Riley v. BondiRiley v. Bondi
OCTOBER TERM, 2024
RILEY v. BONDI, ATTORNEY GENERAL
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 23–1270. Argued March 24, 2025—Decided June 26, 2025
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) sought to remove Pierre Riley, a citizen of Jamaica, from the United States under expedited procedures for aliens convicted of aggravated felonies. On January 26, 2021, the DHS issued a “final administrative review order” (FARO) directing Riley‘s removal to Jamaica. Under
Held:
1. BIA orders denying deferral of removal in “withholding-only” proceedings are not “final ordеr[s] of removal” under
An “order of removal” includes an “order of deportation,” 110 Stat. 3009–627, which, in turn, is defined as an order “concluding that the alien is deportable or ordering deportation,”
An order of removal becomes final at the earlier of two points: (1) “a determination by the [BIA] affirming such order,” or (2) “the expiration of the period in which the alien is permitted to” petition the BIA for review of the order.
The Court‘s decisions in Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U. S. 573, and Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U. S. 523, buttress this conclusion. In Nasrallah, the Court noted that CAT orders are not final removal orders because they do not conclude that an alien is deportable or order deportation. 590 U. S., at 582. The Court held that CAT orders do not “disturb” or “affect the validity” of final removal orders, so they do not merge into final orders because only rulings affecting the validity of a final removal order will merge into the final order for purposes of judicial review. Ibid. Guzman Chavez addressed whether aliens could be released during the pendency of their withholding-only proceedings. The Court held that the directive that they be removed had become “administratively final” regardless of their pending CAT proceedings, and “the finality of [an] оrder of removal does not depend in any way on the outcome of the withholding-only proceedings.” 594 U. S., at 533, 539–540.
The Government argues that the question in Guzman Chavez was whether the removal order in that case was “administratively final” for purposes of detention, not whether a removal order constitutes “the final order of removal” for purposes of filing. But this argument conflates when a petition for review must be filed with the issues that may be adjudicated in that
2. The 30-day filing deadline under
Categorizing a rule as jurisdictional has important consequences that may disrupt the orderly and efficient adjudication of cases in the federal courts. Court precedent shows reluctance to label rules “jurisdic-tional” unless Congress clearly signals that intent. While Congress need not use “magic words” to indicate that a rule is jurisdictional, Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U. S. 428, 436, the Court‘s recent decisions require an exceedingly strong signal for jurisdictional classification. That demanding requirement is not met here.
Section 1252(b)(1) states petitions “must be filed not later than 30 days after the date of the final order of removal.” This language tells aliens what to do to obtain judicial review, but it provides no directives to courts. It does not reference jurisdiction and lacks any language “demarcat[ing] a court‘s power.” Harrow v. Department of Defense, 601 U. S. 480, 484. The placement of the statute also suggests it is not jurisdictional because neither the particular subsection nor the broader section in which the deadline is placed concerns jurisdiction.
Precedents extending back nearly 20 years support classifying
While Stone v. INS, 514 U. S. 386, 405, characterized
Section 1252‘s 30-day filing rule is not jurisdictional, but because the Government does not wish to press that ground for dismissal the Court‘s holding does not preclude
Vacated and remanded.
ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined in full, and in which SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, GORSUCH, and JACKSON, JJ., joined only as to Part II–B.
THOMAS, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 277. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed an opinion dissenting in part, in which KAGAN and JACKSON, JJ., joined in full, and in which GORSUCH, J., joined except as to Part IV, post, p. 281.
Keith Bradley argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Christopher F. Haas, Jeffrey Walker, and Samuel Ballingrud.
Ephraim A. McDowell argued the cause for respondent in support of petitioner. With him on the briefs were Acting Solicitor General Harris, Solicitor General Prelogar, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Boynton, Deputy Solicitor General Gannon, John W. Blakeley, Melissa L. Neiman-Kelting, Dawn S. Conrad, and Elizabeth K. Ottman.
Stephen J. Hammer, by invitation of the Court, 604 U. S. 1040, argued the cause and filed a brief as amicus curiae in support of the judgment below. With him on the brief were Allyson N. Ho, Jonathan C. Bond, Robert A. Batista, M. Christian Talley, Lavi M. Ben Dor, and Patrick J. Fuster.*
Opinion of the Court
JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case, we must decide whether the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit erred in dismissing petitioner Pierre Riley‘s petition for review on jurisdictional grounds. And in order to make that decision, we must decide two subsidiary questions: (1) whether the 30-day filing deadline for judicial review of a “final order of removal,”
The answers to these questions matter in this case because Riley filed a petition for review within 30 days after a BIA order in his withholding-only proceeding but long after the issuance of a “final administrative review order” (FARO) that commanded his removal from the United States. The Court of Appeals held that Riley‘s petition was filed too late, and because it viewed the 30-day deadline as jurisdictional, it dismissed his petition. We now vacate and remand.
Taking the second question first, we hold that a BIA order in a withholding-only proceeding is not a “final order of removal,” and therefore the 30-day filing deadline cannot be satisfied by filing a petition for review within 30 days of the BIA‘s withholding-only order. Second, we hold that the 30-day filing deadline is not jurisdictional. Because the Government has chosen not to seek dismissal of Riley‘s case on that ground, we vacate the judgment below and remand for further proceedings.
In 1995, Pierre Riley, a citizen of Jamaica, entered the United States on a B–2 tourist visa that allowed him to stay for six months, but he did not depart when that time was up. 2 App. 54. He became a member of “a far-reaching and well-organized” drug trafficking gang and was convicted in 2008 for conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute more than 1,000 kilograms of marijuana, as well as for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime. See United States v. Riley, 2008 WL 2662277, *1–*2 (SDNY, July 7, 2008). He was sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment but was released in January 2021. Riley v. Garland, 2024 WL 1826979, *1 (CA4, Apr. 26, 2024) (per curiam).
