RANCHO CINCINNATI RIVERS, L.L.C., APPELLANT, v. WARREN COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION ET AL., APPELLEES.
No. 2020-0643
Supreme Court of Ohio
August 18, 2021
Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-2798
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as Rancho Cincinnati Rivers, L.L.C. v. Warren Cty. Bd. of Revision, Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-2798.]
NOTICE
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
SLIP OPINION NO. 2021-OHIO-2798
RANCHO CINCINNATI RIVERS, L.L.C., APPELLANT, v. WARREN COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION ET AL., APPELLEES.
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as Rancho Cincinnati Rivers, L.L.C. v. Warren Cty. Bd. of Revision, Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-2798.]
Taxation—Real-property valuation—
(No. 2020-0643—Submitted April 14, 2021—Decided August 18, 2021.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Warren County, No. CA 2019-07-075, 2020-Ohio-1319.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Rancho Cincinnati Rivers, L.L.C., owns and leases property
{¶ 2} Rancho contends that for a piece of property to be valued as a “fee simple estate, as if unencumbered” as required by
I. BACKGROUND
A. The property
{¶ 3} The property at issue is a 141,400 square-foot structure with a large parking lot, all of which sits on a parcel of land that is a little over 12 acres. Rancho acquired the property in 2011 for $5,130,000, subject to a 20-year ground lease pursuant to which Lowe‘s pays $375,000 per year.1
B. Course of proceedings
{¶ 4} Appellee Warren County Auditor assessed the property as having a true value of $8,493,150 for the 2016 tax year. In March 2017, Rancho filed a complaint against the auditor‘s valuation; the school board filed a countercomplaint in April 2017 that asked appellee Warren County Board of Revision (“BOR”) to retain the auditor‘s valuation. The BOR held a hearing at which Rancho presented the testimony and appraisal report of Richard G. Racek Jr., a member of the Appraisal Institute. Racek determined that the property had a value of $5,660,000 under the sales-comparison approach2 and a value of $6,000,000 under the income-capitalization approach,3 which he reconciled to an appraised value of $5,800,000. After discussing and rejecting Rancho‘s legal theory, the BOR decided to retain the auditor‘s valuation of the property.
{¶ 5} Pursuant to
{¶ 6} Agreeing with Rancho‘s argument, the magistrate rejected the suggestion that “encumbered comparable properties may be used in a comparable sales approach, unadjusted, merely because the rent for such properties is at the market rate.” Warren CP No. 17CV90441, 6 (Apr. 19, 2019). The magistrate reversed the BOR‘s decision and adopted Racek‘s valuation of $5,800,000.
{¶ 7} The BOR and the auditor (collectively, “the county”) filed objections to the magistrate‘s decision, as did the school board. The common pleas court sustained their objections and set the property‘s value at $8,480,000, in accordance with Burt‘s appraisal. Specifically, the court stated that by “valu[ing] the Property as if the first occupant of the structure had left and the property was sitting for sale, vacant,” “treating the property as ‘vacant’ and ‘second generation,’ ”4 and “comparing the Property to other properties who have been on market for years but have yet to sell,” Racek “provided an inaccurate valuation for the Property.” C.P. No. 17CV090411, 14 (June 28, 2019). The common pleas court explained that Racek‘s approach was not proper, given that “the Property is currently leased to its first and only tenant, and all evidence indicates that lease agreement is fruitful.” Id. The court found that because Burt (1) considered first-generation leases similar to Lowe‘s lease, (2) made qualitative adjustments based on the existence of the leases to which the comparable properties were subject, and (3) inquired into “whether the comparable properties were being leased at market value or if further adjustments were necessary,” id. at 15, Burt‘s appraisal was both more reflective of precedent and more probative than Racek‘s. The court therefore adopted Burt‘s valuation of $8,480,000 as the property‘s value as of January 1, 2016.
