragraphs (D) and (E) of § 53-206 (b) (3) [that is, the
moving exception and the repair exception] plainly and
unambiguously appl[ied] only to the carrying of long
knives.’’ Id. Although we ‘‘reaffirm[ed] our holding in
State Sealy
, supra,
In Campbell , ‘‘[w]e emphasize[d] that this does not mean that an individual would be permitted to carry all of the dangerous weapons specified in § 53-206 (b) on his or her person in [his or her] residence or place of abode for other purposes. . . . For example, it does not follow from the fact that a martial arts student would be permitted to carry a martial arts weapon from his or her residence to a place of repair that the individ- ual would be permitted as a general matter to carry the weapon in his or her residence. If that were the case, there would be no reason why an individual who was not a martial arts student should be prohibited from carrying a martial arts weapon in his or her residence. There is no indication, however, that the legislature was concerned with protecting a general sphere of privacy in the home, where individuals would be permitted to carry any dangerous weapon for any purpose they see fit. Rather, the clear purpose of the exceptions is to allow individuals to carry specific dangerous weapons for specific purposes and, to the extent that using the *16 weapon for the permitted purpose requires the individ- ual to carry it for ancillary purposes such as transporta- tion to the place of use or repair, to permit carrying the weapon for those purposes.’’ [17] (Citation omitted; emphasis omitted.) Id., 380 n.6. Accordingly, we con- cluded that, because ‘‘the statute . . . recognizes no ‘presumed lawful reason’ for carrying a switchblade knife’’; id., 381; Campbell was not ‘‘entitled to a jury instruction under the statute even if the common hall- way of the dormitory constituted his abode because he was carrying a switchblade knife, which is prohibited irrespective of location.’’ Id., 378.
Consistent with our construction of the moving exception of § 53-206 (b) (3) in Campbell , we conclude that the linguistically indistinguishable moving excep- tion of § 29-38 (b) (5) (D) does not apply to the defen- dant’s dirk knife or police baton, which, like switch- blades, are items that are ‘‘prohibited [by statute] irre- spective of location.’’ [18] Id. The plain and unambiguous statutory language, coupled with our recent construc- tion in Campbell of an identically worded provision in a related statute, gave the defendant fair warning that he was not permitted to use his motor vehicle to transport a dirk knife or police baton when, as in the present case, there is no other statutory exception that permits him to transport those items lawfully. Accordingly, we con- clude that § 29-38 (a) is not void for vagueness in the absence of our clarification of the moving exception in § 29-38 (b) (5) (D).
II
WHETHER § 29-38, AS APPLIED, VIOLATES
THE SECOND AMENDMENT
We now turn to the defendant’s claim, which is based
on the United States Supreme Court’s recent decisions
in
McDonald Chicago
,
In addressing the defendant’s claims, we first must determine whether dirk knives and police batons consti- tute arms within the meaning of the second amendment. If we conclude that they are, we then must determine whether the statute’s prohibition against transporting those weapons from one residence to another does not violate the defendant’s rights under the second amend- *17 ment because the state has a sufficiently strong interest in enforcing such a prohibition. We address the parties’ arguments on these points in turn.
A
Background
We begin with a brief review of the scope of the
second amendment, as explained by the United States
Supreme Court in its landmark decision in
District of
Columbia Heller
, supra,
Two years later, the United States Supreme Court
considered whether the second amendment right to
keep and bear arms is incorporated in the concept of
due process and, therefore, applicable to the states via
the fourteenth amendment. See
McDonald
v.
Chicago
,
supra,
Heller
aptly has been characterized as having adopted
‘‘a two-pronged approach to [s]econd [a]mendment
challenges. First, [the court] ask[s] whether the chal-
lenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling within
the scope of the [s]econd [a]mendment’s guarantee.
. . . If it does not, [the] inquiry is complete. If it does,
[the court] evaluate[s] the law under some form of
means-end scrutiny. If the law passes muster under that
standard, it is constitutional. If it fails, it is invalid.’’
(Citation omitted; footnote omitted.)
United States
v.
Marzzarella
,
U.S.
