THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. BRYANT, APPELLANT.
No. 2018-1418
Supreme Court of Ohio
March 24, 2020
2020-Ohio-1041
Submittеd October 22, 2019. APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-170570, 2018-Ohio-3756.
NOTICE
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-1041
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State v. Bryant, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-1041.]
Traffic—
{¶ 1} Appellant, Michael Bryant, appeals the First District Court of Appeals’ judgment affirming his conviction for leaving the scene of a motor-vehicle accident. This court accepted a discretionary appeal to address the statutory duties incumbent upon a driver who has been involved in an automobile accident. See 154 Ohio St.3d 1430, 2018-Ohio-4670, 111 N.E.3d 1191.
Facts and procedural background
{¶ 2} A complaint filed in the Hamilton County Municipal Court charged Bryant with driving under a financial-responsibility-law license suspension in violаtion of
{¶ 3} At trial, Elanor Everhardt testified that around 11:00 p.m. on March 16, 2017, a vehicle operated by Bryant hit the driver‘s side of her car while passing her on the left. Both Bryant and Everhardt pulled into a nearby parking lot and got out of their vehicles. Everhardt‘s sister, who was a passenger in Everhardt‘s car, remained inside the car. Everhardt testified that Bryant was stumbling, smelled of alcohol, and was unaware that he had been in an accident.
{¶ 4} Everhardt and Bryant talked in the parking lot for about an hour, during which time Bryant gave Everhardt his full name and phone number. Bryant told Everhardt he did not have а driver‘s license, but he let her take a photograph of his state identification. Everhardt also took a photograph of Bryant‘s license plate.
{¶ 5} Bryant asked Everhardt not to call the police because he had been drinking, was a drug dealer, and had drugs on him. Bryant offered Everhardt money not to call the police, but Everhardt refused. Nevertheless, Everhardt did not call
{¶ 6} The record is unclear whether Bryant left the parking lot before or after Everhardt called the police, but Bryant had undisputedly departed before the police arrived at the scene. The record does not contain any evidence that Bryant knew Everhardt was calling or had called the police; neither is there evidence that Everhardt told Bryant that she would not call the police.
{¶ 7} Police Officer Weston Voss responded to the scene of the accident following Everhardt‘s call. He testified that although Everhardt had some information to identify Bryant, she did not have the registration number of Bryant‘s vehicle. Officer Voss filed charges against Bryant for failure to control his vehicle, driving under a license suspension, and leaving the scene of the accident.
{¶ 8} We are concerned here only with the charge of leaving the scene of the accident. With respect to that charge, the trial court concluded that Bryant failed to provide Everhardt with the registered number of his vehicle as required by
{¶ 9} This court accepted two propositions of law that present questions of statutory interpretation. The first concerns an operator‘s duty to give certain information to “[t]he police officer at the scene of the accident or collision” under
Analysis
{¶ 10}
(A)(1) In the case of a mоtor vehicle accident or collision with persons or property on a public road or highway, the operator of the motor vehicle, having knowledge of the accident or collision, immediately shall stop the operator‘s motor vehicle at the scene of the accident or collision. The operator shall remain at the scene of the accident or collision until the operator has given the operator‘s name and address and, if the operator is not the owner, the name and address of the owner of that motor vehicle, together with the registered number of that motor vehicle, to all of the following:
(a) Any person injured in the accident or collision;
(b) The operator, occupant, owner, or attendant of any motor vehicle damaged in thе accident or collision;
(c) The police officer at the scene of the accident or collision.
