Leider v. LewisLeider v. Lewis
The Court of Appeal answered these questions in the affirmative, with a dissent on both points. We reverse.
I. BACKGROUND
The original complaint was filed by Robert Culp and Aaron Leider against the City of Los Angeles and the Director of the Los Angeles Zoo, John Lewis (collectively, the City). Plaintiffs alleged the zoo was violating
Leider filed an amended complaint, again seeking injunctive and declaratory relief under
After a bench trial, the court issued injunctions prohibiting the City from using bullhooks or electric shock on zoo elephants, and requiring it to exercise the elephants and rototill their enclosure regularly. It entered declarations to the same effect.5 The City appealed, and a divided Court of Appeal affirmed.
The majority held that (1) law of the case barred the section 3369 defense, and (2) the Legislature had authorized taxpayer actions aimed at enjoining government expenditures that support criminal conduct. The dissent took the view
II. DISCUSSION
Both issues here turn on questions of law, which we review de novo.
A. Law of the Case
” ‘The doctrine of “law of the case” deals with the effect of the first appellate decision on the subsequent retrial or appeal: The decision of an appellate court, stating a rule of law necessary to the decision of the case, conclusively establishes that rule and makes it determinative of the rights of the same parties in any subsequent retrial or appeal in the same case.’ [Citation.]” (Morohoshi v. Pacific Home (2004) 34 Cal.4th 482, 491.) “Generally, the doctrine of law of the case does not extend to points of law which might have been but were not presented and determined in the prior appeal. [Citation.] As an exception to the general rule, the doctrine is . . . held applicable to questions not expressly decided but implicitly decided because they were essential to the decision on the prior appeal.” (Estate of Horman (1971) 5 Cal.3d 62, 73 (Horman).)
The justiciability issue decided in Culp turned on whether
The Yu court rejected the defendants’ reliance on the rule that law of the case does not extend to issues that might have been but were not raised on a prior appeal. It concluded that whether there was a cause of action for abuse of process under Barquis was an issue decided on the first appeal. There the defendants had unsuccessfully tried to distinguish Barquis; in the second appeal they were trying
The majority below was not persuaded by the City‘s reliance on Horman, supra, 5 Cal.3d 62, which involved a petition by the State of California to determine heirship. The state contended the decedent had left no heirs and therefore his estate escheated. A number of citizens of the Soviet Union appeared and presented claims. At trial, the state successfully contested the sufficiency of the claimants’ showings of relationship to the decedent. (Horman, supra, 5 Cal.3d at pp. 68-69.) The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that several trial court rulings had unfairly restricted the claimants’ ability to present evidence. (Estate of Horman (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 796, 805-809.) Shortly before retrial, the state asserted for the first time that four of the claimants had failed to present their claims within the five-year period prescribed by former
“The questions presented and determined on the prior appeal in this case were whether the survivors had established the identity of the decedent and their relationship to him, the admissibility of certain evidence, the discretion of the trial court in denying the motions to reopen and for new trial and the trial court‘s failure to rule on the admissibility of certain evidence. [Citation.] The
Probate Code, section 1026 problem was not raised by either party and was not expressly determined by the court. Neither can it fairly be said that determination of the issue was essential to the decision. We have concluded, therefore, that the decision on the prior appeal did not foreclose the state from asserting this matter at the second trial.” (Horman, supra, 5 Cal.3d at pp. 73-74.)
Here, the majority distinguished Horman on the basis that “the new issue raised there was a procedural bar, while the earlier proceedings focused solely on the merits.” According to the majority, the City‘s new argument that section 3369 barred plaintiff‘s taxpayer action “bore an analytically substantive relationship” to the question of whether the claims in Culp were justiciable. But the dissent by Justice Bigelow, who authored Culp, concluded that “[o]ur first decision did not state a rule of law necessary to the decision of the case that we may apply in this subsequent appeal to resolve the section 3369 issue.” The dissent conceded that this case “shares some similarities with Yu,” but found Horman persuasive. “[W]hether construed as a procedural issue or a substantive one, the ‘five-year period’ problem [in Horman] was a threshold issue that was not raised until after the case was returned to the trial court following the first appeal.”
