People v. Superior Court (Gooden)People v. Superior Court (Gooden)
Original consolidated proceedings in mandate challenging order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Louis R. Hanoian, Judge. Petitions denied.
Angela Bartosik, Randy Mize, Chief Deputy Public Defenders, Robert Ford and Troy A. Britt, Deputy Public Defenders, for Real Parties in Interest.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Thomas S. Patterson, Assistant Attorney General, Tamar Pachter and Nelson R. Richards, Deputy Attorneys General, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Parties in Interest, upon the request of the Court of Appeal.
I
INTRODUCTION
In 2018, the Legislature passed and the Governor signed into law Senate Bill No. 1437 (Senate Bill 1437), legislation that prospectively amended the mens rea requirements for the offense of murder and restricted the circumstances under which a person can be liable for murder under the felony-murder rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015.) Senate Bill 1437 also established a procedure permitting certain qualifying persons who were previously convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine to petition the courts that sentenced them to vacate their murder convictions and obtain resentencing on any remaining counts. (Id., § 3.)
Real parties in interest were convicted of murder and petitioned for vacatur of their convictions and resentencing under the procedures established by Senate Bill 1437. The People moved to dismiss the petitions on grounds that Senate Bill 1437, which the voters did not approve, invalidly amended Proposition 7 (Prop. 7, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 1978); Proposition 7) and Proposition 115 (Prop. 115, as approved by voters, Primary Elec. (June 5, 1990); Proposition 115), voter initiatives that increased the punishments for murder and augmented the list of predicate offenses for first degree felony-murder liability, respectively. The trial court rejected the People‘s argument and denied the motions to dismiss. The People filed petitions for writs of mandate and/or prohibition in our court, asking us to
Like the trial court, we conclude Senate Bill 1437 was not an invalid amendment to Proposition 7 or Proposition 115 because it neither added to, nor took away from, the initiatives. Therefore, we deny the People‘s petitions for writ relief.
II
BACKGROUND
A
In 2018, the Legislature enacted and the Governor signed Senate Bill 1437, effective January 1, 2019. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015.) An uncodified section of the law expressing the Legislature‘s findings and declarations states the law was “necessary to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Id., § 1, subd. (f).) It further provides that the legislation was needed “to limit convictions and subsequent sentencing so that the law of California fairly addresses the culpability of the individual and assists in the reduction of prison overcrowding, which partially results from lengthy sentences that are not commensurate with the culpability of the individual.” (Id., § 1, subd. (e).)
Under the felony-murder rule as it existed prior to Senate Bill 1437, a defendant who intended to commit a specified felony could be convicted of murder for a killing during the felony, or attempted felony, without further examination of his or her mental state. (People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1182 (Chun).) ” ‘The felony-murder rule impute[d] the requisite malice for a murder conviction to those who commit[ted] a homicide during the perpetration of a felony inherently dangerous to human life.’ ”1 (Id. at p. 1184.) “The purpose of the felony-murder rule [was] to deter those who commit[ted] the enumerated felonies from killing by holding them strictly responsible for any killing committed by a cofelon, whether intentional, negligent, or accidental, during
Independent of the felony-murder rule, the natural and probable consequences doctrine rendered a defendant liable for murder if he or she aided and abetted the commission of a criminal act (a target offense), and a principal in the target offense committed murder (a nontarget offense) that, even if unintended, was a natural and probable consequence of the target offense. (People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, 161–162.) ” ‘Because the nontarget offense [was] unintended, the mens rea of the aider and abettor with respect to that offense [was] irrelevant and culpability [was] imposed simply because a reasonable person could have foreseen the commission of the nontarget crime.’ ” (People v. Flores (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 855, 867.)
Senate Bill 1437 restricted the application of the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as applied to murder, by amending
the first degree. [¶] (3) The person was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life ….”3
Senate Bill 1437 also “added a crucial limitation” to
Finally, Senate Bill 1437 added
[¶] (3) The petitioner could not be convicted of first or second degree murder because of [the] changes to [s]ection 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (Id., subd. (a).)
If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief, the court must issue an order to show cause and, absent a waiver and stipulation by the parties, hold a hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder conviction, recall the sentence, and resentence the petitioner. (
If the petitioner is found eligible for relief, the murder conviction must be vacated and the petitioner resentenced “on any remaining counts in the same manner as if the petitioner had not been [sic] previously been sentenced, provided that the new sentence, if any, is not greater than the initial sentence.” (
The Legislature passed Senate Bill 1437 by a two-thirds vote in the Senate and a less-than-two-thirds majority in the Assembly.
