DAVID PANICCIA v. SUCCESS VILLAGE APARTMENTS, INC., ET AL.
AC 44322
Appellate Court of Connecticut
Argued May 10—officially released October 11, 2022
Prescott, Suarez and Bishop, Js.
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Syllabus
The plaintiff, P, sought to recover damages from the defendant, S Co., for S Co.‘s breach of the parties’ employment contract in connection with S Co.‘s termination of P‘s employment. P was hired by S Co. in 2012, pursuant to an employment contract for a term of two years, and his contract was renewed in 2013 for an additional term of two years. In October, 2015, S Co. approved and executed a new employment contract with P for an additional term of two years, to begin on January 25, 2016. Although the 2015 contract was dated October 12, 2015, the board of S Co. approved the contract on October 13, 2015, at a special meeting. In December, 2015, S Co. notified P that his employment would be terminated as of January 25, 2016, the date his 2015 contract was to begin. Following a bench trial, the parties executed a joint stipulation providing for an extension of the statutory (
- The trial court properly granted P‘s motion to open and vacate the judgment rendered in the first trial as that court‘s finding that P did not waive his right to object to the untimely decision was not clearly erroneous: P was under no duty to speak or to protest after the court failed to issue a decision by the agreed upon deadline, prejudgment silence alone was not sufficient to support a finding of waiver under
§ 51-183b , as there must have been some other act or conduct that either delayed the start of the deadline, created a duty to protest in the silent party or served as an affirmative act of waiver or consent, and S Co. was unable to identify any such act or conduct by P that supported a finding of waiver; moreover, S Co.‘s attempt to draw a distinction between a party‘s silence after the statutory 120 day deadline had passed and after an agreed upon extension of that deadline had passed was unpersuasive, as the same considerations applied in either situation. - S Co. could not prevail on its claim that the trial court violated the parol evidence rule by relying on the testimony of witnesses rather than the written employment contract in finding that the 2015 contract was executed on October 13, 2015, and was valid and enforceable; because a party may use extrinsic evidence to prove that a purported contract never came into existence, it followed that a party may do so to prove that a contract, in fact, existed, and, because the date on which the contract was approved and executed was not a negotiated term of the contract, the evidence admitted was not used to vary or contradict any terms of the contract.
- S Co. could not prevail on its claim that the trial court improperly awarded prejudgment interest on P‘s award for back pay under the statutory (
§ 37-3a ) provision providing for an award of interest for the wrongful detention of money: S Co. breached the contract for the payment of wages by preventing P from performing fully under the contract, the damages awarded here were ascertainable at the time of S Co.‘s breach pursuant to the terms of the 2015 contract, and, therefore, contrary to S Co.‘s claim, the damages sought were not akin to damages in a personal injury action; moreover, although S Co. emphasized that P was not seeking liquidated damages under the contract and therefore§ 37-3a did not apply, much like liquidated damages, the award for unpaid wages was determined by the terms of the contract governing the amount of P‘s salary, and the court awarded interest on P‘s weekly salary as each payment would have become due under the terms of the 2015 contract if P had been allowed to perform under it.
Argued May 10—officially released October 11, 2022
Procedural History
Action to recover damages for, inter alia, breach of contract, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Fairfield, where the matter was tried to the court, Arnold, J.; judgment for the defendants; thereafter, the court, Arnold, J., granted the plaintiff‘s motion to open and vacate the judgment; subsequently, the matter was withdrawn as to the defendant Tyreke Bird et al.; thereafter, the matter was tried to the court, Jacobs, J.; judgment for the plaintiff; subsequently, the court, Jacobs, J., denied in part the named defendant‘s motion for reargument, and the named defendant appealed to this court; thereafter, the court, Jacobs, J., issued a memorandum of decision on the named defendant‘s motion for reargument, affirming its award of prejudgment interest, and the named defendant filed an amended appeal. Affirmed.
Megan E. Bryson, for the appellant (named defendant).
