Case Information
*1 Filed 7/9/15
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA THE PEOPLE, )
)
Plaintiff and Respondent, )
) S213819 v. )
) Ct.App. 2/2 B236152 LEON BANKS et al., )
) Los Angeles County Defendants and Appellants. ) Super. Ct. No. BA347305 ____________________________________)
In 1990, the voters passed Proposition 115, which adopted a wide range of
criminal justice reforms, including extending death penalty eligibility to ―major
participant[s]‖ in felony murders. (Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (d)
1
(section
190.2(d)), added by initiative, Primary Elec. (June 5, 1990) Prop. 115, § 10; see
Raven v. Deukmejian
(1990)
Section 190.2(d) was designed to codify the holding of
Tison v. Arizona
(1987)
involvement is substantial and they demonstrate a reckless indifference to the grave risk of death created by their actions. Section 190.2(d) must be accorded the same meaning.
Here, defendant Lovie Troy Matthews acted as the getaway driver for an
armed robbery in which Leon Banks and others participated. In the course of
escaping, Banks shot one of the robbery victims. A jury found Matthews guilty of
first degree murder under a felony-murder theory and found true a felony-murder
special circumstance. The People did not seek the death penalty; consequently,
Matthews received the mandatory lesser sentence for special circumstance murder,
life imprisonment without parole. (§ 190.2, subd. (a).) Section 190.2(d) must be
given the same interpretation irrespective of whether the defendant is subsequently
sentenced to death or life imprisonment without parole. Because the record
establishes Matthews was no more culpable than the getaway driver in
Enmund v.
Florida, supra
,
P ROCEDURAL AND F ACTUAL B ACKGROUND
Matthews‘s culpability for first degree felony murder is not in dispute. We
address only those facts relevant to the narrow issue on which we granted review,
whether Matthews can be found guilty of special circumstance murder and
sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. We recite the evidence in the light
most favorable to the jury‘s verdict. (
People v. Jackson
(2014)
The La Brea Collective is a Los Angeles medical marijuana dispensary. At its 2008 location, the dispensary had a metal security door providing access from the sidewalk and behind that door a sally port and second lockable door leading *3 into the lobby. Patients who rang the front doorbell were required to pass identification and a physician‘s medical marijuana recommendation through a slot in the door to a security guard, Noe Gonzalez, stationed in the sally port. Once the papers were verified, patients would be escorted through the sally port and second locked door into the dispensary lobby. Surveillance cameras monitored the premises.
On the afternoon of October 1, 2008, an employee looked at the camera monitor and saw Gonzalez being escorted into the lobby by two men armed with guns. The two men and a third accomplice, later identified as Leon Banks, David Gardiner, and Brandon Daniels, began tying up employees and searching the premises. One of them asked an employee, ―Where‘s the stuff at?‖ When shots were fired, the three stopped and fled. An employee watched on the monitor as the three reached the front door and struggled to exit. Banks returned to the lobby and fired a shot out the front window. After additional shots were fired, the three were able to escape.
A witness across the street saw Gonzalez trying to push the front door closed from the outside. The witness saw Banks reach his hand around the door from the inside and shoot Gonzalez. As Gonzalez fell, Banks stepped out and shot him again. Banks, Gardiner, and Daniels fled on foot.
A driver passing the dispensary at approximately 3:45 p.m. heard popping sounds and saw Banks and Gonzalez struggling at the dispensary‘s front door. Both had guns and were reaching around the door and shooting at each other. When the driver pulled over and looked back, he saw Gonzalez lying on the sidewalk.
On a residential street one block from the dispensary, a man was standing on the sidewalk in front of his house when Daniels ran by and asked to use his bathroom. The man refused, causing Daniels to pause. An SUV with paper *4 license plates reading ―Power‖ came around the corner, and Daniels screamed ―Troy, Troy‖ (Matthews‘s middle name). The SUV slowed without completely stopping. Daniels jumped in, another man later identified as Gardiner came across the street and jumped in as well, and Matthews drove off.
