MARIO RODRIGUEZ, Petitioner, v.
H049016
In the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Sixth Appellate District
October 20, 2021
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION; (Santa Clara County Super. Ct. Nos. C1647395, C1650275)
Petitioner Mario Rodriguez seeks extraordinary writ relief from a trial court order overruling his objection to an impending competency restoration hearing under
The trial court rejected Rodriguez‘s objection and motion, concluding it could calculate Rodriguez‘s commitment period after it determined at the hearing whether he had regained competence. The court decided that if it were to find that Rodriguez had regained competence, then the commitment period would end as of the certification date. On the other hand, if it were to find that Rodriguez had not regained competence, then his commitment period would be calculated to the date of the court‘s finding.
For the reasons explained below, we disagree with the trial court‘s conclusion regarding the calculation of Rodriguez‘s commitment period and
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Charged Offenses
On December 29, 2016, the Santa Clara County District Attorney (district attorney) filed two informations against Rodriguez. One charged Rodriguez with making criminal threats on or about August 30, 2016 (
B. Proceedings Regarding Rodriguez‘s Competency to Stand Trial
In December 2016, when the trial court held Rodriguez to answer for his alleged crimes, it ordered $25,000 bail and no bail allowed, respectively, on Rodriguez‘s two cases.
1. First Competency Proceedings
One year later, on December 27, 2017, the trial court declared a doubt about Rodriguez‘s competency to stand trial and suspended the proceedings. On May 3, 2018, after the parties submitted the question of competency on the examiners’ reports, the trial court found Rodriguez not competent.
On May 24, 2018, the trial court signed an order of commitment committing Rodriguez in both of his cases to the Department of State Hospitals (DSH) for placement in a locked psychiatric facility for care and treatment under
On September 7, 2018, the medical director of Atascadero State Hospital certified that Rodriguez was competent. The certification of mental competency under
On September 20, 2018, the parties submitted on the examiners’ reports the question of restoration to competence. The trial court found Rodriguez‘s competency restored and reinstated the criminal proceedings. Rodriguez was present in court for this hearing and waived time for trial.
2. Second Competency Proceedings
Almost four months later, on January 10, 2019, the trial court again declared a doubt about Rodriguez‘s competency and suspended the proceedings. On April 18, 2019, after the parties submitted the question of competency on the examiners’ reports, the trial court found Rodriguez not competent.
On May 16, 2019, the trial court ordered that Rodriguez be committed to DSH for placement in a locked psychiatric facility for care and treatment under
On January 9, 2020, the medical director of Atascadero State Hospital certified that Rodriguez was competent. The Director also opined, pursuant to
facility in order to maintain competence to stand trial.” The certification of mental competency under
On January 24, 2020, the parties appeared before the trial court. Attorney Daniel Mayfield substituted into Rodriguez‘s cases as newly assigned defense counsel. Mayfield requested a continuance of a formal hearing under
On February 7, 2020, another intervening court date of March 13, 2020, was set in order for Mayfield to subpoena records. On March 13, 2020, the trial court released subpoenaed records to Mayfield and set another court date for April 17, 2020.
On March 17, 2020, because of Santa Clara County‘s COVID-19 ” ‘shelter in place’ orders, ” the Santa Clara County Superior Court suspended “all non-essential functions.” The superior court did not include restoration hearings among the “essential functions” it would continue to perform during the suspension.
The parties next appeared in court on July 17, 2020. The trial court released additional subpoenaed records to Mayfield. Rodriguez‘s cases were set for a restoration hearing on August 24, 2020, and an intervening court date was set for August 14, 2020.
By August 28, 2020, the trial court had not yet received certain subpoenaed records from Atascadero State Hospital. Another court date regarding the records was set for September 11, 2020. On September 8, 2020, during the call of the master criminal trial calendar, Santa Clara County Superior Court Judge Eric Geffon described the lack of available courtrooms for trials caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.
