People v. PrudholmePeople v. Prudholme
Justice Corrigan authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, and Evans concurred.
PEOPLE v. PRUDHOLME
S271057
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J.
Assembly Bill No. 1950 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 1950) became effective on January 1, 2021 and reduced the maximum length of probation for most felonies to two years. (See
I. BACKGROUND
In November 2018, defendant Ricky Prudholme and two others were seen loading items from a commercial loading dock into two pickup trucks. As they began to drive off, employees of the business blocked the way. Defendant tried to evade them but hit an obstruction. He got out of his truck and began yelling at the employees, claiming he injured his back and threatening to sue them. Police arrested defendant and his cohorts. The trio had loaded their trucks with over $4,100 worth of electronic equipment, which was
Proceedings were suspended for a time because defense counsel declared a doubt as to defendant‘s competence.2 The court found him competent several months later and reinstated proceedings. The record reflects that defendant was 58 years old at the time of the crime. His only prior offense was a misdemeanor vandalism conviction in 2000. The maximum exposure for a second degree robbery is five years in state prison.3 Pursuant to a negotiated disposition, the robbery charge was dismissed and defendant pled to second degree burglary, a wobbler punishable by a prison term of 16, 24, or 36 months, or up to one year in the county jail.4 The maximum available probationary term was five years. The parties agreed to three years of probation. Conditions required defendant to serve a year in the county jail, which he had already completed; submit to a search of his person and residence; stay away from the victim business; and otherwise obey all laws. Defendant filed a notice of appeal, the bases of which were not set out in the notice.
While that appeal was pending, the Legislature enacted Assembly Bill 1950. (See Stats. 2020, ch. 328, § 2, amending
II. DISCUSSION
A. Probation and Assembly Bill 1950
Following a conviction, the court may release certain offenders on probation. “Probation is generally reserved for convicted criminals whose conditional release into society poses minimal risk to public safety and promotes
The Legislature has declared “that the provision of probation services is an essential element in the administration of criminal justice.” (
Before Assembly Bill 1950 amended section 1203.1, a “court could impose felony probation for a period ‘not exceeding the maximum possible term of the sentence,’ except ‘where the maximum possible term of the sentence [was] five years or less,’ in which case probation could [not] ‘continue for . . . over five years.‘” (People v. Forester (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 447, 451,
According to the bill‘s author, the reduction of the maximum probation term for most offenses was based on research showing “that probation services, such as mental health care and addiction treatment, are most effective during the first 18 months of supervision” and “that providing increased supervision and services earlier reduces an individual‘s likelihood” to reoffend. (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1950 (2019–2020 Reg Sess.) as amended June 10, 2020, p. 4.) Additional research cited by bill proponents suggested “that the maximum time needed to engage probationers in behavior change and reduce the likelihood of reoffending is no more than two years, while also creating incentives for individuals to engage in treatment and services early on.‘” (Id. at p. 5.) The bill‘s author urged that it “creates reasonable and evidence-based limits on probation terms, while lowering costs to taxpayers, allowing for the possible investment of savings in effective measures proven to reduce recidivism and increasing public safety for all Californians. The bill also supports probation officers in completing the duties of their job more effectively, by making their caseloads more manageable.” (Id. at p. 4.) A report of the Assembly Committee on Public Safety also noted that “[i]f the fact that an individual is on probation can increase the likelihood that they will be taken back into custody for a probation violation that does not necessarily involve new criminal conduct, then shortening the period of supervision is a potential avenue to decrease individuals’ involvement in the criminal justice system for minor infractions.” (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1950 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 6, 2020, p. 5.)
B. Assembly Bill 1950 Applies Retroactively to All Nonfinal Cases
Defendant contends Assembly Bill 1950 applies to him retroactively because it went into effect while his case was pending on appeal and, thus, not final. The Attorney General agrees, as do we.