Richard E. Hayber, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion
On appeal, the defendant claims that Judge Arnold improperly granted the plaintiff‘s motion to open and vacate the 2018 judgment for the defendant. In the alternative, the defendant claims that Judge Jacobs improperly (1) relied on parol evidence rather than the employment contract in finding that the contract was valid and enforceable and (2) awarded the plaintiff prejudgment interest pursuant to
The following facts, as found by Judge Jacobs or that are otherwise undisputed in the record, and procedural history are relevant to the defendant‘s claims. The defendant is a nonprofit residential community association registered with the state of Connecticut. In January, 2012, pursuant to a written employment contract, the defendant, through its board of directors (board), hired the plaintiff as its property manager for a term of two years, beginning on January 25, 2012 (2012 contract). Under the 2012 contract, the plaintiff earned a yearly salary of $85,000 and received health and dental insurance. The contract included a termination provision, which provided: “Employee shall receive sixty ([6]0) days advance written notice of the Employer‘s decision to terminate. Prior to termination, Employee shall receive a written complaint detailing the issue(s) needing attention or correction and will be given a ninety (90) day period to cure, resolve and/or correct such listed issue(s).” In October, 2013, the board executed an option to renew the 2012 contract for an additional term of two years, beginning on January 25, 2014 (2013 renewal).
On October 13, 2015, the board approved and executed a new employment contract with the plaintiff, pursuant to which the plaintiff was hired as the defendant‘s community association manager for a term of two years, beginning on January 25, 2016 (2015 contract). Although the contract was dated October 12, 2015, the court found, on the basis of testimony from members of the board, that the board approved the contract on October 13, 2015, at a special meeting. The 2015 contract provided that the plaintiff would earn a yearly salary of $90,000 with various benefits, including health, dental, and disability insurance.
On December 30, 2015, the defendant notified the plaintiff that his employment would be terminated as of January 25, 2016. In May, 2016, the plaintiff commenced the underlying action against the
The defendant denied the material allegations in the complaint and alleged the following seven special defenses: (1) The plaintiff obtained the 2012 contract by fraud; (2) the plaintiff‘s employment contracts are invalid and/or unenforceable pursuant to statute; (3) the 2013 renewal is invalid and unenforceable because the 2012 contract was obtained by fraud; (4) the board‘s approval of the 2015 contract was invalid; (5) the plaintiff‘s termination was as of right under the employment contracts; (6) the plaintiff was paid for his services through the end of the 2013 renewal, inclusive of benefits; and (7) the plaintiff failed to mitigate his damages.5
As previously stated, the case initially was tried to Judge Arnold. The trial began on July 25, 2017, and was completed on September 25, 2017, when Judge Arnold received the parties’ posttrial briefs.6 On January 16, 2018, the parties filed a joint stipulation providing that they “agree that Judge Arnold will have until March 14, 2018, to issue a ruling.” Judge Arnold issued his memorandum of decision on April 16, 2018, rendering judgment for the defendant on all counts of the complaint. Judge Arnold found that the board approved and signed the 2015 contract during an executive session on October 12, 2015, in violation of
On April 26, 2018, the plaintiff moved to open and vacate the judgment and for a new trial, claiming that the court‘s decision was untimely under The parties submitted posttrial briefs in January, 2020, and Judge Jacobs issued a memorandum of decision on June 16, 2020, rendering judgment for the plaintiff on all counts of his complaint. Although On July 6, 2020, the defendant filed a motion to reargue and a supporting memorandum of law, claiming that the court improperly: (1) relied on witness testimony to alter the execution date of the 2015 contract in violation of the parol evidence rule; (2) determined that the plaintiff‘s failure to obtain a certificate for “association management services” while providing “community association manager” services, as required under On September 24, 2020, the court issued a memorandum of decision denying the motion as to the defen- dant‘s first two claims but granting reargument as to the defendant‘s claim that the court improperly awarded prejudgment interest without statutory citation. Judge Jacobs noted that “[r]eargument shall be scheduled by the court clerk.” On October 13, 2020, the defendant filed the present appeal. On November 27, 2020, the defendant filed a motion for articulation, requesting that Judge Jacobs articulate her factual findings and legal conclusions regarding the applicability of the parol evidence rule with respect to the execution of the 2015 contract. Judge Jacobs denied the motion for articulation on January 19, 2021, and the defendant filed a motion for review of that ruling. On March 17, 2021, this