Police responding to the scene found Gonzalez dead on the sidewalk, a revolver with his DNA on it on the ground near his outstretched arm. 2 The revolver contained two live rounds and three spent rounds. Within minutes, Banks was captured on foot near the dispensary. Later that afternoon, an SUV with paper Power plates was stopped a few blocks from the dispensary; Matthews, the driver and sole occupant, was arrested. The SUV was registered to Banks and another person, and clothing belonging to Banks was found inside. In a field show-up, witnesses identified Banks as the shooter. Over the next few days, police found at or near the dispensary a photocopy of a doctor‘s medical marijuana recommendation and Banks‘s driver‘s license, zip ties, gloves, a holster, and a semiautomatic handgun. DNA, fingerprint, and palm print testing tied Banks, Daniels, and Gardiner to the dispensary, gloves, zip ties, and doctor‘s statement, but excluded Matthews. Ballistics tests confirmed the semiautomatic handgun was the murder weapon.
Cellphones were recovered from Banks and Matthews. Call records showed Matthews called Banks six times during the afternoon of October 1. Each call lasted between 20 and 50 seconds; the calls came at 2:53, 3:46, 3:49, 3:51, 3:53, and 3:56 p.m. It was not possible to determine whether the two spoke or these calls went to voicemail. Banks called Matthews three times, at 1:49, 3:44, 2 Gonzalez‘s coworkers testified he was unarmed while on duty. The source of Gonzalez‘s gun was never conclusively established.
and 3:58 p.m., with each call lasting approximately 20 seconds; these calls were answered.
Matthews was wearing a global positioning system (GPS) tracking device that showed his movements to within 15 meters. An expert testified Matthews was on the block containing the dispensary at 2:51 p.m., then three blocks away at 3:00 p.m., where he remained for approximately 45 minutes. At 3:46 p.m., Matthews moved toward the dispensary and made a series of stops within a few blocks of it over the next few minutes.
A gang expert testified Matthews, Gardiner, and Daniels were members of the same criminal street gang. The gang‘s primary activities were described generally as narcotics sales, burglaries, robberies, shootings, attempted murders, murders, and gun possession. No evidence was presented that Matthews, Gardiner, or Daniels had killed before, or that Matthews knew any of the three had killed before. The expert testified Banks was not a member of the gang.
Banks and Matthews were tried together. Matthews did not present any evidence on his own behalf but argued the prosecution had failed to carry its burden of proof.
A jury convicted Matthews of first degree murder and found true the special circumstance that the murder was committed during an attempted robbery or burglary. (§§ 187, subd. (a), 190.2, subd. (a)(17).) He was also convicted of burglary and attempted robbery with gang and firearm enhancements. (§§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1), 211, 459, 664, former 12022.53, subds. (d), (e).) Because the prosecution did not seek the death penalty, Matthews was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole.
On appeal, the Court of Appeal rejected Matthews‘s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the special-circumstance true finding. It held his actions as a getaway driver in supporting the underlying robbery, with *6 knowledge death was always a possibility in an armed robbery, were legally sufficient under section 190.2(d). Given the significance of section 190.2(d) in determining which felony murderers are eligible for either life imprisonment without parole and death, or a lesser sentence, we granted review to address its proper construction.
D ISCUSSION
I.
The Felony-murder Aider and Abettor Special Circumstance
The federal Constitution‘s Eighth Amendment does not prohibit the death
penalty, but it does require that states offer guidance to sentencing bodies tasked
with differentiating those for whom death is appropriate from those for whom it is
not. (
Gregg v. Georgia
(1976)
The special circumstances statute extends death eligibility not only to killers, but also to certain aiders and abettors of first degree murder. (§ 190.2, *7 subds. (c), (d).) 3 In the case of first degree felony murder, ―every person, not the actual killer, who, with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant‖ aids or abets the crime may be convicted of special-circumstance murder. ( Id. , subd. (d).) The statute thus imposes both a special actus reus requirement, major participation in the crime, and a specific mens rea requirement, reckless indifference to human life. 4
Section 190.2(d) does not define what qualifies as major participation, but
the statutory history shows where to find guidance. As noted, the provision was
adopted by voter initiative. (See Prop. 115, as approved by voters, Primary Elec.
(June 5, 1990), § 10.) Supporters argued the initiative‘s ― ‗BIRD COURT‘
DEATH PENALTY PROVISIONS [would] improve our death penalty law and
overturn decisions by Rose Bird and her allies which made it nearly inoperative.‖
(Ballot Pamp., Primary Elec. (June 5, 1990) argument in favor of Prop. 115,
p. 34.) Among those decisions,
Carlos v. Superior Court
(1983)
felony-murder aiders and abettors who intended to kill eligible for a death
sentence. (
People v. Mil
(2012)
Proposition 115 revised the scope of capital liability for aiding and abetting
felony murders by looking to federal constitutional law. The text of new section
190.2(d) mirrored the holding of, and was intended to bring ―state law into
conformity with[,]
Tison
v.
