Pace v. Bogalusa City School BoardPace v. Bogalusa City School Board
John W. Waters, Jr. (argued), Ernest L. O‘Bannon, Christopher M. G‘Sell, Bienvenu, Foster, Ryan & O‘Bannon, New Orleans, LA, for Bogalusa City School Bd.
Charles K. Reasonover (argued), Lamothe & Hamilton, New Orleans, LA, for Defendants-Appellees.
Sarah Elaine Harrington, Jessica Dunsay Silver, Tovah R. Calderon, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Civ. Rights Div.-App. Section, Washington, DC, for Intervenor.
Amy Warr, Austin, TX, for State of Texas, Amicus Curiae.
Ellen Bentley Hahn, Advocacy Ctr., Lafayette, LA, Brian Dean East, Advocacy Inc., Austin, TX, for Nat. Ass‘n of Protection & Advocacy Systems, Advocacy Ctr., Advocacy Inc., Am. Ass‘n of People with Disabilities, Bazelon Ctr. for Mental Health Law and Southern Disability Law Ctr., Amici Curiae.
Claudia Center, Lewis Loy Bossing, The Legal Aid Soc., Employment Law Ctr., San Francisco, CA, for Nat. Ass‘n of Protection & Advocacy Systems, Advocacy Ctr., Advocacy Inc., Am. Ass‘n of People with Disabilities, Bazelon Ctr. for Mental Health Law, Southern Disability Law Ctr., Western Law Ctr. for Disability Rights, Disability Rights Educ. and Defense Fund and Legal Aid Soc. Employment Law Ctr., Amici Curiae.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.1
W. EUGENE DAVIS and WIENER, Circuit Judges:
Travis Pace (Pace) appeals the district court‘s dismissal of his claim under the
I. FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND
The factual and procedural background of this case is accurately and succinctly presented in the panel opinion:
In 1994, at the age of fifteen, Travis Pace (Pace) was enrolled at Bogalusa High School. He is developmentally delayed, confined to a wheelchair, and suffers from cerebral palsy and bladder incontinence. In July 1997, Pace‘s mother requested a due process hearing under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq. , as she believed that Pace was denied a “free appropriate public education” (FAPE) due to a lack of handicap accessible facilities at Bogalusa High School and deficiencies in Pace‘s “individualized education programs” (IEPs). The hearing officer found that the Bogalusa City Schools System2 provided Pace with a FAPE in compliance with theIDEA , and the State Level Review Panel (SLRP) affirmed the hearing officer‘s decision.In September 1997, Pace filed a complaint with the Office for Civil Rights of the Department of Education (OCR), alleging violations of
§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (§ 504), 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) , andTitle II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12132 . The OCR and BCSB resolved allegations that the BCSB operated services, programs, and activities that were physically inaccessible to or unusable by individuals with disabilities by entering into a voluntary written agreement under which the BCSB would identify accessibility barriers and the OCR would oversee the development of a compliance plan.In March 1999, Pace filed suit in federal district court, seeking damages and injunctive relief against the BCSB, the Louisiana State Board of Elementary and Secondary Education, the Louisiana Department of Education, and the State of Louisiana, alleging violations of the
IDEA , theADA ,§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act ,42 U.S.C. § 1983 , and various state statutes.3 The district court bifurcated Pace‘sIDEA and non-IDEA claims. In separate orders, it affirmed the SLRP decision by dismissing Pace‘sIDEA claims, then granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment on Pace‘s non-IDEA claims. Pace appeals both decisions.
II. STATE IMMUNITY UNDER THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
We consider first the defendants’ arguments that they are entitled to sovereign immunity from Pace‘s claims under the Eleventh Amendment. At the core of this Eleventh Amendment dispute is the question whether, when Louisiana accepted particular federal funds, it waived the immunity afforded it by the Eleventh Amendment to suits under
A. THE TEXT AND FUNCTION OF THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
We start, as always, with the text. The Eleventh Amendment states:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.5
These forty-three words — adopted in swift response to the Supreme Court‘s holding in Chisholm v. Georgia6 that Article III permitted a state to be sued in federal court7 — protect states from such litigation.8 The protection thus afforded, however, has long since been expanded beyond the plain text of the Amendment. “Though its precise terms bar only federal jurisdiction over suits brought against one State by citizens of another State or foreign state,” the Supreme Court‘s interpretation of the Amendment has “recognized that the Eleventh Amendment accomplished much more.”9 The immunity afforded to states under the Eleventh Amendment “implicates the fundamental constitutional balance between the Federal Government and the States.”10 Therefore, at its core, the Eleventh Amendment serves “as an essential component of our constitutional structure.”11
Nevertheless, Eleventh Amendment immunity is not absolute. A number of different circumstances may lead to a state‘s litigating in federal court absent Eleventh Amendment immunity. We begin with an overview of the Court‘s current framework for assessing when a suit against a state may proceed in federal court.