On September 10, 2020, Mayfield e-mailed the deputy district attorney and stated that he wished to continue the restoration hearing until at least September 28, 2020. The deputy district attorney responded and informed Mayfield that the trial court had “already automatically continued” the restoration hearing to November 2, 2020.
On September 11, 2020, the trial court released subpoenaed records to Mayfield and set the next court date as November 2, 2020. According to a declaration signed by Mayfield and filed in this court with Rodriguez‘s petition for a writ of prohibition, many of the scheduled restoration hearing dates between September 11, 2020 and March 15, 2021 were “automatically continued once the COVID-19 Pandemic struck.”
On September 29, 2020, the deputy district attorney met with Judge Geffon and “expressed the importance of locating an available courtroom to hear pending mental health cases.” Judge Geffon informed the deputy district attorney that the Santa Clara County Superior Court “did not presently have the resources to conduct the hearings in these cases due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the limited trial capacity and backlog of criminal jury trials that had resulted therefrom.”
The scheduled November 2, 2020 hearing never occurred. Rodriguez‘s cases were automatically continued by the trial court to a date in December 2020, which hearing also did not occur.
According to the deputy district attorney and Mayfield, Rodriguez‘s restoration hearing was reset to January 25, 2021, but that hearing did not take place. The restoration hearing was subsequently reset to a date in March 2021.
On March 8, 2021, Rodriguez filed an objection to “the proposed hearing on his alleged restoration to sanity under [section] 1372” and motion to dismiss the charges in case Nos. C1647395 and C1650275, pursuant to
The district attorney orally opposed Rodriguez‘s objection and motion at a hearing held on March 16, 2021. The district attorney argued that Carr II is distinguishable from the present case because Rodriguez had not yet had a restoration hearing and if, at his future hearing, Rodriguez were found to be competent, “time is tolled back to th[e] certificate of competency.”7
The trial court (Judge Geffon) denied Rodriguez‘s objection and motion at the March 16, 2021 hearing. The court reasoned that after a certificate of restoration is issued, if a trial court disagrees with the certificate and finds the defendant has not been restored to competence, then the time “between the restoration certificate and the restoration hearing” “should be counted against the maximum term.” However, if at the restoration hearing a trial court agrees with the certificate of restoration and finds the defendant has been restored to competence, then “it‘s fair to use the date of the restoration certificate as establishing the date on which the defendant was restored to competency.” The court explained that using the date of the certificate of restoration for the purposes of counting the days of a defendant‘s commitment does not cede its power to ultimately decide whether the defendant has been restored to
The trial court noted its concern that, if the time between the certificate of restoration and the restoration hearing were to count in all cases (irrespective of the ultimate determination regarding the defendant‘s restoration to competence), a trial court “would be forced to send the case out for a restoration hearing when the [defendant‘s] lawyer is not ready.”
After the trial court ruled, Rodriguez‘s counsel (Mayfield) requested a further continuance and an order to obtain some of Rodriguez‘s recent jail records related to his recent placement “on at least a 24-hour hold” and “suicide watch.”
D. Writ Proceedings in this Court
On April 16, 2021, Rodriguez filed a petition for a writ of prohibition or other equitable relief to stay competency restoration proceedings (petition). He specifically requested that we “[s]tay all superior court proceedings in Case Numbers C1650275 and C1647395” and “[i]ssue a peremptory writ of prohibition directing respondent court to
vacate its order denying the motion to dismiss and enter an order granting the motion, or equivalent relief; or [...] [...] [...] any other relief deemed just and proper.”8
On April 28, 2021, this court stayed all proceedings in the trial court and requested that the People (real party in interest represented by the district attorney) file a preliminary opposition to the petition. In July 2021, this court issued an order to show cause why a рeremptory writ should not issue as requested by Rodriguez. In August 2021, the district attorney filed a return to the order to show cause, and Rodriguez filed a denial to the return.
In his denial, Rodriguez modifies the relief he requested in his petition, in that he asks us to “grant each of his prayers for relief, issue the writ of prohibition, and remand with directions to the superior court to reconsider the
II. DISCUSSION
A. Rodriguez‘s Objections to the Return
We first address Rodriguez‘s three procedural objections to the district attorney‘s return.