court granted review but denied the relief requested. On December 21, 2021, this court marked over the scheduled argument in the appeal and ordered, sua sponte, the parties to file memoranda on or before January 13, 2022, limited to two issues: “(1) [Whether] the rationale of Gardner v. Falvey, 45 Conn. App. 699, [697 A.2d 711] (1997), requires dismissal of this appeal for lack of a final judgment because the trial court granted reargument, but the motion to reargue had not been decided at the time the appeal was filed [and] (2) [i]f Gardner controls, [whether] this court [should] consider the case en banc and overrule Gardner.” On February 17, 2022, after the parties filed their memoranda, this court ordered, sua sponte, Judge Jacobs to “fully resolve the merits of the defendant‘s July 6, 2020 motion to reargue in light of the court‘s September 25, 2020 order stating: ‘As to the defendant‘s third claim of error, i.e., the court‘s awarding of interest without statutory citation, the defendant‘s request for reargument and for reconsideration is granted.’ ” After hearing reargument on the award of interest on February 28, 2022, Judge Jacobs issued a memorandum of decision resolving the defendant‘s motion to reargue on March 2, 2022. The court declined to alter its award of interest, concluding that the defendant‘s failure to pay the plaintiff his wages as required under the 2015 contract constituted the wrongful detention of money after it became payable under The defendant first claims that the court improperly granted the plaintiff‘s motion to open and vacate judgment. The defendant argues that the court‘s finding that the plaintiff did not waive the right to object to a late decision under We begin with the applicable standard of review. Ordinarily, we review a trial court‘s ruling on a motion to open a judgment for an abuse of discretion. See Acadia Ins. Co. v. O‘Reilly, 138 Conn. App. 413, 417, 53 A.3d 1026 (2012), cert. denied, 308 Conn. 904, 61 A.3d 1097 (2013). “In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, this court must make every reasonable presumption in favor of its action.... The manner in which [this] discretion is exercised will not be disturbed so long as the court could reasonably conclude as it did.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. In the present case, however, the defendant claims that the court improperly failed to find that the plaintiff waived his right to object to the late judgment. “Whether conduct constitutes a waiver is a question of fact.... Our review therefore is limited to whether the judgment is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Foote v. Commissioner of Correction, 125 Conn. App. 296, 302, 8 A.3d 524 (2010). “A finding is clearly erroneous when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Franklin Credit Management Corp. v. Nicholas, 73 Conn. App. 830, 836, 812 A.2d 51 (2002), cert. denied, 262 Conn. 937, 815 A.2d 136 (2003). The following legal principles regarding Accordingly, “an unwarranted delay in the issuance of a judgment does not automatically deprive a court of personal jurisdiction. Even after the expiration of the time period within which a judge has the power to render a valid, binding judgment, a court continues to have jurisdiction over the parties until and unless they object. It is for this reason that a late judgment is merely voidable, and not void. It is for this reason as well that the issues arising under This In the present case, the 120 day deadline under “Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right.... Intention to relinquish [must] appear, but acts and conduct inconsistent with intention [to assert a right] are sufficient.... Thus, [w]aiver does not have to be express, but may consist of acts or conduct from which waiver may be implied.... In other words, waiver may be inferred from the circumstances if it is reasonable to do so.... “[A] waiver is not ordinarily to be inferred from the mere inaction of a party prior to the time the judge files with the clerk his memorandum of decision.... Implications from silence or inaction... might be import some duty or occasion to speak or act, and in order to imply consent that rendition of judgment... might be deferred beyond the limit of time imposed by statute, there must be found to exist some obligation on the part of the [parties] or their counsel either seasonably to admonish the trial judge that the statute must be complied with or, after the [time limit imposed by statute] and before judgment, to interpose objection to its entry thereafter. We find no justification for so far extending the duty of a party or his counsel. The impracticability, if not the impropriety, of the first course is obvious; as to the second, it seems that the most that can reasonably be required is objection seasonably made after the filing of the decision. . . . Therefore, [u]nless some situation develops which in reason requires the party to protest and he does not protest, or unless he consents to the delay either expressly or impliedly, as by agreeing to an additional hearing or by a tardy filing of his brief, no waiver will be spelled out.... “[In cases in which waiver has been found], waiver was not based on silence per se but on some other act or conduct that either