THE
A166001
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR
Filed 3/28/24
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION; (Alameda County Super. Ct. No. 160022B)
Nicholas Beaudreaux, who is now serving an aggregate sentence of 50 years to life for the first degree murder and attempted robbery of Wayne Drummond, has twice unsuccessfully petitioned for resentencing
Beaudreaux appeals again, this time relying on our Supreme Court‘s decision in People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 (Lewis), which clarified the applicable procedural law governing
We will again affirm. We agree with Beaudreaux that, in light of Lewis and Senate Bill 775, the trial court erred at the prima facie stage of these resentencing proceedings by once again failing to appoint counsel, and by relying on substantive facts summarized in this court‘s 2011 opinion affirming his conviction. But those errors were harmless.
The dispositive question here is this. Based on the record of conviction before us—which consists of the jury instructions in Beaudreaux‘s 2009 trial, the jury‘s verdicts, and the findings accompanying the verdicts—must we conclude that Beaudreaux was convicted as Drummond‘s actual killer? We think so. The record here is limited, but it is sufficient to refute conclusively Beaudreaux‘s attempt to allege entitlement to
I. BACKGROUND
The pertinent record of conviction consists of a clerk‘s transcript, the trial court minutes, and the jury instructions and verdicts from the underlying proceedings against Beaudreaux in 2009.2 Supplementing that, we grant Beaudreaux‘s request for judicial notice under
A. Beaudreaux‘s 2009 Trial and Convictions
In December 2008, Beaudreaux and a codefendant, Brandon Crowder, were charged in an information filed by the Alameda County District Attorney with the same two counts: (1) murdering Drummond in violation of
Each count included the same two sentencing enhancement allegations: against Crowder, under
A jury trial followed. In the parlance of criminal trial practice, Crowder “flipped” just as trial began. On the second day of the proceedings, the trial court accepted Crowder‘s change of plea on the murder count from not guilty to no contest to the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter under
The jury was instructed in relevant part on malice murder, felony murder, and attempted robbery, including the instruction that “[t]he defendant has been prosecuted for first degree murder under two theories: (1) The murder was willful, deliberate and premeditated; and (2) Felony murder.” The instruction on malice murder stated: “The defendant is charged in Count 1 with murder in violation of
The felony-murder instruction stated: “The defendant is charged in Count 1 with murder, under a theory of felony murder. [¶] To prove that the defendant
The jury was also instructed that, if it found Beaudreaux guilty of the crimes charged against him, it was to consider the firearm use allegations in accordance with the following guidance: “To prove that the defendant intentionally discharged a firearm, the People must prove that: [¶] 1. The defendant personally discharged a firearm during the commission of that crime; [¶] AND [¶] 2. The defendant intended to discharge the firearm. [¶] If the People have proved both 1 and 2, you must then decide whether the People also have proved that the defendant‘s act caused the death of a person.” (Italics added.)
There was a jury instruction addressing Crowder‘s testimony, which stated as follows: “Before you may consider the testimony of Brandon Crowder as evidence against the defendant regarding the crimes of murder and attempted robbery, you must decide whether Brandon Crowder was an accomplice to those crimes. A person is an accomplice if he or she is subject to prosecution for the identical crime charged against the defendant. Someone is subject to prosecution if he or she personally committed the crime or if: [¶] 1. He or she knew of the criminal purpose of the person who committed the crime; [¶] AND [¶] 2. He or she intended to, and did in fact, aid, facilitate, promote, encourage, or instigate the commission of the crime.” The instruction further stated that if the jury decides a witness is an accomplice, it could not convict based on his or her testimony alone and should view with caution any incriminating testimony by the accomplice.
In July 2009, the jury found Beaudreaux guilty of the first degree murder and attempted robbery of Drummond, and found the sentencing enhancement allegations against him to be true. The jury did not indicate whether it based its first degree murder verdict on a theory of malice murder or felony murder. But it did specifically find that he “personally and intentionally discharge[d] a firearm and caused great bodily injury and death to WAYNE DRUMMOND.”