First, Rodriguez asserts that the return is insufficient because it is unverified. However, after Rodriguez filed his denial, the district attorney submitted a verification to the return. Thus, Rodriguez‘s objection is moot.
Second, Rodriguez asserts insufficiency because the return “does not address analogous, recent case law“—namely, Stiavetti v. Clendenin (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 691 (Stiavetti) and Medina v. Superior Court (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 1197 (Medina). Rodriguez provides no precedent to support his assertion of insufficiency, and we are not persuaded that the district attorney‘s failure to address these rеcent cases renders the return itself insufficient. (See Mansell v. Board of Administration (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 539, 545-546.) We therefore reject this challenge to the return.
Finally, Rodriguez contends that the return includes a declaration of the assigned deputy district attorney that was “not presented to the superior court at the hearing on the motion to dismiss.” Under the facts here, we decide we may consider this declaration. “Ordinarily a reviewing court will not consider evidence arising after the trial court ruling, involving facts open to controversy which were not placed in issue or resolved by the trial court.” (BGJ Associates v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 952, 958; see also People v. Superior Court (Lavi) (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1164, 1173, fn. 5; Stevens v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 594, 607, fn. 13.) However, in an original writ proceeding, we have discretion to consider relevant information not presented to the trial court. (See McCarthy v. Superior Court (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 1023, 1030, fn. 3; see also Bruce v. Gregory (1967) 65 Cal.2d 666, 670–671.) The substance of the information contained in the declaration, which details case events and interactions between the district attorney and the bench officer who ruled on Rodriguez‘s objection to the restoration hearing and motion to dismiss, appears to have been within the knowledge of the bench officer who made the order at issue in this writ proceeding. Under these
B. The Parties’ Contentions
Rodriguez argues the statutory scheme governing inquiry into a defendant‘s competence does not provide for tolling of the incompetency commitment period and the trial court‘s interpretation of
In his return, the district attorney counters with multiple contentions. He asserts, inter alia, that the trial court properly denied Rodriguez‘s mоtion because he is presumed competent as of January 9, 2020 (i.e., the date of the latest Certification of Mental Competency) and “[a]bsent a judicial finding overcoming this presumption, the present matters are not subject to dismissal for violation of the maximum two-year commitment period for incompetency.” The district attorney argues further that Rodriguez‘s commitment has not exceeded two years because the commitment period is properly calculated as terminating upon the filing of a certificate of restoration.
C. Standard of Review and Canons of Statutory Interpretation
Neither party has addressed in briefing the standard for our review of the trial court‘s ruling on Rodriguez‘s objection to a restoration hearing and motion to dismiss under
On the other hand, interpretation and application of a statutory scheme to undisputed facts is a question of law subject to de novo review. (See People v. Camarillo (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1386, 1389; Ghirardo v. Antonioli (1994) 8 Cal.4th 791, 799–801; Moore v. Superior Court of Riverside County (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 561, 573.)
” ‘When we interpret a statute, “[o]ur fundamental task . . . is to determine the Legislature‘s intent so as to effectuate the law‘s purpose. We first examine the statutory language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning. We do not examine that language in isolation, but in the context of the statutory framework as a whole in order to determine its scope and purpose and to harmonize the various parts of the enactment. If the language is clear, courts must generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend. If the statutory language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the statute‘s purpose, legislative history, and public рolicy.” [Citation.] “Furthermore, we consider portions of a statute in the context of the entire statute and the statutory scheme of which it is a part, giving significance to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative purpose.” ’ ”
(Smith v. LoanMe, Inc. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 183, 190.) “A court ‘may not rewrite a statute, either by inserting or omitting language, to make it conform to a presumed intent that is not expressed. ’ ” (Kaanaana v. Barrett Business Services, Inc. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 158, 171.)