delayed the start of the 120 day deadline, created a duty to protest in the silent party or served as an affirmative act of waiver or consent. See, e.g., O.J. Mann Electric Services, Inc. v. Village at Kensington Place Ltd. Partnership, 99 Conn. App. 367, 374-75, 913 A.2d 1107 (2007) (plaintiff failed to object to court issued letter giving alleged erroneous 120 day deadline and plaintiff thereafter submitted brief beyond 120 day deadline he had claimed); Rowe v. Goulet, 89 Conn. App. 836, 845–46, 875 A.2d 564 (2005) (after 120 days but prior to rendition of late judgment plaintiff participated in hearing on damages and failed to object seasonably after late judgment rendered); Franklin Credit Management Corp. v. Nicholas, [supra, 73 Conn. App. 830] (plaintiff failed to object to unsolicited trial brief submitted by defendant) . . . ; Dichello v. Holgrath Corp., [49 Conn. App. 339, 351–52, 715 A.2d 765 (1998)] (after untimely judgment rendered, plaintiff filed motion to open judgment to submit additional evidence and thereafter failed to file seasonable objection to untimely decision); Ippolito v. Ippolito, 28 Conn. App. 745, 749, 612 A.2d 131 (start of 120 day deadline delayed by lack of objection to defendant‘s unsolicited brief), cert. denied, 224 Conn. 905, 615 A.2d 1047 (1992).... “[T]hese observations are consistent with the clear intent of [ In Foote, neither party objected before the habeas court issued its decision denying the habeas petition 200 days after the completion of the trial. Id., 299. Nine days after the judgment had been rendered, however, the petitioner filed a motion to set aside the judgment pursuant to In the present case, Judge Arnold relied on this court‘s decision in Foote in finding that the plaintiff did not waive his right to object to the late decision. The court determined “that the mere silence of the plaintiff upon the expiration of the joint stipulated extension is not fatal to the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed his motion to open and vacate the judgment and motion for new trial ten days after the court filed its memorandum of decision on April 16, 2018, due to the trial court‘s health issues. The memorandum of decision was [filed] beyond the parties’ agreed upon extension date of March 14, 2018.” On appeal, the defendant argues that the plaintiff impliedly waived the right to object to the late decision by remaining silent during the thirty-one days after the expiration of the agreed upon deadline but before the judgment was rendered. The defendant contends that Foote is distinguishable from the present case because the parties in Foote did not expressly waive the provisions of On appeal, this court affirmed the judgment, explaining: “The facts of this case are controlled by Ippolito v. Ippolito, supra, 28 Conn. App. 748-50. Here, as in Ippolito, one of the parties submitted an unsolic- ited brief subsequent to the time the court established for the submission of briefs after the close of evidence. In both cases, the opposing party did not object to the unsolicited brief or seek to strike the brief. Neither of the courts returned the briefs or asked the parties to agree to extend the time in which the decisions were to be rendered. In Ippolito, the failure of the opposing party to file an objection to the unsolicited brief constituted implied consent to extend the period of 120 days from the completion of evidence.... “Here, we note that [the plaintiff] not only failed to object to the filing of the unsolicited brief, but also failed to object when the court had not rendered a decision 120 days after the simultaneous briefs were due, i.e., February 20, 2001. Rather, it appears that [the plaintiff] waited for the court‘s decision. When it received an unfavorable decision, [the plaintiff] filed a motion to set aside the judgment. By failing to raise a seasonable objection to the unsolicited brief or to the passage of 120 days from February 20, 2001, prior to the time the court rendered its judgment, [the plaintiff] by implication waived the time provision of Thus, in Franklin Credit Management Corp., the finding of waiver was not based on the plaintiff‘s failure to object before the late judgment but, rather, on its failure to object to the filing of a supplemental brief, which delayed the start of the 120 day deadline. In the present case, aside from the plaintiff‘s prejudgment silence for thirty-one days after the agreed upon deadline had passed but before judgment was rendered, the defendant is unable to identify any act or conduct by the plaintiff that supports a finding of waiver. See Foote v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 125 Conn. App. 303 (waiver is not based on silence alone “but on some other act or conduct that either delayed the start of the 120 day deadline, created a duty to protest in the silent party or served as an affirmative act of waiver or consent“). The defendant also relies on D‘Amico v. Board of Alderman, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV-98-0144154 (October 16, 2003) (35 Conn. L. Rptr. 627), and McGlinchey v. Stonington, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV-04-0568887-S (June 19, 2006) (41 Conn. L. Rptr. 691). In D‘Amico, the parties agreed to an extension of the 120 day deadline, providing