THE STATE EX REL. FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, OHIO LABOR COUNCIL, INC. v. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF FRANKLIN COUNTY ET AL.
No. 96-1563
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
Decided July 22, 1996.
76 Ohio St.3d 287 | 1996-Ohio-424
Prohibition to prevent common pleas court from exercising further jurisdiction in cause of action involving unfair labor practices charges—Writ granted, when.
(No. 96-1563—Submitted July 12, 1996—Decided July 22, 1996.)
In PROHIBITION.
{¶ 1} Pursuant to
{¶ 2} On August 4, 1995, nine FOP lodges and the Ohio Troopers Coalition, filed a complaint in respondent Franklin County Cоmmon Pleas Court alleging that
{¶ 3} On August 14, 1995, respondent Judge James O‘Grady issued a temporary restraining order (“TRO“) enjoining FOP/OLC from removing the three remaining release persons and directing that the removed release person be restоred to his release position. On August 23, 1995, Judge O‘Grady extended the TRO until September 5, 1995. Subsequently, on September 7, 1995, Judge O‘Grady extended the restraining order to September 29, 1995. (But sеe
{¶ 4} In October 1995, the State Employment Relations Board (“SERB“) dismissed nineteen identically worded unfair labor praсtice charges filed by individual members of Units 1 and 15 challenging the same conduct of FOP/OLC which is the subject of the plaintiffs’ complaint in the underlying common pleas
{¶ 5} FOP/OLC and the state entered into a memorandum of understanding in which, effective July 1, 1996, the state would no longer deduct vacаtion hours from members of Units 1 and 15, and unit members would no longer be released from their regular job duties. The plaintiffs in the underlying common pleas court action filed a motion requesting that FOP/OLC be held in contempt of the temporary restraining order issued by Judge O‘Grady, which had previously expired. Judge O‘Grady issued a show cause оrder and scheduled a hearing on the contempt motion for July 9, 1996. It appears, according to relator‘s memorandum in support, that the conclusion of the trial has been scheduled for August 19, 1996.
{¶ 6} FOP/OLC has now filed this action for a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge O‘Grady and the common pleas court from exercising further jurisdiction in the underlying action. The cause is now before the court to determine if the issuance of a writ of prohibition is warranted.
Cloppert, Portman, Sauter, Latanick & Foley, Robert W. Sauter and Russell E. Carnahan, for relator.
DOUGLAS, J.
{¶ 7} In order for a writ of prohibition to issue, FOP/OLC must establish that (1) respondents are about to exercise judicial power, (2) the exercise of judicial power is legally unauthorized, and (3) if the writ is denied, FOP/OLC will incur injury for which no adequate legal remedy exists. State ex rel. Barclays Bank PLC v. Hamilton Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 536, 540, 660 N.E.2d 458, 461. It is evident here that respondents hаve and are continuing to exercise judicial authority in the underlying action.
{¶ 8} As to the remaining requirements for a writ of prohibition, prohibition is unwarranted where relator possesses an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. State ex rel. Newton v. Ct. of Claims (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 553, 555, 653 N.E.2d 366, 369. Absent a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a court having general subjеct matter jurisdiction can determine its own jurisdiction, and a party challenging the court‘s jurisdiction possesses an adequate remedy by appeal. State ex rel. Enyart v. O‘Neill (1995), 71 Ohio St.3d 655, 656, 646 N.E.2d 1110, 1112. However, where a lower court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction over the cause, prohibition lies to prevent any future unauthorized exercise of jurisdiction and to correct the results of prior jurisdictionally unauthorized actions. State ex rel. Smith v. Frost (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 107, 109, 656 N.E.2d 673, 676.
{¶ 9} FOP/OLC contends that respondents patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction over the underlying action for injunctive and other relief. We agree. The State Employment Relations Board has exclusive jurisdiction to decide matters committed to it pursuant to
{¶ 10} Here, as FOP/OLC notes, it appears that based on the common pleas court cоmplaint filed by plaintiffs, their claims arise from and are dependent upon the collective bargaining agreements executed by FOP/OLC and the state. In additiоn, the complaint filed by the plaintiffs in the underlying action appears to allege conduct which would constitute unfair labor practices pursuant tо
{¶ 11} Since FOP/OLC‘s complaint is well taken, a peremptory writ of prohibition is granted and the Franklin County Common Pleas Court is hereby ordered to dismiss the underlying action.
Writ granted.
RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, COOK and STRATTON, JJ., concur.
MOYER, C.J., and PFEIFER, J., dissent and would grant only an alternative writ.