{¶ 11} We begin our analysis with Bryant‘s first proposition of law, which concerns an operator‘s duty to give the information specified in
{¶ 12} A court‘s objective when construing a statute is to give effect to the legislature‘s intent. State v. Pariag, 137 Ohio St.3d 81, 2013-Ohio-4010, 998 N.E.2d 401, ¶ 10. We seek legislative intent first in the statutory language. State v. Chappell, 127 Ohio St.3d 376, 2010-Ohio-5991, 939 N.E.2d 1234, ¶ 16. If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we apply it as written, giving effect
{¶ 13} In 2016, the General Assembly amended
{¶ 14} Bryant concedes that had a police officer been present with Bryant and Everhardt at the scene of the accident, he would have been required to provide the officer with his name, address, and registered number of his vehicle. But he argues that there was no police officer at the scene and that
{¶ 15} The First District rejected Bryant‘s argument and held that Bryant violated
{¶ 16} In support of its decision, the First District cited State v. Wheaton, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27615, 2018-Ohio-1648, ¶ 46, but Wheaton is distinguishable. First, Wheaton flеd the scene of an accident after the driver of the other vehicle had called the police and despite the other driver‘s warning that to do so was a crime. Id. at ¶ 23, 30, 46. Second, although the Wheaton court did state that
{¶ 17} We read words in a statute in the context of the whole statute. State v. Williams, 79 Ohio St.3d 459, 462, 683 N.E.2d 1126 (1997). “Our role is to evaluate the statute as a whole and to interpret it in a manner that will give effect to every word and clause, avoiding a construction that will render a provision meaningless or inoperative.” State ex rel. Natl. Lime & Stone Co. v. Marion Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 152 Ohio St.3d 393, 2017-Ohio-8348, 97 N.E.3d 404, ¶ 14. Here, that means considering
In the event an injured person is unable to comprehend and record the information required to be given under division (A)(1) of this section, the other operator involved in the accident or collision shall notify the nearest police authority concerning the location of the accident or collision, and the operator‘s name, address, and the registered number of the motor vehicle the operator was operating.
The operator shall remain at the scene of the accident or collision until a police officer arrives, unless removed from the scene by an emergency vehicle operated by a political subdivision or an ambulance.
(Emphasis added.) In contrast to
{¶ 18} Were
{¶ 19} The state argues that ”
{¶ 20} As the First District acknowledged, there is no duty to call the police after every motor-vehicle accident. 2018-Ohio-3756 at ¶ 19. Accordingly, a police officer will not always respond to the scene of a motor-vehicle accident. If there is no “police officer at the scene,” an operator does not violate
{¶ 21} To be clear, we do not decide the contours of Bryant‘s duty had the state presented evidence that Everhardt stated that she was going to call the police or that Bryant possessed actual knowledge that she had called or was going to call the police. It is enough that Bryant remained at the scene for a reasonable amount of time, that he complied with
{¶ 22} The state maintains that our interpretation of
{¶ 23} We conclude that the plain, unambiguous language of
{¶ 24} Bryant‘s second proposition of law concerns the meaning of “registered number” of a motor vehicle under
{¶ 26} Application of the in pari materia rule of statutory construction clarifies the meaning of the ambiguous term “registered number” here. Under that rule of construction, a court must read all statutes relating to the same general subject matter together, in a manner that gives proper force and effect to each one. United Tel. Co. of Ohio v. Limbach, 71 Ohio St.3d 369, 372, 643 N.E.2d 1129 (1994). Here, we read
{¶ 27} When the owner of a motor vehicle first applies to register that vehicle and pays the required fee, the registrar of motor vehicles or a deputy registrar “shall assign to the motor vehicle a distinctive number and issue and deliver to the owner * * * a certificate of registration.”
{¶ 29} Bryant and the state each cite Ohio appellate cases in support of their respective positions regarding the meaning of “registered number,” but the cited cases are not particularly persuasive. Bryant cites two cases involving local ordinances that, like
{¶ 30} The state cites another First District decision in support of its position that a license-plate number is not the same as a vehicle‘s “registered number.” See Cincinnati v. Roseburrough, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-77339 and C-77340, 1978 WL 216491 (Mar. 8, 1978). Roseburrough, however, fares no better than Garman or Crowe at providing meaningful insight. Roseburrough left
{¶ 31} In a final argument, the state contends that even if a vehicle‘s “registered number” is its license-plate number, Bryant still failed to comply with
{¶ 32} Other cases that the state cites involve drivers who fled without providing any of the information required by
Conclusion
{¶ 34} For these reasons, we adopt Bryant‘s propositions of law. We hold that the “registered number” of a motor vehicle, as used in
Judgment reversed and conviction vacated.
FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, and STEWART, JJ., concur.
KENNEDY, J., concurs in judgment only.
O‘CONNOR, C.J., dissents, with an opinion.
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. BRYANT, APPELLANT.
No. 2018-1418
Supreme Court of Ohio
March 24, 2020
2020-Ohio-1041
O‘CONNOR, C.J., dissenting.
I. Analysis
A. The Proper Interpretation of R.C. 4549.02(A)(1)
{¶ 36}
In the case of a motor vehicle accident or collision with persons or property on a public road or highway, the operator of the motor vehicle, having knowledge of the accident or collision, immediately shall stop the operator‘s motor vehicle at the scene of the accident or collision. The operator shall remain at the scene of the accident or collision until the opеrator has given the operator‘s name and address and, if the operator is not the owner, the name and address of the owner of that motor vehicle, together with the registered number of that motor vehicle, to all of the following:
(a) Any person injured in the accident or collision;
(b) The operator, occupant, owner, or attendant of any motor vehicle damaged in the accident or collision;
(c) The police officer at the scene of the accident or collision.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶ 37} Unlike criminal statutes that are prohibitory in nature,
{¶ 38} As the majority correctly observes, there is no general duty to notify police after a collision in all circumstances. And even when a party to an accident does notify the police immediately after an accident, the police may decline to send an officer to the scene due to other demands on limited police resources. Nonetheless, in the present case, the driver of the car hit by Bryant, Elanor Everhardt, did call the police and an officer arrived in a reasonable time after the call. The question we must consider is whether Bryant complied with his duty to “remain at the scene” until he gave the required information to “[t]he police officer at the scene.”
{¶ 39} In my view,
{¶ 40} This interpretation is faithful to the text of the statute, which does not contain any additional detail on what exactly a driver must do to fulfill the duty it creates, for example, by requiring the driver to stay for a specific period of time. It is also flexible enough to allow for the statute to be applied in the many different circumstances presented by accidents and collisions on public roads. The drivers in an accident may explicitly agree not to call the police, or they may call and, if the response time is too long, eventually agree to leave. In all cases, however, it is reasonable to determine that the statute calls for the parties’ actions to be judged
{¶ 41} The facts of the present case clearly show that although Bryant remained at the scene for about an hour, an officer had likely been notified before he left the scene. As a result, Bryant failed to comply with his duty under
{¶ 42} According to Everhardt, Bryant‘s car had two flat tires from the collision. When she got out of her car to speak with Bryant, Everhardt left her phone in her car and told her 16-year-old sister to call the police. This clearly shows that Everhardt intended to call the police to the scene. She also locked the doors of the car out of a concern for her sister‘s safety. As a result of a miscommunication, however, Everhardt‘s sister did not call the police at that time.
{¶ 43} When she began speaking with Bryant, Everhardt noticed that he was stumbling and smelled оf alcohol. Bryant also made a number of incriminating statements. Everhardt testified that Bryant told her that he did not have insurance or a driver‘s license and that he had been drinking. He also stated that he was a drug dealer and that he had drugs on him—admissions that did not necessarily relate to the accident itself and that, if discovered by an officer at the scene, could have exposed Bryant to more significant criminal penalties. While making these admissions, Bryant asked Everhardt not to call police and said that he “meant [her] no ill will.” According to Everhardt, Bryant repeated these statements “for the entire hour.” But Everhardt never agreed not to call the police. In fact, Everhardt had already instructed her sister to call the police by the time she got out of her car and began speaking with Bryant. At one point, Everhardt also told Bryant that she wanted to call the police. When they finally ended their conversation, Everhardt got back into her car and placed a call to the police. Meanwhile, Bryant left the scene, driving away in his car, despite the fact that it had two flat tires.