Arizona
[
, supra
,]
II.
Tison v. Arizona
and
Enmund v. Florida
To understand the import of
Tison
, we start with an earlier case upon which
builds,
Enmund v. Florida, supra
,
On these facts, the United States Supreme Court reversed Enmund‘s death
sentence as prohibited by the federal Constitution. The court found a broad
consensus against imposing death in cases ―where the defendant did not commit
*9
the homicide, was not present when the killing took place, and did not participate
in a plot or scheme to murder.‖ (
Enmund v. Florida, supra
,
In
Tison v. Arizona, supra
,
The United States Supreme Court granted Ricky‘s and Raymond‘s petitions
to consider the application of
Enmund
to these facts. The court began by
discussing at length and endorsing
Enmund
‘s holding that the Eighth Amendment
limits the ability of states to impose death for ―felony murder
simpliciter
.‖ (
Tison
v. Arizona, supra
,
The Supreme Court has yet to revisit and . The only
guidance its subsequent cases offer comes from
Kennedy v. Louisiana
(2008) 554
U.S. 407, 421, where the court in dicta characterized the governing standard as
permitting the death penalty for nonkillers whose ―involvement in the events
leading up to the murders was active, recklessly indifferent, and substantial.‖ Nor,
save once, have this state‘s courts elaborated on the test for death eligibility for
nonkillers. The exception is
People v. Proby
(1998)
We agree with
People v. Proby, supra
,
The two cases embrace the United States Supreme Court‘s long-standing
recognition that, in capital cases above all, punishment must accord with
individual culpability. States may ―make aiders and abettors equally responsible,
as a matter of law, with principals, or . . . enact felony-murder statutes‖ that make
individual involvement in an underlying crime enough to hold a nonkiller liable
for first degree murder. (
Lockett v. Ohio
(1978)
With respect to the mental aspect of culpability,
Tison
, and in turn section
190.2(d), look to whether a defendant has ― ‗knowingly engag[ed] in criminal
activities known to carry a grave risk of death.‘ ‖ (
People v. Estrada, supra
, 11
Cal.4th at p. 577, quoting
Tison v. Arizona, supra
,
With respect to conduct, and establish that a defendant‘s
personal involvement must be substantial, greater than the actions of an ordinary
aider and abettor to an ordinary felony murder such as Earl Enmund. The
defendants‘ actions in
Tison v. Arizona, supra
,
In , Ricky and Raymond Tison helped plan and carry out the escape of
two convicted murderers from prison—one of whom, Gary Tison, was serving a
life sentence for killing a guard in the course of a previous escape. (
Tison v.
Arizona, supra
,
The Tisons did not assist in a garden-variety armed robbery, where death might be possible but not probable, but were substantially involved in a course of *14 conduct that could be found to entail a likelihood of death; distinguishing , the Supreme Court said: ―Far from merely sitting in a car away from the actual scene of the murders acting as the getaway driver to a robbery, each petitioner was actively involved in every element of the kidnaping-robbery and was physically present during the entire sequence of criminal activity culminating in the murder of the Lyons family and the subsequent flight.‖ ( Tison v. Arizona, supra , 481 U.S. at p. 158.) Unlike the Tisons, Earl Enmund was just a getaway driver, sitting in a car away from the murders. Execution of minor, absent participants like Enmund remained disproportionate and constitutionally intolerable. ( Id. at p. 149.)
Among those factors that distinguish the Tisons from Enmund, and thus
may play a role in determining whether a defendant‘s culpability is sufficient to
make him or her death eligible, are these: What role did the defendant have in
planning the criminal enterprise that led to one or more deaths? What role did the
defendant have in supplying or using lethal weapons? What awareness did the
defendant have of particular dangers posed by the nature of the crime, weapons
used, or past experience or conduct of the other participants? Was the defendant
present at the scene of the killing, in a position to facilitate or prevent the actual
murder, and did his or her own actions or inactions play a particular role in the
death?
5
What did the defendant do after lethal force was used? No one of these
5
In cases where lethal force is not part of the agreed-upon plan, absence
from the scene may significantly diminish culpability for death. (See
Enmund v.
Florida, supra
,
considerations is necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily sufficient. All may
be weighed in determining the ultimate question, whether the defendant‘s
participation ―in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death‖ (
Tison v.
