WAYT, APPELLEE, v. DHSC, L.L.C., D.B.A. AFFINITY MEDICAL CENTER, APPELLANT.
No. 2017-1548
Supreme Court of Ohio
December 7, 2018
Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-4822
FISCHER, J.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Stark County, No. 2016CA215, 2017-Ohio-7734. Submitted August 1, 2018. Torts—Damages—R.C. 2315.18—Defamation—Cap on noneconomic compensatory damages—R.C. 2315.18(B)(2) caps noneconomic damages that can be recovered as a result of defamation.
NOTICE
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SLIP OPINION NO. 2018-OHIO-4822
WAYT, APPELLEE, v. DHSC, L.L.C., D.B.A. AFFINITY MEDICAL CENTER, APPELLANT.
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as Wayt v. DHSC, L.L.C., Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-4822.]
Torts—Damages—
(No. 2017-1548—Submitted August 1, 2018—Decided December 7, 2018.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Stark County, No. 2016CA215, 2017-Ohio-7734.
FISCHER, J.
{¶ 1} Appellee, Ann Wayt, filed a civil complaint against appellant, DHSC, L.L.C., d.b.a. Affinity Medical Center (“Affinity Medical”), alleging, among other claims, defamation. The case proceeded to trial. The only claim submitted to the
{¶ 2} The only issue before this court is whether the cap on damages for noneconomic loss set forth in
I. BACKGROUND
{¶ 3} Wayt was a nurse who was employed at Affinity Medical. Affinity Medical terminated Wayt‘s employment after an investigation that followed an accusation that Wayt had neglected her duties and falsified a medical record.
{¶ 4} Following Wayt‘s dismissal, the head of nursing at Affinity Medical sent a complaint to the Ohio Board of Nursing that included an accusation that Wayt had engaged in patient neglect. Some additional documentation wаs sent to the board that detailed Wayt‘s alleged improper conduct.
{¶ 5} Following her termination, Wayt applied for multiple nursing positions. She had only two interviews and did not obtain a permanent nursing position.
{¶ 6} The National Nurses Organizing Committee, a union and professional organization for registered nurses, filed charges against Affinity Medical before the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”), claiming that the hospital had refused to bargain with the union and that Wayt had been terminated because of her involvement with the union. After an administrative law judge issued a report favorable to the union, the NLRB successfully petitioned the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio for injunctive relief that included an order that Wayt be reinstated to her prior position at Affinity Medical. Calatrello ex rel. Natl. Labor Relations Bd. v. DHSC, L.L.C., N.D. Ohio No. 5:13 CV 1538, 2014 WL 296634 (Jan. 24, 2014). The court also ordered Affinity Medical to retract the
{¶ 7} Wayt filed a complaint in the Stark County Cоurt of Common Pleas alleging that Affinity Medical and its employees had defamed her. At trial, the jury found that Wayt had been defamed and awarded her $800,000 in compensatory damages and $750,000 in punitive damages.
{¶ 8} Affinity Medical filed a posttrial motion requesting that the trial court apply the cap on noneconomic compensatory damages set forth in
{¶ 9} Affinity Medical filed an appeal and argued that the amount awarded in damages was in excess of the applicable caps on damages set forth in
II. ANALYSIS
{¶ 10} Affinity Medical argues that under the plain and unambiguous language of
{¶ 11} Like Affinity Medical, Wayt argues that the plain language of
{¶ 12} Wayt further contends that
{¶ 13} Wayt also argues that the proposition of law presented in this case need not be answered because Affinity Medical failed to request a jury interrogatory that would have allowed it to show that the jury awarded noneconomic rather than economic damages. Wayt adds that the statute plainly applies only to noneconomic damages and that the trial court could find that thе damages awarded were economic damages without an interrogatory that showed what kind of damages were awarded.
{¶ 14} Finally, Wayt argues that she was defamed on more than one occasion. Thus, argues Wayt, even if
A. Standard of Review
{¶ 15} The standard of review for questions of statutory interpretation is de novo. Ceccarelli v. Levin, 127 Ohio St.3d 231, 2010-Ohio-5681, 938 N.E.2d 342, ¶ 8. When a statute is plain and unambiguous, we apply the statute as written, Portage Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. Akron, 109 Ohio St.3d 106, 2006-Ohio-954, 846 N.E.2d 478, ¶ 52, and no further interpretation is necessary, State ex rel. Savarese v. Buckеye Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 74 Ohio St.3d 543, 545, 660 N.E.2d 463 (1996).
B. Plain Meaning of the Statute
{¶ 16}
{¶ 17} Property “means real and personal property.”
{¶ 18} The key question in this case is, therefore, whether defamation, which is an injury to reputation, falls within the category of injury to a person.