{¶ 45} Bryant expressly asked Everhardt not to call the police. His incriminating statements could also be seen as part of his attempt to pressure her into not calling the police. Specifically, a reasonable fact-finder could have believed that Bryant was attempting to make Everhardt, who was 20 years old at the time, believe that calling the police to deal with the accident would be unfair to Bryant because it would expose him to additional, harsher penalties, since he had been drinking and had drugs in his possession. But Bryant‘s efforts were ultimately unsuccessful. After pressuring Everhardt for an hour, Bryant received no assurance from her that she would not call the police.
{¶ 46} A reasonable fact-finder could have concluded that when Everhardt returned to her car, Bryant bеlieved she would be calling the police and that he left the scene precisely because he wanted to avoid any interaction with the police. And the fact that Bryant drove away on two flat tires—which made his car unsafe to drive and created a risk to his safety and the safety of anyone on the road at that time—suggests that he believed the police would arrive soon and that his desire to avoid interacting with the police was strong.
{¶ 47} Given all of this, a reasonable fact-finder could have concluded that the circumstances at the scene when Bryant left indicated that a police officer would soon be present. Bryant‘s conviction for failing to comply with the duty created in
B. The Majority‘s Incorrect Interpretation of R.C. 4549.02(A)(1)
{¶ 48} The majority concludes that Bryant complied with
[T]he plain, unambiguous language of
R.C. 4549.02(A)(1) does not require an operator of a motor vehicle who has been involved in an accident or collision to remain at the scene until a police officer arrives when that operator has provided the information required byR.C. 4549.02(A)(1) to the other persons involved in the accident or collision underR.C. 4549.02(A)(1)(a) and(b) and when that operator is unaware that the police have been or will be summoned.
(Emphasis added.) Majority opinion at ¶ 23. By contrast, the majority avoids assessing what would be required to comply with subsection
{¶ 50} The problem with this approach is that the statute does not require the state to prove that a driver leaving the scene has actual knowledge that the police would arrive. As explained above, even when a driver leaves the scene without such actual knowledge, the totality of the circumstances could still indicate that the driver failed to comply with subsection
{¶ 52} The majority places weight on the fact that Bryant left after being at the scene for an hour, but in doing so it ignores the totality of the circumstances. As discussed above, Bryant spent the hour he remained at the scene trying, unsuccessfully, to convince Everhardt not to call the police, and his departure can reasonably be viewed as being caused by his belief that Everhardt was about to call the police. I would therefore not place significant weight on the fact that an hour passed before Bryant left.1
{¶ 53} Third, the majority reads too much into the fact that
{¶ 54} That brings us to the final, and most significant, problem with the majority‘s interpretation of
{¶ 55} The majority sidesteps these concerns by suggesting that the General Assembly‘s intent to protect against drivers who flee the scene of an accident is reflected only in the legislative history of the statute, not the text itself. The majority also suggests that concerns over the result it reaches are policy concеrns that “are properly addressed to the General Assembly, not to the courts.” Majority opinion at ¶ 22. Neither of these is correct. Putting aside the question of whether legislative history may be considered, the text of
{¶ 56} Ultimately, the better interpretation is, as I describe above, to look to the totality of the circumstances and allow the fact-finder to decide whether the driver complied with
II. Conclusion
{¶ 57} Although I agree with the majority‘s holding that the “registered number” of a vehicle is the license-plate number associated with the vehicle, I
Paula Boggs Muething, Cincinnati City Solicitor, Natalia S. Harris, City Prosecutor, and Jonathon Vogt, Assistant City Prosecutor, for appellee.
Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Krista M. Gieske, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
Notes
In the event an injured person is unable to comprehend and record the information required to be given under division (A)(1) of this section, the other operator involved in the accident or collision shall notify the nearest police authority concerning the location of the accident or collision, and the operator‘s name, address, and the registered number of the motor vehicle the operator was operating. The operator shall remain at the scene of the accident or collision until a police officer arrives, unless removed from the scene by an emergency vehicle operated by a political subdivision or an ambulance.