The trial court sentenced Beaudreaux to a total state prison term of 50 years to life, consisting of 25 years to life for first degree murder and 25 years to life under
B. Beaudreaux‘s First and Second Resentencing Petitions
After Senate Bill 1437 went into effect on January 1, 2019 (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708 (Strong)), Beaudreaux, representing himself, filed a petition for resentencing and checked a box requesting appointment of counsel. Without appointing counsel or seeking further briefing, and based on the facts of the crime as recounted in Beaudreaux I, the trial court denied his petition for failure to set forth a prima facie case for relief. This court affirmed that denial by unpublished opinion in Beaudreaux II.
Eighteen months later, Beaudreaux, still representing himself, again petitioned for resentencing under
“The instant petition appears to be similar to defendant‘s prior petition. Notwithstanding defendant‘s actual reliance on Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th 952 and apparent reliance on Senate Bill 775 . . ., neither authority appears to contemplate, let alone permit, giving defendants such as Beaudreaux a second or subsequent opportunity to litigate a claim that was decided against them and that decision is final. Put another way, Beaudreaux does not appear to be entitled to a second bite of the apple. [¶] For all these reasons, the [section 1172.6] petition filed on 14 March 2022 is DENIED.”
Beaudreaux timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. The Senate Bill 1437 Resentencing Scheme
Senate Bill 1437 amended “the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1(f).)
Among the amendments enacted by Senate Bill 1437 was the addition of
Senate Bill 1437 also created a procedure for defendants already convicted of murder under the former law to obtain retroactive resentencing in the trial court. That procedure permits these defendants to petition for resentencing if they could not currently be convicted under the newly amended
In People v. Duchine (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 798 (Duchine), the panel explained the prima facie determination stage of this process as follows: “[T]he time for weighing and balancing and making findings on the ultimate issues arises at the evidentiary hearing stage rather than the prima facie stage, at least where the record is not dispositive on the factual issues. Thus, absent a record of conviction that conclusively establishes that the petitioner engaged in the requisite acts and had the requisite intent, the trial court should not question his evidence. The court may . . . consider the record of conviction at the prima facie stage, but may not evaluate the evidence, make credibility findings adverse to the petitioner, engage in factfinding or exercise discretion. [Citation.] The record should be consulted at the prima facie stage only to determine ‘readily ascertainable facts,’ such as the crime of conviction and findings on enhancements.” (Id. at p. 815.)
B. Refinement of the Section 1172.6 Procedural Framework
Beaudreaux‘s first resentencing petition was denied by the trial court in January 2020, and we affirmed the denial order in Beaudreaux II. In affirming, we rejected contentions from Beaudreaux that, at the prima facie stage of the proceedings, the trial court erred by relying on facts stated in Beaudreaux I and by failing to hold a hearing before summarily denying relief. The California Supreme Court granted Beaudreaux‘s petition for review, and ordered the appeal held in abeyance pending decision in Lewis. In July 2021, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Lewis, and in
Beaudreaux is correct that, at least potentially, changes in the applicable law since the denial of his first resentencing petition could have some bearing on this appeal. Lewis focused specifically on the prima facie stage of the
Lewis further held, consistent with the consensus view among the courts of appeal at the time, exemplified by Duchine, that “[t]he record of conviction will necessarily inform the trial court‘s prima facie inquiry under [section 1172.6], allowing the court to distinguish petitions with potential merit from those that are clearly meritless. This is consistent with the statute‘s overall purpose: to ensure that murder culpability is commensurate with a person‘s actions, while also ensuring that clearly meritless petitions can be efficiently addressed as part of a single-step prima facie review process.” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) Expounding on this point, the Lewis court addressed how to deal with facts stated in prior court of appeal opinions. It stated that “[a]ppellate opinions . . . are generally considered to be part of the record of conviction,” but that “the probative value of an appellate opinion is case specific, and ‘it is certainly correct that an appellate opinion might not supply all answers.‘” (Id. at p. 972.)