Because the issues presented in this case are entirely questions of law involving statutory interpretation and constitutional requirements, our review is de novo. (See Stiavetti, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 706; see also Baqleh v. Superior Court (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 478, 485; People v. Superior Court (Sokolich) (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 434, 441.)
“A criminal defendant cannot be tried if he or she is not competent to understand the nature of the charges or the proceedings, or to rationally assist counsel in the conduct of a defense. (
“[T]he Legislature in 1974 amended the procedures for determining competence. (See
At the
proceedings “shall be suspended until the person becomes mentally competent.” (Id.,
If it finds the defendant incompetent to stand trial, the trial court may order the defendant‘s commitment to an appropriate treatment facility. (See
The procedures that follow a defendant‘s admission to the treatment facility depend on whether, in the judgment of the treatment facility, the defendant will timely be restored to competence. Generally speaking, the statutory purposes of the competency statutes “are to make sure (1) a mentally incompetent criminal defendant is not tried, and (2) the mentally incompetent defendant is confined for incompetency only for a period reasonable for his or her competence to be restored.” (In re Taitano (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 233, 252 (Taitano).)
(Ibid.) “If the defendant regains competence, criminal proceedings may resume.” (Jackson, at p. 101, citing
“If at any point the treatment facility concludes there is no substantial likelihood that the defendant will regain competence, the defendant is returned to the trial court. ([
When the defendant is at the treatment facility, if a statutorily designated health official determines during the commitment that the defendant has regained mental competence, the official must “immediately certify that fact to the court by filing a certificate of restoration with the court,” and “the date of filing shall be the date on the return receipt.” (
In the
In Rells, the Supreme Court rejected a due process challenge to this scheme. It relied in particular on the “legal force and effect” (Rells, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 868) of the mental health official‘s certification of restoration to competence and observed that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment‘s due process clause in fact permits the presumption that the defendant is mentally competent unless he is proved by a preponderance of the evidence to be otherwise.” (Id. at p. 869.)
At a
requests an evidentiary hearing on whether the defendant has been restored to competence, the trial court can summarily determine that the defendant‘s competency has been restored. (See Rells, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 868; People v. Mixon (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1471, 1480–1482.)
The maximum period of commitment under
court determination on the issue of recovered competence. (See
Further, under
court. The court shall notify the community program director or a designee of the return and of any resulting court orders.” (
The current version of
“The purpose of section 1370 is to provide a defendant the maximum term possible, not to exceed [two] years or the maximum period of imprisonment for a charged crime such as a misdemeanor offense . . . to restore his or her competency.” (People v. G.H. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1559 (G.H.); see also In re Albert C. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 483, 491 [“A defendant making progress toward attaining competency may be committed for [two] years or the length of the maximum term of imprisonment for the most serious charged offense, whichever is shorter.“].) The two-year commitment period “applies to the total period actually spent in commitment at a mental institution.” (G.H., at p. 1558, italics added.) Further, the two-year period is measured by “the aggregate of all commitments on the same charges.” (In re Polk (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1230, 1238.)
“When a defendant
competency hearing at this point in the process. (People v. Quiroz (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1371, 1380.)
“If the defendant is not gravely disabled, the defendant must be released [citation], and the trial court may dismiss the action in the interest of justice pursuant to section 1385 (
E. Analysis
Rodriguez сontends that he has been committed as incompetent for more than the two-year statutory maximum period and, thus, the court has “no jurisdiction for a restoration of competency hearing.” He maintains that the “appropriate jurisdictional question” here is whether a court can hold a restoration of competency hearing “more than two years after the commitment order was issued.” He claims the restoration hearing can no longer occur because such a hearing “must be authorized by ‘special’ jurisdiction under section 1372, which can only occur within the commitment period authorized by [section] 1370, subdivision (c)(1).” He maintains the competency statutes do not allow a court to hold a competency hearing after a defendant has completed the maximum commitment term.
We begin our analysis of Rodriguez‘s contention by reiterating what
defendant has regained mental competence.