{¶ 19} In Buck, this court addressed whether “ ‘slander is a personal injury’ by a ‘wrongful act,’ within the intent and meaning of the proviso to section 11819, General Code.” Id. at 101. This court held that the term “personal injury,” “as defined by lexicographers, jurists and text-writers, and by common acceptance, includes injuries to a person‘s reputation,” id. at paragraph one of the syllabus, and we cited with approval several cases from other jurisdictions in which those courts decided that slander or libel is an injury to a person. See Tisdale v. Eubanks, 180 N.C. 153, 104 S.E. 339 (1920) (“the security of one‘s reputation and good name [is] among the personal rights of the citizen”);
{¶ 20} The court in Buck held that barring a phrase or definition within the statute that would lead to a contrary conclusion, injuries resulting from slander are plainly personal injuries. Id. at 104. Further, the court did not distinguish between personal injuries and injuries to a person. Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶ 21} Wayt argues that the legislature‘s inclusion of the phrase “bodily injury” in
{¶ 22} We hold that under the plain language of
{¶ 23} We do not look to the canons of statutory construction when the plain language of a statute provides the meaning. See Hartmann v. Duffey, 95 Ohio St.3d 456, 2002-Ohio-2486, 768 N.E.2d 1170, ¶ 8, citing Lake Hosp. Sys. v. Ohio Ins. Guar. Assn., 69 Ohio St.3d 521, 524, 634 N.E.2d 611 (1994). Assuming arguendo only that the court must look to the canons of statutory construction to determine what the legislature intended by using the phrasе “injury or loss to person or property,” the result in this case would be the same. It is well established that the legislature is presumed to have full knowledge of prior judicial decisions. State ex rel. Huron Cty. Bd. of Edn. v. Howard, 167 Ohio St. 93, 96, 146 N.E.2d 604 (1957). Thus, despite the position taken by those in the dissent, the legislature is presumed to have full knowledge of this court‘s decision in Buck. Moreover, the legislature could easily have drafted the statute to prevent the holding from that case from affecting the outcome of this case; the legislature merely needed to add “defamation” to the list of actions enumerated in
C. Constitutional Argument
{¶ 24} Wayt аrgues that the phrase “injury or loss to person or property” in
{¶ 25} Despite the state‘s Constitution differentiating between injuries to a person and injuries to reputation, any distinction found in the Constitution is not dispositive in this case. In this case, we must decide whether the legislature drew a distinction in
{¶ 26} As noted above, the first step in answering that question is to interpret the plain language of the statute. We do not begin the analysis by
{¶ 27} For these reasons, we decline Wayt‘s invitation to hold that
D. S.B. 80 and Legislative Intent
{¶ 28} Wayt argues that the statement of findings and intent made in Am.Sub.S.B. No. 80, Section 3, 150 Ohio Laws, Part V, 7915, 8024 (“S.B. 80”), indicates that the legislature intended in
{¶ 29} Again, we do not look at legislative intent to determine the meaning of a statute when the statute is unambiguous. Dunbar v. State, 136 Ohio St.3d 181, 2013-Ohio-2163, 992 N.E.2d 1111, ¶ 16. Hоwever, even if we did review S.B. 80 to determine the legislative intent, the text and history of S.B. 80, when viewed in conjunction, do not support Wayt‘s argument.
{¶ 31} For example, as enacted in S.B. 80,
{¶ 32} And, as enacted in S.B. 80,
a partner in a registered limited liability partnership is not liable * * * for debts, obligations, or other liabilities of any kind of, or chargeable to, the partnership or another partner or partners arising from negligence or from wrongful acts, errors, omissions, or misconduct, whether or not intentional or characterized as tort, contract, or otherwise.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶ 33} If, as Wayt suggests, the legislature‘s sole intent when passing S.B. 80 was to “remedy negligent behavior,” thе above-cited sections, which deal with behavior other than negligent behavior, would not be part of S.B. 80. In light of this conclusion, the argument that the legislature‘s sole intent behind S.B. 80 was to address negligence claims does not pass muster.
{¶ 34} Moreover, interpreting
E. Remaining Issues
{¶ 35} In her brief, Wayt argues that even if the caps on damages set forth in
{¶ 36} No proposition of law arguing these issues was accepted by this court, and we decline to аddress these arguments because they are beyond the scope of this appeal.
III. CONCLUSION
{¶ 37} For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals as to compensatory damages, and we remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
KENNEDY, FRENCH, and DEWINE, JJ., concur.
DEGENARO, J., concurs in judgment only.
O‘CONNOR, C.J., dissents, with an opinion joined by O‘DONNELL, J.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
{¶ 38} I dissent. At issue in this case is whether the damage caps in
{¶ 39} If we look only at the words in the statute, it is clear that injury or loss to person does not include loss of reputation. If an injury to a person occurs, then there is an identifiable harm to the person‘s body and typically a course of action for healing it, often with medical aid.1 There is also identifiable and relatively quantifiable harm to establish damages and a financial remedy.
{¶ 40} On the other hand, a person‘s reputation is separate from her or his body, and the person has little control over it—reputation exists entirely in the hearts and minds of others. The lack of control over one‘s own reputation is one reason that the tort of defamation is so menacing. A person can be of upstanding
{¶ 41} Defamation is an injury or loss to reputation, not to person, and therefore the caps on damages in
{¶ 42} The Ohio Constitution reinforces the distinctions between person and reputation. The framers, recognizing the differences between these injuries, ensured access to the courts for both wrongs.
