THE STATE EX REL. KAYLOR, APPELLANT, v. BRUENING, JUDGE, APPELLEE.
No. 97-9
Supreme Court of Ohio
October 22, 1997
80 Ohio St.3d 142 | 1997-Ohio-350
Submitted August 26, 1997. APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lake County, No. 96-L-074.
McNamara, Lucci, Hanrahan & Loxterman and David E. Koerner, for appellant.
William L. Sheroke, Lake County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Per Curiam.
{¶ 1} In November 1987, Penny J. Kaylor, n.k.a. Cola (“Cola“), gave birth to JoAnna Marie Kaylor (“JoAnna“). Appellant, Anthony Kaylor (“Kaylor“), who was married to Cola, is JoAnna‘s biological father. In July 1991, following the termination of the marriage, appellee, Lake County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division Judge Francine M. Bruening, granted custody of JoAnna to Kaylor and awarded Cola weekly visitation with JoAnna for a minimum of two hours. Cola‘s visitation was contingent on her obtaining psychological counseling.
{¶ 2} Kaylor remarried, and in March 1995, his new wife and JoAnna‘s stepmother, Michelle Lee Kaylor, filed a petition in the Lake County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division, to adopt JoAnna. The probate court notified Cola of a hearing on the adoption petition, and Cola entered an appearance objecting to the adoption. In May 1995, on the day of the hearing on the adoption petition, Cola filed an emergency motion to establish immediate visitation with JoAnna in the domestic relations court. Cola further filed in the domestic relations court a motion for Kaylor to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of the court‘s July 1991 visitation ordеr.
{¶ 4} Kaylor then moved to dismiss Cola‘s pending motions in domestic relations court concerning her visitatiоn with JoAnna based on the probate court‘s adoption decree. Kaylor claimed that the adoption decree divested the domestic relations court of jurisdiction to grant Cola any parental rights, including visitation. In May 1996, Judge Bruening overruled Kaylor‘s motion to dismiss and proceeded to the trial on the merits of Cоla‘s motions.
{¶ 5} Shortly thereafter, Kaylor filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals for Lake County requesting a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Bruening from proceeding further on Cola‘s motions relating to visitation. The court of appeals issued an alternative writ, stayed the domestic relations court procеedings, and ordered Judge Bruening to respond to the prohibition action. Judge Bruening filed a motion to dismiss the prohibition action because she “did not lack patent and unambiguous jurisdiction to decide whether the natural parent [Cola] had any right to visitation.” The court of appeals treated Judge Bruening‘s dismissal motion as a motion for judgment on the pleadings, granted it, and dismissed the action.
{¶ 6} The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right.
Civ.R. 12(B)(6); Civ.R. 12(C); Standard of Review
{¶ 7} Kaylor asserts that the court of appeals erred in dismissing his prohibition action. In his second proposition of law, Kaylor contends that the court of appeals erronеously construed Judge Bruening‘s
{¶ 8} Loc.App.R. 18 of the Eleventh Appellate District provides that original actions filed in the court of appeals “shall proceed as any civil action under the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure” and that any party may file “a motion to dismiss or a motion for judgment.” Loc.App.R. 18(A) and (B).
{¶ 10} Nevertheless, any error by the court of appeals in treating Judge Bruening‘s motion as a
{¶ 11} Pursuant to
{¶ 12} With the foregoing standard in mind, we now address Kaylor‘s specific contentions.
Prohibition; Patent and Unambiguous Lack of Jurisdiction; R.C. 3107.15; Adoption Decree
{¶ 13} In his first proposition of law, Kaylor asserts that the court of appeals erred in dismissing his prohibition action because
{¶ 14} To be entitled to a writ of prohibition, Kaylor must establish that (1) Judge Bruening is about to exercise judicial power, (2) the exercise of that power is unauthorized by law, and (3) denial of the writ will cause injury to him for which no other adequate legal remedy exists. State ex rel. Jones v. Garfield Hts. Mun. Court (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 447, 448, 674 N.E.2d 1381, 1382. Kaylor sufficiently alleged in his complaint that Judge Bruening is about to exercise judicial power by рroceeding with the biological mother‘s motions concerning visitation.