{¶ 8} Rancho appealed, and the Twelfth District affirmed the judgment of the common pleas court. According to the court of appeals, Rancho “interprets
{¶ 9} Based on this interpretation of precedent, the court of appeals affirmed the common pleas court‘s adoption of
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of review
{¶ 10} The fair market value of property for tax purposes is a question of fact, the determination of which is primarily within the province of the taxing authorities. See NWD 300 Spring, L.L.C. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 151 Ohio St.3d 193, 2017-Ohio-7579, 87 N.E.3d 199, ¶ 13. When reviewing a board of revision‘s decision pursuant to
{¶ 11} However,
B. The statute at issue
{¶ 12}
{¶ 13} For purposes of this case, the crucial language of the statute is the phrase “fee simple estate, as if unencumbered.”5 That language was added to the statute by 2012 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 487 (“H.B. 487”), effective tax year 2013. See Terraza 8, L.L.C. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 150 Ohio St.3d 527, 2017-Ohio-4415, 83 N.E.3d 916, ¶ 15, 18. Before H.B. 487 was enacted, the statute merely required that the auditor determine the value “of each separate tract, lot, or parcel of real property.” 136 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3182, 3247. At that time, the statute made no explicit reference to a fee-simple estate.
C. Rancho‘s propositions of law
{¶ 14} Rancho presents four propositions of law that focus on two main issues.6 Under the first, second, and fourth
{¶ 15} Under the third proposition of law, Rancho contends that even apart from
D. The competing appraisals
{¶ 16} Rancho maintains that Burt‘s appraisal is not competent evidence of value because it is inconsistent with its vacant-at-transfer rule. Rancho‘s argument focuses most heavily on the sales-comparison analysis performed by the two appraisers: Racek adjusted downward the sales price of any comparable property that was subject to a lease because “a premium was considered to have been paid for the property rights conveyed.” In contrast, Burt consulted with the parties to the sales that he used as comparables and determined that “the rent and lease terms were considered to be at market given the location, physical characteristics and market conditions.” He then concluded that although certain market-related adjustments were necessary, the sale prices did not need any specific adjustment for the “property rights conveyed.”
{¶ 17} Rancho maintains that its vacant-at-transfer rule requires the type of “property-rights-conveyed” adjustments that Racek made but that Burt rejected. The common pleas court rejected Rancho‘s argument, holding that “Burt‘s methodology of reviewing leased properties and making certain adjustments based upon the leases and whether they were at market value is not a defective method as a matter of law.” C.P. No. 17CV090411 at 15 (June 28, 2019). The court of appeals affirmed that judgment, and we must now decide which appraiser‘s approach is the proper approach for purposes of future applications of
E. The acquired meaning of the phrase “fee simple estate, as if unencumbered” is inconsistent with Rancho‘s vacant-at-transfer rule
{¶ 18} Rancho argues that its vacant-at-transfer rule embodies the plain meaning of
{¶ 19} The county asserts that
{¶ 20} We agree with the county on this point. Rancho‘s argument is not compelling because it does not involve the express terms of
{¶ 21} When interpreting and applying a statute, a court typically relies on “definitions provided by the legislative body” or, when a definition is not given in the statute, the “plain and ordinary meaning” of a term, which we ascertain by looking to the “ ‘particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole.’ ” Lingle v. State, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2020-Ohio-6788, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 15, quoting K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291, 108 S.Ct. 1811, 100 L.Ed.2d 313 (1988). To discern the plain meaning of statutory text, we consult not only lexical sources such as dictionaries, but also the meaning that the words have acquired when they are used in case law. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322, 112 S.Ct. 1344, 117 L.Ed.2d 581 (1992), quoting Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739-740, 109 S.Ct. 2166, 104 L.Ed.2d 811 (1989), quoting NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329, 101 S.Ct. 2789, 69 L.Ed.2d 672 (1981) (“ ‘[w]here Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled meaning under * * * the common law, a court must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to incorporate the established meaning of these terms’ ” [brackets and ellipsis added in Community for Creative Non-Violence]); see also Wayt v. DHSC, L.L.C., 155 Ohio St.3d 401, 2018-Ohio-4822, 122 N.E.3d 92 (because precedent stated that defamation is “an injury to the person,” the definition of a “tort action,” which includes the phrase “injury or loss to person,” encompassed an action for defamation).