Shortly after Lewis was decided, the Legislature passed, and the Governor signed, Senate Bill 775. Among Senate Bill 775‘s many revisions to
C. Contentions of the Parties
Arguing for reversal in this case, Beaudreaux asserts three errors. First, relying on People v. Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942 (Farfan), he argues the trial court erroneously treated his resentencing petition as a procedurally barred “successive petition.” Second, relying on Lewis and Senate Bill 775, he claims the trial court erred by ignoring his request for appointment of counsel and not allowing him to present briefing before entering an order of summary dismissal at the prima facie stage of the proceeding. Third, relying on Senate Bill 775, which prohibits the use of appellate factual recitals unless used for procedural background, he claims the trial court erroneously relied on substantive facts recited in Beaudreaux I.
Taking a slightly different tack to the prima facie insufficiency of Beaudreaux‘s resentencing petition than the trial court did, the People advance three contentions of their own. First, under the doctrine of issue preclusion, they claim Beaudreaux is bound by the 2009 jury findings that he personally used a firearm and inflicted great bodily harm, causing Drummond‘s death. Second, under the doctrine of law of the case, they claim Beaudreaux is bound by our 2020 affirmance of his first resentencing petition in Beaudreaux II. Third, whether or not Beaudreaux is procedurally barred, they claim any procedural error here was harmless because the record of conviction conclusively demonstrates he was Drummond‘s actual killer.
In evaluating these competing contentions, our standard of review is de novo. We independently review the denial of a resentencing petition at the prima facie stage, whether the denial is based on the issue preclusion doctrine (Cheveldave v. Tri Palms Unified Owners Assn. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1202, 1218–1219), the law of the case doctrine ( Leider v. Lewis (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1121, 1125, 1127), or, more generally, failure by the petitioner to make a prima facie showing under
D. Analysis
We need not address the People‘s law of the case argument because we conclude their issue preclusion argument is correct, which fully resolves the appeal on harmless error grounds. We ” ‘review the [trial court‘s] ruling, not the court‘s reasoning, and, if the ruling was correct on any ground, we affirm.’ ” (People v. Chism (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1266, 1295, fn. 12.) Here, while we agree with Beaudreaux that the trial court erred by failing to appoint counsel and by relying on substantive facts stated in Beaudreaux I, these procedural errors are statutory only, and thus, are governed by the usual harmless error for non-constitutional error. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 972–974; see People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)
Applying the Watson harmless error standard, we ask whether it is reasonably probable that Beaudreaux‘s petition would have survived summary dismissal if these procedural errors had not occurred. We think not. Beaudreaux is bound under the doctrine of issue preclusion by the jury findings that he personally and intentionally fired a weapon in the course of an attempted robbery that caused the death of Drummond. As we read those findings, the jury necessarily found Beaudreaux to be the actual killer. And because the record of conviction irrefutably defeats his allegation that he could not have been convicted of murder under current law, the court‘s procedural errors in failing to appoint counsel and relying on substantive facts recited in Beaudreaux I are harmless.
1. Issue Preclusion
” ‘In general, whether a prior finding will be given conclusive effect in a later proceeding is governed by the doctrine of issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel.’ [Citation.] ‘The doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, is firmly embedded in both federal and California common law. It is grounded on the premise that “once an issue has been resolved in a prior proceeding, there is no further factfinding function to be performed.” [Citation.] “Collateral estoppel . . . has the dual purpose of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue with the same party or his privy and of promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation.” ’ ” ( People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 451 (Curiel).)