an additional ninety days from March 20, 2002, for the court to render a decision. D‘Amico v. Board of Alderman, supra, 627 n.1. The court, however, did not issue its decision until July 17, 2003, 394 days after the ninety day extension had passed. Id., 627. On August 21, 2003, the defendant moved to open and set aside the judgment as untimely under In McGlinchey v. Stonington, supra, 41 Conn. L. Rptr. 691, the plaintiffs initially provided a “blanket waiver” of the 120 day time limit, but one of the defendants consented to only a 30 day extension until December 26, 2005. On December 21, 2005, the court requested an additional extension of time until February 1, 2006, to issue its decision, and the plaintiffs again agreed to waive the 120 day deadline. Id. On March 30, 2006, the court notified the parties that it was ready to issue its decision and requested a waiver of the 120 day deadline until April 10, 2006. Id. The defendants consented to the request, but the plaintiffs did not respond. Id. On April 13, 2006, during a conference call between the court and the parties, the plaintiffs’ counsel informed the court that he was not able to agree to any further waiver of the deadline. Id. On April 17, 2006, one of the defendants sent a letter to the court discussing the law regarding waivers and urging the court to issue its decision. Id. The court issued its decision on April 19, 2006, and the plaintiffs sent a letter to the court on April 20, 2006, responding to the defendant‘s April 17 letter and objecting to the issuance of a decision. Id. On April 28, 2006, the plaintiffs moved to set aside the judgment as untimely under The court denied the motion. Id., 693. The court first held that the plaintiffs had “provided the court with an unconditional waiver [of the 120 day deadline].... Therefore, the plaintiffs’ initial expressed waiver stands and cannot now be revoked.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 692. Having determined that the plaintiffs had expressly waived the provisions of Notably, both D‘Amico and McGlinchey, neither of which is binding on this court, were decided before this court issued its decision in Foote v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 125 Conn. App. 296, in which this court rejected the reasoning employed by the trial courts in each case. In Foote, this court noted that “it has been stated that consent to a late judgment may be implied... from the silence of the parties until the judgment has been rendered.... On several occasions, however, our Supreme Court has clarified that silence may be implied consent only when Here, the defendant claims that the plaintiff had a duty to speak or to protest during the thirty-one days after the parties’ deadline had passed but before judgment was rendered and, therefore, the plaintiff‘s prejudgment silence alone constituted implied consent to a late judgment. The defendant‘s attempt to draw a distinction between a party‘s silence after the statutory 120 day deadline has passed and a party‘s silence after an agreed upon extension of the deadline has passed is unpersuasive. The same considerations apply in either situation, and we reiterate that prejudgment silence alone is not sufficient to support a finding of waiver under In sum, because the plaintiff in the present case was under no duty to speak or protest after the court failed to issue a decision by the agreed upon deadline, the court‘s finding that the plaintiff did not waive his right to object to the untimely decision was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the court properly granted the motion to open and vacate the judgment. II The defendant next claims that the court, Jacobs, J., violated the parol evidence rule by relying on the testimony of witnesses rather than the written contract in finding that the 2015 contract was executed on October 13, 2015. The defendant argues that the 2015 contract is fully integrated and, therefore, that the court improperly relied on parol evidence to contradict its terms. The plaintiff responds that the date on which the 2015 contract was executed is not a term of the contract subject to the parol evidence rule. We agree with the plaintiff. We begin with the applicable standard of review. “Because the parol evidence rule is not an exclusionary rule of evidence... but a rule of substantive contract law... the [defendant‘s] claim involves a question of law to which we afford plenary review.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Medical Device Solutions, LLC v. Aferzon, 207 Conn. App. 707, 728, 264 A.3d 130, cert. denied, 340 Conn. 911, 264 A.3d 94 (2021). The following legal principles govern our resolution of the defendant‘s claim. “[I]t is well established that the parol evidence rule is... a substantive rule of contract law that bars the use of extrinsic evidence to vary the terms of an otherwise plain and unambiguous contract.... The rule does not prohibit the use of extrinsic evidence for other purposes, however, such as to prove mistake, fraud or misrepresentation in the inducement of the contract.... “The rule also does not prevent a party from using extrinsic evidence to establish the existence of a condition precedent to the formation of a contract.... As [our Supreme Court] explained long