Shortly thereafter, immigration authorities took Riley into custody and sought his removal. Because he had been convicted of an aggravated felony, his case proceeded along the supposedly streamlined track that Congress created in 1996. See
In this case, it was undisputed that Riley had been convicted of an aggravated felony, and therefore on January 26, 2021, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a FARO directing that Riley be sent back to Jamaica.
Riley did not contest his removal from the United States, but he resisted return to Jamaica under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention or CAT), Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100–20, 1465 U. N. T. S. 113. Article Three of the Convention prohibits a signatory state from sending a person to another nation if “there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.” The United States became a full party to the CAT in 1994, see United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the Committee Against Torture, 55 U. N. GAOR Supp. No. 55, p. 44, U. N. Doc. A/55/44 (2000), and as subsequently required by legislation, see Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, § 2242(b), 112 Stat. 2681–822, regulations implementing the CAT‘s requirements were then adopted. As relevant here, these regulations prohibit the removal of an alien to a country where torture is likely. See generally
Seeking relief under the CAT, Riley told an immigration officer that a wealthy and powerful Jamaican drug kingpin had it in for Riley‘s family, had killed two of his cousins, was influential with the police and politicians in Jamaica, and would likely kill Riley if he was returned to any place in that country. See 2 App. 66–70. The officer concluded that Riley did not demonstrate reasonable fear of persecution, but an Immigration Judge (IJ) disagreed and therefore sent Riley‘s case to what is called a “withholding-only” proceeding—that is, a proceeding at which the only issue is whether the alien may be removed to his home country.
At Riley‘s withholding-only proceeding, the IJ found Riley credible and granted
The DHS appealed that decision to the BIA, which found that Riley‘s claim was “not supported by sufficient objective evidence.” 1 App. 50. Accordingly, the BIA vacated the IJ‘s order and thus allowed the FARO to be enforсed. 2024 WL 1826979, *1.
Three days after the issuance of that order, Riley filed a petition for review in the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, but the court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. It held that the final order of removal in Riley‘s case was the FARO issued on January 26, 2021, not the later BIA order denying CAT relief. This meant that Riley‘s petition had not been filed on time, and because the court thought that the 30-day filing deadline in
In holding that the 30-day filing deadline is jurisdictional, the Fourth Circuit joined the Seventh Circuit, but its holding conflicted with decisions of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits. Compare Martinez v. Garland, 86 F. 4th 561, 571–572 (CA4 2023); F. J. A. P. v. Garland, 94 F. 4th 620, 626 (CA7 2024), with Argueta-Hernandez v. Garland, 87 F. 4th 698, 705 (CA5 2023); Alonso-Juarez v. Garland, 80 F. 4th 1039, 1046–1047 (CA9 2023). And in holding that the 30-day filing deadline begins to run when a FARO is issued, the Fourth Circuit joined the Second Circuit, see Bhaktibhai-Patel v. Garland, 32 F. 4th 180, 192–194 (CA2 2022), but its decision was at odds with decisions of numerous other Circuits, most of which were handed down before our decisions in Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U. S. 573 (2020), and Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U. S. 523 (2021), analyzed related issues. See Jimenez-Morales v. Attorney Gen., 821 F. 3d 1307, 1308 (CA11 2016); Garcia v. Sessions, 856 F. 3d 27, 35 (CA1 2017); Bonilla v. Sessions, 891 F. 3d 87, 90, n. 4 (CA3 2018); Argueta-Hernandez, 87 F. 4th, at 706; F. J. A. P., 94 F. 4th, at 635–636; Alonso-Juarez, 80 F. 4th, at 1046; Arostegui-Maldonado v. Garland, 75 F. 4th 1132, 1142–1143 (CA10 2023); Kolov v. Garland, 78 F. 4th 911, 918–919 (CA6 2023).
We granted certiorari to resolve these two splits. Riley v. Garland, 604 U. S. 1007 (2024). Because the Government agreed with Riley‘s position on both issues, we appointed Stephen J. Hammer as amicus curiae to defend the judgment below. 604 U. S. 1040 (2024). He has ably discharged his responsibilities.
II
A
Under
1
The statutory text speaks directly and clearly to this question. While the Immigration and Nationality Act does not define the term “order of removal,” any statutory reference to “an order of removal” is “deemed to include a reference to . . . an order of deportation.” Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, § 309(d)(2), 110 Stat. 3009–627. An “order of deportation,” in turn, is defined as an order “concluding
We must therefore identify which order concluded that Riley is “deportable” and commanded his deportation, and it is clear that the qualifying order is the FARO issued by DHS on January 26, 2021. That order held that Riley was deportable and directed that he be removed from the United States. See 1 App. 8.
The order was also the Executive‘s final determination on the question of removal. An order of removal becomes final at the earlier of two points: (1) “a determination by the [BIA] affirming such order,” or (2) “the expiration of the period in which the alien is permitted to” petition the BIA for review of the order.
2
Our decisions in Nasrallah and Guzman Chavez buttress this conclusion. Although the ultimate issue in each of those cases differed from the question now before us, both decisions are instructive.
In Nasrallah, the question was whether the alien could mount a factual challenge to the denial of relief under the CAT. Because the alien had been convicted of aggravated felonies,
We disagreed. See id., at 582–583. We noted that a CAT order is not a final order of removal because “it is not an order ‘concluding that the alien is deportable or ordering deportation.’ ” Id., at 582. And what is more, we held, a CAT order “does not disturb” or “affect the validity” of a final order of removal. Ibid. We therefore held that the BIA‘s CAT order “d[id] not merge into” a final order of removal for purposes of judicial review because only “rulings that affect the validity of the final order of removal” merge into that order. Ibid.
