COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. COMMISSION ON STATE MANDATES, Defendants and Respondents.
S239907
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
November 19, 2018
Fourth Appellate District, Division One D068657; San Diego County Superior Court 37-2014-00005050-CU-WM-CTL
Justice Cuéllar filed the opinion of the court, in which Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, and Meehan concurred.
When convicted sex offenders have a diagnosed mental disorder making it likely they would engage in sexually violent behavior if released, they are subject to civil commitment proceedings under the Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA;
For the first 15 years of the SVPA’s existence, it was the State of California that — according to the Commission on State Mandates (Commission) — had to foot the bill. But in early 2013, the Department of Finance (Department) asked the Commission to reconsider its earlier decision and declare that the SVPA was no longer a state-mandated program. The Department argued that the state’s financial responsibility ceased on November 7, 2006, when the voters enacted The Sexual Predator Punishment and Control Act: Jessica’s Law (Proposition 83), which “substantively amended and reenacted various sections of the Welfare and Institutions Code that had served as the basis for the Commission’s Statement of Decision.”
Soon thereafter, the counties of San Diego, Los Angeles, Orange, Sacramento, and San Bernardino (collectively, the Counties) filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate and a complaint for declaratory relief against the Commission, the State of California, the Department, and John Chiang in his then-official capacity as State Controller (collectively, the State respondents). The San Diego County Superior Court denied the petition and dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeal reversed, finding that Proposition 83 did not alter in any way the state’s obligation to reimburse the Counties for the costs of implementing the SVPA. (County of San Diego v. Commission on State Mandates (2016) 7 Cal.App.5th 12, 18 (County of San Diego).). We agree that the Commission erred when it treated Proposition 83 as a basis for terminating the state’s obligation to reimburse the Counties simply because certain provisions of
I.
A.
The state has conditional authority to enlist a local government in carrying out a new program or providing a higher level of service for an existing program. Only when the state “reimburse[s] that local government for the costs of the program or increased level of service” may the state impose such a mandate on its local governments. (
Predictably, local governments often disagree with the state about who is responsible for funding new programs. For the first five years after article XIII B was adopted, such unresolved disputes ended up in court. This arrangement led to unnecessary litigation, burdened the judiciary, delayed reimbursement, and injected uncertainty into budget planning at both the state and local levels. (See Kinlaw v. State of California (1991) 54 Cal.3d 326, 331;
In 2010, the Legislature enabled either party to request reconsideration of a prior Commission decision. Using formal procedures prescribed by statute, an affected state or local agency may ask that the Commission “adopt a new test claim decision to supersede a previously adopted test claim decision . . . upon a showing that the state’s liability for that test claim decision . . . has been modified based on a subsequent change in law.” (
B.
The SVPA was enacted by the Legislature in 1995 to enable the involuntary civil commitment of certain persons. The individuals subject to civil commitment under the SVPA are those who, following completion of their prison terms, have a diagnosed mental disorder that makes them likely to engage in sexually violent behavior. (
- Designation by the County Board of Supervisors of the appropriate district attorney or county counsel who will be
responsible for the SVP civil commitment proceedings ( Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6601, subd. (i) ); - Initial review of reports and records by the county’s designated counsel to determine whether the county concurs with the state’s recommendation (
Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6601, subd. (i) ); - Preparation and filing of the petition for commitment by the county’s designated counsel (
Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6601, subd. (i) ); - Preparation and attendance by the county’s designated counsel and indigent defense counsel at the probable cause hearing (
Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6602 ); - Preparation and attendance by the county’s designated counsel and indigent defense counsel at trial (
Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 6603 ,6604 ); - Preparation and attendance by the county’s designated counsel and indigent defense counsel at subsequent hearings regarding the condition of the SVP (
Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 6605 , former subds. (b)-(d),6608 , subds. (a) & (b), former subdivisions (c) & (d)); - Retention of necessary experts, investigators, and professionals for preparation for trial and subsequent hearings regarding the condition of the SVP (
Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 6603 ,6605 , former subd. (d)); and - Transportation and housing for each potential SVP at a secured facility while the individual awaits trial on the SVP determination. (
Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6602 .)
The Department then began reimbursing counties in a manner consistent with the Commission’s decision. For fiscal
In January 2013, though, the Department sought to terminate these payments by requesting that the Commission adopt a new test claim under
It is true that Proposition 83 included several of the statutory mandates on which the Commission’s 1998 ruling relied. But as the parties concede, these provisions were reprinted in Proposition 83 solely because the California Constitution requires that “[a] section of a statute may not be amended unless the section is re-enacted as amended.” (
Following the second hearing, the Commission determined that Proposition 83 had transformed six of the eight listed local government duties (and part of a seventh) from reimbursable state-mandated activities into nonreimbursable voter-mandated activities. Once again, the Commission deemed it “irrelevant . . . whether Proposition 83 made any substantive changes at all to the SVP code sections.” (Cal. Com. on State Mandates, Statement of Decision No. 12-MR-01 (Dec. 6, 2013), supra, at p. 39.) What proved pivotal for the Commission instead was “that Proposition 83 amended and reenacted wholesale most of the code sections that gave rise to the mandated activities found in the [original] test claim.” (Ibid.)