B. EXCEPTIONS TO ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY
There are two fundamental exceptions to the general rule that bars an action in federal court filed by an individual against a state. First, a state‘s Eleventh Amendment immunity may be abrogated when Congress acts under § 5, the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.12 Second, a state may consent to suit in federal court.13
1. Abrogation under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
Congress can single-handedly strip the states of their Eleventh Amendment immunity and thereby authorize federal court suits by individuals against the states. When Congress does this, it is exercising its power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity. In Reickenbacker v. Foster,14 we examined the Supreme Court‘s cases concerning congressional abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and derived the following test for determining whether a federal statute is a valid exercise of Congress‘s power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment and, consequently, whether the statute abrogates Eleventh Amendment immunity: (1) The statute must contain an unequivocal statement of congressional intent to abrogate; (2) Congress must have identified a history and pattern of unconstitutional action by the states; and (3) the rights and remedies created by the statute must be congruent and proportional to the constitutional violation(s) Congress sought to remedy or prevent.15 If these three requirements are satisfied, states are subject to federal jurisdiction in suits under the statute adopted pursuant to § 5, regardless of any absence of consent.
2. Waiver of Immunity by Consent
Either in the absence of § 5 abrogation or in addition to it, a state always has the prerogative of foregoing its protection from federal court jurisdiction under the Eleventh Amendment.16 A state‘s consent to suit must be both knowing and voluntary. That consent must always be “knowing and voluntary” follows from College Savings Bank, in which the Supreme Court cited Johnson v. Zerbst, to define what constitutes effective waiver.17 Waiver is effective when it is the “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.”18 The first part, “intentional relinquishment,” captures the principle of voluntariness; and the second part, “known right or privilege,” captures the element of knowingness.
When Congress conditions the availability of federal funds on a state‘s waiver of its Eleventh Amendment immunity, we employ a five-prong test derived from the Supreme Court‘s definitive spending power case, South Dakota v. Dole,19 to ascertain the validity of the waiver. In Dole, South Dakota challenged a congressional statute that conditions the states’ receipt of federal highway funds on their adoption of the minimum drinking age of twenty-one. South Dakota argued that the statute exceeded Congress‘s spending power and violated the Twenty-First Amendment.20 The Court rejected this argument, noting that even though Congress is prohibited by the Twenty-First Amendment from directly regulating the distribution of alcoholic beverages, the Spending Clause authorizes it indirectly to entice states to raise their drinking age by dangling the proverbial carrot of federal dollars.21
Dole embodies an expansive interpretation of Congress‘s spending authority. Indirect persuasion is constitutional, reasoned the Court, because the spending power “is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the Constitution.”22 Congress can, therefore, validly use its spending power to legislate conditions on the disbursement of federal funds even though those conditions would be unconstitutional if enacted as direct prohibitions.23 It goes without saying that, because states have the independent power to lay and collect taxes, they retain the ability to avoid the imposition of unwanted federal regulation simply by rejecting federal funds.
Nevertheless, Congress‘s power to effect policy through the exercise of its spending power is not unlimited. Dole announced the restrictions that control such exercise: (1) Federal expenditures must benefit the general welfare; (2) The conditions imposed on the recipients must be unambiguous; (3) The conditions must be reasonably related to the purpose of the expenditure; and (4) No condition may violate any independent constitutional prohibition.24 In addition, the Dole Court recognized a fifth requirement that the condition not be coercive: “[I]n some circumstances the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.‘”25
Thus, Dole makes clear that, as long as its framework is employed, congressional spending programs that are enacted in pursuit of the general welfare and unambiguously condition a state‘s acceptance of federal funds on reasonably related requirements are constitutional unless they are either (1) independently prohibited or (2) coercive. When the condition requires a state to waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity, Dole‘s requirement of an unambiguous statement of the condition and its proscription on coercive inducements serve a dual role because they ensure compliance with College Savings Bank‘s requirement that waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity must be (a) knowing and (b) voluntary.