Our reasoning in Guzman Chavez was similar. The question there was whether the aliens in question could be released during the pendency of their withholding-only proceedings, and the answer to that question hinged on whether the aliens were being detained under
We held that the aliens were detained under
For present purposes, the lessons taught by Nasrallah and Guzman Chavez are clear. An order denying relief under the CAT is not a final order of removal and does not affect the validity of a previously issued order of removal or render that order non-final. That teaching dooms Riley‘s argument here.
3
Riley and the Government struggle to escape the reasoning of Nasrallah and Guzman Chavez, but their efforts are unconvincing. Riley begins by arguing at length that in a case like his, an order denying withholding of removal or CAT relief should be regarded as marking the point in time of a final order because it occurs last and enables the FARO to be executed. See Brief for Petitioner 29–34. But as already explained, this argument runs headlong into Nasrallah and Guzman Chavez.
The Government, while agreeing with the court below that a CAT or withholding-only relief order is not itself a final order of removal, also contends that a previously issued removal order cannot become final “until the conclusion of withholding-only proceedings.” Brief for Respondent in Support of Petitioner 42–43. But Guzman Chavez makes clear that “the finality of [an] order of removal does not depend in any way on the outcome of the withholding-only proceedings.” See 594 U. S., at 539.
The Government responds that the question in Guzman Chavez was whether the removal order in that case was “administratively final” for purposes of detention under
The first of these arguments analogizes review under
The Government‘s second argument regarding the meaning of finality in
We appreciate this difference, but just because finality may serve different purposes under different statutes, it does not follow that the meaning of finality necessarily varies. Here, Riley‘s argument does not provide an adequate reason to disregard the lessons of Nasrallah and Guzman Chavez.
4
The Government‘s final submission concerns the practical problems that it fears will arise if a removal order becomes final before the issue of withholding-only relief is decided. The Government worries that aliens like Riley who wish only to contest removal to their native country will not file a petition for review until their request for withholding of removal to that destination is denied. And if an alien files a petition for review before the question of withholding-only relief is settled, the Government fears that the proceed-ing in the court of appeals may be wrapped up before the BIA denies withholding-only relief, and the alien may thus be deprived of any judicial review of that denial. See Brief for Respondent in Support of Petitioner 36–38.
These are legitimate practical concerns, but we must nevertheless follow the statutory text and our prior precedents. And in any event, these problems are not unavoidable. In a case like this, the Government can inform aliens of the need to file a petition within 30 days after the issuance of a FARO, and it can alert the court of appeals to the pendency of a withholding-only proceeding so that review there can wait until that issue is decided. And if requests for withholding of removal in cases like Riley‘s are decided expeditiously—and that was the whole point of the supposedly streamlined procedure adopted by Congress to effect the quick removal of dangerous aliens*—petitions for review of removal orders should not linger long on a court of appeals docket before the withholding issue is ready for review. Finally, if the Government makes a general practice of
In sum, the statutory text and our precedents make clear that the FARO is the final order of removal in this case, and withholding-only proceedings do not disturb the finality of an otherwise final order of removal.
B
We turn next to the question whether
This question is important because categorizing a rule as jurisdictional has important consequences that may disrupt the orderly and efficient adjudication of cases in the federal courts. Courts generally decide only the questions that are presented by the parties. See Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U. S. 428, 434 (2011). If a party neglects to raise, concedes, or waives an issue, a court generally has no obligation to consider it. See Wilkins v. United States, 598 U. S. 152, 157–158 (2023); see also Union Pacific R. Co. v. Locomotive Engineers, 558 U. S. 67, 81–82 (2009) (noting that nonjurisdictional matters are “ordinarily forfeited if the party asserting the rule waits too long to raise the point” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
True jurisdictional requirements, however, are different. A federal court must always satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction. See United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U. S. 402, 408–409 (2015). Thus, even if the parties fail to spot a jurisdictional issue or agree that the court has jurisdiction, the court cannot proceed unless it makes an independent determination that it has jurisdiction. See Henderson, 562 U. S., at 434; see also 33 C. Wright, C. Koch, & R. Murphy, Federal Practice and Procedure § 8316, p. 50 (2018) (“[A] litigant‘s failure to comply with a jurisdictional bar deprives a court of all authority to hear a case, regardless of waiver or equitable considerations” (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)).
Relying on a string of decisions issued during the past 19 years, Riley and the Government argue that the 30-day filing deadline in
1
Because jurisdictional rules have a unique capacity to disrupt the orderly adjudication of disputes, we are reluctant to label a rule “jurisdictional” unless Congress has clearly signaled that the rule is meant to have that status. See Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U. S., at 409–410; Henderson, 562 U. S., at 435–436. We have said that Congress “need not use magic words in order to speak clearly” on the question whether a provision is jurisdictional, id., at 436, but our pattern of recent decisions shows that we will not categorize a provision
And in this case, that demanding requirement is not met. We start with the text of the statute. Section 1252(b)(1) provides that “[t]he petition for review must be filed not later than 30 days after the date of the final order of removal.” This language tells aliens what they must do if they want judicial review, but it provides no directives to courts. It makes no reference to jurisdiction and lacks any language “demarcat[ing] a court‘s power.” Harrow v. Department of Defense, 601 U. S. 480, 484 (2024); see Henderson, 562 U. S., at 438; Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U. S., at 411.
