State ex rel. Jones v. Garfield Hts. Mun. CourtState ex rel. Jones v. Garfield Hts. Mun. Court
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Moyer, Douglas, Resnick, F.E. Sweeney, Pfeifer, Cook, Lundberg Stratton (per curiam)
Prohibition to prevent municipal court from proceeding in a pending petty-theft case—Complaint dismissed, when.
{¶ 1} In May 1996, appellant, Moses E. Jones III, filed a complaint in prohibition in the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County. Jones sought to prevent appellee, Garfield Heights Municipal Court, from proceeding in his pending petty-theft case, Maple Hts. v. Jones, case No. 96-243.
{¶ 2} According to his complaint, in December 1995, Jones was charged by the city of Maple Heights with petty theft in violation of
{¶ 3} Upon learning of the police report, Jones moved to transfer the case to the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court. Jones contended that he should have been charged with felony theft instead of misdemeanor petty theft and that the municipal court thus lacked jurisdiction to try him. The municipal court overruled Jones’s motion and set the case for jury trial.
{¶ 4} The court of appeals, after considering the foregoing allegations, sua sponte dismissed Jones’s complaint for a writ of prohibition.
{¶ 5} The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right.
Koblentz & Koblentz, Richard S. Koblentz and Craig J. Morice, for appellant.
Michael G. Ciaravino, for appellee.
Per Curiam.
{¶ 6} In his propositions of law, Jones asserts that the court of appeals erred in sua sponte dismissing his complaint for a writ of prohibition. Although
{¶ 7} Regarding the remaining requirements for a writ of prohibition, absent a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a court having general subject-matter jurisdiction can determine its own jurisdiction, and a party challenging the court’s jurisdiction possesses an adequate remedy by an appeal. State ex rel. Fraternal Order of Police, Ohio Labor Council, Inc. v. Franklin Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 287, 289, 667 N.E.2d 929, 931.
{¶ 8} Jones contends that the municipal court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to try his petty-theft case because he should have been charged with theft, a felony of the fourth degree. Under
{¶ 9} Jones essentially claims that the city prosecutor undercharged him and that he should have been charged with a felony instead of a misdemeanor. But Jones’s claim challenges the decision of the prosecutor in charging him, rather the jurisdiction of the municipal court. Cf. Mootispaw v. Eckstein (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 383, 385, 667 N.E.2d 1197, 1199 (“[T]he decision whether to prosecute is discretionary and not normally subject to judicial review.“). Unlike the defendant in the case relied on by Jones to support his claim that the municipal court lacked jurisdiction, State v. Nelson (1977), 51 Ohio App.2d 31, 5 O.O.3d 158, 365 N.E.2d 1268, Jones was not charged with a felony.
{¶ 10} Based on the foregoing, the municipal court did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction over Jones’s petty-theft trial, and Jones had an adequate legal remedy by an appeal to raise his “jurisdictional” claims. Because Jones obviously could not prevail on the facts alleged in his complaint, the court of appeals
Judgment affirmed.
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.