THE PEOPLE,
A167813 (Solano County Super. Ct. No. FCR330516)
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE
Filed 3/15/24
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
In 2018, Steven Laurent Montgomery, Jr. pled no contest to several violent felonies. Pursuant to a plea bargain, the trial court sentenced him to 18 years in prison, including two one-year enhancements for prior prison sentences within the meаning of former
BACKGROUND
The prosecutor charged Montgomery with forcible oral copulation (former
Under the terms of a plea agreement, Montgomery pled no contest to injuring a domestic partner, false imprisonment, and assault with a deadly weapon, in addition to admitting the great bodily injury enhancement as to those offenses. He also pled no contest to forcible oral copulation, and the prosecutor dismissed the sex offense enhancement and assault charge. Montgomery also аdmitted two prison priors within the meaning of former
The parties agreed to — and the trial court imposed — a sentence of 18 years, which consisted of the upper term of eight years for forcible oral copulation, one year for injuring a domestic partner plus a five-year grеat bodily injury enhancement, eight months for false imprisonment, one year for assault with a deadly weapon, and one consecutive year for each prison prior.
After the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) notified the trial court of various errors in the abstract оf judgment, the court — with the agreement of the parties — imposed the great bodily injury enhancement on the forcible oral copulation plea and corrected the abstract of judgment to reflect a sentence of 17 years and eight months. And after the Legislature enacted Sen. Bill 483, the court dismissed both one-year prison priors, but it did not conduct a resentencing hearing in Montgomery‘s presence.
The parties agree Sen. Bill 483 not only invalidated Montgomery‘s prison priors, it mandated a full resentencing hearing — with a right to be present, represented by counsel, and present evidence at the hearing. We likewise agree, reverse the trial court‘s order striking the prison priors, and remand for a resentencing hearing under
But the parties disagree on one remaining point. The Attorney General argues that, if the trial court is inclined to reduce Montgomery‘s sentence beyond dismissing the prison priors, the prosecutor must be permitted to amend or withdraw from the plea agreement, returning the parties to the status quo ante. For his part, Montgomery contends the prosecutor cannot withdraw from the plea agreement due to any sentence reduction at the hearing, even one due to enactments other than Sen. Bill 483. We conclude Montgomery has the better argument.
“By its plain terms,
“[L]ong-standing law limits the court‘s unilateral authority to strike an enhancement yet maintain other provisions of the plea bargain.” ( People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685, 701.)
A plea agreement, however, does incorporate ” ’ “the reserve power of the state to amend the law.” ’ ” (Doe v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 64, 66.) A plea agreement “does not have the effect of insulating [the parties] from changes in the law that the Legislature has intended to apply to them.” (Ibid.) Thus, the critical inquiry in determining the effect of a change in the law on a plea agreement is one of legislative intent. (Harris v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 984, 991.) Here, in an uncodified section of Sen. Bill 483, the Legislature expressed that “any changes to a sentence as а result of the act that added this section shall not be a basis for a prosecutor or court to rescind a plea agreement.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 1.)
Two courts have addressed the extent to which the Legislature has precluded prosecutors from withdrawing from a plea bargain due to sentеnce reductions following a
Carter based its conclusion on the text and legislative history of Sen. Bill 483. (Carter, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 968, 973–975.)
This interpretation is consistent with other resentencing provisions in
We respectfully disagree with our сolleagues in Division One. Coddington — relying on People v. Stamps — rejected the argument that Sen. Bill 483‘s uncodified section prohibits a prosecutor from rescinding a plea agreement for sentence reductions beyond the elimination of prison priors. (Coddington, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at pp. 570–571.) The court concluded the codified legislative purpose in
Like Carter, we think the language here is closer to Harris v. Superior Court than People v. Stamps. (Carter, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 974.) Stamps held that, for the defendant ” ‘to justify a remand for the court to consider striking his serious felony enhancement while maintaining the remainder of his bargain, defendant must establish not only that [the legislative change] applies retroactively, but that, in enacting that provision, the Legislature intended to overturn long-standing law that a court cannot unilaterally modify an agreed-upon term.’ ” (Carter, at p. 969.) Stamps concluded the Legislature did not intend such a result because none of the legislative materials mentioned plea agreements. (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 701–702.) In Harris, by contrast, the Supreme Court concluded that, by “expressly mentioning convictions by plea, Proposition 47 contemplated relief to all eligible defendants.” (Harris, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 991–993.) As in Harris, Sen. Bill 483‘s uncodified section “еxpressly mentions plea agreements and prohibits both the court and the prosecution from rescinding the plea agreement.” (Carter, at p. 974.)
We also conclude that, by enacting Sen. Bill 483, the Legislature intended to correct past sentencing disparities resulting from ” ‘racial bias’ ” and to ” ‘ensure equal justice,’ ” rather than the potential disparity noted in Coddington. (Coddington, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 571; Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 1.) Indeed, the Legislature said as much in the uncodified section, explicitly making Senate Bill No. 136 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) retroactive “in order to ensure equal justice and address systemic racial bias in sentencing.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 1.) This intent is also evidenced by Sen. Bill 483‘s express mandate that resentencing under its terms shall result in a reduced sentence unless there is a finding that a lesser sentence would endanger public safety. (
DISPOSITION
The trial court‘s order striking the prison priors is reversed, and the matter remanded so the court may hold a resentencing hearing that complies with
Rodríguez, J.
WE CONCUR:
Tucher, P. J.
Fujisaki, J.
A167813
Trial Court: Solano County Superior Court
Trial Judge: Hon. Daniel J. Healy
Counsel:
Megan Hailey-Dunsheath, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and David A. Voet, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.