In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 (Estrada) involved just such a case. A new statute reduced the prison term for the defendant‘s offense but made no express statement as to whether that reduction should apply retroactively. Previous Court of Appeal cases had held “the old law should continue to operate as to past acts, so far as punishment is concerned.” (Id. at p. 747.)9 Estrada noted and disapproved those cases. (See Estrada, at p. 748.) It reasoned that the prospective application provision of section 3 “simply embodies the general rule of construction, coming to us from the common law, that when there is nothing to indicate a contrary intent in a statute it will be presumed that the Legislature intended the statute to operate prospectively and not retroactively. That rule of construction, however, is not a straitjacket. Where the Legislature has not set forth in so many words what it intended, the rule of construction should not be followed blindly in complete disregard of factors that may give a clue to the legislative intent. It is to be applied only after, considering all pertinent factors, it is determined that it is impossible to ascertain the legislative intent. In the instant case there are, as
will be pointed out, other factors that indicate the Legislature must have intended that the amendatory statute should operate in all cases not reduced to final judgment at the time of its passage.” (Estrada, at p. 746.)
Estrada explained that in such a situation, the problem “is one of trying to ascertain the legislative intent — did the Legislature intend the old or new [punishment] statute to apply? Had the Legislature expressly stated which statute should apply, its determination, either way, would have been legal and constitutional. It has not done so. We must, therefore, attempt to determine the legislative intent from other factors.” (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 744.) Estrada held that “[w]hen the Legislature amends a statute so as to lessen the punishment it has obviously expressly determined that its former
Estrada involved an amendment that reduced the prison term the defendant was serving. However, as noted, a grant of probation is generally not considered punishment but an act of leniency aimed at reforming the defendant, reducing recidivism, and securing restitution to the victim. The amendment in Estrada reduced his term of incarceration, not a length of probation. As a result, that case is not directly on point. When enacting Assembly Bill 1950, the Legislature did not express an intent with regard to retroactivity, nor did it decrease the punishment for an offense. The question here, then, is the same as in Estrada: Despite its silence regarding retroactive application, does the new statutory language and the history of its enactment by “necessary implication” lead to an “inevitable inference” that the Legislature “must have intended” to reduce the available probationary period “to every case to which it constitutionally could apply“? (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at pp. 744, 745.) We conclude that the Legislature must have so intended.
While placing a defendant on probation itself is deemed an act of clemency, the court may impose various conditions on the probationary grant. These include the imposition of a jail term, the suspension of a further jail or prison sentence, and the payment of a fine or victim restitution. In addition, the court may require the probationer to submit to a search of his home, car, person, electronic devices and social media accounts. Probation conditions may restrict where the defendant can go, with whom he can associate, where he lives and whether he can move or leave the county. He may be required to wear a device that continuously monitors his whereabouts. While probation conditions can serve rehabilitative ends, they can also be invasive and restrictive. Their violation can lead to a return to jail or prison, without the right to a jury trial on the question of the violation or the commission of a new offense. (See People v. Sims (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 943, 959–960 (Sims).)
Although probation is not considered a traditional form of punishment, in light of these restrictions on personal liberty contemplated by the imposition of probation, we conclude the rationale of Estrada applies equally here. Estrada concluded that a reduction of punishment reflected a legislative
As a result, there is adequate support for the conclusion that the Legislature “must have intended” to reduce the available probationary period in “every case to which it constitutionally could apply.” (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 745.) As Sims reasoned, “by limiting the maximum duration a probationer can be subject to such restraint, Assembly Bill No. 1950 has a direct and significant ameliorative benefit for at least some probationers who otherwise would be subject to additional months or years of potentially onerous and intrusive probation conditions.” (Sims, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 959; see People v. Burton (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th Supp. 1, 15–16.)
Because defendant‘s case was still pending on appeal when Assembly Bill 1950‘s amendment went into effect, the new law applies retroactively to him. Estrada involved a conviction after trial. It concerned one simple question: When the Legislature reduced punishment, what did it intend with regard to retroactivity? In answering that question Estrada was not called upon to grapple with legislation reflecting other policy considerations, like the modification of a plea bargain. In the context of a plea agreement, deciding that a statute applies retroactively “does not answer the [separate] question of how that statute should be applied.” (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 700.) We now turn to that inquiry.