In this matter, the following events all occurred by late January 2020, well before Rodriguez‘s aggregate commitment-by any measure-had reached the two-year maximum under
Rodriguez contends that his incompetency commitment continues until the trial court approves the certification of restoration under
Rodriguez‘s principal authority for his contention that he has exceeded the two-year maximum commitment period is the recent decision of Division Three of the First District Court of Appeal in Carr II, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th 1136. There, the Court of Appeal addressed an argument by the People that “a defendant who has been certified by
state authorities to be competent and returned to court pursuant to
In Carr II, the trial court had committed the defendant to a treatment facility as incompetent to stand trial under
After finding the defendant, who, as described above, was subject to a developmental disability, as incompetent, the trial court again committed him to a treatment facility. A few months later, the defendant moved for release on the ground he had reached the maximum commitment authorized by law. The trial court denied the motion concluding that the certification of competency had “tolled” the defendant‘s commitment period. (Carr II, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 1141.) The defendant then filed а petition for writ of habeas corpus in the trial court, again asserting that he had exceeded the maximum commitment period set forth in
the “certification of competency terminated [the defendant‘s] commitment and thereby tolled” the maximum commitment period. (Id. at p. 1142.) The court ruled that the period between the certification of the defendant‘s competency and its subsequent determination that the defendant remained incompetent ” ‘did indeed count as part of the “commitment” for purposes of calculating [the defendant‘s] maximum commitment time.’ ” (Ibid.) Additionally, the trial court ordered that the defendant remain confined in local custody pending investigation of alternative civil commitment proceedings. (Ibid.)
On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court, concluding that the “relevant statutes do not explicitly state the point at which an incompetency commitment ends, but the statutory language and the case law . . . clearly indicate that the certificate of competency serves only to initiate proceedings by which the cоurt will hear and decide the question of the defendant‘s competency.” (Carr II, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 1144.) Further, the
the information, indictment, or misdemeanor complaint, or the maximum term of imprisonment provided by law for a violation of probation or mandatory supervision, whichever is shorter, a defendant who has not become mentally competent shall be returned to the committing court.” (
We do not agree that Carr II requires reversal of the trial court‘s order. Under the facts in this cаse, we conclude Carr II is not dispositive, and we decline to adopt its reasoning. We respectfully disagree with the Carr II court‘s rejection of the significance of the certification of restoration with respect to calculation of the two-year commitment period under
The court in Carr II questioned the “purpose [to] be served in requiring [a] court to approve the certification as expressly contemplated in
The incompetency scheme‘s overall “purpose is restoration of a specific mental state without which the criminal process cannot proceed.” (Waterman, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 569.) More specifically, the commitment of an incompetent defendant is intended to provide treatment to “promote the defendant‘s speedy restoration to mental competence.” (
Rodriguez does not point to any information in the record demonstrating that he is still receiving treatment for the purpose of restoring his competence. Although a
defendant may, at the discretion of the court after it approves the certificate of restoration, be provided “continued treatment . . .
Because Rodriguez is no longer receiving treatment to restore competence, and because he is presumed to be competent by operation of the filing of the certificate of restoration, we conclude the period when the defendant is returned to court after having been certified as competent but before the trial court makes its own determination of competency does not count toward the two-year maximum commitment period referenced in
We express no opinion whether a different analysis would apply if there were evidence that Rodriguez had wrongfully been denied treatment to restore competence or if he were not transported to and from the treatment facility in a timely manner. (Cf. Medina, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 1203 [“In the usual case, only days actually spent in commitment at a mental institution or treatment facility are applied to the maximum commitment period. But this case is unusual: Medina has been denied the treatment to which he is legally entitled—and the ability to accrue time toward the maximum commitment period-because the providers of services have not fulfilled their obligations.“].) We recognize that, on different facts, due process considerations may compel a different result. (See id. at p. 1229 [“Medina has not received the treatment to which he is legally entitled, due to the actions of the RCOC, the DDS, and the DSH. . . . Under these circumstances, applying only days actually spent in treatment at a facility toward the maximum confinement period of three years would violate due process.“].) There is no evidence of such failures to comply with statutory mandates here.