Accordingly, local government duties 1, 2, 3, 6, and part of 7, which were “expressly included” in the ballot measure, were no longer reimbursable. (Cal. Com. on State Mandates, Statement of Decision No. 12-MR-01 (Dec. 6, 2013), supra, at pp. 23-25.) The Commission further reasoned that local government duty 5 (the preparation and attendance at trial by the county’s designated counsel and appointed counsel for indigents), the remainder of local government duty 7 (the retention of necessary experts for trial), and part of local government duty 8 (transportation and housing of SVP while
The Counties responded by filing a petition for a writ of administrative mandate and a complaint for declaratory relief. The writ petition sought an order setting aside the Commission’s statements of decision issued on July 26, 2013,
The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded the matter to the Commission for reconsideration. It found that the statutory duties identified in the Commission’s 2013 test claim ruling were neither necessary to implement nor expressly included in Proposition 83 “[b]ecause the duties imposed by the statutes at issue were not affected by Proposition 83.” (County of San Diego, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 34.) The court declined to accord any significance to the ballot measure’s expanded definition of an SVP (see fn. 2, ante) because the Commission’s 1998 decision had previously concluded that the definition set forth in
We granted the State respondents’ petition for review to consider whether Proposition 83, by amending and reenacting provisions of the SVPA, constituted a “subsequent change in law” sufficient to modify the Commission’s prior decision, which directed the State of California to reimburse local governments
II.
To resolve the question before us, we must consider four distinct legal principles. First, the state must reimburse local governments for the costs of discharging mandates imposed by the Legislature. (
A.
We begin with the requirement that the state reimburse local governments for costs incurred when the state enlists their assistance in implementing a state program. (See
The question left unresolved by these provisions is what, precisely, qualifies as a mandate imposed by the voters.
Many voter initiatives (such as Proposition 83) amend existing statutory sections. Among these are statutory sections that have already been determined to impose reimbursable duties on local governments. When an existing statutory section is amended — even in the tiniest part — the state Constitution requires the entire section to be reenacted as amended. (
Proposition 83 is an example. It reenacted verbatim
The Commission nonetheless found the mere existence of Proposition 83 sufficient to transfer fiscal responsibility for the costs of these duties from the state to county governments. In the Commission’s view, “the extent and degree of substantive amendments” made by a ballot measure are “immaterial” to the
We conclude that the Commission’s approach is at odds with the constitutional requirement that the state reimburse local governments for the costs of complying with state mandates. (Cf. Yoshisato, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 989 [rejecting an interpretation that “assigns undue import to the technical procedures for amending statutes”].) If the term “ballot measure” in
According pivotal significance to a mere technical restatement also would prove difficult to reconcile with
Nor does the Commission persuasively reconcile a sweeping transfer of financial responsibility whenever a ballot measure happens to restate a provision containing a state mandate with the voters’ intended purpose in
By treating those untouched statutory bystanders no differently from materially changed or newly added provisions, the Commission’s approach leads to results “that no one would consider reasonable.” (MacKinnon v. Truck Ins. Exchange (2003) 31 Cal.4th 635, 650; see People v. Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, 605.) The Commission’s view implies that merely restating a state-mandated duty in a ballot measure to renumber the section, correct punctuation or grammar errors, or substitute gender-neutral language (see, e.g., Yoshisato, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 983, 985) automatically relieves the state of its obligation to reimburse local governments for performing their assigned role. Ironically, such wholesale reallocation of financial burdens would occur under the Commission’s theory even if nothing in the initiative changed any activities the local governments were required to perform. Conversely, if the local government duties listed here happened to appear in a completely separate statute not subject to technical reenactment rather than appearing in the section Proposition 83 amended in other respects, they would have remained state mandates. The mere happenstance that the mandated duties were contained in test claim statutes that were amended in other respects not clearly germane to any of the duties — and thus had to be reenacted in full under the
So it is telling that the State respondents conspicuously avoid embracing the full scope of the Commission’s reasoning. What they argue instead is that the compelled reenactment of the test claim statutes transformed the state mandate into a voter-imposed mandate because the voters simultaneously limited the Legislature’s ability to revise or repeal the test claim statutes. They point to Proposition 83’s amendment clause, which provides in relevant part: “The provisions of this act shall not be amended by the Legislature except by a statute passed in each house by rollcall vote entered in the journal, two-thirds of the membership of each house concurring, or by a statute that becomes effective only when approved by the voters. However, the Legislature may amend the provisions of this act to expand the scope of their application or to increase the punishments or penalties provided herein by a statute passed by a majority of each house thereof.” (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 2006) text of Prop. 83, § 33, p. 138 (Voter Guide).) In their view, these provisions no longer qualify as legislatively imposed mandates because the Legislature now lacks the power to amend or repeal these test claim statutes using the ordinary legislative process.