{¶ 16} Judge Bruening and the domestic relations court had basic statutory jurisdiction under
{¶ 17}
“(A) A final decree of adoption * * * as issued by a court of this state * * * shall have the following effects as to all matters within the jurisdiction or before a court of this state * * *:
“(1) Except with respect to a spouse of the petitioner and relatives of the spouse, to rеlieve the biological or other legal parents of the adopted person of all parental rights and responsibilities, and to terminate all legal relationships between the adopted person and the adopted person‘s relatives, including the adopted person‘s biological or other legal parents, so that the adopted person thereafter is a stranger to the adopted person‘s former relatives for all purposes * * *.” (Emphasis added.)
{¶ 18} Judge Bruening contends that arguments concerning
{¶ 20} Although Judge Bruening attempts to distinguish Sweeney and Ridenour because they involve postadoption visitation requested by biological grandparents rather than parents, the language of
{¶ 21} Therefore, while Judge Bruening and the domestic relations court possessed basic statutory jurisdiction to grant visitation to a natural parent in a divorce, dissolution, legal separation, or child support proceeding,
{¶ 23} Judge Bruening‘s reliance on our dicta in Smith is also misplaced. First, the Smith holding that the South African adoption decree did not patently and unambiguously divest the cоmmon pleas court of jurisdiction over a parentage action was primarily based on the fact that South African law did not require any notice to the biological father of an illegitimate child to effectuate the adoption decree. There is no similar defect concerning the adoption decree here. Second, while in Smith, 75 Ohio St.3d at 420, 662 N.E.2d at 369, we opined that “R.C. 3107.15 does not divest juvenile courts of jurisdiction to proceed in parentage actions,” that was dicta, which was unnecessary to our holding. Finally, for the reasons previously discussed, the Smith dictum is incorrect to the extent it might be inferred therefrom that
{¶ 24} Based on the foregoing, with the material allegations of Kaylor‘s complaint and all reasonable inferences being construed most strongly in his favor, it is not beyond doubt that he can prove no set of facts entitling him to the requested relief in prohibition. Therefore, the court of appeals erred in dismissing the prohibition action. Kaylor‘s first proposition of law is sustained.
Issuance of Writ
{¶ 25} Kaylor contends that we should reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and grant the requested relief in prohibition. Normally, reversal of a court of appeals’ erroneous dismissal of a complaint requires a remand for further proceedings. State ex rel. Natl. Emp. Benefit Serv., Inc. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 49, 50, 550 N.E.2d 941, 943, fn. 1. But if the parties are in agreement about the pertinent facts, we can exercise our plenary authority in extraordinary actions and address the merits. State ex rel. Fogle v. Steiner (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 158, 163, 656 N.E.2d 1288, 1293. Here, based on the parties’ essential agreement concerning the adoption decree, we grant the writ because Judge Bruening patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to proceed in the underlying action. Id.
{¶ 26} It also appears that the court of appeals erred in dismissing the prohibition action even assuming it properly determined that Kaylor did not allege fаcts showing a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction on the part of Judge Bruening. Kaylor contends in his second proposition of law that even if the lack of jurisdiction was not patent and unambiguous, he could still have proven that appeal did not constitute an adequate legal remedy because it was not сomplete, beneficial, and speedy. State ex rel. Keenan v. Calabrese (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 176, 178, 631 N.E.2d 119, 121 (“While neither mandamus nor prohibition may be employed as a substitute for appeal from an interlocutory order, an appeal is inadequate if not complete in its nature, beneficial and speedy.“). Kaylor‘s allegations of “no adequate remedy in the ordinаry course of law” and “irreparable harm to the minor child and to the relationship between [Kaylor] and his family” should the domestic relations court proceedings not be stopped were sufficient to preclude dismissal under
Conclusion
{¶ 27} Accordingly, based on the foregoing, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and grant the writ of prohibition because Judge Bruening patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to proceed in the underlying action.
Judgment reversed
and writ granted.
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.