,
B
Whether Dirk Knives and Police Batons
Are Protected Arms Under
the Second Amendment
As we have explained, in evaluating the constitution-
ality of the statutory proscription against the transporta-
*19
tion of dirk knives and police batons, we first must
determine whether those weapons fall within the term
‘‘[a]rms’’ for purposes of the second amendment.
[23]
See,
e.g.,
United States
v.
Henry
,
Significantly, however, for purposes of the present case, the court in Heller then articulated ‘‘what types of weapons Miller permits. Read in isolation, Miller ’s phrase ‘part of ordinary military equipment’ could mean that only those weapons useful in warfare are protected. That would be a startling reading of the opinion, since *20 it would mean that the National Firearms Act’s restric- tions on machineguns (not challenged in Miller ) might be unconstitutional, machineguns being useful in war- fare in 1939. We think that Miller ’s ‘ordinary military equipment’ language must be read in tandem with what comes after: ‘[O]rdinarily when called for [militia] ser- vice [able-bodied] men were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at the time.’ . . . The traditional militia was formed from a pool of men bringing arms ‘in common use at the time’ for lawful purposes like self-defense. ‘In the colonial and revolutionary war era, [small-arms] weap- ons used by militiamen and weapons used in defense of person and home were one and the same.’ . . . Indeed, that is precisely the way in which the [s]econd [a]mendment’s operative clause furthers the purpose announced in its preface. We therefore read Miller to say only that the [s]econd [a]mendment does not pro- tect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abid- ing citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted.) Id., 624–25; see also United States Miller , supra, 307 U.S. 179–82 (discussing, inter alia, William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England , Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations , and state statutes governing citizens’ obligations to participate in militia and to sup- ply weapons such as muskets or firelocks, ammunition, swords and bayonets).
The court further noted that this reading of
Miller
’s
‘‘important limitation’’ on the second amendment right
finds ‘‘[support in] the historical tradition of prohibiting
the carrying of ‘dangerous and unusual weapons.’ ’’
Dis-
trict of Columbia Heller
, supra,
1
Dirk Knives
The state contends that dirk knives fall outside the
scope of the second amendment because they ‘‘are not
normally carried by private, law-abiding citizens for
defense of hearth and home, and are not traditional
military weapons.’’ The state supports this argument
with citations to a number of nineteenth century cases
to which the court in
Heller
cites; see, e.g.,
Aymette
v.
State
,
A particularly thorough and authoritative analysis of
this issue is found in
State Delgado
,
After examining the centuries long evolution of the
knife as a weapon used by military forces around the
world; see id., 401–402; the court in
Delgado
explained
that the switchblade knife was simply a technological
improvement on folding knives such as military jack-
knives and the ‘‘constant or enduring’’ pocketknife. Id.,
402. Accordingly, the court concluded that, if the Ore-
gon dangerous weapons statute ‘‘proscribed the posses-
sion of mere pocketknives, there can be no question
but that the statute would be held to conflict directly
with [a]rticle I, [§] 27 [of the Oregon constitution]. The
only difference is the presence of the spring-operated
mechanism that opens the knife.’’ Id., 403. The court
therefore invalidated the state’s absolute prohibition on
the possession of switchblade knives. Id., 404. But
see
Lacy State
,
Guided by the definition of the term ‘‘arms,’’ as articu-
lated in
District of Columbia Heller
, supra, 554 U.S.
624–25, and the analytical approach employed in both
Heller
and
Delgado
, supra,
‘‘Well after the nation’s founding, knives continued to be an important tool for many American soldiers. During World War II, American soldiers, sailors, and airmen wanted and purchased fixed blade knives, often of considerable dimensions. At least in some units, sol- diers were ‘authorized an M3 trench knife, but many carried a favorite hunting knife.’ The Marine Corps issued the Ka-Bar fighting knife. As one World War II memoir recounts, ‘[t]his deadly piece of cutlery was manufactured by the company bearing its name. The knife was [one] foot long with a [seven inch long] by [one and one-half inch wide] blade. . . . Light for its size, the knife was beautifully balanced.’ Vietnam mem- oirs report that Ka-Bar and similar knives were still in use, but ‘not [everyone was] issued a Ka-Bar knife. There [were] not enough to go around. If you [did not] have one, you [were forced to] wait until someone [was] going home from Vietnam and [gave] his to you.’ Even today, some Special Forces units regularly carry combat knives.’’ (Emphasis omitted; footnotes omitted.) D. Kopel et al., ‘‘Knives and the Second Amendment,’’ 47 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 167, 192–93 (2013).