The placement of the 30-day filing rule also weighs against amicus‘s argument. Neither the particular subsection nor the broader section in which the deadline is placed concerns jurisdiction, but there are other sections in which the deadline could have been housed if it had been meant to have jurisdictional status. One possibility is
2
Our precedents extending back nearly 20 years support classifying
Since Arbaugh, however, we have been more disciplined in our use of the term “jurisdictional.” In that case, we were required to decide whether satisfying Title VII‘s definition of a covered “employer,” which turns on the number of employees in a work force, was a jurisdictional requirement. 546 U. S., at 503. In holding that this coverage requirement is not jurisdictional, we made clear that courts should treat a “statutory limitation” as jurisdictional only if Congress “clearly states” that the provision has jurisdictional consequences. Id., at 515–516. And since Arbaugh, our cases have almost uniformly found that the provisions at issue failed to meet this very demanding test. See, e. g., Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U. S. 154, 166 (2010); Henderson, 562 U. S., at 441–442; Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medical Center, 568 U. S. 145, 154–155 (2013); Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U. S., at 410–411; Boechler v. Commissioner, 596 U. S. 199, 211 (2022); Wilkins, 598 U. S., at 158–159; Harrow, 601 U. S., at 485.
The one exception to this pattern is John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U. S. 130 (2008)—and, not surprisingly,
Here, amicus argues that Stone v. INS, 514 U. S. 386 (1995), is like the earlier jurisdictional decisions on which we relied in John R. Sand. In Stone, the Court characterized
Stone, to be sure, did describe a predecessor provision‘s filing deadline as “jurisdictional.” 514 U. S., at 405; see also Henderson, 562 U. S., at 437. As we later explained, however, Stone used the term “jurisdictional” loosely and did not “atten[d] to the distinction between ‘jurisdictional’ rules (as we understand them today) and nonjurisdictional but mandatory ones.” Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U. S. 411, 421 (2023). Stone suggested that all mandatory filing requirements are jurisdictional, see 514 U. S., at 405, but since that time, we have repeatedly found that filing deadlines, including some couched in mandatory terms, are not jurisdictional. In Henderson, we unanimously held that
In these cases, like the present case, the statutes imposed requirements on litigants, not the courts; but even when the relevant statutory language was not litigant-focused, we have found that our clear statement rule was not satisfied. See, e. g., Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U. S., at 410–411 (holding that
In sum, we hold that
*
*
*
For these reasons, the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring.
The Court today holds that the Fourth Circuit erred in treating the 30-day deadline in
in full. I write separately to note that the Fourth Circuit may nevertheless lack jurisdiction over this suit for a different reason. Petitioner Pierre Riley sought review of an “Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals . . . entered on May 31, 2022.” 1 App. 42 (emphasis deleted). Today‘s opinion makes clear that this May 31 order is not a ““final order of removal.”” Ante, at 267. Instead, it is an order denying relief under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT). Congress has specified that federal courts of appeals lack jurisdiction to review CAT orders “except as part of the review of a final order of removal.” § 2242, 112 Stat. 2681–822, note following
I
Through a series of statutory enactments, Congress has established a comprehensive framework for “[j]udicial review of a final order of removal.”
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) grants the federal courts of appeals jurisdiction to review an alien‘s “final order of removal.”
IIRIRA contemplates that an alien facing removal may bring a “claim” under the CAT.
This Court has made clear that “CAT orders are not the same as final orders of removal.” Nasrallah, 590 U. S., at 582 (emphasis deleted). “An order granting CAT relief means only that, notwithstanding the order of removal, the [alien] may not be removed to the designated country of removal, at least until conditions change in that country.” Ibid. “A CAT order is not itself a final order of removal because it is not an order “concluding that the alien is deportable or ordering deportation.”” Ibid.
While IIRIRA acknowledges that an alien may bring a “claim” under the CAT, see
IIRIRA also contains a “zipper clause,” which provides for consolidation in judicial review. The zipper clause states that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section,” judicial review of “all questions of law and fact . . . arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien” shall be “available only in judicial review of a final order under this section.”
The zipper clause plainly covers CAT claims because CAT claims “aris[e] from” removal proceedings.
II
Riley has never petitioned for judicial review of a final order of removal. See Brief for Petitioner 10–12. He petitioned the Fourth Circuit only for “review of the Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals . . . entered on May 31, 2022.” 1 App. 42 (emphasis deleted). And, as the Court today holds, this May 31 order addressing Riley‘s CAT claim is not a final order of removal. Ante, at 267.
I do not see how the Fourth Circuit has jurisdiction to review a CAT order in isolation when the petitioner does not seek review of a final order of removal. Congress has providеd that federal courts of appeals lack jurisdiction to review an order denying CAT relief “except as part of the review of a final order of removal.” § 2242(d), 112 Stat. 2681–822 (emphasis added). “In other words, a final order of removal is required if a court is to review a CAT order at all.” Nasrallah, 590 U. S., at 592 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Riley has undoubtedly received a final order of removal. But, he has never sought judicial review of that order pursuant to the procedures outlined in
On remand, the Fourth Circuit must assure itself of its jurisdiction before it can proceed to the merits of Riley‘s petition. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 101–102 (1998). I encourage the Fourth Circuit to consider whether it has jurisdiction to review a CAT order—and only a CAT order—when the petitioner does not seek review of a final order of removal.
Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Kagan and Justice Jackson join, and with whom Justice Gorsuch joins as to all but Part IV, dissenting in part.
Sometimes, to ask a quеstion is to answer it. When petitioner Pierre Riley received an order from the Department of Homeland Security notifying him it would seek to deport him to Jamaica, he timely sought deferral of that removal on the ground that he would likely be killed upon his return there. After initially winning such relief from an Immigration Judge, Riley lost before the Board of Immigration Appeals. The question is when Riley should have petitioned for judicial review of the Board‘s order. Was his petition due 30 days after the Government first notified him he would be deported, well over a year before the Board issued the order Riley sought to challenge? Or was it instead due 30 days after the order denying his claim for deferral of removal? The answer is clear: One should not be required to appeal an order before it exists.