Our interpretation of
Our decision that Rodriguez‘s commitment period under
three-year period of confinement, a defendant is not entitled to have his or her precommitment credits deducted from his or her maximum term of confinement.” (Id. at p. 1559.) Additionally, in People v. Reynolds (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 801, the Court of Appeal concluded that, “[i]n determining whether defendant‘s previous confinement exceeded the maximum three-year period, the [trial] court correctly disregarded defendant‘s precommitment custody credits, and there was no violation of defendant‘s equal protection rights in doing so.” (Id. at p. 809.) These decisions rely on the distinction between commitment for treatment to restore a defendant to competence and other custodial periods related to the criminal offense. They suggest that a defendant‘s days in custody in which he or she is not being treated for restoration to competence do not count toward the maximum commitment period. (See, e.g., id. at p. 806 [“A defendant who, as a result of a mental disorder, is adjudged not competent to stand trial on a felony charge may be committed to a state hospital for no more than three years.” (Italics added.)].)
We also reject Rodriguez‘s contentions that terminating the commitment period when the certification of restoration is filed violates the separation of powers, his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection, or the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
“A core function of the Legislature is to make statutory law, which includes weighing competing interests and determining social policy. A core function of the judiciary is to resolve specific controversies between parties. . . . Separation of powers principles compel the courts to carry out the
determination of defendant‘s guilt and punishment.” (Centeno v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 30, 43.)
We discern no separation of powers violation under our interpretation of sections
As one Court of Appeal stated when rejecting the People‘s argument that the trial court could afford a competency hearing at a stage when the statute did not explicitly provide for one, “the availability of a competence hearing in this context turns on a balancing of important considerations: the right of a defendant not to remain in a treatment facility longer than the statutory maximum; the right of the defendant not to be tried if incompetent; the interest in prosecuting a competent individual for charged crimes; the state interest in public safety; and the appropriate division of responsibility between the treatment facility and the court, among others.” (Taitano, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 256, italics added.) The certificate of restoration to competence by the designated health official and prompt return to the trial court vindicates the defendant‘s right not to remain longer than two years in the treatment facility. The judicial determination of restoration of competency ensures that the defendant is not tried if incompetent. We perceive no constitutional violation in this statutory scheme.
As for Rodriguez‘s due process argument, because he was certified as competent, is no longer receiving treatment to restore competence, and a contested hearing on the competency issue is required only upon a request of one or both of the parties, his custodial commitment has transmuted. He is presumed competent, and the burden is on
the defense (if either the defendant or defense counsel chooses to challenge a defendant‘s restoration to competence) to prove he is incompetent. Given that the certification of competency in this case was filed well before the two-year period had run, Rodriguez is not being “held more than the reasonable period of time necessary to
Similarly, the constitutional proscription against cruel and/or unusual punishment is not violated because Rodriguez has not been and will not be held indefinitely due to incompetency and without any treatment. (Cf. People v. Feagley (1975) 14 Cal.3d 338, 359, 376.) He has received treatment to restore his competency and will receive additional treatment in the future—up to the two-year maximum—if he now proves he is incompetent.
Finally, our conclusion that the commitment period ended with the filing of the certification in this case (and a court determination under
III. DISPOSITION
The petition for writ of prohibition or other equitable relief is denied. This court‘s April 28, 2021 stay order is vacated. This oрinion is made final as to this court seven days from the date of filing. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.490(b)(2)(A).)
WE CONCUR:
Greenwood, P.J.
Grover, J.
Danner, J.
Trial Court: County of Santa Clara
Trial Judge: Hon. Eric S. Geffon
Counsel: Brian C. McComas, by appointment of the Santa Clara County Independent Defense Office, for Petitioner.
Jeffrey F. Rosen, District Attorney, Crystal Tindell Seiler, Barbara A. Cathcart, Supervising District Attorneys, for Real Party in Interest.
H049016
Rodriguez v. Superior Court