ago, [t]he rule... is, that [one] may show that a writing purporting to be a contract never came into existence as a contract, or has ceased to be a contract, and [this] may [be] show[n]... by evidence outside of the writing. This... rule is not an exception to the [parol evidence rule or] an infringement of it.... The practical distinction between the two rules... is that evidence to vary the terms of an agreement in writing is not admissible, but evidence to show that there In the present case, the defendant claimed in its pretrial memorandum that “despite the plaintiff‘s efforts to establish that the 2015 contract was executed by the then board of directors on October 13, 2015, the evidence will bear out that same was executed on October 12, 2015, during an executive session of the board of directors, in violation of... The defendant relies on our Supreme Court‘s decision in Alstom Power, Inc. v. Balcke-Durr, Inc., 269 Conn. 599, 612-13, 849 A.2d 804 (2004), in which the court concluded that the trial court properly determined that extrinsic evidence was inadmissible to vary the effective date of the parties’ agreement. In the present case, however, the effective date of the 2015 contract is not varied or contradicted by the court‘s finding that it was executed on October 13, 2015. Moreover, because the date on which the contract was approved and executed is not a negotiated term of the contract, the evidence admitted in the present case was not used to vary or contradict any terms of the contract. Consequently, the court properly considered parol evidence in determining whether the 2015 contract was valid and enforceable.12 See Zhou v. Zhang, supra, 334 Conn. 622. III Finally, the defendant claims that the court improperly awarded prejudgment interest We begin with the applicable standard of review. “The decision of whether to grant interest under The following additional facts are relevant to the defendant‘s claim. On March 2, 2022, after allowing reargument on its award of prejudgment interest under On appeal, the defendant argues that Section 37-3a provides in relevant part: “[I]nterest at the rate of ten per cent a year, and no more, may be recovered and allowed in civil actions... as damages for the detention of money after it becomes payable....” “Although “In fact, an award of interest under “It is well established that [ “Prejudgment interest pursuant to Thus, a “court‘s determination [as to whether interest should be awarded under In the present case, the plaintiff sought his salary pursuant to the 2015 contract. At its core, his claim is that the defendant unlawfully detained his wages after January 25, 2016, pursuant to the 2015 contract. Thus, the plaintiff sought to recover money that remained unpaid after it was due, and the court found that the defendant‘s breach of the 2015 contract, i.e., preventing the plaintiff from performing under the 2015 contract and refusing to pay the plaintiff‘s salary, constituted the wrongful detention of money under The defendant nevertheless claims that the damages awarded in the present case are akin to damages in a personal injury action. It argues that the plaintiff “seeks damages that will place him in the same position that he would have been in had the contract been performed, which such claims have previously been found not to set forth claims for liquidated damages satisfying the legal prerequisite for the imposition of prejudgment interest....” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In support of its argument, the defendant relies on Foley v. Huntington Co., 42 Conn. App. 712, 742, 682 A.2d 1026, cert. denied, 239 Conn. 931, 683 A.2d 397 (1996), for the proposition that prejudgment interest under In Foley, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant breached a contract for the sale of a nursing home facility. Id., 715–16. A jury returned a plaintiff‘s verdict, awarding him $938,000 on the breach of contract claim, but the trial court reserved for itself whether to award prejudgment interest on the breach of contract damages. Id., 720, 737. In finding that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury‘s award of $938,000, the trial court noted that the “plaintiff provided expert testimony that valued the property at $7 million as of the time for performance of the contract. The price fixed in the contract was $5.25 million. The difference between the two figures was the range for damages.” Id., 722. The trial court determined that the plaintiff was not entitled to prejudgment interest under On appeal, this court first determined that the trial court incorrectly concluded In the present case, the defendant breached the contract for the payment of wages by preventing the plaintiff from performing fully under the contract, and, unlike the damages awarded in Foley, the determination of which required expert testimony regarding the valuation of property, the damages awarded in the present case were ascertainable at the time of the defendant‘s breach pursuant to the terms of the 2015 contract.14 Cf. Whitney v. J.M. Scott Associates, Inc., 164 Conn. App. 420, 438-39, 137 A.3d 866 (2016) (“[T]he damages at issue... are not liquidated damages that fall within the scope of The judgment is affirmed. In this opinion the other judges concurred.