The history of dirk knives in particular is consistent with the American military usage of knives in general. ‘‘A dirk is a long straight-bladed dagger or short sword usually defined by comparison [to] the ceremonial weapons carried by Scottish highlanders and naval offi- cers in the [e]ighteenth and [n]ineteenth [c]enturies.’’ Commonwealth Miller , supra, 22 Mass. App. 695. In the 1700s, the Scottish brought the dirk to the Americas, where its design evolved from a knife with a handle grip overlapping a large single-edged blade, to a double- edged blade; after 1745, dirk blades ‘‘[q]uite frequently . . . were made from old sword blades.’’ H. Peterson, supra, p. 19. As the dirk has evolved to be nearly synony- mous with the dagger, the term became ‘‘appli[cable] to all the short side arms carried by naval officers,’’ such that it came to include ‘‘true daggers and sharply curved knives almost of cutlass length.’’ Id., p. 2; see also id., p. 95 (describing dirk as ‘‘[t]he most colorful of all the naval knives’’ and ‘‘[a] companion to and substitute for the sword’’). The blade shape of dirks evolved during the nineteenth century from straight and double-edged to curved and then back to straight; all dirks featured large handles separated from the blade by prominent guards, or quillons. See id., pp. 96–101 *24 (collecting photographs); see also E. Janes, supra, p. 67 (noting that dirk used in early nineteenth century had double-edged blade, becoming, ‘‘in fact, a short sword’’). Indeed, as the naval dirk evolved over time to become the Ka-Bar fighting knife and other military issued combat knives—all of which look remarkably like the dirk knife at issue in the present case—the enhancements have included now common stabbing oriented features such as relatively long blades tapered to a sharp point, multiple edges, a handle with a hilt to protect the user’s hand during thrusting, and thick grips. Compare H. Peterson, supra, pp. 100–101 (photographs of nineteenth century naval dirks), with id., pp. 108, 111 (describing and depicting Navy Mark 2 and Ka-Bar knives), and id., p. 109 (noting that naval Mark 2 knife was ‘‘only possible weapon’’ for use in defending against enemy frogmen during underwater demolition work).
As to whether dirk knives are ‘‘ ‘dangerous and
unusual weapons’ ’’;
District of Columbia Heller
supra,
Although the state cites to numerous authorities that, at first blush, might appear to support a contrary conclu- sion, a more careful review of these authorities reveals that they lack persuasive force. We turn first to its post- Heller authorities, most notably, Commonwealth v. Alem A ., supra, Massachusetts Appeals Court, Docket No. 10-P-600, which is directly on point insofar as it concluded that the second amendment, as elucidated by Heller , does not extend to a large, double-edged knife. Nevertheless, the Massachusetts Appeals Court designated its decision in Alem A . as unpublished and nonprecedential, presumably because its entire consti- tutional analysis consists of a single paragraph. Even that limited analysis is suspect in view of the court’s reasoning that, because double-edged knives are deemed ‘‘dangerous’’ under the Massachusetts statute prohibiting the carrying of dangerous weapons, they are, ipso facto, ‘‘ ‘dangerous and unusual’ ’’ and, as a consequence, not protected under the second amend- ment. Id. Alem A . is wholly unpersuasive authority that we respectfully decline to follow.
The state’s reliance on
Wooden United States
supra,
Finally, the most venerable authorities on which the
state relies, in particular, the nineteenth century cases
of
Aymette
v.
State
, supra,
For these reasons, we agree with the defendant that, under Heller , the dirk knife that he was transporting to his new residence falls within the term ‘‘[a]rms’’ for purposes of the second amendment. We therefore must decide whether the state’s interest in prohibiting the defendant from possessing that weapon in his vehi- cle is sufficient to overcome the defendant’s second *27 amendment rights. We first consider, however, whether the defendant’s possession of the police baton also is subject to protection under the second amendment.