” ‘As traditionally understood and applied, issue preclusion bars relitigation of issues earlier decided “only if several threshold requirements are fulfilled. First, the issue sought to be precluded from relitigation must be identical to that decided in a former proceeding.” ’ ” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 451.) The identical issue requirement “addresses whether ‘identical factual allegations’ are at stake in the two proceedings.” (Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 342, italics added.) ” ‘[I]n determining whether the identity [of issues] requirement is satisfied, courts must be mindful of the need to distinguish “issues” from “legal theories.” ’ ” (Ayala v. Dawson (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1319, 1327.)4
” ‘Second, this issue must have been actually litigated in the former proceeding. Third, it must have been necessarily decided in the former proceeding. Fourth, the decision in the former proceeding must be final and on the merits. Finally, the party against whom preclusion is sought must be the same as, or in privity with, the party to the former proceeding.’ [Citation.] ‘The party asserting collateral estoppel bears the burden of establishing these requirements.’ ” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 451–452; see Lucido v. Superior Court, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 341.) And ” ‘[i]n considering whether these [five] criteria have been met, courts look carefully at the entire record from the prior proceeding, including the pleadings, the evidence, the jury instructions, and any special jury findings or verdicts.’ ” (Curiel, at p. 452.)
Beaudreaux makes no real effort to convince us that some or all of the threshold requirements for application of issue preclusion are missing here. That seems understandable. The evidentiary record of the trial is not before us, but we have the legal framework that governed the trial in the form of the jury instructions and the adjudicated results of the trial in the form of the jury‘s verdicts and findings. Having considered the defense Beaudreaux offered, weighed the evidence, and applied the trial court‘s instructions, the jury found that he “personally and intentionally discharge[d] a firearm and caused great bodily injury and death to WAYNE DRUMMOND.”
When we compare the underlying prosecution of Beaudreaux to the
2. The Equitable Exception for Intervening Changes in the Law
Rather than contest the applicability of issue preclusion as a threshold matter, Beaudreaux claims he is entitled to invoke the ” ‘well-settled equitable exception’ ” to issue preclusion for circumstances where there has been some significant change in the law since the factual findings claimed to be binding were made. (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 454, quoting Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 716.)
For this proposition, Beaudreaux relies on Farfan, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th 942. In that case, the trial court summarily denied a first
Putting to one side the analytical muddiness created by the term “successive petition” in this context,5 we read Farfan as a straightforward application of Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 703, which sided with Court of Appeal cases holding that felony-murder special-circumstances findings predating People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks) and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark) are not issue preclusive in later
As the Supreme Court later indicated in Curiel, the test is whether there has been a change so significant that it would result in a different factual finding on the issue claimed to be foreclosed had the law as it exists today governed when the finding was made. (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 458.) Beaudreaux points to no change in the law specific to the findings that he was armed, discharged his gun, and not only caused great bodily injury to another person, but the death of that person. Instead, he argues more generally that, “under the felony murder concepts in place when appellant was tried prior to the changes to
We see two problems with this line of argument. First, Curiel squarely rejects the contention that
Second, even assuming hypothetically that Beaudreaux could produce evidence of the accidental discharge and self-inflicted wound scenarios he posits might have occurred here, the law of felony murder has not changed in a manner that would lead to a different result on those supposed facts, even if changes in the law of murder generally could be a driving consideration. We still have the longstanding rule that a defendant is guilty of felony murder if, while intending to commit a qualifying felony, he personally performs an act that causes death, regardless of whether the fatal act was
In People v. Coefield (1951) 37 Cal.2d 865, for example, a robber struck a store clerk in the head with his pistol to “knock[] him out,” but the gun discharged, killing the man. (Id. at pp. 867–868.) The Supreme Court held that
3. The “Actual Killer” Element of Section 189, Subdivision (e)
