WESTERVILLE CITY SCHOOLS BOARD OF EDUCATION, APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT, v. FRANKLIN COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION ET AL., APPELLEES; GC NET LEASE (WESTERVILLE) INVESTORS, L.L.C., APPELLANT AND CROSS-APPELLEE.
No. 2016-0902
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
September 26, 2018
Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-3855
APPEAL and CROSS-APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, Nos. 2015-828 and 2015-1165. Submitted June 12, 2018.
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as Westerville City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-3855.]
NOTICE
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
SLIP OPINION NO. 2018-OHIO-3855
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as Westerville City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-3855.]
Real-property valuation—
Per Curiam.
{¶ 1} At issue in this real-property tax case is the 2013 value of a single-tenant office building occupied by J.P. Morgan Chase under a net lease. Under
I. Background
{¶ 2} On March 24, 2014, appellee and cross-appellant, the Westerville City Schools Board of Education (“BOE”), filed a complaint challenging the auditor‘s 2013 value of $35,500,000 for the 388,669-square-foot single-tenant office building at issue. The building is a multistory structure that was constructed in 1974, expanded in 1983, and renovated in 1999. The BOE advocated adoption of a November 2013 sale price of $44,500,000 as the property value based on the conveyance-fee statement and deed, which the BOE presented at the hearing before appellee Franklin County Board of Revision (“BOR”).
{¶ 3} At that hearing, the owner, appellant and cross-appellee, GC Net Lease (Westerville) Investors, L.L.C., presented the appraisal report and testimony of Samuel D. Koon, a member of the Appraisal Institute. The BOE objected to the submission of this evidence, arguing that it was not admissible as evidence of value, because GC Net Lease had not rebutted the presumption that the sale price was the best evidence of the value of the property. GC Net Lease‘s counsel pointed to H.B. 487‘s amendments to
{¶ 4} The lease on the property resulted from a February 2010 sale-leaseback transaction under which the recorded sale price was $32,500,000. In October 2010, the property transferred for $35,500,000, which evidently formed the basis for the auditor‘s initial valuation.
{¶ 5} According to Koon, the November 2013 sale was a “portfolio sale” of 18 properties located in multiple states; Koon noted that GC Net Lease‘s parent company reported to the Securities and Exchange Commission that $44,500,000 of the aggregate sale price was allocated to the subject property. The BOE objected on hearsay grounds to the appraiser‘s testimony regarding the specific circumstances of the 2013 sale. Neither the BOR nor the BTA specifically ruled on that objection. In any event, GC Net Lease has not challenged the allocation of $44,500,000 to the sale of the property at issue.
II. Procedural history
{¶ 6} The record contains the June 11, 2015 BOR deliberation adopting the $44,500,000 sale price as the tax-year-2013 property value. Nonetheless, the BOR‘s June 18, 2015 decision letter indicated a property value of $27,928,600; the BOE appealed that decision to the BTA on July 10, 2015.
{¶ 7} On July 15, 2015, the BOR issued a “corrected” decision letter indicating a property value of $44,500,000, which GC Net Lease appealed to the BTA. The BTA consolidated the two cases and held a hearing. The BOE appeared at the hearing in order to ask for a briefing schedule. GC Net Lease waived a hearing, but according to the BTA‘s decision, GC Net Lease did submit a statement arguing that the BOR lacked jurisdiction to issue the July 15 decision.
{¶ 9} Turning to the merits, the BTA noted that the applicable version of
III. Analysis
A. The H.B. 487 version of R.C. 5713.03 applies in this case, and appraisal evidence is admissible and relevant
{¶ 10} We can easily resolve the issue raised by the BOE on cross-appeal regarding which version of
{¶ 11} But we noted in Terraza 8 that the H.B. 487 amendments to
The statutory amendment thus allows taxing authorities to consider non-sale-price evidence—particularly evidence of encumbrances and their effect on sale price—in determining the true value of
property that has been the subject of a recent arm‘s-length sale.