{¶ 22} Twenty-four years before the General Assembly inserted the phrase “fee simple estate, as if unencumbered” in
{¶ 23} Accordingly, the Alliance Towers syllabus does not require that property be valued as if it were “vacant at transfer.”
{¶ 24} The conclusion that the phrase “fee simple estate, as if unencumbered” means valuing property in accordance with rent from a lease that is a typical lease in the market was confirmed in Berea City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 106 Ohio St.3d 269, 2005-Ohio-4979, 834 N.E.2d 782, superseded by statute. In Berea, a shopping center had been sold while it was encumbered by long-term leases. (We will refer to the sale of real estate that is subject to a lease when it is sold and transferred as a “leased-fee sale.”) We confronted the issue whether the sale price from a leased-fee sale—or an appraisal based on valuing the leased fee—must be accepted as the value of the property. The BTA, citing Alliance Towers, rejected both the sale price and the appraisal that had been introduced by the property owner and held that the Alliance Towers syllabus required the BTA to adopt a school board‘s appraisal because the school board‘s appraiser valued the property “using economic or market rent as the basis for his appraisal” rather than the actual rent paid under the existing lease. Berea at ¶ 5. We reversed the BTA‘s decision, holding that the rule of the Alliance Towers syllabus was not relevant in a case in which a recent arm‘s-length sale supplied the true value of the property. Berea at ¶ 14-15.
{¶ 25} Thus, under Berea, an arm‘s-length sale price was conclusive of a property‘s value, regardless of whether the sale involved an unencumbered property or a leased fee or whether the terms of any existing lease at the time of the sale were typical of the market. See id. at ¶ 13, quoting former
{¶ 26} In Berea, this court overruled two cases: Ratner v. Stark Cty. Bd. of Revision, 23 Ohio St.3d 59, 491 N.E.2d 680 (1986) (“Ratner I”), and Ratner v. Stark Cty. Bd. of Revision, 35 Ohio St.3d 26, 517 N.E.2d 915 (1988) (“Ratner II”). See Berea at ¶ 13. In doing so, we rejected the proposition from Ratner I and II that appraisal evidence could be considered when a property is sold in an arm‘s-length transaction. Berea at ¶ 13. But the reasoning of Ratner I and II is consistent with this court‘s decision in Berea regarding what is meant by a property being valued as a fee-simple estate, as if unencumbered.
{¶ 27} In Ratner I, this court adhered to the “best-evidence-of-value rule,” i.e., that the best evidence of the value of real property is an actual, recent sale of the property in an arm‘s-length transaction. See id. at 60. At the same time, however, Ratner I opened the door to allowing a court to review independent appraisals evaluating the cash equivalency of the sale price to show that the sale price did not reflect the market value of the property. Id. at 60-61. Subsequently, in Ratner II, we affirmed the BTA‘s decision after the remand ordered in Ratner I: in the later decision, the board took appraisal evidence into account to determine the market value of the real estate at issue. Ratner II at 29-30. Neither Ratner I nor Ratner II indicated that the sale price of an encumbered property could not, on account of its being encumbered by a lease, be regarded as the presumptive best evidence of value. Nor did those cases suggest that property must be valued as if it were vacant at the time of transfer. See Hilliard City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 53 Ohio St.3d 57, 558 N.E.2d 1170 (1990) (in a situation in which the owner of the property at issue presented no contrary appraisal evidence, the recent arm‘s-length sale price of the property, which had been subject to a lease that was set to take effect in the future, constituted the property‘s true value).