Incomprehensibly, the Court disagrees. It acknowledges that the immigration laws required Riley to appeal the Department‘s decision that he was “deportable” together with the Board‘s (much later) order denying him relief from removal to Jamaica. It admits that the only way to review both orders is to do so after the latter of the two issues. Yet it concludes Riley‘s appeal was due before the Board issued the second order. Because Congress did not write so incoherent a judicial-review provision, I respectfully dissent.*
I
A
Petitioner Pierre Riley grew up in Kingston, Jamaica. In 1995, at age 16, he entered the United States on a visitor‘s visa to live with his father, a U. S. citizen. Riley overstayed his visa, becаuse (he says) he thought his father had arranged for his naturalization. Eventually, Riley got involved in marijuana trafficking, and in 2008, a federal jury convicted him of conspiring to distribute marijuana and possessing a firearm in furtherance of that conspiracy. For those offenses, a Federal District Court sentenced him to 25 years’ imprisonment.
In January of 2021, after serving nearly 15 years of his sentence, Riley moved for compassionate release, arguing that his
A few days later, the Department of Homeland Security served Riley with notice that it would seek to remove him from the United States. Because Riley had been convicted of an aggravated felony, the Government could pursue his removal “without a hearing before an immigration judge.”
B
The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), Art. 3, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100–20, 1465 U. N. T. S. 113, categorically prohibits signatory states from returning any person “to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.” The United States has been a party to the Convention since 1994, and federal statutes and regulations implement its requirements. See ante, at 265;
At a subsequent hearing before an Immigration Judge, Riley again testified that he feared removal to Jamaica. Riley explained that, following his compassionate release, “a big drug kingpin” who functioned as a major political leader in his Kingston neighborhood and was “tied in with all facets of law enforcement” had threatened repeatedly to kill him. Administrative Record in Riley v. Garland, No. 22–1609 (CA4), p. 194; see id., at 204–207. In 2008, Riley said, the same kingpin had ordered the killing of his cousin, Oneil Spencer, after Spencer stopped “donat[ing]” money “to fund political campaigns and pay off government officials.” Id., at 201. When another cousin, Darrel Scott, was deported from the United States to Jamaica two years later and urged the local police to investigate Spencer‘s murder, he too was shot and killed. Id., at 203–204.
After Riley‘s release made the Jamaican news, his mother, sister, and brother each began receiving a constant stream of death threats directed at Riley. Id., at 207–209, 280–289. His mother reported the threats to the police, but (Riley testified) she was told that “the reason why your son is
Along with his CAT application for deferral of his removal to Jamaica, Riley submitted letters from his mother, sister, brother, and stepfather corroborating his testimony. See id., at 280–289. Riley also submitted Spencer‘s death certificate, which lists “multiple gunshot wounds” as the cause of death. Id., at 292.
The Immigration Judge found Riley‘s testimony credible, concluded that he was more likely than not to face torture or death upon his return to Jamaica, and granted CAT deferral of removal.
C
The Department of Homeland Security appealed the Immigration Judge‘s deferral order to the Board of Immigration Appeals. The Board discerned “no clear error in the Immigration Judge‘s credibility determination.” 1 App. 47. Nevertheless, it concluded that Riley‘s claim was “based on the stringing together of a series of suppositions.” Id., at 50. Accordingly, the Board once again ordered Riley removed to Jamaica. The Board filed its order on May 31, 2022, 16 months after the first administrative removal order. Three days after the Board denied relief, Riley petitioned the Fourth Circuit for review.
On its own motion, the Fourth Circuit dismissed Riley‘s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court recognized that an order “denying CAT relief is reviewable “as part of the review of a final order of removal.”” Riley v. Garland, 2024 WL 1826979, *2 (Apr. 26, 2024) (per curiam) (quoting Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U. S. 573, 582 (2020)). By statute, noncitizens must file their “petition[s] for review” of such final removal orders “not later than 30 days,”
II
Should Riley have appealed the Board‘s order denying deferral of removal before the Board issued it? The answer ought to be easy. Yet the majority today renders the statute incoherent, holding that Riley should have appealed the order one year and three months before the Board entered it.
According to the majority, “statutory text and our prior precedents” require this absurd result. Ante, at 272. Our Nation‘s immigration laws may be complex, but the irrational scheme the Court endorses today is a product entirely of its own creation. Statutory text and precedent overwhelmingly confirm what common sense tells us: Riley‘s appeal was timеly.
A
Although the majority purports to be bound by the statute, its cursory analysis elides all but one of the relevant provisions. Ante, at 267. Background on the
Early versions of the Immigration and Nationality Act granted the courts of appeals exclusive jurisdiction to review “all final orders of deportation,” Act of Sept. 26, 1961, § 5(a), 75 Stat. 651, an undefined term this Court interpreted to include “order[s] denying suspension of deportation,” Foti v. INS, 375 U. S. 217, 222 (1963). Under that framework, a noncitizen who received an order denying relief from removal (such as the Board‘s order denying Riley‘s CAT claim) could have appealed it as a standalone order of deportation, regardless of whether a prior order had resolved the issue of removability. Cf. Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U. S. 206, 211 (1968) (allowing separate petitions for review of “denials of discretionary relief” following an initial removal order). A number of amendments intended to streamline the immigration laws changed that analysis. See Kolov v. Garland, 78 F. 4th 911, 922–924 (CA6 2023) (Murphy, J., concurring) (describing these developments). Specifically, Congress ““consolidate[d] judicial review of immigration proceedings into one action in the court of appeals.”” Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U. S. 221, 230 (2020) (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U. S. 289, 313 (2001)). It did so by enacting the so-called zipper clause, ibid., which channels judicial review of all claims “arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States” into a single appeal: the appeal of a “final order [of removal],”
“Importantly,” the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 expressly “provides for judicial review of CAT claims.” Id., at 580. Thus, noncitizens (including those whose opportunities for judicial review are otherwise limited on account of criminal convictions) can obtain judicial review of orders denying CAT relief. Id., at 580–581. Because such challenges “aris[e]” out of the removal proceedings, however, the zipper clause applies to them.