Arizona, supra
,
The People propose we treat as a major participant potentially eligible for death anyone ―whose conduct involves the intentional assumption of some responsibility for the completion of the crime regardless of whether the crime is ultimately successful. As such, participation in planning with the intent of facilitating the commission of the crime, or participating in conduct integral to or for the purpose of facilitating the commission of the crime, constitutes major participation.‖ This test cannot be reconciled with the holdings of and . Requiring only ―the intentional assumption of some responsibility for the completion of the crime‖ would sweep in essentially every felony murderer— indeed, even Earl Enmund himself—whether an actual killer or not. Doing so would violate the Supreme Court‘s requirement that each felony murderer‘s culpability be considered individually and disregard the court‘s corresponding recognition that, for many nonkillers, death is disproportionate to that individual culpability and thus unconstitutional.
Finally, we note the standards we articulate, although developed in death
penalty cases, apply equally to cases like this one involving statutory eligibility
under section 190.2(d) for life imprisonment without parole. As a purely
constitutional matter, nothing would foreclose California from imposing life
imprisonment without parole sentences on felony murderers with Matthews‘s
degree of culpability. (See
People v. Estrada, supra
,
III. Application
When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we ask
― ‗whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution,
any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.‘ ‖ (
People v. Edwards
(2013) 57 Cal.4th
658, 715, quoting
Jackson v. Virginia
(1979)
A. Major participation Considering the record in the light most favorable to the judgment, there was substantial evidence to show Matthews acted as the getaway driver for an armed robbery. The jury could infer from Matthews‘s movements that he dropped his confederates off near the dispensary. Matthews then waited three blocks away for approximately 45 minutes. Moments after the shooting and a call from Banks, he drove toward the dispensary. A witness saw Daniels flag Matthews down. He slowed, Daniels and Gardiner got in, and he drove them away.
The evidence in the record places Matthews at the Enmund pole of the Tison - Enmund spectrum. Indeed, as Matthews argues, his conduct is virtually indistinguishable from Earl Enmund‘s. No evidence was introduced establishing Matthews‘s role, if any, in planning the robbery. 6 No evidence was introduced establishing Matthews‘s role, if any, in procuring weapons. Matthews and two confederates—though not the shooter—were gang members, but, in contrast to the convicted murderers the Tison brothers chose to free and arm, no evidence was introduced that Matthews, Gardiner or Daniels had themselves previously committed murder, attempted murder, or any other violent crime. The crime itself was an armed robbery; Enmund and together demonstrate that participation in an armed robbery, without more, does not involve ―engaging in criminal 6 The People argue Matthews had a greater role than Enmund in planning their respective armed robberies, but the prosecution introduced no evidence that would support this. At most, there was evidence Matthews participated in the robbery, from which a jury might reasonably infer he had some role in planning it, but the nature of that role is, on the record before us, a matter of pure conjecture. In , in contrast, the trial court made express findings that Earl Enmund had planned the robbery. (See Enmund v. Florida, supra , 458 U.S. at pp. 803–806, 809 (dis. opn. of O‘Connor, J.); Enmund v. State, supra , 399 So.2d at pp. 1365, 1372–1373.)
activities known to carry a grave risk of death.‖ ( Tison v. Arizona, supra , 481 U.S. at p. 157.) During the robbery and murder, Matthews was absent from the scene, sitting in a car and waiting. There was no evidence he saw or heard the shooting, that he could have seen or heard the shooting, or that he had any immediate role in instigating it or could have prevented it.
On this record, Matthews was, in short, no more than a getaway driver,
guilty like Earl Enmund of ―felony murder
simpliciter
‖ (
Tison v. Arizona, supra
,
The Court of Appeal dismissed the relevance of comparisons to the facts of
Enmund v. Florida, supra
,
In the alternative, the People offer the prosecutor‘s closing argument below
to illustrate how Matthews‘s conduct can be distinguished from Earl Enmund‘s.
Tellingly, however, the closing argument offers no distinction; were one simply to
replace the names of those involved in this case with those involved in
Enmund v.