B
Real parties in interest Allen Gooden and Marty Dominguez were convicted of murder in unrelated proceedings. Gooden was convicted of first degree felony murder in 1982 for the death of a neighbor during a burglary. He was sentenced to 25 years to life for the murder conviction. Dominguez was found guilty of second degree murder in 1990 after a companion killed a pedestrian under facts suggesting the jury may have relied on the natural and probable consequence doctrine. He was sentenced to 15 years to life for the murder conviction. Real parties in interest filed petitions under
Proposition 7, commonly known as the Briggs Initiative, increased the punishment for first degree murder from a term of life imprisonment with parole eligibility after seven years to a term of 25 years to life. (Prop. 7, §§ 1–2.) It increased the punishment for second degree murder from a term of five, six, or seven years to a term of 15 years to life. (Ibid.) Further, it amended
imprisonment without the possibility of parole (LWOP). (Id., §§ 5–6.) Proposition 7 did not authorize the Legislature to amend or repeal its provisions without voter approval.
Proposition 115, known as the “Crime Victims Justice Reform Act,” amended
The trial court consolidated real party in interests’ cases and denied the motions. The court found Senate Bill 1437 did not amend Proposition 7 because it did “not reduce sentences for first or second degree-murder.” Further, the court found Senate Bill 1437 did not amend Proposition 115 because it did not “in any way modif[y]” the predicate offenses on which first degree felony-murder liability may be based. Therefore, the court found Senate Bill 1437 was not an invalid legislative amendment.
The People filed petitions for writs of mandate and/or prohibition in our court, requesting us to direct the trial court to vacate its order and enter a new
III
DISCUSSION
A
Under
An issue that often arises in litigation involving the constitutionality of a legislative enactment under
that changes an existing initiative statute by taking away from it.“]). When confronted with the task of determining whether legislation amends a voter initiative, the Supreme Court has asked the following question: “[W]hether
In undertaking this analysis, the Supreme Court has cautioned that not all legislation concerning “the same subject matter as an initiative, or event augment[ing] an initiative‘s provisions, is necessarily an amendment” to the initiative. (Pearson, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 571.) On the contrary, ” ‘[t]he Legislature remains free to address a ” ‘related but distinct area’ ” [citations] or a matter that an initiative measure “does not specifically authorize or prohibit.” ’ ” (Ibid.; see also Cooper, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 47; County of San Diego v. San Diego NORML (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 798, 830.)
B
This appeal turns on whether Senate Bill 1437 amended Proposition 7 or Proposition 115 under the standards just discussed. If Senate Bill 1437 amended one or both initiatives, as the People contend, Senate Bill 1437 violates
1
a
We begin with whether Senate Bill 1437 amended Proposition 7. To resolve this question, we must determine what the voters contemplated when they enacted the initiative. (Pearson, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 571.) “We first consider the initiative‘s language, giving the words their ordinary meaning and construing this language in the context of the statute and initiative as a whole. If the language is not ambiguous, we presume the voters intended the meaning apparent from that language, and we may not add to the statute or rewrite it to conform to some assumed intent not apparent from that language. If the language is ambiguous, [we] may consider ballot summaries and arguments in determining the voters’ intent and understanding of a ballot measure.” (Ibid.)
Therefore, we start with the express language of Proposition 7. In pertinent part, the initiative provided as follows: “Every person guilty of murder in the first degree shall suffer death, confinement in state prison for life without
The People contend Senate Bill 1437—which, as noted ante, amended the mens rea requirements for the offense of murder—“effectively change[d] the penalties for murder,” and therefore “took away” from Proposition 7, “by changing the very definitions [of murder] relied upon by the voters ….” In so doing, the People conflate two distinct concepts—the elements of murder and the punishment imposed for murder. The elements of an offense and punishment are, as all parties seemingly agree, closely and historically related. Indeed, for a crime to exist, there must exist both a prohibited act and punishment. (
However, the elements of an offense and the punishment for an offense plainly are not synonymous. (People v. Anderson (2009) 47 Cal.4th 92, 119 [“A ... penalty provision is not an element of an offense ….“]; see People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, 801 [” ‘[T]he definition of crimes generally has not been thought automatically to dictate what should be the proper penalty.’ “].) ” ‘Every crime consists of a group of elements laid down by the statute or law defining the offense and every one of these elements must exist or the statute is not violated. This group of essential elements is known as the “corpus delicti,” the body or the elements of the crime.’ ” (Anderson, at p. 101.) Punishment, however, ” ‘has always meant a “fine, penalty, or confinement inflicted upon a person by the authority of the law and the judgment and sentence of a court, for [the] crime or offense committed by him.” ’ ” (People v. Ruiz (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1100, 1107.) In other words, a punishment is the consequence of a finding of guilt intended to further the public policy goals of retribution and deterrence. (Ibid.)