The dissent reasoned that the Culp opinion “considered only a narrow issue regarding the justiciability of plaintiffs’ claims, and concluded there were triable issues of material fact related to alleged illegal expenditures in connection with
Therefore, this case is governed by the general rule that law of the case does not apply to arguments that might have been but were not presented and resolved on an earlier appeal. (Horman, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 73; 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Appeal, § 476, pp. 534-535.) As will be seen, whether section 3369 restricts the injunctive relief available in taxpayer actions is a question that raises complex issues of statutory interpretation. It is a stretch too far to infer that the Court of Appeal necessarily resolved these technical points of law when it considered whether the original complaint presented issues of public policy inappropriate for judicial resolution. The statements in Yu regarding continual reinvention of legal arguments were conditioned on the premise that the issue at hand had been implicitly determined on the prior appeal. (Yu, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at pp. 311- 312.) Although as Witkin observes, whether an issue was implicitly decided can be “[a] most perplexing problem,” this is not such a case. (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Appeal, § 476, p. 534.) The Culp court fully resolved the justiciability issue before it without having to consider whether section 3369‘s limitation on equitable relief would apply in plaintiffs’ taxpayer action.
B. The Bar Against Equitable Relief for Violations of Penal Law
As enacted in 1872, section 3369 stated: “Neither specific nor preventive relief can be granted to enforce a penalty or forfeiture in any case, nor to enforce a
A central rationale for the rule embodied in section 3369 was set out in People v. Lim (1941) 18 Cal.2d 872 (Lim), which “articulated an important limitation on the scope of the government‘s power to exploit the public nuisance injunction as an adjunct of general legal policy.” (People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1090, 1106.) In Lim, a district attorney sought to enjoin the operation of a gambling establishment as a public nuisance. This court held that the Legislature, not the courts, must define which public nuisances are subject to restraint by injunction. ” ‘Nuisance’ is a term which does not have a fixed content either at common law or at the present time. . . . In a field where the meaning of terms is so vague and uncertain it is a proper function of the legislature to define those breaches of public policy which are to be considered public nuisances within the control of equity.” (Lim, at p. 880.) As particularly relevant here, the Lim court declared:
“Conduct against which injunctions are sought in behalf of the public is frequently criminal in nature. While this alone will not prevent the intervention of equity where a clear case justifying equitable relief is present [citations], it is apparent that the equitable remedy has the collateral effect of depriving a
defendant of the jury trial to which he would be entitled in a criminal prosecution for violating exactly the same standards of public policy. [Citations.] The defendant also loses the protection of the higher burden of proof required in criminal prosecutions and, after imprisonment and fine for violation of the equity injunction, may be subjected under the criminal law to similar punishment for the same acts. For these reasons equity is loath to interfere where the standards of public policy can be enforced by resort to the criminal law, and in the absence of a legislative declaration to that effect, the courts should not broaden the field in which injunctions against criminal activity will be granted. Thus, . . . the basis for an action such as this must be found in our statutes rather than by reference to the common law definitions of public nuisance.” (Lim, supra, 18 Cal.2d at pp. 880-881.)
Lim involved a prosecutor‘s attempt to pursue injunctive relief instead of criminal penalties. However, Lim and section 3369 were applied to a private action in International Etc. Workers v. Landowitz (1942) 20 Cal.2d 418 (Landowitz). In 1933, section 3369 had been amended to read: “Neither specific nor preventive relief can be granted to enforce a penalty or forfeiture in any case, nor to enforce a penal law, except in a case of nuisance or unfair competition.” (Former
“The phrase ‘unfair competition’ when carried beyond its traditional scope in equitable actions . . . does not have a fixed meaning in the absence of statutory definition. Courts of equity, therefore, are loath to enjoin conduct on that ground in the absence of specific authorization therefor. [Citation.] The reasons underlying this rule are similar to those governing courts of equity in the issuance of injunctions against nuisances. We recently held in such a case that where the conduct sought to be enjoined was not within the traditional equitable jurisdiction, it must be brought clearly within the statutory definition of the term ‘nuisance’ and could not be predicated on the vague definitions of that term found in the early criminal law. (People v. Lim, supra, [18 Cal.2d at] p. 880.)
Civil Code, section 3369 , contains no broader a definition of the term ‘unfair competition’ than existed at common law and in itself furnishes no basis for an injunction against the violation of the penal ordinance involved in this case. Where the Legislature has sought to regulate methods of competition by means of injunction, it has specifically described the conduct which is prohibited. It has provided that suchconduct might be enjoined in equity . . . .” (Landowitz, supra, 20 Cal.2d at p. 422.)9
Lim was again followed in Schur, supra, 47 Cal.2d 11, the case most closely on point here. Nathan H. Schur (Schur), a corporation, sued the City of Santa Monica, asserting its status as a taxpayer and claiming that city officials were violating
The Schur court reversed. It explained that the action essentially sought to restrain city officials from committing a crime by issuing gambling licenses in violation of state law. The judgment enjoined the expenditure of city funds on the licenses, and also “declare[d] the games were contrary to the state laws. We believe that judgment cannot stand because the city officials were vested with authority to make the determination and the only method of relief therefrom was by a review of their action without taking independent evidence on the subject; that unless the conduct complained of constitutes a nuisance as declared by the Legislature, equity will not enjoin it even if it constitutes a crime, as the appropriate tribunal for the enforcement of the criminal law is the court in an appropriate criminal proceeding.” (Schur, supra, 47 Cal.2d at p. 17.)