Florida, supra
,
The People also highlight the evidence of cellphone contact between
Matthews and Banks, the shooter. The record shows a series of nine cellphone
calls between Matthews and Banks, each lasting less than one minute, and as
*20
many as six of which may simply have gone to voicemail. No evidence about the
content of the calls was introduced, and the bare evidence of the call records tells
us nothing additional about Matthews‘s awareness of or involvement in the
shooting. Banks and Matthews apparently spoke either hours before or shortly
after the killing, and GPS evidence established Matthews was away from the scene
until after the victim was dead. Earl Enmund, too, no doubt found out after the
robbery that his coconspirators had killed two people, yet he still drove them away
to safety and apparently directed disposal of the murder weapons. (
Enmund v.
State, supra
,
The other facts the People cite—that Matthews drove near the crime scene,
sat in a parked car blocks away waiting for a signal to pick up his confederates,
and afterward drove toward the dispensary and picked up two accomplices—show
simply that he acted as a getaway driver. Earl Enmund, too, was a getaway driver
who may have been involved in planning an armed robbery, but as a matter of
precedent Enmund is the quintessential ―minor actor.‖ (
Tison v. Arizona, supra
,
B. Reckless Indifference to Human Life
Consideration of Matthews‘s mens rea also leads us to conclude he is
legally ineligible for a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. Reckless
indifference to human life ―requires the defendant be ‗
subjectively
aware that his
or her participation in the felony involved a grave risk of death.‘ ‖ (
People v. Mil,
supra
,
The Court of Appeal, in a line of reasoning endorsed by the People, concluded that ―[w]ith advance knowledge of the planned robbery and burglary, Matthews had to be aware of the risk of resistance and the extreme likelihood that death could result.‖ 7 According to the appellate court, Matthews‘s confederates surely ―anticipated as much because they were armed,‖ and although Matthews was not armed, the jury could readily infer Matthews knew his confederates were.
The problem with the sufficiency of such evidence to prove reckless indifference to human life is that Enmund and deem identical evidence inadequate. In , the Supreme Court rejected exactly this argument, that the risk of death inherent in an armed robbery justifies the death penalty simply for knowingly participating in such a crime. ―It would be very different if the likelihood of a killing in the course of a robbery were so substantial that one should share the blame for the killing if he somehow participated in the felony. But competent observers have concluded that there is no basis in experience for the notion that death so frequently occurs in the course of a felony for which killing is not an essential ingredient that the death penalty should be considered as 7 The prosecutor‘s closing argument rested on the same theory: Matthews knowingly participated in a robbery, and the fact armed robberies carry with them ―a possibility someone may get killed‖ is common knowledge.
a justifiable deterrent to the felony itself.‖ ( Enmund v. Florida, supra , 458 U.S. at p. 799.)
In
Tison
as well, the Arizona Supreme Court had employed the same logic
as the Court of Appeal here, reasoning that the constitutional culpability
requirement was satisfied by the fact a participant in an armed robbery could
anticipate lethal force might be used. The United States Supreme Court was
unpersuaded, observing Earl Enmund himself might well have anticipated the use
of lethal force as a possibility, for ―the possibility of bloodshed is inherent in the
commission of any violent felony and this possibility is generally foreseeable and
foreseen; it is one principal reason that felons arm themselves.‖ (
Tison v. Arizona,
supra
,
The People attempt to distinguish
Tison
‘s discussion of the issue by noting
it arose as part of the high court‘s rejection of the Arizona Supreme Court‘s
equating knowledge of the foreseeability of possible death with the intent to kill
called for by . However true, this point does not sap the discussion of its
force. While
Tison
slightly revised the mental culpability necessary for death
eligibility, from intent to kill to reckless indifference toward human life, it
simultaneously concluded knowledge of the possible risk of death inherent in
certain felonies (like armed robbery) would not satisfy this lesser standard either.