All this explains why, though Riley seeks to appeal the denial of CAT relief and not the finding that he is removable, the appellate deadline in his case nonetheless depends on identifying the “order of removal” and determining when it became “final.” Ibid.
An “order of removal” is the same as an ““order of deportation.”” Nasrallah, 590 U. S., at 579, 584. Along with the other 1990s amendments, Congress enacted a statutory definition of that
B
Riley‘s order of removal did not become final, for purposes of appeal, until the Board issued its order denying CAT relief. Congress expressly provided for judicial review of “any cause or claim” under CAT.
1
Immigration laws define finality, but only with respect to orders of removal subject to direct Board review. Congress provided that orders of removal “shall become final upon the earlier of . . . (i) a determination by the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming such order; or (ii) the expiration of the period in which the alien is permitted to seek review of such order by the Board of Immigration Appeals.”
In the mine run of cases, an immigration judge hears claims about removability together with claims about protection from or deferral of removal (such as CAT claims) in a single proceeding, which ends in a consolidated appeal to the Board. The finality provision makes clear that, in those cases, the underlying removal order becomes final once the Board has concluded its review.
Expedited removal orders like the one issued in Riley‘s case, however, are not subject to Board review at all.
The majority claims the statutory definition renders the order of removal final immediately upon its issuance. That is so, the majority says, because when a removal order is not appealable, “the period to seek review [of it] “expires” as soon as the [order] is issued.” Ante, at 267. In other words, the majority treats a nonexistent appeals period as if it were merely an infinitesimally short period, one so short as to “expire” instantaneously.
That makes no sense. “Expiration,” after all, means the ““conclusion [or] termination of a limited time.”” See Webster‘s New Twentieth Century Dictionary 645 (2d ed. 1979); Black‘s Law Dictionary 579 (6th ed. 1990) (“Cessation; termination from mere lapse of time, as the expiration date of а lease, insurance policy, statute, and the like“); Black‘s Law Dictionary 722 (12th
The majority gives no argument for reaching the opposite conclusion. It stands alone, moreover, in asserting that a “straightforward reading of the statutory text” resolves this case. Ante, at 267. Even the courts of appeals that have attempted to defend the majority‘s position admit that “[t]he definition of finality in
2
Absent an unambiguous answer in the statute‘s definition of finality, the Court should turn to tools of statutory construction: the ““ordinary or natural” meaning” of the term “final,” Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U. S. 1, 9 (2004), ““ “the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice” ”” associated with finality, Lackey v. Stinnie, 604 U. S. 192, 200 (2025), and the relevant provisions’ ““place in the overall statutory scheme,”” West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U. S. 697, 721 (2022).
Beginning with the ordinary meaning of “final,” this Court has previously recognized that term “clearly denotes some kind of terminal event.” Smith v. Berryhill, 587 U. S. 471, 479 (2019). Thus, an order becomes “final” when it ““leaves nothing to be looked for or expected,”” when it ““leaves no further chance for action, discussion, or change.”” Ibid., and n. 8 (quoting 5 Oxford English Dictionary 920 (2d ed. 1989) and Webster‘s New World College Dictionary 542 (5th ed. 2016)).
Of course, an order can be terminal in one sense and not another. Consider a conviction. Once a jury delivers, and the court enters, a guilty verdict, nothing remains “to be looked for or expected” from that court with respect to the conviction. In that sense, a conviction is as final as its gets. Nevertheless, “appellate review” is prohibited “until conviction and imposition of sentence.” Flanagan v. United States, 465 U. S. 259, 263 (1984). So for purposes of appeal, a conviction remains nonfinal until sentencing is complete as well. Yet another rule of finality applies to the availability of collateral review. See Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U. S. 113, 119 (2009) (noting that, under
This multiplicity of finality rules makes clear that it is not enough to muse about finality in the abstract. Rather, the Court must focus on the specific sense of finality relevant here, which (all agree) is finality for purposes of appeal. Because ““[f]inality as a condition of review is an historic characteristic of federal appellate procedure,”” Flanagan, 465 U. S., at 263, centuries of precedent and practice inform that analysis.
As a general matter, an order is final for purposes of appeal “when the district court disassociates itself from the case, leаving nothing to be done at the court of first instance save execution of the judgment.” Clay v. United States, 537 U. S. 522, 527 (2003). That understanding of finality serves one central purpose: preventing piecemeal litigation. As this Court put it long ago, “[f]rom the very foundation of our judicial system,” rules of finality have ensured that “the whole case and every matter in controversy in it” is “decided in a single appeal.” McLish v. Roff, 141 U. S. 661, 665–666 (1891). That is why this Court‘s finality jurisprudence is grounded “not in merely technical conceptions of “finality,”” but rather in the policy “against piecemeal litigation.” Catlin v. United States, 324 U. S. 229, 233–234 (1945).