2
Police Baton
In response to the defendant’s contention that he had
a second amendment right to have the police baton in
his vehicle, the state contends that police batons are
‘‘dangerous and unusual’’ when possessed by persons
not associated with law enforcement. In particular, the
state points to the facts of the Rodney King case; see
Koon
v
. United States
,
We begin with a brief discussion of
People Brown
supra,
In contrast, in
Kessler
, supra,
Kessler
is more persuasive than
Brown
with respect
to whether police batons fall within the protection of the
second amendment. Perhaps most importantly, police
batons simply are not the same as blackjacks, rendering
Brown
distinguishable in that important regard.
[37]
See
Commonwealth Perry
,
This widespread acceptance of batons within the law
enforcement community also supports the conclusion
that they are not so dangerous or unusual as to fall
outside the purview of the second amendment. To this
end, the fact that police batons are inherently less lethal,
and therefore less dangerous and less intrinsically
harmful, than handguns, which clearly constitute
‘‘arms’’ within the meaning of the second amendment,
provides further reason to conclude that they are enti-
tled to constitutional protection. Cf.
People Yanna
supra,
C
Means-End Scrutiny of § 29-38
Finally, we must determine whether the statutory ban
on the defendant’s possession of the dirk knife and
police baton in his vehicle for the purpose of trans-
porting them to his new residence survives constitu-
tional scrutiny. Our resolution of this issue requires us
to evaluate the impact of this statutory restriction on
*30
the ‘‘core’’ right identified in
District of Columbia
v.
Heller
, supra,
The state contends that, even if, as we have con- cluded, the dirk knife and police baton seized from the defendant’s vehicle fall within the purview of the second amendment’s right to keep and bear arms, heightened judicial scrutiny is inapplicable because § 29-38 does not constitute a substantial burden on rights guaranteed under the second amendment. The state argues, rather, that, because § 29-38 does not prohibit the use of a vehicle to transport certain other weapons from one residence to another, its infringement on second amendment rights is insignificant. For similar reasons, the state also asserts that, if heightened scrutiny is appropriate, intermediate, rather than strict, scrutiny should apply. The state further contends that the stat- ute’s ban on transporting ‘‘a few inherently dangerous weapons,’’ including dirk knives and police batons— which, the state acknowledges, are illegal either to transport or to carry, without exception; see generally General Statutes §§ 29-38 and 53-206—survives inter- mediate scrutiny because it ‘‘employ[s] a reasonable means to meet the [substantial governmental interest in] promoting public safety on our streets’’ by ‘‘keeping dangerous and deadly weapons off [those] streets and out of cars.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Although we reject the state’s contention that the statu- tory ban on transporting dirk knives and police batons does not substantially burden the defendant’s rights under the second amendment, we agree with the state that intermediate rather than strict scrutiny is the appro- priate standard. We also conclude, however, that § 29- 38, as applied to the facts of this case, does not survive that heightened level of constitutional review.
In
Heller
, the United States Supreme Court did not
articulate the level of scrutiny applicable to laws that
are found to restrict or burden second amendment
rights, explaining that the District of Columbia’s com-
plete ban on possessing an operable firearm in the home
failed constitutional muster under any standard.
Dis-
trict of Columbia
v.
Heller
, supra,
Consistent with the approach that other federal cir-
cuit courts of appeals have adopted, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals has observed that, because of ‘‘
Heller
’s
emphasis on the weight of the burden imposed by the
[District of Columbia] gun laws, [the court does] not
read [
Heller
] to mandate that any marginal, incremental
or even appreciable restraint on the right to keep and
bear arms be subject to heightened scrutiny. Rather,
heightened scrutiny is triggered only by those restric-
tions that . . . operate as a substantial burden on the
ability of law-abiding citizens to possess and use a fire-
arm for self-defense (or for other lawful purposes).’’
United States
v.
Decastro
,
Although neither the state nor the defendant has iden-
tified a case that is directly on point factually with the
present one, it is evident that the prohibition against
transporting a dirk knife and a police baton to a new
home constitutes a significant restriction on the right
to possess those weapons in that new home. Indeed,
aside from an outright ban on possessing those weap-
ons, it is difficult to conceive of a greater abridgement
of that right than a restriction that bars the use of a
vehicle to transport either of those weapons from one
home to another. Moreover, under § 29-38, it is unlawful
for an ordinary citizen, like the defendant, to transport
those weapons from the place of purchase to the pur-
chaser’s home.
