People v. EspinoPeople v. Espino
A number of published decisions have considered whether
The Attorney General also contends that, if Espino is resentenced and his sentence is reduced, the prosecution is entitled to withdraw from its plea agreement with Espino. We reject this contention.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and remand with directions to conduct a full resentencing.
I. BACKGROUND
In 2017, pursuant to a plea agreement, Espino pleaded no contest to robbery (
In May 2023, in light of the intervening enactment of what is now
Espino timely noticed an appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Resentencing
Espino contends that the trial court misconstrued
1. Statutory Background
Prison priors are governed by
In Senate Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Sess.) (Sen. Bill 483), the Legislature made this change retroactive. (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3.) In what is now
In addition,
2. The Word “Impose”
Although
Although no published decision appears to have addressed whether
The first decision to consider the Attorney General‘s implied execution requirement was from this district, and it rejected the requirement. (See Renteria, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1282–1283.) Subsequent decisions from the Third, Fourth and Fifth Districts have agreed. (People v. Mayberry (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 665, 673-676 (Mayberry) [Fifth District]; People v. Saldana (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 1270, 1272–1273, review granted March 12, 2024, S283547 (Saldana) [Third District]; People v. Christianson (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 300, 314, review granted Feb. 21, 2024, S283189 (Christianson) [Fourth District].) One published decision, from Division Two of the Fourth District, disagreed. (People v. Rhodius (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 38, 40-41, 45, 48–49, review granted Feb. 21, 2024, S283169 (Rhodius).) The Supreme Court has granted review of this decision and two of the decisions taking the opposite view. (Rhodius, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th 38; Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th 300; Saldana, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th 1270.)
We see no good reason to reject the weight of authority interpreting
As the Attorney General points out, the word “impose” is often “employed as shorthand” to refer to enhancements that are both imposed and executed. (People v. Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1118, 1125 (Gonzalez.) Thus, where the context shows that “impose” refers to a term of imprisonment—as in the firearm enhancement statute, which states that “[o]nly one additional term of imprisonment under this section shall be imposed” on a person for each crime (
The Attorney General notes that
In addition, we find it unlikely that the Legislature silently intended to render only those prison priors that were imposed and executed legally invalid. The language of
Accordingly, in keeping with the majority of decisions considering the issue, we conclude that
3. The Dissent
Our dissenting colleague agrees that
In arguing that
The dissent also points to the declaration of intent in the uncodified section of Sen. Bill 483. This section declares that the intent of the Legislature was to retroactively apply its amendments limiting prison priors under
In addition, it is unclear that the benefits expressly conferred by
The legislative history cited by the dissent is similarly inconclusive. The dissent asserts that the Legislature focused on those individuals serving time attributable to now-invalid sentencing enhancements based on a committee analysis of the potential impact of Sen. Bill 483. (See Sen. Com. on Appropriations, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 843 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), as amended Mar. 3, 2021, p. 3.) However, the committee may simply have been focusing on the most important aspect of the legislation in assessing its impact. Consequently, we decline to infer from the report or from the Legislature‘s focus more generally that
Indeed, such an inference would conflict with other parts of the legislative history. According to the dissent, where a prison prior for a crime other than a sexually violent offense was imposed but punishment was stricken, the prior is not imposed under
The dissent also argues that, when a prison prior is imposed but punishment is struck, the enhancement adds nothing to the sentence imposed. However, in some circumstances, when an enhancement has been imposed but punishment struck, “[t]he fact of the enhancement . . . remain[s]” and may adversely impact the defendant in other ways such as restricting the ability to accrue conduct credits or subjecting the defendant to additional punishment for future convictions. (In re Pacheco (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1439, 1444; see also People v. Fuentes (2016) 1 Cal.5th 218, 225 [“even if the punishment is struck, an enhancement finding could impact defendant in a future case“].) While the dissent argues that prison priors do not have these impacts, we are not so sure, and, even when punishment is struck, prison priors may have other impacts that we have not considered. In any event, it is not our role in interpreting statutes to make them fit the perceived policies underlying them perfectly in all instances; it is to ascertain the Legislature‘s intent, even if the legislation may be imperfectly drawn in some instances.