C. The Appropriate Remedy
Defendant contends the proper retroactive application of Assembly Bill 1950 to a probationary term bargained for in a plea agreement is to simply
1. Plea Agreements, Section 1192.5, Stamps and Harris
When parties enter a plea bargain, each side negotiates to gain a benefit. The prosecution most often agrees to a term that is less than the defendant‘s maximum exposure, obviating the need for a trial and thus lessening the burden on victims, witnesses and the system itself while providing the certainty of a conviction. As here, the defense often achieves the benefit of counts being dismissed or reduced and gains the protection of a more limited exposure to what would otherwise be the risk of harsher punishment. The court may be actively involved in the negotiations and, in any event, must approve the plea agreement, making it the ultimate arbiter of whether the disposition is fair and appropriate. (See People v. Segura (2008) 44 Cal.4th 921, 929.) “Plea negotiations and agreements are an accepted and integral component of the criminal justice system and essential to the expeditious and fair administration of our courts.’ [Citations.] Plea agreements benefit that system by promoting speed, economy, and the finality of judgments.” (Ibid.)
Section 1192.5 provides, with exceptions not applicable here, that “[u]pon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to an accusatory pleading charging a felony, . . . the plea may specify the punishment ... and may specify the exercise by the court thereafter of other powers legally available to it.” (
which case defendant may withdraw his plea. (See
“The statutory scheme contemplates that a court may initially indicate its approval of an agreement at the time of the plea but that it may, at the time set for the hearing on the application for probation or pronouncement of judgment, withdraw its approval in the light of further consideration of the matter....’ (
Stamps, as here, involved the intersection of this statutory scheme of plea bargaining and the retroactivity rule of Estrada. Stamps, who faced a potential “third strike” sentence of 25 years to life, agreed to a plea bargain imposing a nine-year sentence, which included a mandatory five-year enhancement for a prior conviction of a serious felony. (
The defendant argued his case should be remanded to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion whether to strike the enhancement, potentially reducing his agreed-upon prison term of nine years to four. Stamps noted, however, that “[e]ven when applicable, section 1385 ordinarily does not authorize a trial court to exercise its discretion to strike in contravention of a plea bargain for a specified term.” (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 700.) Stamps reasoned that “it is not enough for defendant to establish that the amended section 1385 applies to him retroactively under Estrada in order to receive the remedy he seeks. In order to justify a remand for the court to consider striking his serious felony enhancement while maintaining the remainder of his bargain, defendant must establish not only that Senate Bill 1393 applies retroactively, but that, in enacting that provision, the Legislature intended to overturn long-standing law that a court cannot unilaterally modify an agreed-upon term by striking portions of it under section 1385. We are not persuaded that the Legislature intended this result.” (Id. at p. 701.)
authority to unilaterally modify a plea agreement. Indeed, none of the legislative history materials mention plea agreements at all.” (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 702Stamps continued: “Senate Bill 1393 was intended to bring a court‘s discretion to strike a five-year serious felony enhancement in line with the court‘s general discretion to strike other enhancements. Thus, the Legislature gave a court the same discretion to strike a serious felony enhancement that it retains to strike any other sentence enhancing provision. Its action did not operate to change well-settled law that a court lacks discretion to modify a plea agreement unless the parties agree to the modification.” (Ibid.)
In this context, Stamps concluded a limited remand was appropriate to allow the defendant “the opportunity to seek the court‘s exercise of its section 1385 discretion.” (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 707.) If the court were inclined to exercise its discretion to strike the enhancement, “such a determination would have consequences to the plea agreement.” (Ibid.) The court may withdraw its prior approval of the plea agreement because “[t]he court‘s exercise of its new discretion to strike the serious felony enhancement, whether considered a new circumstance in the case or simply a reevaluation of the propriety of the bargain itself, would fall within the court‘s broad discretion to withdraw its prior approval of the plea agreement.” (Id. at p. 708.) Further, barring the prosecution‘s agreement to reduce the agreed-upon sentence, ” ‘the prosecutor is entitled to the same remedy as the defendant — withdrawal of assent to the plea agreement.’ ” (Id. at p. 707.) Stamps directed the defendant “should be allowed to make an informed decision whether to seek relief on remand.” (Id. at p. 708.)
2. Assembly Bill 1950‘s Amendment to Section 1203.1 Created A Statutory Ambiguity With Section 1192.5
“If defendant stood convicted of a crime . . . as a result of trial or an open plea of guilty as charged” (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 700), the remedy for retroactive application of Assembly Bill 1950 would be straightforward: The probationary term should be reduced to two years, the maximum period allowed under section 1203.1 as amended. (See People v. Quinn (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 874, 879–885.)