Schur‘s reference to criminal court as the appropriate forum for adjudicating violations of criminal law is significant. (Schur, supra, 47 Cal.2d at p. 17.) “The prosecutor ordinarily has sole discretion to determine whom to charge, what charges to file and pursue, and what punishment to seek. [Citation.] No private citizen, however personally aggrieved, may institute criminal proceedings independently [citation], and the prosecutor‘s own discretion is not subject to judicial control at the behest of persons other than the accused. [Citations.] An individual exercise of prosecutorial discretion is presumed to be ’ “legitimately founded on the complex considerations necessary for the effective and efficient administration of law enforcement.” ’ ” (Dix v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 442, 451; see People v. Eubanks (1996) 14 Cal.4th 580, 588-589.) This fundamental tenet of our criminal justice system supports the Schur
In Schur, a Penal Code statute specifically prohibiting the licensing of illegal games was not a sufficient basis for the issuance of injunctive relief in a taxpayer action. A provision expressly recognizing an equitable remedy was required. Schur established that
The Schur court quoted Lim at length, followed by citations to section 3369 and Landowitz, supra, 20 Cal.2d 418. (Schur, supra, 47 Cal.2d at pp. 18-19.) It then advised the trial court that “[c]aution should be observed therefore upon retrial to avoid violating that rule.” (Id. at p. 19.) The reference is to the rule found in section 3369, Landowitz, and Lim: ” ‘equity is loath to interfere where the standards of public policy can be enforced by resort to the criminal law, and in the absence of a legislative declaration to that effect, the courts should not broaden the field in which injunctions against criminal activity will be granted.’ ” (Schur, at p. 19, quoting Lim, supra, 18 Cal.2d at p. 880.)
Leider argues that Schur‘s discussion of grounds for injunctive relief was merely dictum, and its holding rested on the conclusion that the trial court had improperly exercised independent review of the city‘s licensing decision. The argument fails. Statements responsive to the issues raised on appeal and intended
Neither Leider nor amici curiae refer us to any taxpayer action in which an “illegal expenditure” under
Newly enacted
“Our primary task in interpreting a statute is to determine the Legislature‘s intent, giving effect to the law‘s purpose.” (Tuolumne Jobs & Small Business Alliance v. Superior Court (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1029, 1037.) We begin with the language of the statutes as the most reliable indicator of intent. We construe terms in context, harmonizing the statutes both internally and with each other to the extent possible. (Ibid.) We presume the Legislature was aware of existing judicial decisions directly bearing on the legislation it enacted. (City of San Jose v. Operating Engineers Local Union No. 3 (2010) 49 Cal.4th 597, 606 (City of San Jose).) We do not presume it meant to overthrow long-established principles of law, unless such an intention is clearly expressed or necessarily implied. (Brodie v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1313, 1325 (Brodie).)
When the Legislature moved the unfair competition provisions from
Given this state of the law, the Legislature‘s insertion of “except . . . as otherwise provided by law” into
There is none. To the contrary, the Legislature‘s focus was solely on the unfair competition provisions of section 3369, and even then it contemplated no substantive changes. (See Stop Youth Addiction, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 570.) The
Thus, we conclude the Legislature did not intend to overturn the long-established law governing equitable relief for violations of penal law when it amended
Here, the trial court found that the City and its zoo director had violated Penal Code statutes proscribing animal abuse, but it provided them neither the right to a jury trial nor the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The considerations limiting the reach of equitable intervention stated long ago in Lim, supra, 18 Cal.2d at pages 880-881, were thereby contravened. So were the rules of Landowitz, supra, 20 Cal.2d at page 422, requiring penal provisions for injunctive relief to specify the prohibited conduct, and Schur, supra, 47 Cal.2d at pages 17-19, holding
III. DISPOSITION
We reverse the Court of Appeal‘s judgment, and remand for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.
CORRIGAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.
WERDEGAR, J.
CHIN, J.
LIU, J.
CUÉLLAR, J.
KRUGER, J.
Notes
“(a) Deprivation of food, water, or rest.
“(b) Use of electricity.
“(c) Physical punishment resulting in damage, scarring, or breakage of skin.
“(d) Insertion of any instrument into any bodily orifice.
“(e) Use of martingales.
“(f) Use of block and tackle.” (