[42]
As a consequence, the statute’s com-
plete proscription against using a vehicle to transport
the two protected weapons deprives their owner of any
realistic opportunity either to bring them home after
they have been purchased or to move them from one
home to another. In fact, at oral argument before this
court, the state acknowledged that, in light of that statu-
tory prohibition, there may be no lawful means of doing
either. In contrast to other statutory schemes that
have been found not to substantially burden second
amendment rights; see, e.g.,
United States Decastro
supra,
We also must determine, therefore, whether the statu-
*33
tory ban on transporting dirk knives and police batons
from a former residence to a current residence satisfies
the appropriate level of means-end scrutiny. As a gen-
eral matter, the applicable level of scrutiny depends on
‘‘how close the law comes to the core of the [s]econd
[a]mendment right and the severity of the law’s burden
on the right.’’
Ezell
v.
Chicago
, supra,
‘‘In analyzing the second prong of [the test, namely],
the extent to which a challenged prohibition burdens
the [s]econd [a]mendment right . . . laws which regu-
late only the
manner
in which persons may exercise
their [s]econd [a]mendment rights are less burdensome
than those [that] bar firearm [or other weapon] posses-
sion completely. . . . [Thus] . . . regulations [that]
leave open alternative channels for self-defense are less
likely to place a severe burden on the [s]econd [a]mend-
ment right than those [that] do not. Cf. [
United States
v.]
Marzzarella
, [supra,
The statutory restriction in the present case strikes close to the core protection of the second amendment because it erects a virtual bar to possessing certain protected weapons, including dirk knives and police batons, in the home for the purpose of self-defense. On the other hand, this restriction on the right to have those weapons in the home does not adversely affect an individual’s ability to do the same with respect to a myriad of other weapons that fall within the purview of the second amendment. For example, under § 29-38 (a), any person may transport a pistol or revolver in a motor vehicle if that person has a proper permit, and § 29-38 (b) (4) permits the transportation by vehicle of *34 an unloaded BB. gun if it is stored in the trunk or kept in a locked container other than the glove compartment or console. Similarly, under § 29-38 (b) (5) (D), an indi- vidual may use a vehicle to transport a knife, the edged portion of the blade of which is four inches or more in length, for the purpose of removing one’s household goods from one place to another. Indeed, as the state concedes, the defendant was entitled to use his car to transport his machetes, sword and long dragon knife to his new home. The availability of these and other options for possessing protected weapons in the home mitigates the adverse effect of the statutory prohibition against transporting dirk knives and police batons from one home to another.
Although the defendant advocates for the application
of strict scrutiny, he does not support his argument
with relevant case law applying that level of review in
the second amendment context. In light of the nature
and extent of the restrictions at issue in the present
case, we agree with the state that intermediate scrutiny
represents the applicable level of constitutional review.
‘‘[A]lthough addressing varied and divergent laws,
courts throughout the country have nearly universally
applied some form of intermediate scrutiny in the [s]ec-
ond [a]mendment context.’’
New York State Rifle &
Pistol Assn., Inc
. v.
Cuomo
,
Accordingly, we turn to the question of whether § 29-
38, as applied to the facts of the present case, survives
intermediate scrutiny. To establish that it does, the state
must demonstrate that the absolute ban on transporting
dirk knives and police batons is ‘‘substantially related
to an important government objective.’’
Clark Jeter
Nevertheless, to establish the requisite substantial
relationship between the purpose to be served by the
statutory provision and the means employed to achieve
that end, the explanation that the state proffers in
defense of the provision must be ‘‘exceedingly persua-
sive.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
United States
Virginia
,
Post- Heller case law supports the commonsense con- clusion that the core right to possess a protected weapon in the home for self-defense necessarily entails the right, subject to reasonable regulation, to engage in activities necessary to enable possession in the home. [45] Thus, the safe transportation of weapons protected by the second amendment is an essential corollary of the right to possess them in the home for self-defense when such transportation is necessary to effectuate that right. Conversely, in rejecting second amendment challenges to measures prohibiting the possession of handguns outside the home, courts have deemed it sig- nificant that those regulatory schemes contained provi- sions including, in addition to the right to possess handguns in the home, limited exceptions permitting the transportation of handguns between homes, or between home and dealer or repairer. [47]
We conclude that the state has not provided sufficient
reason for extending the ban on transporting dirk knives
and police batons to a scenario, like the present one,
in which the owner of those weapons uses his vehicle
to move them from a former residence to a new one.