However, the inquiry regarding the proper retroactive application of Assembly Bill 1950 is complicated here by the existence of a plea bargain.
The end result is that the Legislature has enacted two statutes that could bear upon the outcome here.
The language of amended section 1203.1 has created a statutory ambiguity regarding how the law should be applied retroactively to existing plea agreements. Did the Legislature intend such application should be governed by section 1192.5, subdivision (b), which mandates “the court may not proceed as to the plea other than as specified in the plea“? Or did the Legislature intend to exercise its own inherent power to alter plea bargains in cases not yet final?
Generally, a court may not accept an unauthorized plea. ” ‘Where a trial court is asked to approve an illegal plea bargain — illegal because it violates a policy condition established by the Legislature or the people through the initiative process — the proper course of action for the court is clear. It should decline to act in excess of its authority and should refuse to approve an arrangement under which it is called upon to do so.’ ” (People v. John (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 168, 176.) “Faced with . . . an unlawful plea bargain, a trial court should withhold approval of the bargain.” (People v. Ellis (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 334, 342Stamps might seem most appropriate to allow the prosecution to either agree to the new, reduced term or for the parties to negotiate a different, legally authorized disposition in light of the new law. (See Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 705–708.)
66, italics added.) We found such an intent in the context of Proposition 47, concluding the electorate did not intend to allow the prosecution to withdraw from a plea bargain when a defendant successfully sought resentencing under that law‘s new scheme. (See Harris, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 991–993.) The Legislature has subsequently codified our statement in Doe v. Harris that plea agreements are not insulated “from changes in the law that the Legislature has intended to apply to them,” and any provision of a bargain “that requires a defendant to generally waive future benefits of legislative enactments, initiatives, appellate decisions, or other changes in the law that may retroactively apply after the date of the plea is void as against public policy.” (
So the question remains: When it amended
3. The Legislature Intended To Reduce The Probationary Terms in Nonfinal Plea Agreements
“Our fundamental task is to determine the Legislature‘s intent to effectuate the law‘s purpose, giving the statutory language its plain and commonsense meaning. We examine that language, not in isolation, but in the context of the statutory framework as a whole to discern its scope and purpose and to harmonize the various parts of the enactment. [Citation.] ‘If
Initially, we observe that Assembly Bill 1950 did not reduce the punishment for any particular offense or enhancement. Instead, it reduced the maximum allowable probation term for a wide range of offenses. As noted, a legislative analysis of the bill stated, “Proponents of reducing the length of probation terms argue that probation supervision is most beneficial in the early part of a probation term. In addition, advocates argue that increased levels of supervision can lead to increased involvement with the criminal justice system due to the likelihood that minor violations will be detected. The proponents of probation reform further contend that reducing the length of probation terms would enable probation officers to more effectively manage their caseloads by focusing resources on those most at risk of reoffending.” (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1950 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 10, 2020, p. 5.) According to the bill‘s author, a 2018 study “revealed that 20 percent of prison admissions in California are the result of probation violations,” and research showed “that probation services, such as mental health care and addiction treatment, are most effective during the first 18 months of supervision. Research also indicates that providing increased supervision and services earlier reduces an individual‘s likelihood to recidivate.” (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1950, supra, as amended June 10, 2020, p. 5.)
The legislative history of Assembly Bill 1950 reflects a determination by the Legislature that a shorter period of probation would more effectively achieve the rehabilitative goals undergirding probation by concentrating services earlier in the probation cycle when they are predicted to be most effective. Further, according to the bill‘s author, to the extent that “half of those [probation] violations are technical and minor in nature, such as missing a drug rehab appointment or socializing with a friend who has a criminal record” (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1950, supra, as amended June 10, 2020, p. 4), a shorter period of probation would reduce the length of time during which a defendant could violate probation on such technicality. (See Assem. Com. on Public Safety,
The Legislature thus enacted Assembly Bill 1950 to reduce the length of probation across the board in order to increase probationary effectiveness and reduce the likelihood of incarceration for minor probation violations. These goals would seem to apply to all probationary terms regardless of whether they are imposed following conviction at trial, an open plea, or a plea agreement. A reduction in punishment for a particular offense says nothing, directly, about the Legislature‘s intent to modify plea bargains. Yet, the reduction of the authorized probationary period does not speak to punishment precisely, but to the efficiency and efficacy of probation as a rehabilitative device in a variety of circumstances. (See
As the legislative history indicates, opponents of the bill argued “that a case-by-case approach is needed rather than an across the board decrease in the length of probation terms.” (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1950, supra, as amended June 10, 2020, p. 5; see also id., at pp. 7–8.) Similarly, the Attorney General argues “[i]t would be speculative to infer from AB 1950‘s purposes an intent to deprive the trial court of its broad sentencing discretion and statutorily vested authority to withdraw its prior approval of the plea in cases where a shorter probation term does not further the interests of justice or society.” However, the Legislature adopted an across-the-board approach, notwithstanding arguments for a more case-specific consideration. The Legislature has thus signaled its view that, for an eligible defendant, a shorter period of probation generally serves the public‘s interests, regardless of how a conviction was secured.
