THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. PARIAG, APPELLEE.
No. 2012-0819
Supreme Court of Ohio
September 19, 2013
137 Ohio St.3d 81, 2013-Ohio-4010
Submitted April 9, 2013
{¶ 1} We are asked to determine whether records of a dismissed charge may be sealed if the offense arises from or is in connection with the same act that led to a conviction on an unsealable charge. The Tenth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court‘s decision to seal the record of the dismissed charges in this case. Because we conclude that the Tenth District Court of Appeals erred in its analysis, we reverse its judgment and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.
I. Introduction
Background Facts
{¶ 2} Appellee, Marlon Pariag, was stopped by the Ohio State Highway Patrol on December 31, 2010. He was charged with a traffic offense and also with possession of drugs of abuse, in violation of
{¶ 3} On March 10, 2011, Pariag applied to seal the records pertaining to the drug charges that had been dismissed. The state objected and argued that because the record of a traffic conviction could not be sealed under
{¶ 4} The trial court ordered the records of the dismissed drug charges sealed, concluding that the conviction in the traffic case did not prevent the sealing of the records in the criminal case involving the dismissed drug offenses.
{¶ 5} A divided panel of the Tenth District Court of Appeals held that
Issues Presented
{¶ 6} We accepted the state‘s discretionary appeal. 132 Ohio St.3d 1513, 2012-Ohio-4021, 974 N.E.2d 111. In the first proposition of law, the state argues that under
{¶ 7} We now hold that a trial court is precluded, pursuant to
II. Law and Analysis
Standard of Review
{¶ 9} Because the propositions involve the interpretation of a statute, which is a question of law, we review the court of appeals’ judgment de novo. Med. Mut. of Ohio v. Schlotterer, 122 Ohio St.3d 181, 2009-Ohio-2496, 909 N.E.2d 1237, ¶ 13.
{¶ 10} When construing a statute, a court‘s objective is to determine and give effect to the legislative intent. State ex rel. Solomon v. Police & Firemen‘s Disability & Pension Fund Bd. of Trustees, 72 Ohio St.3d 62, 65, 647 N.E.2d 486 (1995). To determine legislative intent, a court must first consider the words used in a statute. State v. Maxwell, 95 Ohio St.3d 254, 2002-Ohio-2121, 767 N.E.2d 242, ¶ 10. When a statute‘s language is clear and unambiguous, a court must apply it as written. Zumwalde v. Madeira & Indian Hill Joint Fire Dist., 128 Ohio St.3d 492, 2011-Ohio-1603, 946 N.E.2d 748, ¶ 23. Further construction is required only when a statute is unclear and ambiguous. State v. Chappell, 127 Ohio St.3d 376, 2010-Ohio-5991, 939 N.E.2d 1234, ¶ 16.
The Privilege of Sealing a Record
{¶ 11} In this case, the words “expungement” and “sealing” have been interchanged. “Expungement” is a legislative construct with no universally applied definition. Although the word “expungement” was used in
{¶ 12} Expungement of a criminal record is an “act of grace created by the state.” State v. Hamilton, 75 Ohio St.3d 636, 639, 665 N.E.2d 669 (1996). It
Statutory application
{¶ 13} Because Pariag did not seek to seal the record of a conviction,
Any person who is found not guilty of an offense by a jury or a court or who is the defendant named in a dismissed complaint, indictment, or information, may apply to the court for an order to seal his official records in the case. Except as provided in section 2953.61 of the Revised Code, the application may be filed at any time after the finding of not guilty or the dismissal of the complaint, indictment, or information is entered upon the minutes of the court of the journal, whichever entry comes first.
Former
{¶ 14}
{¶ 15}
When a person is charged with two or more offenses as a result of or in connection with the same act and at least one of the charges has a final disposition that is different than the final disposition of the other charges, the person may not apply to the court for the sealing of his record in any of the cases until such time as he would be able to apply to the court and have all of the records in all of the cases pertaining to those charges sealed * * *.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶ 16} The statute applies when a person is charged with multiple offenses that arise “as a result of or in connection with the same act.” Although the Tenth District Court of Appeals held that
{¶ 17} The Tenth District also held that
Relevance of State v. Futrall
{¶ 18} We have already determined that an applicant with multiple convictions in one case may not partially seal his or her record pursuant to
{¶ 19} Pariag‘s charges in two separate cases resulted in different dispositions—one conviction and two dismissals—and thus
{¶ 20} Pariag is ineligible to have the records of the dismissed drug charges that otherwise would be sealable under
{¶ 21}
{¶ 22} Pariag filed an application to seal the records of his drug charges that were dismissed in Franklin County Municipal Court case No. 2011 CRB 239. The trial court, on remand, must determine whether those charges arose “as the result of or in connection with the same act” as his traffic conviction in case No. 2011 TRD 100861.
{¶ 23} Accordingly, the judgment of the appellate court is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
O‘CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY and FRENCH, JJ., concur.
PFEIFER, O‘DONNELL, and O‘NEILL, JJ., dissent.