{¶ 43} Instead of relying on a clear constitutional provision establishing that injury to reputation and injury to person are two separate harms, the majority mistakenly depends on this court‘s 1928 interpretation of the term “personal injury,” Smith v. Buck, 119 Ohio St. 101, 162 N.E. 382 (1928). That reliance is misplaced. The term at issue in this case is “injury to person.” The court had two holdings in Buck:
The words “personal injury” as defined by lexicographers, jurists and text-writers, and by common acceptance, denote an injury either to the physical body of a person or to the reputation of a person, or to both.
The words “personal injury” by “wrongful act,” of section 11819, General Code, comprehend, among other injuries to the person, injury by libel or slander.
Buck at paragraphs one and two of the syllabus.
{¶ 44} In reaching these conclusions, the court in Buck primarily considered the definition of the word “personal,” which it found to mean “pertaining to the person” or “ ‘relating to an individual.’ ” Id. at 101, quoting Webster‘s New International Dictionary. It is true that a reputation generally pertains to or is related to a person, but
{¶ 46} The majority also includes a string cite of cases that the Buck court relied on. Although still technically good law, these cases are either unpersuasive or help to establish that
Reputation is a sort of right to enjoy the good opinion of others, and is capable of growth and real existence, as an arm or a leg. If it is not to be classed as a personal right, where does it belong? No provision has been made for any middle class of injuries between those to person and those to property, and the great body of wrongs arrange themselves under the one head or the other.
Mozee, quoting Johnson v. Bradstreet Co., 87 Ga. 79, 13 S.E. 250, 251 (1891). Tisdale and Mozee are wholly inapposite because Ohio‘s Constitution specifically answers the question “where doеs [reputation] belong?” by recognizing a middle class of injuries and creating an entirely separate action for loss or injury to reputation that supplants the common law‘s less differentiated protections. Because the Ohio Constitution recognizes injury to reputation as separate from injury to person, the court is amiss in relying on cases depending on common-law causes of action. See, e.g., Drake v. Rogers, 13 Ohio St. 21, 29 (1861) (“wherever the legislature has by statutory law assumed to establish either rules of property or conduct, it has always been the policy of the law in this state, or at least such is the generally received understanding, that the common law can neither add to nor take from the statutory rules so established”).
{¶ 48} In the last case that the majority cites, McDonald v. Brown, 23 R.I. 546, 51 A. 213, 214 (1902), the Rhode Island Supreme Court construed the term “injury to the person” “in its broad and general sense.” But in State v. Simmons, 114 R.I. 16, 19, 327 A.2d 843 (1974), the Rhode Island court declined to extend its
{¶ 49} This court‘s decision in Nadra v. Mbah, 119 Ohio St.3d 305, 2008-Ohio-3918, 893 N.E.2d 829, which the majority also cites favorably, is likewise unpersuasive. The court in Nadra cited Buck for the proposition that “personal injury includes injury to one‘s body and injury to one‘s reputation.” Id. at ¶ 26. But Nadra does not stand for the proposition that an injury to person includes defamation.
{¶ 50} The court in Nadra relied on the same case that appellant, DHSC, L.L.C., d.b.a. Affinity Medical Center, points to now: Lawyers Coop. Publishing Co. v. Muething, 65 Ohio St.3d 273, 603 N.E.2d 969 (1992). But Muething did not involve an allegation of defamation, libel, or slander. Muething‘s claimed loss of reputation arose from his reliance on legal forms that Lawyers Cooperative wrote and published. Indeed, the court held that “Muething‘s claims for humiliation and damage to his reputation are virtually indistinguishable from his claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress and, therefore, could not be maintained in the absence of an assertion that he feared or saw some quantifiable physical loss.” Id. at 280. Muething is inapplicable to defamation claims.
{¶ 51} The majority‘s position is also unsupported by the dictionary definitions of the statute‘s key terms. Black‘s Law Dictionary 506 (10th Ed.2014) defines defamation as “[m]alicious or groundless harm to the reputation or good name of another by the making of a false statement to a third person.” Reputation means “[t]he esteem in which someone is held or the goodwill extended to or
{¶ 52} Applying these definitions to
{¶ 53} In a defamation action, the alleged injury or loss is to a person‘s reputation, not to one‘s being or possessions. Consequently, I would hold that the plain language of the statute does not cap damages for people who are defamed. I would affirm the judgments of the trial and appellate court.
{¶ 54} I dissent.
O‘DONNELL, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.
B. Zimmerman Law and Brian L. Zimmerman; and Crabbe, Brown & James, L.L.P., and Andrew G. Douglas, for appellee.
Hanna, Campbell & Powell, L.L.P., Douglas G. Leak, W. Bradford Longbrake, Frank G. Mazgaj, and Emily R. Yoder; and Howard & Howard Attorneys and Michael O. Fawaz, for appellant.
Elfvin, Klingshirn, Royer & Torch, L.L.C., and Christina Royer; and McCarthy, Lebit, Crystal & Liffman Co., L.P.A., and Colin R. Ray, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Employment Lawyers Association.
Cooper & Elliot, L.L.C., C. Benjamin Cooper, and Charles H. Cooper, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Association for Justice.