People v. YartzPeople v. Yartz
We must decide whether a 1978 conviction based on a nolo contendere, or no contest, plea may serve as a predicate prior conviction in a civil commitment proceeding under the Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA or Act). (
For reasons that follow, we conclude that an SVPA civil commitment proceeding is a special proceeding of a civil nature, and not a “civil suit” under
Thus, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which held to the contrary.
In 1978, defendant pled no contest to, and was convicted of, committing a lewd or lascivious act on a child under the age of 14. (
On May 16, 1997, the San Joaquin County District Attorney petitioned to commit defendant as a sexually violent predator (SVP) under the Act. (
The trial court denied the motion. A jury found defendant to be a sexually violent predator and the court committed him to the Department of Mental Health for two years. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeal reversed.
Citing Leake v. Superior Court (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 675, 680, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 767 (Leake), which concluded that an SVPA proceeding is a “civil action or a special proceeding of a civil nature,” the Court of Appeal agreed with defendant that his 1978 conviction was subject to the limitation of
Based on the foregoing, the Court of Appeal concluded defendant‘s 1978 conviction based on his no contest plea could not be used as a predicate offense to support his civil commitment under the SVPA. (
DISCUSSION
Relying on
A. The SVPA
“The SVPA provides for the involuntary civil commitment of an offender immediately upon release from prison, for a two-year period, if the offender is found to be an SVP.” (Cooley v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 228, 243, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 177, 57 P.3d 654 (Cooley).) To establish that an offender is a “[s]exually violent predator,” the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the person (1) “has been convicted of a sexually violent offense against two or more victims,” and (2) “has a diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior.” (
The SVPA is not punitive in purpose or effect. (Hubbart v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1138, 1166, 1171, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 492, 969 P.2d 584 (Hubbart).) Its proceedings are “civil in nature....” (Cooley, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 250, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 177, 57 P.3d 654, citing Hubbart, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1172, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 492, 969 P.2d 584; People v. Superior Court (Preciado) (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1128, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 159.) More than 40 years before the SVPA‘s 1995 enactment, we concluded that “[s]exual psychopathy proceedings are special proceedings of a civil nature which are collateral to the criminal case. [Citations.]” (Gross v. Superior Court (1954) 42 Cal.2d 816, 820, 270 P.2d 1025 (Gross) [former
Relying in part on Hubbart, several Courts of Appeal have described an SVPA commitment proceeding as a “special proceeding of a civil nature.” (People v. Superior Court (Cheek) (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 980, 988, 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 760 (Cheek); see Bagration v. Superior Court (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1677, 1685, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 292 (Bagration) [following Cheek]; see also Leake, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 680, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 767; People v. Hedge (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1477, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 52.) However, the Leake Court of Appeal also concluded that the Legislature enacted the SVPA “as a civil action.” (Leake, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 680, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 767.)
In Leake, the Court of Appeal held that the Civil Discovery Act of 1986 (
However, in correlating a civil action with a special proceeding, the Leake Court of Appeal incorrectly suggested that proceedings under one or more of the civil commitment schemes constituted “civil actions.” (See Bagration, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 1685, fn. 7, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 292 [“special proceedings” include proceedings under LPS Act and
Since 1872, judicial remedies have been divided into two classes: actions and special proceedings. (
Thus, as the Cheek Court of Appeal correctly concluded, “an SVPA commitment proceeding is a special proceeding of a civil nature, because it is neither an action at law nor a suit in equity, but
B. Penal Code Section 1016, Former Subdivision (3)
Defendant, however, argues that even if the SVPA civil commitment proceeding is not a civil action but a special proceeding of a civil nature, the definition of “civil suit” under
“In construing a statute, our task is to determine the Legislature‘s intent and purpose for the enactment. (People v. Tindall (2000) 24 Cal.4th 767, 772, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 533, 14 P.3d 207.) We look first to the plain meaning of the statutory language, giving the words their usual and ordinary meaning. (Ibid.) If there is no ambiguity in the statutory language, its plain meaning controls; we presume the Legislature meant what it said. (Ibid.) `However, if the statutory language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider various extrinsic aids, including the purpose of the statute, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, and the statutory scheme encompassing the statute.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Garcia (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1166, 1172, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 464, 52 P.3d 648.) For reasons that follow, we reject defendant‘s contention that the term “civil suit” under
As noted above, the term “civil action” is by definition not a “special proceeding” (
Although there is little legislative history of the amendment adding the nolo contendere plea to
After our Teitelbaum decision, “[i]t is reported that at the legislative hearings on California Penal Code Section 1016(3), a general dissatisfaction was voiced against
The Legislature‘s subsequent amendment of section 1016 — deleting the limitation with respect to felony cases — supports this understanding of the legislative intent. (Stats.1982, ch. 390, § 3, p. 1725; see ante, 36 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 333, fn. 6, 123 P.3d at p. 608, fn. 6.) “Although an expression of legislative intent in a later enactment is not binding upon a court in its construction of an earlier enacted statute, it is a factor that may be considered. [Citations.]” (Cummins v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 478, 492, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 823, 115 P.3d 98.) In amending
Matters like traffic offenses, corporate fraud, and crime victims’ damages suits are quite distinct from SVPA proceedings, which identify a “`small but extremely dangerous group of sexually violent predators that have diagnosable mental disorders‘” (Hubbart, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1144, fn. 5, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 492, 969 P.2d 584), and are highly critical to the public‘s safety. (But see People v. Vasquez (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1225, 1233, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 610, 25 P.3d 1090 [SVPA commitment and loss or denial of professional license both seek to protect public from felon‘s future harmful conduct].)