i. Clear Statement: “Knowing”
In Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman,26 the Court analyzed Congress‘s power to impose conditions on a state‘s receipt of federal funds and pronounced:
There can, of course, be no knowing acceptance if a State is unaware of the conditions or is unable to ascertain what is expected of it. Accordingly, if Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously.... By insisting that Congress speak with a clear voice, we enable the States to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation.27
Thus, we know that this stringent clear-statement rule ensures that when a state foregoes its Eleventh Amendment immunity in exchange for federal funds, it does so “knowingly.”28 In our reading of Pennhurst, the only “knowledge” that the Court is concerned about is a state‘s knowledge that a Spending Clause condition requires waiver of immunity, not a state‘s knowledge that it has immunity that it could assert. At bottom, we conclude that if Congress satisfies the clear-statement rule, the knowledge prong of the Spending Clause waiver analysis is fulfilled.
ii. Non-Coercive: “Voluntary”
If the clear-statement rule is satisfied, a state‘s actual acceptance of clearly conditioned funds is generally voluntary. The only exception to this presumption arises if the spending program itself is deemed “coercive,” for then a state‘s waiver is, by definition, no longer voluntary.
In summary, the Supreme Court has articulated two ways that a state can be subject to an individual‘s suit in federal court, regardless of the Eleventh Amendment. First, Congress may abrogate state immunity. Second, the state may waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity by consent. If waiver results from participation in a Spending Clause program, the program must be a valid exercise of Congress‘s spending power; the waiver condition must satisfy the clear-statement rule (thereby ensuring that the state‘s waiver is “knowing“); and the program must be non-coercive (automatically establishing that the waiver is “voluntary“).
C. WAIVER OF ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY PURSUANT TO CONDITIONAL SPENDING PROGRAMS
Keeping firmly in mind the Court‘s current framework for analyzing when a state may be subject to suit in federal court, we turn to the particular facts and legal contentions of the instant case. The two statutory provisions at issue purport to have conditioned Louisiana‘s receipt of federal funds on its waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity to suits under
A State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal court for a violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, the Age Discrimination Act of 1975, title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, or the provisions of any other Federal statute prohibiting discrimination by recipients of Federal financial assistance.29
Similarly,
Louisiana does not dispute that the first and third prongs of the Dole analysis, i.e., whether the Spending Clause statute at issue was enacted in pursuit of the general welfare, and whether the condition is sufficiently related to the federal interest in the program funded,32 are satisfied here. Consequently, we restrict our consideration to the three remaining prongs of the Dole test. Following prior panels of this court,33 and every circuit (but one) that has made these inquiries, we conclude that the statutes at issue validly conditioned Louisiana‘s receipt of these federal funds on its waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity.34
First, we determine whether the conditions contained in
1. Is the Clear-Statement Rule Satisfied Absent Use of the Words “Waiver” or “Condition“?
In the face of the unequivocal language of
2. Does the Presence of Abrogation Language Preclude a Finding of Waiver?
Louisiana also argues that because
We held in Pederson that, in
Just because particular language may or may not function with equal efficacy under both exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity, does not mean that it fails the clear-statement rule. As we concluded in AT&T, the rule requires only that “the state has been put on notice clearly and unambiguously by the federal statute that the state‘s particular conduct or transaction will subject it to federal court suits brought by individuals.”43 Congress need not declare in the statute whether it is proceeding under abrogation or waiver, or both. For the purpose of the clear-statement rule,
Undaunted, Louisiana still contends that it did not knowingly waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity. Louisiana and the dissent rely on Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Sciences Ctr.,44 which looked to the Supreme Court‘s decision in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett45 to justify departing from the heavy weight of authority supporting waiver based on the clarity of the language in
The lawsuits in Garcia involved disputes that arose between September 1993 and August 1995.48 During that pre-Garrett period, it was universally accepted that the ADA validly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity. Rather than looking at the clear-statement rule and the state‘s acceptance of funds, Garcia analyzed whether a state would have realized — “known” — that it was abandoning its Eleventh Amendment immunity by accepting federal funds during the period of time applicable to the lawsuits at issue there (and here).49 The Garcia court noted that, during the relevant period, “Title II of the ADA was reasonably understood to abrogate [the state‘s] sovereign immunity under Congress‘s Commerce Clause authority.”50 The court also pointed out that the requirements of Title II and
Louisiana and the dissent maintain that we should follow the panel and apply the “logic” of Garcia to the instant case. First, Louisiana contends that, because it “believed” that the
Even though it found that the statutory provisions at issue are unambiguous,54 the panel nevertheless concluded that Louisiana‘s purported waivers of Eleventh Amendment immunity are invalid because they were not knowing. The panel drew support from the holding in Garcia, but its reasoning differed slightly from the Second Circuit‘s. According to the panel opinion, “[b]elieving that [the
The fatal flaw with that syllogism lies in the fact that neither the mandates of the
The dissent nevertheless insists that, during the time that
In addition, the Garcia approach is problematic for a number of reasons, the most fundamental of which is that, by focusing its inquiry on what the state could have believed, the Second Circuit engrafted a subjective-intent element onto the otherwise objective Spending Clause waiver inquiry. In other words, Garcia‘s approach employs the wrong jurisprudential test, because it distorts what is necessary to show knowledge for Spending Clause waivers. Analytically, the “knowledge” question that we ask when we undertake the Spending Clause waiver inquiry is coextensive with the clear-statement rule; for, when a state actually accepts funds that are clearly conditioned on a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity, it is held objectively to “know” that it is accepting all clearly stated conditions. That it might not “know” subjectively whether it had any immunity to waive by agreeing to those conditions is wholly irrelevant.