Thus, Senate Bill 1437 presents a classic example of legislation that addresses a subject related to, but distinct from, an area addressed by an initiative. (Kelly, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 1025–1026; see Pearson, supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 572–573 [legislation allowing postconviction discovery addressed area related to, but distinct from, initiative governing pretrial discovery]; Cooper, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 46–47 [legislation limiting availability of presentence conduct credits for offenders did not amend Briggs Initiative provision authorizing postsentence conduct credits]; Knight v. Superior Court (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 14, 27 (Knight) [legislation according rights and responsibilities for domestic partners did not amend initiative limiting marriage to persons of the opposite sex].) The Legislature is free to enact such legislation without voter approval. (Kelly, at p. 1025.)
The People concede Proposition 7 addressed “the penalties for murder,” not the elements of murder. However, they claim the electorate intended its voter-approved penalties to apply to murder as the offense was understood at the time Proposition 7 was passed, not as murder may later be defined based on subsequent legislative changes. They point to language in the initiative indicating the increased punishments were for persons convicted of “murder in the first-degree” and “murder in the second-degree,” and claim these terms specifically incorporated by reference the then-existing definitions of first and second degree murder, as interpreted by statute and judicial authorities. In support of this argument, they rely on a tool of statutory construction discussed in Palermo v. Stockton Theatres, Inc. (1948) 32 Cal.2d 53 (Palermo), which provides: “[W]here a statute adopts by specific reference the provisions of another statute, regulation, or ordinance, such provisions are incorporated in the form in which they exist at the time of the reference and not as subsequently modified ….” (Id. at pp. 58–59.)
We do not find this rule applicable here. Instead, we believe a cognate rule discussed in the Palermo decision is more apt under the circumstances:
The Supreme Court decision of People v. Hernandez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 835, is instructive. There, the defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit murder and sentenced under a statute, enacted in 1955, which provided as follows: ” ‘[T]he punishment [for conspiracy to murder] shall be that prescribed for murder in the first degree.’ ” (Id. at p. 864.) The Hernandez court considered whether the statutory reference to punishment ” ‘prescribed for murder in the first degree’ ” was intended to fix the penalty permanently at the punishment for first degree murder as it existed in 1955, when the conspiracy statute was enacted, or whether it was intended to account for subsequent changes in the penalty for first degree murder. (Id. at pp. 864–865.) It concluded the reference was general and therefore not intended to freeze the punishment for first degree murder as it existed in 1955. (Id. at p. 865.) We find the Hernandez court‘s analysis applicable in this case, given the clear similarities between the language at issue here (” ‘murder in the first degree’ ” and “murder in the second degree“) and the language considered in the Hernandez decision (punishment ” ‘prescribed for murder in the first degree’ “). (Id. at pp. 864, 865.)
Additionally, we note that Proposition 7 did not identify specific provisions of the
Further, Proposition 7 did not include any time-specific limitations when referring to first or second degree murder, as we might expect if the voters had intended to permanently wall off the definition of murder from future consideration by the Legislature. (Doe v. Saenz (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 960, 981 [reference to statute was general, not specific,
b
“Since the language of the initiative is unambiguous, we need not look to other indicia of the voters’ intent.” (Knight, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 25.) To the extent the ballot materials are relevant, however, they do not support the People‘s contention that Senate Bill 1437 thwarted the voters’ intent in passing Proposition 7.
The Analysis prepared by the Legislative Analyst described Proposition 7 as follows: ”Background: [¶] Under existing law, a person convicted of first degree murder can be punished in one of three ways: (1) by death, (2) by a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole, or (3) by a life sentence with the possibility of parole, in which case the individual would become eligible for parole after serving seven years. A person convicted of second degree murder can be sentenced to 5, 6, or 7 years in prison…. [¶] Proposal: [¶] This proposition would (1) increase the penalties for first and second degree murder, (2) expand the list of special circumstances requiring a sentence of either death or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, and (3) revise existing law relating to mitigating and aggravating circumstances.” (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elect. (Nov. 7, 1978), analysis by Legis. Analyst, at p. 32 (Ballot Pamphlet).)