As the Attorney General points out, to preclude the use of a nolo contendere plea in a subsequent SVPA proceeding would frustrate the “narrow and important purpose” of the Act, which is “confining and treating mentally disordered individuals who have demonstrated their inability to control specific sexually violent behavior through the commission of similar prior crimes.” (Hubbart, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1164, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 492, 969 P.2d 584.) Delaying this necessary identification and treatment would obviously place the public at significant risk. “The Legislature indicated that to the extent such persons are currently incarcerated and readily identifiable, commitment under the SVPA is warranted immediately upon their release from prison. The Act provides treatment for mental disorders from which they currently suffer and reduces the threat of harm otherwise posed to the public.” (Id. at p. 1144, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 492, 969 P.2d 584, italics added.)
Defendant and the dissent, however, assert that our decision in Cartwright, supra, 16 Cal.3d 762, 129 Cal.Rptr. 462, 548 P.2d 1134, is dispositive of the meaning of “civil suit,” and precludes the use of defendant‘s 1978 conviction in the SVPA proceeding. We disagree.
In Cartwright, chiropractor Adam Cartwright pled no contest to
After reviewing the relevant case law, the Cartwright majority agreed with the trial court that the “reasonable expectations of persons examining the law on the subject” are that a conviction based on a nolo contendere plea cannot be used as a “ground for discipline or other adverse consequences authorized by a statute for convictions generally.” (Cartwright, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 773, 129 Cal.Rptr. 462, 548 P.2d 1134, relying on Caminetti v. Imperial Mut. L. Ins. Co. (1943) 59 Cal.App.2d 476, 139 P.2d 681 [Insurance Commissioner‘s conservatorship]; In re Hallinan (1954) 43 Cal.2d 243, 272 P.2d 768 [State Bar discipline]; Kirby v. Alcoholic Bev. etc. App. Bd. (1969) 3 Cal.App.3d 209, 83 Cal.Rptr. 89 (Kirby) [revocation of liquor license].) The “settled nature of the California rule against collateral use of convictions based on nolo contendere pleas is an important reason for permitting the rule to remain in effect unless and until changed by legislation. Those who have entered nolo contendere pleas in the past instead of standing trial were entitled to rely upon the limitations announced by California decisions on subsequent uses of their pleas and of the ensuing convictions. [Citation.]” (Cartwright, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 773, 129 Cal.Rptr. 462, 548 P.2d 1134.)
Contrary to defendant‘s and the dissent‘s suggestion, Cartwright is not dispositive of the issue here. It did not rest its holding on
Moreover, Cartwright does not reasonably stand for the broad proposition that a conviction based on a nolo contendere plea cannot be used in any subsequent proceedings. (See Cartwright, supra, 16 Cal.3d at pp. 770-771, 129 Cal.Rptr. 462, 548 P.2d 1134, discussing Kirby, supra, 3 Cal.App.3d 209, 83 Cal.Rptr. 89.) Kirby, on which the Cartwright majority extensively relied, made clear that it was concerned with the effect of a nolo contendere plea in an administrative proceeding in particular. (Kirby, supra, 3 Cal.App.3d at p. 219, 83 Cal.Rptr. 89 [“The collateral effect of a nolo contendere plea in an administrative proceeding is a subject that produces little unanimity of opinion in legal circles“].) Significantly, neither Cartwright nor the cases it relied on involved a sexual psychopathy-type proceeding, which we had already concluded was a special proceeding of a civil nature. (Gross, supra, 42 Cal.2d at p. 820, 270 P.2d 1025.) A fair reading of Cartwright makes clear that the decision at most extended the reach of the bar against using the nolo contendere plea and conviction (see
Defendant also points out that Cartwright emphasized that a “conviction is significant in the statutory scheme only insofar as it is a reliable indicator of actual guilt.” (Cartwright, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 773, 129 Cal.Rptr. 462, 548 P.2d 1134.) A nolo contendere plea‘s reliability as such is “substantially reduced” because of a “defendant‘s reservations about admitting guilt for all purposes,” and the suggested “weakness in the available proof of guilt.” (Ibid.) However, in the SVPA context, a conviction based on a defendant‘s nolo contendere plea does not undermine the determination of a defendant‘s suitability for civil commitment. For instance, requisite convictions alone “shall not be the sole basis for the determination” that a person is an SVP. (
In sum, we conclude that
We reverse the Court of Appeal‘s judgment and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with our opinion.
WE CONCUR: GEORGE, C.J., BAXTER, MORENO and ARDAIZ, JJ.*
Dissenting Opinion by KENNARD, J.
Before it was amended in 1982,
The majority reasons that “civil suit” means the same thing as “civil action,” that the term “civil action” has a technical legal meaning under the Code of Civil Procedure, and that the Legislature intended the term “civil suit” in
If the majority is correct that “civil suit” in
The Cartwright majority stated: “A review of prior California decisions on this question shows that except in one instance convictions based on nolo contendere [no contest] pleas have until now been rejected in California as a basis for discipline or other adverse legal consequences unless a statute expressly specifies such convictions
The Cartwright majority implicitly rejected the arguments in the dissenting opinion authored by Justice Richardson. In vain, the Cartwright dissent urged a construction of
The majority asserts that Cartwright “is not dispositive of the issue here” because it “did not rest its holding on
Of course, this court has the authority to overrule Cartwright, supra, 16 Cal.3d 762, 129 Cal.Rptr. 462, 548 P.2d 1134, and to adopt a different and narrower construction of
As the Cartwright majority explained, “Those who have entered nolo contendere pleas in the past instead of standing trial were entitled to rely upon the limitations announced by California decisions on subsequent uses of their pleas and of the ensuing convictions.” (Cartwright, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 773, 129 Cal.Rptr. 462, 548 P.2d 1134.) The majority here casts aside this important restriction on judicial authority when it applies its new interpretation of
I CONCUR: WERDEGAR, J.