The dissent asserts that, by focusing on the clear-statement requirement, we have disregarded College Savings Bank‘s “clear declaration” requirement. But College Savings Bank was not a conditional-spending case. There, the Court invalidated “constructive waivers” of Eleventh Amendment immunity “based upon the State‘s mere presence in a field subject to congressional regulation.”59 Such a constructive waiver is a far cry from a state‘s acceptance of federal funds that are explicitly conditioned on its waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity. In fact, the College Savings Bank opinion expressly distinguished conditional-spending waivers of Eleventh Amendment immunity, which it said were “fundamentally different from” illegitimate constructive waivers.60 Nothing in College Savings Bank indicates that, when the clear-statement requirement is met, a state can be said to lack knowledge that by accepting federal funds it waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity.
In sum, Garcia and the dissent would subjugate the bright-line of objective reasoning to the slippery slope of assessing a state‘s subjective belief.61 If, like the panel, we were to follow that approach, we would be getting into the business of looking past the straightforward objective facts, i.e., (1) the clear statement requiring waiver and (2) the state‘s actual, uncoerced acceptance of federal funds, in an attempt to fathom what was in a state‘s “head,” a precarious exercise indeed. The clear-statement rule guards against post hoc questions about intent.
Accordingly, we hold that Louisiana‘s waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity to actions under
3. Can Congress Condition Waiver of Eleventh Amendment Immunity When It Exercises its Spending Power?
Louisiana challenges Congress‘s power under the Spending Clause to condition receipt of federal education funds on a state‘s waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity. This position is frivolous. We have consistently interpreted Supreme Court guidance as permitting such conditional spending programs, as has every other circuit that has squarely addressed the issue.63 We do not change course today.
4. Is Conditioning Acceptance of Federal Funds a Violation of the Unconstitutional-Conditions Doctrine?
Louisiana also attempts to invoke the “unconstitutional-conditions doctrine” to challenge Congress‘s ability to condition the acceptance of federal funds on waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity. In the most general sense, the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine examines the extent to which government benefits may be conditioned or distributed in ways that burden constitutional rights or principles.64 For at least two reasons, Louisiana‘s reliance on the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine is misplaced.
First, as evidenced by the dearth of cases employing it in this context,65 the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine is most meaningful when the government imposes a condition of questionable constitutional character on an individual right. But here, federal and state sovereigns are on opposite sides of the controversy, and the constitutional “right” at issue is structural rather than personal. Consequently, for the reasons announced in the Third Circuit‘s analysis in Koslow v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the doctrine is inapplicable. The Koslow court considered whether the Rehabilitation Act, including
[T]he Supreme Court has not yet applied the “unconstitutional conditions” doctrine to cases between two sovereigns. Unlike private persons, states have the resources to serve their citizens even if the federal government, through economic incentives, encourages a particular result. A state‘s political powers — not the least of which is the power to levy taxes on its citizens — help ensure the federal government does not “coerce” the state through economic “encouragement.” An individual citizen, in contrast, lacks these formidable institutional resources.66
We embrace that reasoning.
Second, the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine, even when applied piecemeal by the Supreme Court, is anchored at least in part in a theory of coercion or compulsion.67 In this context, that concern is subsumed in the non-coercion prong of the Dole test.68 In other words, in the Spending Clause context, any role that the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine might have in cabining Congress‘s authority to give funds in exchange for waiving immunity is already part-and-parcel of the standard Spending Clause analysis. Thus, no independent constitutional bar invalidates Louisiana‘s waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity.
5. Is These Programs Coercive?
In light of Dole, we must determine whether the conditional-spending schemes at issue are unduly coercive. We hold that they are not. A state can prevent suits against a particular agency under
D. ABROGATION OF IMMUNITY
Alternatively, