LINGLE ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. THE STATE OF OHIO ET AL., APPELLEES.
Nos. 2019-1247 and 2019-1309
Supreme Court of Ohio
December 23, 2020
2020-Ohio-6788
KENNEDY, J.
Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-6788. Submitted July 8, 2020. APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, Nos. 17AP-251 and 17AP-252, 2019-Ohio-2928.
NOTICE
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-6788
LINGLE ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. THE STATE OF OHIO ET AL., APPELLEES.
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as Lingle v. State, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-6788.]
(Nos. 2019-1247 and 2019-1309—Submitted July 8, 2020—Decided December 23, 2020.)
APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, Nos. 17AP-251 and 17AP-252, 2019-Ohio-2928.
KENNEDY, J.
{¶ 2} In this case, the trial court incorrectly determined that out-of-state offenders who are automatically required to register as sexual predators in Ohio pursuant to
{¶ 3} Based on the plain language of
{¶ 4} We therefore affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the court of appeals, and we remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Facts and procedural history
{¶ 5} Appellant Harmon Lingle pleaded guilty to committing a lewd and lascivious act in Florida and was classified as a sex offender. When he moved to Ohio in 2008 after serving his prison sentence, he was initially classified as a sex offender before being reclassified as a sexual predator based on his lifetime registration requirement in Florida.
{¶ 6} Appellant Mark Grosser pleaded no contest in Florida to solicitation of a minor over the Internet and transmitting material harmful to a juvenile; he was classified as a sex offender in Florida and sentenced to jail and probation. In 2008, his probation was transferred to Ohio, where he was classified as a Tier I sex offender before being reclassified as a sexual predator, also because of his lifetime registration requirement in Florida.
{¶ 7} In separate actions brought against the Ohio Attorney General and the Franklin County sheriff, Lingle and Grosser sought a declaratory judgment that they had been incorrectly classified as sexual predators and subject to mandatory lifetime registration requirements. They argued that they should have been classified as sexually oriented offenders in 2008.
{¶ 8} Lingle also sought a declaration that because he had already registered for the ten-year period required for sexually oriented offenders, the Ohio Attorney General must remove him from Ohio‘s sex-offender database, while Grosser sought a declaration that his registration requirement would terminate in 2018. The trial court consolidated the actions.
{¶ 9} Lingle and Grosser moved for judgment on the pleadings, which the trial court granted in part and denied in part. The trial court determined that
{¶ 10} The Tenth District Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
{¶ 11} We accepted Lingle‘s and Grosser‘s appeal on the following proposition of law:
A person with an out-of-state sex offense conviction cannot be required to register in Ohio as a “sexual predator” if they can show that their home-state registration requirement is not substantially similar to Ohio law because the person is not likely to
reoffend, and therefore does not fit the statutory definition of “sexual predator” in
R.C. 2950.01(E) .
See 157 Ohio St.3d 1502, 2019-Ohio-4768, 134 N.E.3d 1226.
Conflict cases
{¶ 12} The Tenth District also certified that its judgment conflicted with judgments of the First and Fifth District Courts of Appeals, which held that if an out-of-state sex offender petitions a court pursuant to
{¶ 13} We agreed that a conflict exists, consolidated the conflict case with the jurisdictional appeal, and ordered the parties to brief the following conflict question:
“Does
R.C. 2950.09(F) provide out-of-state offenders challenging theirR.C. 2950.09(A) automatic sexual predator classification with a right to an evidentiary hearing whereby the offender must prove by clear and convincing evidence that he or she is not likely to commit a sexually-oriented offense in the future?”
ANALYSIS
Statutory construction
{¶ 14} This case returns us to a familiar place: statutory construction. In construing a statute, we do not ask “what did the general assembly intend to enact, but what is the meaning of that which it did enact.” Slingluff v. Weaver, 66 Ohio St. 621, 64 N.E. 574 (1902), paragraph two of the syllabus. “When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no need for this court to apply the rules of statutory interpretation.” Symmes Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Smyth, 87 Ohio St.3d 549, 553, 721 N.E.2d 1057 (2000).
{¶ 15} To determine the plain meaning of a statute, a court relies on the definitions provided by the legislative body. See Fox v. Std. Oil Co. of New Jersey, 294 U.S. 87, 96, 55 S.Ct. 333, 79 L.Ed. 780 (1935). When a term is not defined in the statute, we give the term its plain and ordinary meaning. Brecksville v. Cook, 75 Ohio St.3d 53, 56, 661 N.E.2d 706 (1996). And “[i]n ascertaining the plain meaning of the statute, the court must look to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole.” Kmart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291, 108 S.Ct. 1811, 100 L.Ed.2d 313 (1988).
Former R.C. 2950.09 and out-of-state offenders
{¶ 16} Under Ohio‘s version of Megan‘s Law, if a person has committed a sexually oriented offense in another state and is required “as a result of [a] conviction” for that offense to register as a sex offender for life in the other state, “that conviction * * * automatically classifies the person as a sexual predator” in Ohio.
The court may enter a determination that the offender * * * filing the petition described in division (F)(1) of this section is not an adjudicated sexual predator in this state for purposes of the registration and other requirements of this chapter * * * only if the offender * * * proves by clear and convincing evidence that the requirement of the other jurisdiction that the offender * * * register as a sex offender until the offender‘s * * * death is not substantially similar to a classification as a sexual predator for purposes of this chapter. If the court enters a determination that the offender * * * is not an adjudicated sexual predator in this state for those purposes, the court shall include in the determination a statement of the reason or reasons why it so determined.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶ 17} This provision ensures that even though
Former R.C. 2950.09(F)(2) is unambiguous, and a trial court must ascertain what caused the requirement that an out-of-state offender register until death and whether that is substantially similar or is not substantially similar to a classification as a sexual predator under former R.C. Chapter 2950
{¶ 18} Before we focus on the word “requirement” in
{¶ 19} The General Assembly in
[1] If a person is convicted of or pleads guilty to committing a sexually oriented offense that is not a registration-exempt sexually oriented offense, and if the sexually oriented offense is a violent sex offense or a designated homicide, assault, or kidnapping offense and the offender is adjudicated a sexually violent predator in relation to that offense, the conviction of or plea of guilty to the offense and the adjudication as a sexually violent predator automatically classifies the offender as a sexual predator for purposes of this chapter. [2] If a person is convicted of or pleads guilty to committing * * * a sexually oriented offense that is a violation of division (A)(1)(b) of
section 2907.02 of the Revised Code and if either the person is sentenced undersection 2971.03 of the Revised Code , or the court imposes upon the offender a sentence of life without parole under division (B) ofsection 2907.02 of the Revised Code , the conviction of or plea of guilty to the offense automatically classifies the offender as a sexual predator for purposes of this chapter. [3] If a person is convicted of or pleads guilty to committing * * * attempted rape and also is convicted of * * * a specification of the type described insection 2941.1418 ,2941.1419 , or2941.1420 of the Revised Code , the conviction of * * * the offense and the specification automatically classify the offender as a sexual predator for purposes of this chapter.
(Emphasis added.) These three categories of convictions lead to the automatic classification of the offender as a sexual predator.
{¶ 20} For sexually oriented convictions that do not lead to automatic sexual-predator classification,
{¶ 21}
If a person is convicted * * * in a court in another state * * * for committing a sexually oriented offense that is not a registration-exempt sexually oriented offense and if, as a result of that conviction * * * the person is required, under the law of the jurisdiction in which the person was convicted, * * * to register as a sex offender until the person‘s death, that conviction * * * automatically classifies the person as a sexual predator for the purposes of this chapter, but the person may challenge that classification pursuant to division (F) of this section.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶ 22} The language of
{¶ 23} The grammatical structure of
{¶ 24} “Requirement” in
{¶ 25} Therefore, the word “requirement” in
{¶ 26} The difficulty with
{¶ 27} While
{¶ 28} The legislature could have brought more clarity had it chosen to use the word “reason” instead of the catchall term “requirement” in
Former R.C. 2950.09(F) does not allow for a recidivism hearing
{¶ 29} The conflict question for which we ordered briefing concerns whether
The dissent‘s reading of the Removal Provision is untenable
{¶ 30} It is apparent from the statutory language in
{¶ 31} Therefore, in making its determination under
CONCLUSION
{¶ 32} For these reasons, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the court of appeals, and we remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part, and cause remanded.
BERGERON and STEWART, JJ., concur.
DONNELLY, J., concurs, with an opinion.
DEWINE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with an opinion joined by O‘CONNOR, C.J., and FISCHER, J.
PIERRE BERGERON, J., of the First District Court of Appeals, sitting for FRENCH, J.
{¶ 33} I concur in the court‘s judgment and fully join the majority opinion. I write separately only to note that in imposing registration and community-notification requirements under
{¶ 34} But overinclusive registration requirements that indiscriminately lump lower-risk offenders in with the highest-risk offenders can paradoxically diminish the ability to protect the public from the highest-risk offenders. If all out-of-state offenders are summarily classified as sexual predators, the pool of registrants may become diluted and those who do pose the highest risk to the public may get lost in the crowd—while those who do not pose the highest risk still face serious adverse collateral consequences. See generally Katherine Godin, The New Scarlet Letter: Are We Taking the Sex Offender Label Too Far?, 60-Dec. R.I.B.J. 17, 19-20 (2011); Abigail E. Horn, Wrongful Collateral Consequences, 87 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 315, 333-334 (2019). Overpopulation of the sexual-predator registration group may overwhelm the system and force government agencies to make difficult financial choices. See Godin at 19. In some cases, excessively stringent registration requirements could actually encourage sex offenders to reoffend because they are left with little to no incentive to rehabilitate. Id.
{¶ 35} Against that backdrop,
DEWINE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
{¶ 36} I agree with the majority that the review contemplated by
{¶ 37} Under Megan‘s Law, Ohio‘s former sex-offender-registration scheme, an offender who was convicted of a sexually oriented offense in another state and who is required to register until death in that other state is automatically classified as a sexual predator in Ohio.
{¶ 38} By its terms, the provision asks whether two things are substantially similar: (1) the other jurisdiction‘s requirement of lifetime registration and (2) Ohio‘s classification as a sexual predator. Although the statute refers to the other state‘s lifetime registration “requirement” in the singular, the reference to Ohio‘s sexual-predator “classification” encompasses the registration duties attendant to
{¶ 39} Under this plain reading, the other state‘s determination is essentially carried over into Ohio. An offender who is obligated to register for life in his former state cannot free himself of that requirement simply by moving to Ohio. As long as the other state‘s registration duties are “substantially similar” to those imposed under Ohio‘s sexual-predator classification, the lifetime registration requirement follows the offender to Ohio.
{¶ 40} The majority says that it, too, is applying the plain language of the statute. But it reaches a result that has little connection to the statutory language. It says that what the statute really requires is that a court compare the reason for lifetime registration in the foreign state to a sexual-predator classification in Ohio. One is at a loss to figure out what this means or where it comes from. It certainly doesn‘t come from the text. Indeed, a side-by-side comparison shows how far the majority strays from the statutory language:
| What | What the majority says |
|---|---|
| The offender must prove that “the requirement of the other jurisdiction that the offender * * * register as a sex offender until the offender‘s * * * death is not substantially similar to a classification as a sexual predator.” | The trial court should “examine why the out-of-state offender was required to register for life and whether that reason is substantially similar to a classification as a sexual predator in Ohio under |
{¶ 41} The majority‘s reading of the statute is certainly novel. It has not been advanced by any of the parties. And it is not one that any of the Ohio courts that have looked at this issue has ever thought of.