{¶ 12} Just as the BTA did in its decision on appeal in Terraza 8, the BTA‘s approach to the value issue in the present case perpetuates the Berea rule in contravention of the H.B. 487 amendments to
B. Under R.C. 5713.03, no threshold showing is required before a tax tribunal must give full consideration to appraisal evidence
{¶ 13} The BOE argues that Terraza 8 does not call for vacating the BTA‘s decision and remanding here, because the BTA relied on pre-Berea caselaw in declining to consider Koon‘s appraisal. Namely, in rejecting the appraisal and upholding the sale price, the BTA quoted and relied on Pingue v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 87 Ohio St.3d 62, 64, 717 N.E.2d 293 (1999), to conclude that “ ‘[i]t is only when the purchase price does not reflect the true value that a review of independent appraisals based upon other factors is appropriate.’ ” 2016 WL 3401901 at *6. According to the BOE, this precept requires the proponent of non-sale-price evidence to impugn the sale in some way before appraisal evidence becomes relevant and admissible. Indeed, in cases decided while the holding of Berea was in effect, the evidence of a qualifying sale precluded consideration of an appraiser‘s opinion of value unless the recency, arm‘s-length character, or voluntariness of the sale had been rebutted. Columbus City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 146 Ohio St.3d 470, 2016-Ohio-757, 58 N.E.3d 1126, ¶ 5-8, 14, 19-20. And at oral argument, the BOE‘s counsel asserted that under Terraza 8, “the burdens with respect to an arm‘s-length sale had not changed” in this respect.
{¶ 14} But
{¶ 15} By making appraisal evidence generally admissible and competent, the statutory amendments return the approach to valuing real property to what it was before Berea. Both the BTA and the BOE cite the pre-Berea case Pingue, 87 Ohio St.3d 62, 717 N.E.2d 293, in support of their position that reliance on appraisal evidence is not appropriate when there has been a sale whose recency has not been impugned, but neither mentions that the lead opinion in that case reflected the view of only three justices. See Kraly v. Vannewkirk, 69 Ohio St.3d 627, 633, 635 N.E.2d 323 (1994) (noting that an earlier decision of the court was “of questionable precedential value inasmuch as it was a plurality opinion which failed to receive the requisite support of four justices of this court in order to constitute controlling law”). Justice Pfeifer, who provided the fourth vote for the judgment in Pingue, took a very different approach from the plurality. He made clear that he believed that appraisal evidence was the best way to determine value and that he concurred in the judgment because the appraisal evidence in that case was faulty. Pingue at 66 (Pfeifer, J., concurring).
{¶ 16} A pre-Berea case that garnered four justice votes is Ratner, 23 Ohio St.3d 59, 491 N.E.2d 680. Ratner made clear that appraisal evidence was admissible and competent even when a sale price was proposed as establishing the property‘s value. In Ratner, the court reversed a BTA decision that had adopted the stated sale price without considering the appraisal opinions. This court noted that “the taxpayer presented testimony from two appraisers using traditional valuation methods to establish that the contract sale price did not reflect true value.” Id. at 61. Moreover, we find it significant that Berea explicitly overruled Ratner. See Berea, 106 Ohio St.3d 269, 2005-Ohio-4979, 834 N.E.2d 782, at ¶ 13. By overriding Berea in enacting H.B. 487‘s amendments to
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 17} For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the decision of the BTA and remand the cause for further proceedings. On remand, the BTA must consider the appraisal evidence alongside the sale price as evidence of the property‘s value and give due consideration to whether the sale price reflects the value of the unencumbered fee-simple estate. The BTA must decide the cause on the existing record, see Bronx Park, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2018-Ohio-1589, ___ N.E.3d ___, at ¶ 13, but must consider any objections that were timely advanced by the BOE against the evidence offered by GC Net Lease.
Decision vacated and cause remanded.
O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, FRENCH, FISCHER, DeWINE, and DeGENARO, JJ., concur.
Rich & Gillis Law Group, L.L.C., Mark H. Gillis, Karol C. Fox, Kelley A. Gorry, Kimberly G. Allison, and Richelle L. Thoburn, for appellee and cross-appellant.
Sleggs, Danzinger & Gill Co., L.P.A., and Todd W. Sleggs, for appellant and cross-appellee.