As defendant argues, employing the Stamps procedure and allowing the prosecution to withdraw from the plea agreement would appear contrary to the purposes underlying the new law as explored in the previous paragraph. Presumably, the prosecution would seek to withdraw from a plea bargain as a result of Assembly Bill 1950 if it views the newly reduced maximum probationary term as insufficient under the particular circumstances of the case. Yet if the bargained-for statutory probation term is now considered insufficient, the People‘s only recourse would be to require a plea to a more serious offense, making Assembly Bill 1950‘s two-year probation limit inapplicable, or to seek a prison term. It seems doubtful the Legislature intended that its ameliorative action would transform plea bargains for probationary terms into dispositions calling for admission of a more serious offense or a state prison sentence, given the legislative history.
Months later, the Legislature amended the statute criminalizing oral copulation. While the act remained a felony if effected by force, consensual oral copulation between nonprisoner adults was decriminalized. Fourteen months after his commitment, Collins was found no longer a danger to others and criminal proceedings were reinstated. The court sentenced him to a prison term of one to 15 years, the term provided under the indeterminate sentencing scheme at the time of his plea. Collins reversed the sentence, reasoning that, under Estrada, his conviction was not yet final and the defendant could not be sentenced for an offense that was no longer a crime.12 (See Collins, supra, 21 Cal.3d at pp. 212–213.)
However, Collins concluded the prosecution was entitled on remand to reinstate the dismissed counts, reasoning: “Critical to plea bargaining is the concept of reciprocal benefits. When either the prosecution or the defendant is deprived of benefits for which it has bargained, corresponding relief will lie from concessions made.” (Collins, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 214.) “The state, in entering a plea bargain, generally contemplates a certain ultimate result; integral to its bargain is the defendant‘s vulnerability to a term of punishment. . . . When a defendant gains total relief from his vulnerability to sentence, the state is substantially deprived of the benefits for which it agreed to enter the bargain.” (Id. at p. 215.)
Collins is distinguishable. Initially, Prudholme, unlike Collins, would not “gain[] total relief from his vulnerability to sentence.” (Collins, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 215.) He was required to serve a county jail sentence and would remain subject to a probationary term, albeit one of shorter duration. But
In sum, we determine that, by enacting Assembly Bill 1950, the Legislature intended that its new limitations on the maximum term of probation in amended
We conclude by noting that determining legislative intent in these circumstances can be a difficult, divisive, and time-consuming one for courts, which have to discern intent from sometimes opaque sources. That process, and the attendant delay and confusion it brings, can be avoided by an express
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified to reduce the length of probation to two years. As modified, the judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.
CORRIGAN, J.
We Concur:
GUERRERO, C. J.
LIU, J.
KRUGER, J.
GROBAN, J.
JENKINS, J.
EVANS, J.
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion People v. Prudholme
Procedural Posture (see XX below)
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted (published)
Review Granted (unpublished) XX NP opn. filed 8/26/21 – 4th Dist., Div. 2
Rehearing Granted
Opinion No. S271057
Date Filed: June 26, 2023
Court: Superior
County: San Bernardino
Judge: Kyle S. Brodie
Counsel:
Erica Gambale, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland and Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorneys General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Steve Oetting and Elizabeth M. Kuchar, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
Erica Gambale
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 2896
Mission Viejo, CA 92690
(949) 293-3486
Elizabeth M. Kuchar
Deputy Attorney General
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800
San Diego, CA 92101
(619) 738-9109