In declining to create an exception for prison priors that were imposed but punishment was struck, we are also cognizant of the rule of lenity. This rule ” ’ “generally requires that ‘ambiguity in a criminal statute should be resolved in the favor of lenity, giving the defendant the benefit of every reasonable doubt on questions of interpretation.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Reynoza (2024) 15 Cal.5th 982, 1013.) The rule applies where two reasonable interpretations of a statute ” ’ ” ‘stand in relative equipoise.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.) Thus, even if we were to conclude that the considerations raised by the dissent
B. The Plea Agreement
The Attorney General argues that, if Espino is resentenced under
Here again, the Attorney General raises an issue on which published decisions are split and asks this court to follow the minority view. One decision from the First District has held that, where a trial court resentences a defendant under
As a general rule, once a court approves a plea agreement, “the court may not proceed as to the plea other than as specified in the plea.” (
Sen. Bill 483‘s uncodified section expressly states that the Legislature did not intend to permit prosecutors to rescind plea agreements based on resentencing under the statute: “It is the intent of the Legislature that any changes to a sentence as a result of the act that added this section shall not be a basis for a prosecutor or court to rescind a plea agreement.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 1.) In light of this statement, most published decisions to consider resentencing under
In Coddington, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th 562, Division 1 of the First District reached a different conclusion. Coddington focused on
III. DISPOSITION
The order denying Espino‘s request for resentencing is reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court, which is directed to recall Espino‘s sentence and resentence him consistent with
BROMBERG, J.
I CONCUR:
GROVER, ACTING P.J.
Lie, J., Dissenting:
” ‘By definition, a sentence enhancement is “an additional term of imprisonment added to the base term.” ’ ” (People v. Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1118, 1124 (Gonzalez);
The Gonzalez court did not attribute a technical legal meaning to “impose,” but the ordinary meaning of a transitive verb “cannot be artificially isolated from” its object—here, the sentencing enhancement. (Cf. People v. Moses (2020) 10 Cal.5th 893, 907.) A sentencing enhancement being an additional term of imprisonment added to a base term (
The gap between my reading and the majority‘s of “[a]ny sentence enhancement that was imposed” (
That the fact of the former
After all, the Legislature knows how to craft retroactive relief more broadly—to dismiss convictions after both finality of judgment and completion of sentence, for example, and to seal records of sentences already served. (See, e.g.,
Even if one may discern ambiguity in the stated legislative intent, I do not believe the legislative history supports a different reading: that history reflects the Legislature‘s consistent focus on those serving time attributable to those enhancements it contemplated applying retroactively. To gauge the potential impact of the bill, for example, the Legislature specifically considered what could be determined of how many people were “serving terms of sentence enhancements“: “While it is not presently known how many individuals currently are serving a term of incarceration at the local level that includes
The Legislature could have considered extending some form of relief for those who—despite ultimately experiencing no additional punishment for the fact of their prior prison term—had needed to factor the threat of such additional punishment in deciding whether to proceed to trial, negotiate a stipulated sentence, or plead “open” to the full breadth of the trial court‘s deferentially reviewed sentencing discretion. The Legislature could have used the ubiquity and demonstrable disparate impact of one-year prior prison term enhancements—imposed and executed, imposed and stayed, or simply stricken—as the fulcrum for a broader decarceral endeavor, to leverage maximum retroactive effect from intervening sentencing reforms (otherwise limited in retroactivity under In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740) across the largest possible population. But in declaring “legally invalid” certain of those former
I would therefore affirm the trial court‘s order denying defendant Jack Espino‘s request for resentencing.
LIE, J.