DAVID KAANAANA et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC., et al., Defendants and Respondents.
S253458
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
March 29, 2021
Second Appellate District, Division Eight B276420 and B279838; Los Angeles County Superior Court BC496090
Justice Corrigan authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Liu, Cuellar, Kruger, Groban, and Jenkins concurred. Justice Kruger filed a concurring opinion, in which Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justice Jenkins concurred.
KAANAANA v. BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES, INC.
S253458
Opinion of the Court
California‘s prevailing wage law is a minimum wage provision that generally applies to those employed on public works. Different provisions define the term “public works” in various contexts. As relevant
I. BACKGROUND
Los Angeles County Sanitation District No. 2 (the District) maintains and operates a system for the transfer and disposal of refuse. (
Defendant Barrett Business Services, Inc. (Barrett) contracted with the District to provide belt sorters and others to staff and operate the two facilities. These workers were under Barrett‘s supervision and not considered District employees. In each site, refuse is deposited onto a conveyor belt and manually sorted. Belt sorters remove nonrecyclable materials, clear obstructions, sort recyclables, and put them into containers.
Plaintiffs in this class action sued Barrett and a former manager on behalf of all belt sorters employed at the two locations from April 2011 to September 2013. The complaint alleged causes of action for failure to: (1) pay minimum and/or prevailing wages; (2) pay overtime at prevailing wage rates; (3) provide meal periods; and (4) timely pay all wages owed at the time of termination. It also alleged unfair business practices and sought both civil penalties and restitution of wages. Plaintiffs alleged their work fell under
In a split decision, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court‘s ruling on the motion to strike. The majority concluded that plaintiffs’ belt sorting
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
There is no factual dispute about the kind of work plaintiffs performed. Whether they were entitled to the prevailing wage because their labor fell under the applicable statutory definition of “public works” is a question of law we review de novo. (City of Long Beach v. Department of Industrial Relations (2004) 34 Cal.4th 942, 949 (City of Long Beach).)
Since the original public works statutes were passed nearly 90 years ago, the Legislature has enacted many provisions relating to public works. Lawmakers have used various formulations to describe what they intended to designate as public works for purposes of these enactments. When different formulations are used over the evolving history of a concept, often reflecting the prevailing forces of the times or the realities at play in different segments of the workplace, courts occasionally encounter the need for statutory interpretation. This is one such case.
The essence of Barrett‘s argument is that some definitions of public work are limited to labor that generally involves construction. Perforce, they urge that all public works provisions should be interpreted as so limited. The particular provision at issue here does not include the limitation Barrett insists upon.
B. The Statutory Framework
California‘s prevailing wage law was first enacted in 1931 as an uncodified measure.4 (Public Wage Rate Act or 1931 Act;
The overarching purpose of the prevailing wage law is to “protect and benefit employees on public works projects.” (Lusardi Construction Co. v. Aubry (1992) 1 Cal.4th 976, 985 (Lusardi).) “This general objective subsumes within it a number of specific goals: to protect employees from substandard wages that might be paid if contractors could recruit labor from distant cheap-labor areas; to permit union contractors to compete with nonunion contractors; to benefit the public through the superior efficiency of well-paid employees; and to compensate nonpublic employees with higher wages for the absence of job security and employment benefits enjoyed by public employees.” (Id. at p. 987.) Courts liberally construe the law to fulfill these purposes. (City of Long Beach, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 949-950; see also Azusa Land Partners v. Department of Industrial Relations (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 1, 15 (Azusa).)