We disagree. The strict limitation on amending initiatives generally — and the relevance of the somewhat liberalized constraints imposed by Proposition 83’s amendment clause — derive from the state constitution.
The State respondents’ argument depends on one crucial assumption: that because of
The State respondents take a narrow view of the Legislature‘s power to amend a statutory provision when its reenactment in a ballot measure was compelled by the state Constitution. But they concede only “limited authority” supports this view. Indeed, the lone case cited by the State respondents is Shaw, but that case analyzed a legislative amendment aimed at the heart of a voter initiative, not a bystander provision that had been only technically restated. At issue in Shaw was Proposition 116, a 1990 voter initiative that in relevant part amended
As the Court of Appeal readily observed, the Legislature‘s 2007 amendment was suspect for a specific reason: it sought to undo the very protections the voters had enacted in Proposition 116. (Shaw, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at pp. 597-598.) Unlike Proposition 83, Proposition 116 had not merely restated a key provision without change. Rather, Proposition 116 had added language to
By contrast, nothing in Proposition 83 focused on duties local governments were already performing under the SVPA. No provision amended those duties in any substantive way. Nor did any aspect of the initiative‘s structure or other indicia of its purpose suggest that the listed duties merited special protection from alteration by the Legislature. According to the Voter Guide, the intended purpose of Proposition 83 was to increase penalties for violent and habitual sex offenders; prohibit registered sex offenders from residing within 2,000 feet of a school or park; require lifetime electronic monitoring of felony registered sex offenders; expand the definition of an SVP; and change the then-existing two-year commitment term for SVPs to an indeterminate commitment. (Voter Guide, supra, Official Title and Summary of Prop. 83,, p. 42.) Indeed, no indication appears in the text of the initiative, nor in the ballot pamphlet,
A more prudent conclusion is to assign somewhat more limited scope to the state constitutional prohibition on legislative amendment of an initiative statute. When technical reenactments are required under
With that in mind, we turn to the statutory provisions identified by the Commission as the source for local government duties 1, 2, 3, 6, and part of 7 -- i.e.,
B.
Similar flaws afflict the Commission‘s analysis of local government duties 5, 7, and part of 8, which derive from
The Commission‘s conclusion was based on the theory that
We considered an analogous situation in San Diego Unified School Dist. v. Commission on State Mandates (2004) 33 Cal.4th 859 (San Diego Unified). There, we considered whether the costs associated with mandatory expulsion hearings for students found to be in possession of firearms at school (see
Here again, the State respondents avoid defending the Commission‘s reasoning. Instead, they rely on the expanded definition of a ” ’ [s]exually violent predator’ ” in Proposition 83. (Voter Guide, supra, text of Prop. 83, § 24, p. 135.) As they point out, the voters broadened the definition of an SVP within the meaning of
The Court of Appeal chose to dispose of this argument in a single sentence: “The Commission‘s 1998 decision . . . concluded that Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600 was not a basis for any of the duties for which the Counties sought reimbursement.” (County of San Diego, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 36.) The statement is true, but only to a limited extent. The 1998 decision, which purported to address
Yet it would be misleading to suggest that
Unfortunately, the Commission never considered whether the expanded SVP definition in Proposition 83 transformed the test claim statutes as a whole into a voter-imposed mandate or, alternatively, did so to the extent the expanded definition incrementally imposed new, additional duties on the Counties. Its ruling granting the State respondents’ request for mandate redetermination instead rested entirely on grounds that we now disapprove. Moreover, the parties admit -- and the Court of
III.
Constitutional requirements governing matters such as voter initiatives and the Legislature‘s financial responsibility to local governments must be read in context. When a ballot initiative is used to amend any part of an existing statutory section, the California Constitution requires that the initiative include the text of the entire statutory section to enable voters to understand the context of the proposed change. (
Because the Commission erred in concluding otherwise, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal insofar as it reversed the judgment of the trial court. We remand the matter to the Court of Appeal, so it can direct the trial court to modify its judgment as follows: the trial court shall issue a writ of mandate directing the Commission to set aside the decisions challenged in this action and to reconsider the test claim in a manner consistent with this opinion.
CUÉLLAR, J.
We Concur:
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.
CHIN, J.
CORRIGAN, J.
LIU, J.
KRUGER, J.
MEEHAN, J.*
* Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to