THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MARC CARR, Defendant and Respondent.
A158637
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE
Filed 1/19/21
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION; (Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. 51907013)
BACKGROUND
The early history of this case is set out in this court‘s opinion in Carr v. Superior Court (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 264 (Carr I). We will not repeat it here, and will only summarize the facts relevant to this appeal.
While Carr was awaiting trial on serious charges the trial court found him incompetent to stand trial. In August 2015 the court ordered Carr committed to the Porterville Developmental Center (Porterville), a secure treatment facility for individuals with intellectual disabilities.
Some two months later, Carr remained in jail and had not yet been transferred to Porterville. The court ordered the facility to admit him within 21 days and ordered it and the Regional Center of the East Bay (Regional Center) to show cause why they should not be sanctioned for failure to comply with its August order.
In November 2015, shortly before the hearing on the order to show cause, the parties were informed that Porterville was not a suitable placement for Carr because he required involuntary medication. The Regional Center
In December 2015 the Department of Developmental Services (DDS) sought to have Carr jointly re-evaluated by a DDS psychologist and a forensic psychiatrist for the Department of State Hospitals (DSH). The court authorized the new evaluation. Carr remained on the wait list for Porterville.
In March 2016, a DSH psychiatrist certified that Carr was competent to stand trial. The psychiatrist opined that Carr “meets the criteria for malingering, antisocial personality disorder and borderline intellectual functioning and does not meet criteria for any serious psychotic disorder.”
Carr filed a petition for writ of mandate in this court challenging the certification of competency. (Carr I, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 378.) On April 28, 2017, we held the certificate of competency “was adequate to initiate proceedings to determine whether his competency was restored,” and denied
the petition. (Id. at p. 266) But we cautioned that, “although Carr claims the certification of his competency was employed as a subterfuge to circumvent the state‘s obligation to place him in a state hospital, nothing in the record suggests the mental health clinicians evaluating his status on behalf of the [DDS] employed anything other than their best clinical judgment. If that is not so, Carr has the opportunity to demonstrate before the trial court in the upcoming competency trial that his diagnosis of malingering was a sham done to circumvent the court‘s placement order.” (Id. at p. 272.)
A hearing on whether Carr had been restored to competence began on February 13, 2018 pursuant to
In November 2018, Carr moved for release on the ground he had completed the maximum three-year commitment authorized by law. The trial court denied the motion based on its conclusion that DSH‘s March 2016 certification of competency tolled the commitment period. Carr then petitioned the superior court for a writ of habeas corpus, again asserting he had exceeded the maximum three-year commitment period set forth in
section
On September 3, the court rejected the state‘s contention that the March 2016 state official‘s certification of competency terminated Carr‘s commitment and thereby tolled the three-year maximum commitment period. To the contrary, it found the statutory language and the case law “clearly intend that a judge is required to act on the certificate before the defendant is found to have recovered competence, or whether he remains incompetent.” “The official‘s filing of a certificate of restoration only had the legal force and effect of causing Petitioner to be returned to court for further proceedings. . . . [W]here, as here, the defendant chose to challenge the certification of competence, the court was required to provide Petitioner a hearing whereupon the court determined whether or not the defendant was competent.” Accordingly, the period between the March 2016 certificate of competency and the June 2018 ruling that Carr was incompetent “did indeed count as part of the ‘commitment’ for purposes of calculating Petitioner‘s maximum commitment time.”
The court ordered that Carr remain confined in local custody pending investigation of alternative civil commitment proceedings. The People promptly appealed, and the court stayed execution of its order pending this appeal.
DISCUSSION
The People contend the court erred when it found Carr had served more than the maximum statutory commitment period. In their view, the court should have excluded from its calculations the periods between (1) the state‘s initial certification of competence on March 16, 2016 and the court‘s rejection of that certification on August 27, 2018; and (2) the second certification of competency on May 23, 2019 and the grant of habeas relief on September 3, 2019. The argument fails based upon its faulty premise that a certification of competency, not a court finding, terminates the statutory commitment period.