Indeed, the state has proffered no such justification; it
relies, rather, on the assertion that § 29-38 ‘‘substantially
furthers its public safety objective by imposing a permit
requirement on having pistols and revolvers in the car
*36
and by identifying a few inherently dangerous weapons,
among them a dirk knife and a police baton, that are
illegal to carry or transport under any circumstances.’’
Section 29-38 contains a variety of limited exceptions,
however, permitting the transportation of other weap-
ons that the legislature also has determined to be dan-
gerous, and some of those exceptions pertain to
weapons that are significantly more lethal than dirk
knives and police batons, such as handguns and long
knives, including machetes and swords. This fact
defeats any claim that a similarly limited exception
allowing the transportation of dirk knives and police
batons from one home to another would frustrate or
impede the concededly compelling governmental inter-
est of ensuring the safety of the public and police offi-
cers. See, e.g.,
United States Marzzarella
, supra, 614
F.3d 99 (‘‘[i]f a regulation fails to cover a substantial
amount of conduct implicating the asserted compelling
interest, its underinclusiveness can be evidence that
the interest is not significant enough to justify the regu-
lation’’). As those existing exceptions demonstrate, the
legislature is fully capable of adopting reasonable regu-
latory measures, in the interest of public safety, short
of a ban on transporting dirk knives and police batons
from one residence to another, while also accommodat-
ing the defendant’s second amendment right to keep
those weapons in the home for self-defense. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth Reyes
,
We turn, then, to the appellate remedy. ‘‘It is well
established that this court has a duty to construe stat-
utes, whenever possible, to avoid constitutional infirmi-
ties . . . . [W]hen called [on] to interpret a statute, we
will search for an effective and constitutional construc-
tion that reasonably accords with the legislature’s
underlying intent.
.
.
. This principle directs us to
search for a judicial gloss . . . that will effect the legis-
lature’s will in a manner consistent with constitutional
safeguards.’’ (Citations omitted;
internal quotation
marks omitted.)
State Cook
,
Furthermore, we already have determined that § 29-
38 plainly does
not
except such conduct from its reach.
See part I B of this opinion. We previously have declined
to place a gloss on a statute that contradicts its plain
meaning;
Keller Beckenstein
,
Finally, we wish to emphasize that our holding is a narrow one and that the legislature is free to regulate the carrying and transportation of all weapons, including, of course, dirk knives and police batons, in the interest of public safety. Nothing in this opinion is meant to limit that broad regulatory authority, except insofar as the legislature may seek to use that authority in a man- ner that cannot be squared with the rights protected by the second amendment. Because the existing statutory scheme places an undue burden on the defendant’s right to possess and keep his dirk knife and police baton in his home by making it impossible for him to transport those weapons there, that scheme does not pass consti- tutional muster as applied to the defendant’s conduct in the present case.
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment of acquittal on both counts of having a weapon in a motor vehicle.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
knowingly has, in any vehicle owned, operated or occupied by such person,
General Statutes (Rev. to 2009) § 29-38 provides: ‘‘(a) Any person who
any weapon, any pistol or revolver for which a proper permit has not been
issued as provided in section 29-28 or any machine gun which has not been
registered as required by section 53-202, shall be fined not more than one
thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than five years or both, and the
*38
presence of any such weapon, pistol or revolver, or machine gun in any
vehicle shall be prima facie evidence of a violation of this section by the
owner, operator and each occupant thereof. The word ’weapon’, as used in
this section, means any BB. gun, any blackjack, any metal or brass knuckles,
any police baton or nightstick, any dirk knife or switch knife, any knife
having an automatic spring release device by which a blade is released from
the handle, having a blade of over one and one-half inches in length, any
stiletto, any knife the edged portion of the blade of which is four inches or
over in length, any martial arts weapon or electronic defense weapon, as
defined in section 53a-3, or any other dangerous or deadly weapon or
instrument.