In the portion of the ballot materials presenting the argument in favor of Proposition 7, proponents urged voters to approve the initiative because “the people ha[d] been demanding a tough, effective death penalty law to protect our families from ruthless killers. But, every effort to enact such a law ha[d] been thwarted by powerful anti-death penalty politicians in the State Legislature. [¶] In August of 1977, when the public outcry for a capital punishment law became too loud to ignore, the anti-death penalty politicians used their
These materials all concern the issue of punishment. By contrast, they are silent on the critical issues addressed by Senate Bill 1437. They do not mention the mens rea element of murder or any other requirement necessary for a person to be liable for murder. They do not mention sections 187 (defining murder), 188 (defining malice), or 189 (defining the degrees of murder). Further, they do not discuss the felony-murder rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine. These ballot materials buttress our conclusion that voters intended Proposition 7 to strengthen the punishments for persons convicted of murder, not to reaffirm or amend the substantive offense of murder.
The legislative history of Senate Bill 1437 does not assist the People either. The People note that the Office of Legislative Counsel sent an opinion letter to Assemblymember Jim Cooper, dated June 20, 2018, in which it purportedly advised that Senate Bill 1437 was an invalid amendment to Proposition 7. However, as real parties in interest explain, there is some uncertainty as to whether the letter—which did not identify by title the pending legislation on which the Office of Legislative Counsel was commenting—pertained to Senate Bill 1437 or, alternatively, Assembly Bill No. 3104, a bill that was not enacted, but would have amended
We need not resolve this uncertainty because, even assuming the letter pertained to Senate Bill 1437, opinions of the Office of Legislative Counsel, while entitled to considerable weight, are not binding. (Mundy v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1396, 1404.) Here, the two-page Office of Legislative Counsel‘s letter was not persuasive, as it defined a legislative amendment in a manner our Supreme Court has never endorsed (using the Quackenbush definition of amendment discussed ante). Further, it gave no consideration to the differences between the elements of a crime and the punishment for a crime. It also did not address whether the references in Proposition 7 to “first degree murder” and “second degree murder” were specific or general under the Palermo rule of statutory construction. For all these reasons, we do not find the letter persuasive. (See St. John‘s Well Child & Family Child Center v. Schwarzenegger (2010) 50 Cal.4th 960, 982.)
c
Finally, the People contend that irrespective of whether the Legislature may make prospective changes to the offense of murder, it may not retroactively “allow[] someone who was convicted of murder, lawfully and as a matter of historical fact, to secure a sentence less than that mandated in
The People‘s constitutional attack on the resentencing procedure established in
d
In sum, the voters who enacted Proposition 7 considered and approved increased punishments for persons convicted of murder, including additional means by which such persons could be punished by death or LWOP. However, the text of the initiative and the ballot materials for the initiative do not demonstrate an intent to freeze the substantive elements of murder in place as they existed in 1978. Therefore, Senate Bill 1437—which did not address the issue of punishments for persons convicted of murder—cannot be considered an amendment to Proposition 7.
2
We turn now to whether Senate Bill 1437 amended Proposition 115. For many of the same reasons discussed ante, we conclude the issues addressed by Senate Bill 1437 are distinct from the subject matter of Proposition 115. Therefore, we agree with the real parties in interest and Attorney General that Senate Bill 1437 did not amend Proposition 115.
We conclude it does not. Senate Bill 1437 did not augment or restrict the list of predicate felonies on which felony murder may be based, which is the pertinent subject matter of Proposition 115.6 It did not address any other conduct which might give rise to a conviction for murder. Instead, it amended the mental state necessary for a person to be liable for murder, a distinct topic not addressed by Proposition 115‘s text or ballot materials.
The People do not contend otherwise. Instead, they emphasize that Proposition 115 reenacted
they argue the following language from Proposition 115 precludes the Legislature from amending, by simple majority, any portion of
Under
In view of this constitutional mandate, the Supreme Court has rejected the claim the People present here. In Commission, voters approved an initiative: (1) reenacting an existing statutory section, including provisions with minor changes or no changes (to comply with
As in Commission, the initiative in question restates a statutory provision in full (
3
In closing, we reiterate a bedrock principle underpinning the rule limiting legislative amendments to voter initiatives: “[T]he voters should get
IV
DISPOSITION
The petitions are denied.
McCONNELL, P.J.
I CONCUR:
IRION, J.
O‘Rourke, J., dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. For the reasons expressed in my dissent in People v. Lamoureux (Nov. 19, 2019, D075794) __Cal.App.5th __, filed concurrently herewith, I would grant the People‘s petition.
O‘ROURKE, J.