A. Statutory Framework
The Legislature has provided a comprehensive and orderly process for evaluating defendants who are incompetent to stand trial and returning
”
experts to examine the defendant [citation], the introduction of evidence by the defendant and the People [citation], and the presentation of argument by each thereafter [citation]. It states that ‘[i]t shall be presumed that the defendant is mentally competent unless it is proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is mentally incompetent.’ ” (Id. at p. 566.)
“Once incompetency is established, the statutory scheme is replete with mandatory reviews to insure a subject will not be warehoused unduly in a mental institution. He may not even leave the local community if outpatient therapy is deemed sufficient. [Citation.] Whether hospitalized or not, his progress toward competence must be reported to the court within 90 days. [Citation.] Reports must be submitted at six-month intervals and another section
If a statutorily designated health official determines during the commitment that the defendant has regained mental competence, that official must “immediately certify that fact to the court by filing a certificate of restoration with the court. . . .” (
has been restored after state health officials file a certificate of competency. Nonetheless, “the numerous references in that statue to a hearing indicate a legislative intention that such a hearing be afforded.” (People v. Murrell (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 822, 826; see also Rells, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 867-868 [section
The applicable maximum period of commitment in this case is three years.3 (
B. Analysis
The People maintain that a defendant who has been certified by state authorities to be competent and returned to court pursuant to section
The relevant statutes do not explicitly state the point at which an incompetency commitment ends, but the statutory language and the case law discussed above clearly indicate that the certificate of competency serves only to initiate proceedings by which the court will hear and decide the question of
the defendant‘s competency. Under section
where the defendant can receive competency maintenance services. (
The People‘s view that the certificate of competence alone suffices to terminate a commitment cannot be squared with the statutory scheme that makes clear it is the trial court, not a state health official, that determines whether the defendant has been restored to competence. The People do not explain how to reconcile their construction of the statutes with the explicit references to a court hearing and determination of competency in section
For these reasons alone, the People‘s construction of the statutory scheme does not stand up to inspection. Statutory language “is construed in the context of the statute as a whole and the overall statutory scheme, so that we give ’ “significance to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative purpose.” ’ . . . An interpretation that renders
related provisions nugatory must be avoided [citation]; each sentence must be read not in isolation but in the light of the statutory scheme.” (In re Ogea (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 974, 981-982.)
In view of the statutory language and the case law, the People‘s suggestion that it “goes without saying” that certification terminates a commitment because competency restoration treatment ceases upon the defendant‘s return to court (see
The People‘s citation to Bryant, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th 175, is also unpersuasive. Bryant addresses whether an incompetent defendant was entitled to accrue “good time” credits under section
county jail if a timely restoration certificate had been issued.” (Id. at p. 184.) Nothing in this reasoning or conclusion suggests that a certificate of competency terminates the commitment. (See In re Marriage of Cornejo (1996) 13 Cal.4th 381, 388 [” ‘It is axiomatic that cases are not authority for propositions not considered’ “]; Nevarov v. Caldwell (1958) 161 Cal.App.2d 762, 769 [court should not expand decision beyond its intended application].)
The People argue as a matter of policy that, if commitment time continues to accrue during section
In this case, the trial court concluded “[t]here is no legislative intention that the time period, within which a defendant reasonably avails himself of the opportunity to challenge the certification, would then be held against him for purposes of extending his maximum commitment period. To hold otherwise would be to undermine the equally compelling intention of the statute that protects the IST defendant from being held beyond his three year maximum commitment period. In light of this, the statute and case law support the conclusion that not only did the Legislature intend that a
defendant be afforded a hearing under
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
Siggins, P.J.
WE CONCUR:
Petrou, J.
Jackson, J.
People v. Carr, A158637
Trial Court: Superior Court of Contra Costa County
Trial Judge: Honorable Clare Marie Maier
Counsel:
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Seth K. Schalit, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Bridget Billeter, Deputy Attorney General for plaintiff and appellant.
Contra Costa County Public Defender‘s Office, Robin Lipetzky, Public Defender, Stephanie Elizabeth Regular, Assistant Public Defender for defendant and respondent.