‘‘(b) The provisions of this section shall not apply to: (1) Any officer
charged with the preservation of the public peace while engaged in the
pursuit of such officer’s official duties; (2) any security guard having a baton
or nightstick in a vehicle while engaged in the pursuit of such guard’s official
duties; (3) any person enrolled in and currently attending a martial arts
school, with official verification of such enrollment and attendance, or any
certified martial arts instructor, having any such martial arts weapon in a
vehicle while traveling to or from such school or to or from an authorized
event or competition; (4) any person having a BB. gun in a vehicle provided
such weapon unloaded and stored in the trunk of such vehicle or in a locked
container other than the glove compartment or console; and (5) any person
having a knife, the edged portion of the blade of which is four inches or
over in length, in a vehicle if such person is (A) any member of the armed
forces of the United States, as defined in section 27-103, or any reserve
component thereof, or of the armed forces of the state, as defined in section
27-2, when on duty or going to or from duty, (B) any member of any military
organization when on parade or when going to or from any place of assembly,
(C) any person while transporting such knife as merchandise or for display
at an authorized gun or knife show, (D) any person while lawfully removing
such person’s household goods or effects from one place to another, or
from one residence to another, (E) any person while actually and peaceably
engaged in carrying any such knife from such person’s place of abode or
business to a place or person where or by whom such knife is to be repaired,
or while actually and peaceably returning to such person’s place of abode
or business with such knife after the same has been repaired, (F) any person
holding a valid hunting, fishing or trapping license issued pursuant to chapter
490 or any salt water fisherman while having such knife in a vehicle for
lawful hunting, fishing or trapping activities, or (G) any person participating
in an authorized historic reenactment.’’
otherwise noted.
All references in this opinion to § 29-38 are to the 2009 revision unless
[2]
The defendant suffered a traumatic brain injury as the result of a mine
explosion while serving overseas in Kosovo. He testified that this prior
injury exacerbated any subsequent head trauma, including the trauma that
he suffered as a result of the automobile accident on July 22, 2010.
[3]
The jury apparently agreed with the defendant’s contention that he was
transporting the two machetes, the dragon knife and the sword in accordance
with the moving exception of § 29-38 (b) (5) (D). See footnote 1 of this
opinion. It is this finding by the jury that provides the basis for the state’s
concession that the defendant also was transporting the dirk knife and
police baton from his former residence to his new residence.
[4]
The defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the
Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to
General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.
[5]
We note that the state and the defendant agree that there is no statutory
prohibition against owning a dirk knife or a police baton and storing the
weapon in one’s home. As we explain more fully hereinafter, however; see
part I B of this opinion; in
Campbell
,
[7] California Penal Code § 16470 (Deering 2012) provides: ‘‘As used in this part, ‘dirk’ or ‘dagger’ means a knife or other instrument with or without a handguard that is capable of ready use as a stabbing weapon that may inflict great bodily injury or death. A nonlocking folding knife, a folding knife that is not prohibited by Section 21510, or a pocketknife is capable of ready use as a stabbing weapon that may inflict great bodily injury or death only if the blade of the knife is exposed and locked into position.’’ We note that the defendant cites Cal. Penal Code § 12020 (c) (24) (Deering 2008), which was transferred, without substantive change, to Cal. Penal Code § 16470 in 2012. his or her person any BB. gun, blackjack, metal or brass knuckles, or any release device by which a blade is released from the handle, having a blade dirk knife, or any switch knife, or any knife having an automatic spring portion of the blade of which is four inches or more in length, any police of over one and one-half inches in length, or stiletto, or any knife the edged instrument, shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than three years or both. Whenever any person is found guilty of baton or nightstick, or any martial arts weapon or electronic defense weapon, as defined in section 53a-3, or any other dangerous or deadly weapon or a violation of this section, any weapon or other instrument within the provi- sions of this section, found upon the body of such person, shall be forfeited any failure of the judgment of conviction to expressly impose such forfeiture. to the municipality wherein such person was apprehended, notwithstanding while transporting such knife as