Generally, prevailing wages must be paid to all those “employed on public works” (
This case involves the italicized definition, which contains three basic elements: (1) work; (2) done for an irrigation, utility, reclamation, improvement, or other similar district (a covered district); except (3) the operation of an irrigation or drainage system for an irrigation or reclamation district (irrigation exclusion). This dispute revolves around the first element. Barrett concedes that the District is a covered district and that the irrigation exclusion does not apply.7 But Barrett argues that the only “work” covered by
In essence, Barrett argues the construction and installation provision (
C. Analysis
Familiar principles guide our consideration. Our fundamental task is to ascertain the Legislature‘s intent and effectuate the law‘s purpose, giving the statutory language its plain and commonsense meaning. (Garcia v. McCutchen (1997) 16 Cal.4th 469, 476.) We examine that language in the context of the entire statutory framework to discern its scope and purpose and to harmonize the various parts of the enactment. (Coalition of Concerned Communities, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 34 Cal.4th 733, 737.) “If the language is clear, courts must generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend. If the statutory language permits more than one reasonable
Unlike the construction and installation provision of
1. Statutory Definitions of Public Works
a. Section 1720, subdivision (a)
When the Public Wage Rate Act was enacted in 1931, the law‘s application was expressly limited to workers engaged in construction work. (See Metropolitan Water Dist. v. Whitsett (1932) 215 Cal. 400, 415-416.) The law‘s operative provision required payment of prevailing wages “to all laborers, workmen and mechanics employed by or on behalf of” the state or a local government “engaged in the construction of public works, exclusive of maintenance work.” (
In 1937, the Legislature enacted the
When the Legislature alters statutory language, “as for example when it deletes express provisions of the prior version,” the presumption is that it intended to change the law‘s meaning. (Dix v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 442, 461.) Here, the Legislature‘s deletion of the word “construction” indicates an intent to expand, beyond construction work, the assortment of activities that would qualify as public works when done for a covered district. (Cf. County of Los Angeles v. State of California (1987) 43 Cal.3d 46, 55.)10
Barrett concedes the Legislature removed the word “construction” from the covered district provision. But it argues that apart from this “ambiguous deletion,” there is no evidence the Legislature intended to enlarge
Barrett‘s characterization sweeps too broadly and overlooks important qualifiers in the authorities it cites.
Other textual indications in the three definitions adopted in 1937 support a conclusion that
Second,
Barrett reads this exclusionary language differently. It starts from the premise that the covered district provision only applies to construction-type work, and thus that the operation of an irrigation or drainage system is not “public works” under that definition. It then contends that the exclusionary language should be read to mean that such operational work is included in the definition of “public works,” but only for purposes of
The plain language of
The proposed
As noted, the 1931 Act only applied to “construction work.” ( The operative provisions of each of these enactments were placed in the Public Works Chapter when the Barrett argues the other seven definitions of “public works” in the current version of The types of projects included in Relying on the principle of in pari materia, Barrett argues the term “work” in Statutes are considered to be in pari materia when they relate to the same person or thing, or class of persons or things, or have the same purpose or object. (Walker v. Superior Court (1988) 47 Cal.3d 112, 124, fn. 4.) Such statutes should “be construed together so that all parts of the statutory scheme are given effect.” (Lexin v. Superior Court (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1050, 1090-1091.) “Identical language appearing in separate provisions dealing with the same subject matter should be accorded the same interpretation.” (Walker, at p. 132.) The first four statutes cited by Barrett provide that for certain limited purposes, including the application of prevailing wage laws, the term “public works” also means: (1) “any construction work done under private contract,” if certain conditions exist ( But the principle of harmonization does not authorize courts to rewrite statutes. (State Dept. of Public Health v. Superior Court (2015) 60 Cal.4th 940, 956.) Where the Legislature chooses to define the same term differently in two different provisions, neither definition should be “rewritten under the guise of an in pari materia construction.” (People v. Honig (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 289, 328.) The last cited statute, Next, Barrett argues that statutes outside the Labor Code show that the term “public works” is commonly understood as being limited to “construction of works to be owned by and used for the benefit of the public.” Barrett