The reason for that focus is simple: The only way to ensure that orders are appealed together is to have them become final together as well. Otherwise, an expiring deadline on an earlier order (say, a conviction) would force individuals to appeal that order before the remaining issues in the case (say, a criminal sentence) have been resolved. So when two orders must be consolidated into the same appeal, it follows inescapably that they become final together, as well. Whether a ruling is final for purposes of appeal therefore depends principally on whether that ruling can, consistent with the policy against piecemeal review, be appealed independently. See Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U. S. 148, 152–153 (1964) (collecting cases).
An example illustrates the point. Sometimes, a dispute over an award of attorney‘s fees follows the conclusion of litigation on the merits. At present, “[t][here is no question that awards of attorney‘s fees may be appealed separately as final orders after a final determination оf liability on the merits.” García-Goyco v. Law Environmental Consultants, Inc., 428 F. 3d 14, 18 (CA1 2005). Thus, for example, when a party loses a civil case at trial, it may appeal the jury verdict before the fee litigation has concluded. See Sprague v. Ticonic Nat. Bank, 307 U. S. 161, 168–169 (1939). Because separate appeals are permitted, the finality of the merits judgment does not depend on the status of the attorney‘s fees dispute.
Suppose, now, that Congress passed a law providing that an appeal from final judgment “shall be the sole and exclu-sive means for judicial review of” an order awarding attorney‘s fees. Cf.
Yet that is precisely what the Court does today with respect to appeals from CAT orders. Recall that withholding-only decisions (which now include CAT orders) once were independently appealable as orders of deportation. See supra, at 286. Congress then enacted
3
That the majority nonetheless adopts the opposite position, contrary to every one of this Court‘s finality precedents, might suggest there is reason to doubt that CAT orders are appealable at all. Yet statutory text and this Court‘s prece-dent are crystal clear on this point: Congress provided for judicial review of CAT claims.
Section 1252(a)(4) provides that “a petition for review” under that section “shall be the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of any cause or claim under the [CAT].” No “exclusive means” for review would be possible if review were unavailable. That is why this Court held in Nasrallah that “a noncitizen may obtain judicial review of . . . CAT orders,” 590 U. S., at 583, even as the dissent complained that the Court wrongly “viewed
Perhaps the idea is that noncitizens may seek judicial review of their CAT claims only if, by luck or happenstance, they also have a challenge to the underlying order of removal. The majority‘s finality rule, however, prevents CAT appeals еven under those circumstances. After all, courts will likely finish reviewing the removal order before the Board ever hears the associated CAT claim. Section 1252(a)(4) also does not direct courts to limit review of CAT claims in this way; it simply requires that review of the two kinds of orders be consolidated. Nor would this reading make any sense. Consider its effect on the attorney‘s fees hypothetical, where that reading would mean litigants could appeal a fee award only if, by luck or happenstance, they also had a meritorious challenge to the unrelated merits judgment.
Importantly, this Court rejected a nearly identical argument about
Under the ““well-settled” and “strong presumption”” favoring judicial review, “when a statutory provision “is reasonably susceptible to divergent interpretation, we adopt the reading that accords with traditional understandings and basic principles:
The majority, perhaps aware of precedent‘s constraints, does not dispute any of this. It acknowledges, as it must, that CAT claims are reviewable. Ante, at 271–272. Yet once the majority accepts that premise, it is left with no way to justify its construction of the judicial-review provision as requiring petitions for review to be filed well before the rele-vant CAT orders are issued. If judicial review is available, then it must be available after the relevant order is issued and not before. And if review is available after the relevant orders issue, then there is no conceivable reason to require applicants to file their petitions beforehand.
III
A
Besides its halfhearted attempt to invoke the inapplicable statutory definition, the majority offers a single thought about the dispositive issue of finality. The original order, it says, “was . . . the Executive‘s final determination on the question of removal,” so it “constituted “the final order of removal” in this case.” Ante, at 267. The implication is that, because this order was a “final determination,” ibid., it became final the moment it was issued.
This argument conflates two different questions: when the agency made its final decision on the question of removability, and when the “order of removal” became final for appellate purposes. This Court explained just months ago that “a finding of “removability”” is only “one term in a final order of removal.” Monsalvo Velázquez, 604 U. S., at 722. That the agency‘s removability finding is final therefore does not mean that the order containing it is final for purposes of appeal.
The majority‘s skewed reasoning betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of the final-judgment principle. Every interlocutory order finally determines the limited question it decides, but of course that does not mean every order becomes instantly final for purposes of appeal. When a district court declines to certify an expert witness, that is its final word on the matter, yet the order remains nonfinal for purposes of appeal until the entire case has been litigated to judgment. When a district court disqualifies a litigant‘s counsel, that order is the court‘s “final determination on the question” of disqualification, ante, at 267; counsel could not show up to trial again the next day. Yet the order remains nonfinal for purposes of appeal
In failing to recognize as much, the majority breaks with basic principles of finality and appellate review, holding (seemingly for the first time) that two orders that statutorily must be appealed together nonetheless do not become final together. Inexрlicably, the majority admits that “review of removability and withholding of removal should occur in a single appellate proceeding,” and that “review of the denial of CAT relief cannot take place until the [Board] has denied such relief.” Ante, at 271. Yet it refuses to accept the inevitable conclusion: If the orders must be reviewed “in a single appellate proceeding,” ibid., then they become final for purposes of appeal together as well. The result: Noncitizens facing expedited removal will be forced to file immediate appeals of their removal orders in every case, simply to protect their right to judicial review in the event they lose their ongoing withholding-only proceedings.