Even where the threshold requirements for issue preclusion are met (as they are here), and even where we conclude the equitable exception to issue preclusion does not apply (which is what we have concluded), that does not end our inquiry into the sufficiency of Beaudreaux‘s resentencing petition for purpose of
Here, citing People v. Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588 (Offley), Beaudreaux‘s first line of argument is that the limited record of conviction before us cannot support a valid conviction of murder because of the possibility the jury found that a third person (i.e., Crowder) shot Drummond and decided to convict Beaudreaux without making the necessary finding of malice aforethought on his part. In Offley, the defendant was convicted as a conspirator to a gang murder under a natural and probable
We doubt neither the soundness of the Offley court‘s reasoning nor Beaudreaux‘s legal premise in relying on it. (See In re Ferrell (2023) 14 Cal.5th 593, 604–608) [granting habeas corpus relief, citing Offley favorably, and holding that a jury‘s
Beaudreaux‘s case turns instead on whether he could be validly convicted of robbery felony murder today under
Employing similar logic, the court in People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 16–20 (Lopez) reversed a
Against this evidentiary backdrop, the court instructed the jury on the legal concept of proximate causation as follows: ” ‘An act causes death if the death is the direct, natural, and probable consequence of the act and the death would not have happened without the act. A natural and probable consequence is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes.’ ” (Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 16.) The jury found the defendant guilty as charged (id. at p. 10), and many years later he filed a
Under the jury instructions in Beaudreaux‘s case, by contrast, causation was an element the jury had to find in order to convict him of murder—and it did so find—but there was no amplifying instruction permitting it to conclude that the instructional phrase “caused the death of another person” meant anything more than that Beaudreaux shot Drummond to death, in accord with the plain meaning of those words. Courts have a sua sponte duty to instruct on proximate causation, which of course has a specialized legal meaning. (People v. Bernhardt (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 567, 591; Judicial Council of Cal., Crim. Jury Instns. (2012) Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 240.) But this sua sponte duty kicks in only where the evidence justifies giving such an instruction. Here, we must assume the court understood its instructional obligations and saw no evidence to instruct on the legal meaning of causation.
The possibility the accomplice witness instruction may have been misread in this manner strikes us as highly improbable. By its terms, the instruction cannot reasonably be read to invite the jury to consider whether Crowder shot Drummond. Quite to the contrary, the whole point of the instruction—which is reflected in its title, “Accomplice Testimony Must be Corroborated: Dispute Whether Witness Is Accomplice” (italics added)—was to focus the jury on Crowder‘s possible liability as an aider and abettor, not on the possibility that he personally was a triggerman. After taking the entirety of the record of conviction into account, the dispositive consideration for us is that, while Crowder was charged as a codefendant with murder, he was never charged with discharging a gun or inflicting great bodily injury on Drummond. Only one of two originally named defendants was charged, convicted, and found to be the fatal shooter in this case, and that defendant was Beaudreaux.
Accordingly, reading all the charges, the instructions, the verdicts, and the findings as a whole, we see no legal route Beaudreaux‘s jury could have taken to convict him without finding he was Drummond‘s actual killer. As our Fourth District, Division One colleagues stated in affirming the summary denial of resentencing relief for a defendant seeking resentencing relief in similar circumstances: “Without weighing conflicting evidence or making credibility determinations, the record of conviction irrefutably establishes as a matter of law that the jury determined [the defendant] was the actual killer. The [jury‘s] . . . only path to convicting [the defendant] of first degree felony murder with special circumstances and a personal-infliction-of-great-bodily-injury enhancement was based on a finding she actually killed [the victim].” (People v. Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 56.)
We conclude no reasonable juror who found that Beaudreaux personally discharged his gun and caused great bodily injury and death might have
III. DISPOSITION
The order dismissing Beaudreaux‘s second petition for
STREETER, J.
WE CONCUR:
BROWN, P. J.
GOLDMAN, J.
Trial Court: Superior Court of California, County of Alameda
Trial Judge: Hon. Morris D. Jacobson
Counsel:
Janet J. Gray, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Bridget Billeter, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Masha A. Dabiza, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
People v. Beaudreaux – A166001