points to the following statutes: This argument fails for two reasons. First, the fact construction projects authorized by other statutes must comply with prevailing wage laws does not mean that those laws only apply to construction projects. Second, each of the statutes Barrett cites was enacted years after and did not purport to amend Finally, Barrett points to The parties argue that case law and administrative decisions interpreting a. Case Law Plaintiffs rely on three cases: Reclamation Dist. No. 684 v. Department of Industrial Relations (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1000 (Reclamation Dist. No. 684); Azusa, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th 1; and Reliable Tree Experts v. Baker (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 785 (Reliable Tree Experts). Each case tangentially addressed whether labor other than construction and installation qualified as public work. Azusa is the most relevant of the three. In that case, a developer challenged a ruling that contract workers doing construction work for a group of government entities, including a community facilities district, were entitled to prevailing wages under The Legislature has granted the Director of the Department of Industrial Relations (Department) “quasi-legislative authority to determine coverage of projects or types of work under the prevailing wage laws.” ( The trial court relied on a 2006 Department decision15 in granting Barrett‘s motion. The question was whether workers hauling biosolids for a sanitation district were entitled to prevailing wages. (Orange County Biosolids, supra, at p. 1.) The Department concluded they were not, stating, “[T]he most reasonable way to define the scope of section 1720(a)(2) is to require that the work fall within one of the types of covered work enumerated” in In an amicus brief, the District and others urge us to defer to the interpretation of Deference to these decisions is unwarranted. The Department‘s interpretation in these decisions is neither long-standing nor consistent. Contrary to Where, as here, an administrative body has repeatedly changed its stance on the scope of a statute over a short period, its position does not warrant the deference it might typically be accorded. (See Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1094, 1105, fn. 7.) Moreover, as the Court of Appeal noted, Department has “de-designated” these past decisions as precedential, suggesting Department has concluded they should not be entitled to deference. (Kaanaana, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 795.) Finally, the issue here is “a pure one of statutory interpretation“; thus, Department has no “’ “comparative interpretative advantage over the courts.” ’ ” (Duncan, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 304; see also Center for Biological Diversity v. Department of Fish & Wildlife (2015) 62 Cal.4th 204, 236.) Barrett argues there is no logical reason why the Legislature would have applied the prevailing wage laws to a broader range of activities when done for covered districts than for other government agencies.16 But it offers no reason to think that belt sorters materially differ from laborers whose work Neither the statute nor its legislative history explains why the Legislature singled out work done for covered districts in The most reasonable interpretation of “public works” in The judgment is affirmed. CORRIGAN, J. We Concur: CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. Concurring Opinion by Justice Kruger I agree with the majority opinion, which I have signed. The result in this case follows from the text of Part of the mystery stems from the nature of the statutory definition in This is at least a little peculiar. There is nothing immediately and obviously distinctive about irrigation districts, reclamation districts, and the like, that explains why they should be singled out in this fashion. The prong of the definition governing irrigation and other special districts first appeared, in substantially similar form, in a maximum-hour law. (See Stats. 1929, ch. 793, § 1, p. 1603.) It is not clear why the maximum-hour law had included a special definition for the covered districts, however, nor is it clear why the Legislature saw fit to apply the same definition for purposes of all of the other public works protections in the Labor Code. Certainly the Legislature is entitled to draw such distinctions. (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 27.) But if the Legislature had a considered reason for this differential treatment of various kinds of public agencies, that reason is not readily apparent from the historical record. This feature of the statutory public works definition was apparently obscure enough that, for decades after its enactment, it appears no one thought to apply the language of the special districts definition to the sort of work plaintiffs here perform. That omission does not license us to disregard the language of the governing definition, which is most naturally read to cover KRUGER, J. We Concur: CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.b. Barrett‘s Other Arguments
2. Case Law and Administrative Decisions
3. Other Claims
D. Conclusion
III. DISPOSITION
LIU, J.
CUÉLLAR, J.
KRUGER, J.
GROBAN, J.
JENKINS, J.
JENKINS, J.