{¶ 42} It‘s hard to follow how the majority gets to where it does. It points out that the Removal Provision‘s reference to “the requirement of the other jurisdiction that the offender * * * register as a sex offender until the offender‘s * * * death,”
{¶ 43} The majority speculates that the General Assembly chose to use the word “requirement” because it did not know what other states called their classification “assignment[s].” See majority opinion at ¶ 26. But, again, that does little to explain why the General Assembly would write the statute in the manner that it did if what it really wanted was some kind of comparison between the Ohio classification and why the out-of-state offender was required to register for life.
{¶ 44} One wonders what lower courts will do with the majority‘s charge. What exactly does a court compare when it looks at the whys of registration? Presumably, someone is required to register for life because a legislature passed a law providing for lifetime registration, the person committed some crime making them eligible for lifetime registration, and there was some process—automatic or otherwise—by which the person was ordered to register. So which of these should a court compare: the law, the crime, the process, or all three? The majority refuses to say.
{¶ 46} Another possible take on how a court might “examine why the out-of-state offender was required to register for life,” majority opinion at ¶ 31, would be for it to look to the other state‘s classification process. The majority suggests some processes through which a person might be required to register for life: “The requirement for lifetime registration might spring directly from the conviction for a particular offense, it might result from an adjudicative process following the conviction, it might be the default registration for all sexually oriented offenses, or it might result for another reason.” Id. at ¶ 25.
{¶ 47} Let‘s try to compare some of the possible “whys” the majority has provided. Suppose that in one state a person convicted of committing a rape at gunpoint is classified through an adjudicative process but in Ohio that person would be classified automatically as a sexual predator. Could that offender avoid lifetime registration in Ohio simply because Ohio‘s classification process was different than the other state‘s? Such a result would seem ridiculous since that person would have been a lifetime registrant if the crime were committed in Ohio. But under the majority‘s view, if what it characterizes as the reasons for classification are not substantially similar, the offender could have the sexual-predator classification removed.
{¶ 49} What if another state classifies an offender in a civil process based on a psychological evaluation? Is the fact that a judge does not make the determination a substantial difference in the reason for classification? Or consider a state that permits offenders to petition to have their lifetime registration requirement lifted if after a certain time they have not committed any more sex offenses. Is that a substantial difference from Ohio, since Ohio does not permit its sexual predators to seek to have their classifications removed? Who can say.
{¶ 50} The majority places great emphasis on the fact that the Removal Provision “refers to the law of the other jurisdiction that requires lifetime registration” (emphasis deleted), majority opinion at ¶ 25, but under its view, if the reason why the other state has ordered an offender to register for life is different than Ohio‘s, all other attributes of that state‘s laws are of no consequence. The fact that the other state ordered an offender to register for life doesn‘t matter; all that matters is whether the other state did things the same way we do. If it didn‘t, then to get out from under the other state‘s lifetime registration requirement, all the offender need do is relocate to Ohio.
{¶ 51} In the end, the majority leaves courts with no explanation about what it means for a court to compare the reason for lifetime registration in another state to a classification in Ohio. And the majority‘s lack of guidance is particularly troubling because once a determination is made that a state arrived at the lifetime registration requirement for a reason different than Ohio‘s (whatever that means),
{¶ 52} I see no basis for remanding this case for the trial court to conduct the ill-defined and illogical comparison required by the majority. The Removal Provision simply provides that the other state‘s order will be carried over into Ohio, unless the offender shows that the obligations imposed by the out-of-state order are not substantially similar to those imposed pursuant to an Ohio sexual-predator classification. I would therefore remand the cause to the trial court for it to conduct that evaluation. Because the majority takes a contrary view, I respectfully dissent from that portion of its judgment.
O‘CONNOR, C.J., and FISCHER, J., concur in the foregoing opinion.
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Stephen P. Hardwick, Assistant Public Defender, for appellants.
Dave Yost, Attorney General, Benjamin M. Flowers, State Solicitor, and Michael J. Hendershot, Chief Deputy Solicitor, for appellee state of Ohio.
Barbara E. Wright, in support of neither party for amici curiae, Ohio Rational Sexual Offense Laws and National Association for Rational Sexual Offense Laws.