PFEIFER, J., dissenting.
{¶ 24} There were three charges in the underlying cases. One, a traffic offense, is not sealable. One of the reasons traffic offenses are not sealable is that they do not materially affect a person‘s life. The other charges, which were dismissed, were possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia and those charges are sealable. That makes sense. Drug offenses can materially affect a person‘s life, and the General Assembly allows them to be sealed. Today this court determines that a material offense that was dismissed and that is ordinarily sealable cannot be sealed because an immaterial traffic offense cannot be sealed. That doesn‘t make sense.
{¶ 25} This case does not merit the attention of this court. We should never have accepted jurisdiction, and we should now dismiss the case as having been improvidently allowed. Barring that, we ought to affirm the not unreasonable judgment of the court of appeals. I dissent.
{¶ 26} Respectfully, I dissent.
{¶ 27} The issue in this case is whether
{¶ 28} The role of the judiciary is to interpret statutes and to determine the intent of the General Assembly in passing legislation. The intent of the General Assembly in enacting
Timing Statutes
{¶ 29} Pursuant to
Any person, who is found not guilty of an offense by a jury or a court or who is the defendant named in a dismissed complaint, indictment, or information, may apply to the court for an order to seal the person‘s official records in the case. Except as provided in section 2953.61 of the Revised Code, the application may be filed at any time after the finding of not guilty or the dismissal of the complaint, indictment, or information is entered upon the minutes of the court or the journal, whichever entry occurs first.
{¶ 30} Also at issue in this case is
When a person is charged with two or more offenses as a result of or in connection with the same act and at least one of the charges has a final disposition that is different than the final disposition of the other charges, the person may not apply to the court for the sealing of his record in any of the cases until such time as he would be able to apply to the court and have all of the records in all of the cases pertaining to those charges sealed pursuant to divisions (A)(1) and (2) of section 2953.32 and divisions (A)(1) and (2) of section 2953.52 of the Revised Code.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶ 31} The role of the judiciary is to interpret legislation, and “[t]he primary goal in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature.” State ex rel. Cordray v. Midway Motor Sales, Inc., 122 Ohio St.3d 234, 2009-Ohio-2610, 910 N.E.2d 432, ¶ 15. To determine the General Assembly‘s intent, “the court first looks to the language in the statute and the purpose to be accomplished.” State v. S.R., 63 Ohio St.3d 590, 595, 589 N.E.2d 1319 (1992), citing Henry v. Cent. Natl. Bank, 16 Ohio St.2d 16, 242 N.E.2d 342 (1968), paragraph one of the syllabus. “Where the meaning of the statute is clear and definite, it must be applied as written,” but “where the words are ambiguous and are subject to varying interpretations, further interpretation is necessary.” State v. Chappell, 127 Ohio St.3d 376, 2010-Ohio-5991, 939 N.E.2d 1234, ¶ 16, citing Bailey v. Republic Engineered Steels, Inc., 91 Ohio St.3d 38, 40, 741 N.E.2d 121 (2001).
{¶ 32} Moreover, when two statutes relate to the same subject, such as
{¶ 33} Reading
{¶ 35} Moreover, since
one who is charged but not convicted of an offense suffers no stigma as a result of his having once been the object of an unsustained accusation. That detriment to one‘s reputation and employment prospects often flows from merely having been subjected to criminal process has long been recognized as a serious and unfortunate by-product of even unsuccessful criminal prosecutions.
In re Hynes v. Karassik, 47 N.Y.2d 659, 662, 419 N.Y.S.2d 942, 393 N.E.2d 1015 (1979).
{¶ 36} Interpreting
{¶ 37} Moreover, in this case,
{¶ 38} A comparison of the elements of the offenses charged in this case demonstrates that operating a motor vehicle is a necessary element for a conviction of driving under suspension, but is totally unrelated to the elements for a conviction of possession of drugs or drug paraphernalia. In order to establish the offense of driving under suspension as defined in
Convictions Precluding Sealing
{¶ 39}
{¶ 40} The majority relies on State v. Futrall, 123 Ohio St.3d 498, 2009-Ohio-5590, 918 N.E.2d 497, in support of its holding. Futrall, however, is factually
Conclusion
{¶ 41} The legislature provided that persons charged with but not convicted of offenses may apply to the court for an order to seal the record of dismissed charges, and it specifically set forth the time when such applications could be filed.
{¶ 42} In addition, it specified that when a person is charged with two or more offenses as a result of or in connection with the same act and different dispositions result, an application may be filed to seal the dismissed charges. In this case, however, that factual predicate has not been met, because the act of possessing the marihuana and possessing the drug paraphernalia did not result from the act of driving under suspension nor did it occur in connection with that conduct.
{¶ 43} Finally, because
{¶ 44} Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the appellate court.
O‘NEILL, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.
Richard C. Pfeiffer Jr., Columbus City Attorney, Lara N. Baker-Moorish, City Prosecuting Attorney, and Melanie R. Tobias, Assistant City Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.