Across a wide variety of statutory contexts, courts have recognized that protective appeals are “procedural hoops” that “serve no function.” West Penn Power Co. v. EPA, 860 F. 2d 581, 585, 586 (CA3 1988) (explaining, in Clean Air Act case, the need “to avoid a de facto requirement of protective appeals“); Outland v. CAB, 284 F. 2d 224, 227–228 (CADC 1960) (declining to read the Administrative Procedure Act to require protective appeals while reconsideration is pending); Newark, New Castle and Seaford, Del. v. FERC, 763 F. 2d 533, 544–545 (CA3 1985) (same, in Federal Power Act case); Rosler v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 241, 245–246 (1991) (explaining, in Veterans’ Judicial Review Act case, that reading protective appeal requirement into statute “would . . . pose
a substantial administrative problem” and cause “many” claimants to “lose their right to judicial review“). Protective appeal requirements “set a trap for the unwary, who, if they are not intimately familiar with the intricacies of the finality doctrine, may inadvertently lose their right to judicial review.” West Penn Power Co., 860 F. 2d, at 585.
For that reason, too, this Court has rejected statutory readings that would result in similar protective-appeal requirements, even in the face of seemingly contrary textual commands. Consider
More recently, this Court has twice refused to read a protective-appeal requirement into
B
The Court overlooks Santos-Zacaria, Monsalvo Velázquez, and the wealth of precedent on finality, claiming instead that two other cases are “instructive” and require a different outcome here. Ante, at 268. Neither case supports the majority‘s conclusion.
First, the majority points to Nasrallah‘s holding that “a CAT order is not a final order of removal,” does not disturb or affect the validity of a final order of removal, and does not merge into such an order. Ante, at 268. The majority does not explain, however, why this holding supports its conclusion. An order need not “‘affect the validity‘” of a decision (or merge into it) to impact its finality for purposes of appeal. Ibid. As noted, a sentence does not affect the validity of a conviction (and the two do not “merge“), yet a conviction cannot be final for purposes of appeal until the sentence is final as well. Notably, Nasrallah itself compared the relationship between removal and CAT orders to that between a criminal conviction and sentence. 590 U. S., at 583. Nasrallah is therefore hardly dispositive here.
In any event, it should be clear by now that the majority‘s discussion of Nasrallah misses the point. Whether CAT orders disturb or affect the substance of removal orders would certainly be relevant if the Court conducted its finality analysis without guidance from Congress, as it did in the case of fee awards. See Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U. S. 527, 531 (1882) (fee orders are “so far independent” of the merits “as to make the decision substantially a final decree for the purposes of an appeal“). But here, Congress dictated that the two orders must be consolidated for purposes of appeal.
The majority next points to Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U. S. 523 (2021), as supporting its conclusion. Ante, at 269. That case concerned the 90-day removal period following an order of removal, during which the Government is required to detain noncitizens. See
Nor is it at all surprising that “administratively final” in
The majority claims to “appreciate th[e] difference” between the two sorts of finality. Ante, at 271. But, the majority explains, “the meaning of finality” is not “necessarily” different, even when Congress uses different words to serve different purposes. Ibid. That truism hardly helps. The majority gives up shortly afterward, simply asserting by ipse dixit that the differences do not matter here. In light of
IV
Today‘s holding deals untold damage to basic principles of finality and judicial review. Time will tell whether the Court will extend its illogic beyond politically disfavored noncitizens. Cf. McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. v. McKesson Corp., 604 U. S. 146, 158, n. 5 (2025) (recognizing “unfairness . . . potentially ris[ing] to the level of a constitutional due process problem,” of rule that would require regulated businesses to seek judicial review before the applicability of
As it stands, the chaos the majority causes to our system of immigration appeals is considerable. The effects on noncitizens subject to expedited removal proceedings should by now be clear enough. The majority suggests a number of workarounds for that chaos, including by allowing protective appeals and notice about the need to file such appeals long before CAT proceedings have concluded. See ante, at 271–272. To be clear, the Government is obligated by the
In addition, the courts of appeals should consider applying standard principles of equitable tolling, which are likely available nоw that the Court has recognized that
Today‘s decision may have consequences beyond expedited removal proceedings, too. Recall that, in the typical case, an immigration judge decides all questions related to both removal and withholding in the same proceeding. See supra, at 289. The Board of Immigration Appeals then reviews all aspects of the immigration judge‘s decision. As things stand today, the noncitizen may petition for review of the Board‘s decision once agency review has completed. See ibid.;
Finally, lest one think today‘s decision will at least allow the Government to conduct its immigration policies more cheaply or efficiently, even that is not the case. It is not by accident that the Government, across the past and present administration, stands firmly with Riley here, even as it rarely fails to press colorable jurisdictional objections. See Diamond Alternative Energy, LLC v. EPA, 606 U. S. 100, 108 (2025). As the Government knows, “[a] whole train of unnecessary consequences” follows from requiring noncitizens to appeal in every expedited removal case, simply to protect their eventual right to appeal future withholding-only decisions. Outland, 284 F. 2d, at 228. In each of these unnecessary appeals, “the Board and other parties may be called upon to respond and oppose the motion for review; when the Board acts, the petition for review must be amended to bring the petition
* * *
Not long ago, this Court described delays in regulatory approvals of construction projects as “‘borde[ring] on the Kafkaesque.‘” Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County, 605 U. S. 168, 184 (2025). In holding that Riley was required to file his appeal 16 months before the order he sought to challenge existed, the Court surely moves from the border well into the heartland of illogic and absurdity. Respectfully, I dissent.
REPORTER‘S NOTE
The attached opinion has been revised to reflect the usual publication and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination makes available the official United States Reports citation in advance of publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court. A list of counsel who argued or filed briefs in this case, and who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
p. 266, line 8: “Argueta-Herandez” is changed to “Argueta-Hernandez”
p. 272, line 18: “the” is inserted before “Government”
p. 290, line 24: “the” is changed to “this”