{¶ 28} In light of the syllabus in Alliance Towers, 37 Ohio St.3d 16, 523 N.E.2d 826, and the other cases preceding the enactment of H.B. 487, the phrase “fee simple estate, as if unencumbered” had an acquired meaning when the General Assembly inserted that phrase into
F. R.C. 5713.03 invokes a market-lease rule rather than a vacant-at-transfer rule
{¶ 29} Our decisions applying amended
{¶ 30} In making those determinations, we held that “the statutory amendment [to
{¶ 31} After Terraza, in Westerville City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 154 Ohio St.3d 308, 2018-Ohio-3855, 114 N.E.3d 162, ¶ 15, we held that by “making appraisal evidence generally admissible and competent, the statutory amendment[] return[s] the approach to valuing real property to what it was before Berea.” More specifically, in Westerville City Schools, we noted that by enacting H.B. 487, the legislature reinstated this court‘s holding in Ratner I, 23 Ohio St.3d 59, 491 N.E.2d 680—i.e., that “appraisal evidence is admissible and competent evidence of value even in cases in which a sale price has been offered as evidence of value,” Westerville City Schools at ¶ 14.
{¶ 32} In sum, our case law establishes a “market-lease rule.” The market-lease rule has two aspects. First, as we held in Terraza, the leased-fee sale price is the best evidence of the value of the property and establishes its presumptive value, subject to rebuttal. This first aspect of the market-lease rule strongly militates against Rancho‘s vacant-at-transfer rule: if property must be valued as if vacant at transfer, then it makes no sense to presume that a leased-fee sale price constitutes the property‘s value.
{¶ 33} Second, when property must be valued and there is no evidence of a recent arm‘s-length transaction, an appraisal that takes into account a lease with terms that are typical for the market may be considered and adopted. In Harrah‘s, 154 Ohio St.3d 340, 2018-Ohio-4370, 114 N.E.3d 192, a school board sought review of a decision of the BTA adopting a value for a property that was based on the owner‘s appraisal. The school board‘s appraiser valued the property “as if it were generating income under a hypothetical lease, under what [the appraiser] believe[d] would be current market rates.” Id. at ¶ 26. While the BTA disregarded this appraisal because it constituted a “leased-fee valuation,” id. at ¶ 26, we held that the BTA‘s refusal to consider the appraisal was legally erroneous, id. at ¶ 27. By so holding, we embraced the view that property may be valued in light of income generated by a hypothetical lease—as long as that hypothetical lease reflected current market rates.
{¶ 34} Despite our holding in Harrah‘s that a hypothetical leased-fee sale is competent evidence of value under
{¶ 35} Under the market-lease rule, the property-rights adjustments that Racek made, along with other aspects of his appraisal, are neither statutorily required nor forbidden. The selection of comparable sales and adjustments made to the sale prices by an expert appraiser, so long as the sales and the adjustments relate to the market for the property at issue, are legally permissible. The BTA or a common pleas court, as the fact-finders, must decide how much weight to accord competing appraisals. See Black, 16 Ohio St.3d at 14, 475 N.E.2d 1264 (requiring the common pleas court to exercise independent judgment
{¶ 36} Because we hold that the market-lease rule reflects the acquired meaning of the phrase “fee simple estate, as if unencumbered,” we reject the first, second, and fourth propositions of law advanced in Rancho‘s merit brief.