The court distinguished the defendants before it from ―the category of
*23
felony murderers for whom
Enmund
explicitly held the death penalty
disproportional,‖ because for the Tisons, unlike for Earl Enmund and his ilk, ―the
record would support a finding of the culpable mental state of reckless
indifference to human life.‖ (
Tison v. Arizona, supra
,
Alternatively, the People highlight the United States Supreme Court‘s
recognition that ―there are some felonies as to which one could properly conclude
that any major participant necessarily exhibits reckless indifference to the value of
8
In
People v. Lopez
(2011)
In
People v. Hodgson, supra
,
human life.‖ (
Tison v. Arizona, supra
,
Section 189 codifies the first degree felony-murder rule (
People v. Harris
(2008)
That one may infer the felonies listed in section 189 are those the
Legislature views as ―inherently dangerous‖ (
People v. Cavitt
(2004) 33 Cal.4th
187, 197) does not change the analysis. Whether a category of crimes is
sufficiently dangerous to warrant felony-murder treatment, and whether an
individual participant has acted with reckless indifference to human life, are
different inquiries. Section 189 cannot be read as attempting to conflate them, and
in any event under and it would be impermissible for a state
legislature to declare all participation in broad classes of felony murders, such as
burglaries or robberies, punishable by death without further inquiry into each
*25
individual defendant‘s mental state. (See
Tison v. Arizona, supra
, 481 U.S. at
p. 149;
Enmund v. Florida, supra
,
Finally, the People note two case-specific features of the armed robbery here that they suggest demonstrate reckless indifference to human life. First, Matthews, Daniels, and Gardiner—but not Banks—were members of the same gang. An expert testified their gang included 750 members, divided into cliques. In a single line of testimony, the expert identified the primary activities of the entire gang as ―narcotics sales, burglaries, robberies, shootings, attempted murders, murders, gun—carrying guns.‖ No evidence indicated Matthews or his two confederates had ever participated in shootings, murder, or attempted murder, or even that any member of their clique had. 10
This evidence does not materially distinguish this case from or bring it any closer to Tison . The evidence connecting Daniels and Gardiner personally to past acts of violence was so attenuated as to be essentially non- existent; as to Banks, the actual shooter, it was entirely nonexistent. The contrast with Tison , where the Tison brothers freed and armed Gary Tison, who had killed before in the course of a previous prison escape, is stark.
9
does not specify those few felonies for which any major participation
would ―necessarily exhibit[] reckless indifference to the value of human life.‖
(
Tison v. Arizona, supra
,
10 The only specific gang crimes the expert testified to were two firearm possession convictions committed by other members uninvolved in the instant robbery. (See § 186.22, subd. (e)(31) & (32).)
Second, the dispensary had a sally port, security cameras, and a guard. To
get through the sally port, the robbers had a medical marijuana authorization; to
deal with the guard and others, they brought zip ties to subdue employees.
Gonzalez‘s coworkers testified they believed he was an unarmed guard, and there
was no evidence Matthews believed otherwise, or even that he knew a guard
would be present. Because nothing in the record reflects that Matthews knew
there would be a likelihood of resistance and the need to meet that resistance with
lethal force, the evidence failed to show Matthews ―knowingly engag[ed] in
criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death.‖ (
Tison v. Arizona, supra
,
The insufficiency of these details to distinguish
Enmund
aside, a larger
consideration is at issue here. The actions of Earl Enmund, the Tison brothers,
and countless other nonkiller felony murderers fall on a continuum, a spectrum of
culpability. To ask whether there is any variation at all between Matthews‘s
conduct and Enmund‘s is certainly relevant, but in doing so we do not simply
assume Enmund‘s conduct represents a constitutional maximum, i.e., the most
culpable one can be and yet still be constitutionally ineligible for death, such that
any
variation would move one into the death-eligible zone. Nationally, thousands
of armed robberies occur each year; per
Enmund
, only roughly 1 in 200 results in
death. (
Enmund v. Florida, supra
,
Because on the evidence in the record no rational trier of fact could have found Matthews‘ conduct supported a felony-murder special circumstance, the jury‘s special-circumstance true finding cannot stand.
D ISPOSITION
We reverse the Court of Appeal‘s judgment as to defendant Lovie Troy Matthews and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
W ERDEGAR , J.
W E C ONCUR :
C ANTIL -S AKAUYE , C. J.
C HIN , J.
C ORRIGAN , J.
L IU , J.
C UÉLLAR , J.
K RUGER , J.
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. Name of Opinion People v. Banks
__________________________________________________________________________________ Unpublished Opinion NP opn. filed 8/29/13 – 2d Dist., Div. 2
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________________________________ Opinion No. S213819
Date Filed: July 9, 2015
__________________________________________________________________________________ Court: Superior
County: Los Angeles
Judge: Gail Ruderman Feuer
__________________________________________________________________________________ Counsel:
Sharon M. Jones, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant Leon Banks Danalynn Pritz, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant Lovie Troy Matthews.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Marc A. Kohm, Peggy Z. Huang, Keith H. Borjon and Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr., Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): Danalynn Pritz
3625 East Thousand Oaks Boulevard, Suite 182
Westlake Village, CA 91362
(844) 805-3262
Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr.
Deputy Attorney General
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702
Los Angeles, CA 90013
(213) 897-2396