merchandise or for display at an authorized or of the armed forces of the state, as defined in section 27-2, when on duty with the preservation of the public peace while engaged in the pursuit of such officer’s official duties; (2) the carrying of a baton or nightstick by a (3) the carrying of a knife, the edged portion of the blade of which is four security guard while engaged in the pursuit of such guard’s official duties; inches or more in length, by (A) any member of the armed forces of the United States, as defined in section 27-103, or any reserve component thereof, cealed upon one’s person while lawfully removing such person’s household gun or knife show, (D) any person who is found with any such knife con- or going to or from duty, (B) any member of any military organization when on parade or when going to or from any place of assembly, (C) any person goods or effects from one place to another, or from one residence to another, where or by whom such knife is to be repaired, or while actually and knife from such person’s place of abode or business to a place or person (E) any person while actually and peaceably engaged in carrying any such competition; and (6) the carrying of a BB. gun by any person upon such person’s own property or the property of another person provided such other person has authorized the carrying of such weapon on such property, peaceably returning to such person’s place of abode or business with such knife after the same has been repaired, (F) any person holding a valid hunting, fishing or trapping license issued pursuant to chapter 490 or any salt water fisherman carrying such knife for lawful hunting, fishing or trapping activities, or (G) any person while participating in an authorized historic reenactment; (4) the carrying by any person enrolled in or currently attending, or an instructor at, a martial arts school of a martial arts weapon while in a class or at an authorized event or competition or while transporting such weapon to or from such class, event or competition; (5) the carrying of a BB. gun by any person taking part in a supervised event or competition of the Boy Scouts of America or the Girl Scouts of America or in any other authorized event or competition while taking part in such event or competition or while transporting such weapon to or from such event or and the transporting of such weapon to or from such property.’’ ‘‘(b) The provisions of this section shall not apply to (1) any officer charged General Statutes § 53-206 provides: ‘‘(a) Any person who carries upon [8] [9] By way of example, the defendant cites to the fourth edition of Webster’s New World Dictionary which, he asserts, defines ‘‘baton’’ as ‘‘a staff serving as a symbol of office,’’ ‘‘a slender stick used in directing music,’’ ‘‘a metal rod twirled by a drum major,’’ and ‘‘a short, light rod used in relay races.’’ Other definitions of the term ‘‘baton’’ are: ‘‘a staff borne as a symbol of office,’’ ‘‘a narrow heraldic bend,’’ ‘‘a slender rod with which a leader directs a band or orchestra,’’ ‘‘a hollow cylinder carried by each member of a relay team and passed to the succeeding runner,’’ and ‘‘a hollow metal rod with a weighted bulb at one or both ends that is flourished or twirled by a drum major or drum majorette . . . .’’ Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, supra, p. 103. Although the dictionary on which the defendant relies provides only these definitions and contains no mention of a police baton; see footnote 9 of this opinion; that dictionary is a more general reference source that lacks the comprehensive coverage of dictionaries that ordinarily are more appropriate for use in accordance with § 1-1.
[11] In 1999, the legislature amended General Statutes (Rev. to 1999) § 29-
38 and General Statutes (Rev. to 1999) § 53-206 to include within their
purview ‘‘any police baton or nightstick . . . .’’ Public Acts 1999, No. 99-
212, §§ 12 and 14 (P.A. 99-212). The only commentary in the legislative
history with respect to this portion of P.A. 99-212 was a colloquy during
the debate in the House of Representatives between Representatives Ronald
S. San Angelo and Michael P. Lawlor clarifying that a police officer may
possess his or her nightstick or police baton at home because the statutory
exception for law enforcement ‘‘also encompasses when [a police officer
is] at home. [As] long as he was not using those dangerous weapons in any
fashion that was inconsistent with his official duties, either on duty or off
duty, that would be okay.’’ 42 H.R. Proc., Pt. 15, 1999 Sess., p. 5454, remarks
of Representative San Angelo.
[12]
The defendant testified at trial that the baton seized from his vehicle
is a metal extension tube that he had used as an army medic for splinting
leg fractures. Nevertheless, as with the dirk knife, whether the state estab-
lished that the item at issue was a prohibited police baton gave rise to a
question of fact for the jury; see, e.g.,
Richards
v.
Commonwealth
, supra,
(‘‘the [trial] court [improperly] characterized the residence or place of abode
[14]
State
See
Campbell
,