G. The case law requiring adjustments of leased-fee comparables does not support Rancho‘s vacant-at-transfer rule
{¶ 37} Under its third proposition of law, Rancho claims that this court has held in other cases dealing with the valuation of property that “property rights adjustments to leased comparables must be made.” As we have just discussed,
{¶ 38} The cases that Rancho cites in support of its argument are Steak ‘n Shake, Inc. v. Warren Cty. Bd. of Revision, 145 Ohio St.3d 244, 2015-Ohio-4836, 48 N.E.3d 535, Rite Aid of Ohio, Inc. v. Washington Cty. Bd. of Revision, 146 Ohio St.3d 173, 2016-Ohio-371, 54 N.E.3d 1177, Lowe‘s Home Ctrs., Inc. v. Washington Cty. Bd. of Revision, 145 Ohio St.3d 375, 2016-Ohio-372, 49 N.E.3d 1266 (“Lowe‘s I”), and Lowe‘s Home Ctrs., Inc. v. Washington Cty. Bd. of Revision, 154 Ohio St.3d 463, 2018-Ohio-1974, 116 N.E.3d 79 (“Lowe‘s II”). Close inspection of those cases, however, shows that they do not support Rancho‘s argument that an appraiser must as a matter of law make the kind of property-rights adjustments that Racek made. In each of those cases, our holding is predicated on our rejection of a specific doctrine that the BTA articulated in Target Corp. v. Lake Cty. Bd. of Revision, BTA No. 2008-M-1088, 2011 WL 6917517 (Dec. 20, 2011).
{¶ 39} In its Target decision, the BTA applied what could be called the “unadjusted-sale-price argument.” That argument depended on our holding in Berea, 106 Ohio St.3d 269, 2005-Ohio-4979, 834 N.E.2d 782. As discussed earlier in this opinion, Berea held that an arm‘s-length sale price from a leased-fee sale conclusively established the value of a property. Based on Berea, we have repeatedly rejected the argument that sale prices should be adjusted because of the economics of leases that encumbered the property at the time of sale. AEI Net Lease Income & Growth Fund v. Erie Cty. Bd. of Revision, 119 Ohio St.3d 563, 2008-Ohio-5203, 895 N.E.2d 830, superseded by statute (the elevated sale price of a property, which was attributable to above-market lease payments resulting from an earlier sale-leaseback transaction, was not required to be adjusted); Rhodes v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision, 117 Ohio St.3d 532, 2008-Ohio-1595, 885 N.E.2d 236 (pursuant to an arm‘s-length agreement between a willing seller and a willing buyer, the sale price of a building in which a lessee operated a drugstore pursuant to a long-term lease constituted the “exchange value” of the property, as opposed to the value-in-use of the property, and thus reflected the property‘s
{¶ 40} In Target, the BTA reasoned that because Berea prohibited the adjustment of the leased-fee sale price of commercial real estate, leased-fee sale prices used as comparables to value an owner-occupied commercial property also must not be adjusted. 2011 WL 6917517 at *3. In the cases that Rancho cites in support of its third proposition of law, we rejected that reasoning as illogical, holding instead that to the extent that the absence of an encumbrance on the property at issue would lead to a higher or lower sale price, the comparables must be adjusted to reflect that fact. See Steak ‘n Shake at ¶ 35-36; Rite Aid at ¶ 20; Lowe‘s I at ¶ 17-18.
{¶ 41} In this context, Rancho relies most heavily on Lowe‘s II, 154 Ohio St.3d 463, 2018-Ohio-1974, 116 N.E.3d 79, which addressed the 2013 tax year and therefore applied amended
{¶ 42} We disagree. Lowe‘s II explicitly identifies, as the reason for returning the case to the BTA, the danger that the BTA adopted the “unadjusted sale-price argument” that the BTA had embraced in its Target decision, Lowe‘s II at ¶ 29. Thus, Lowe‘s II does not support Rancho‘s argument that the law requires an appraiser to make a property-rights adjustment nor does the case more generally support the vacant-at-transfer rule.
III. CONCLUSION
{¶ 43} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Twelfth District Court of Appeals.
Judgment affirmed.
O‘CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FISCHER, DEWINE, and BRUNNER, JJ., concur.
STEWART, J., concurs in judgment only.
The Gibbs Firm, L.P.A., Ryan J. Gibbs, and Geoffrey N. Byrne, for appellant.
David P. Fornshell, Warren County Prosecuting Attorney, and Christopher A. Watkins, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellees Warren County Board of Revision and Warren County Auditor.
David C. DiMuzio, Inc., David C. DiMuzio, and Mathew C. DiMuzio, for appellee Kings Local School District, Board of Education.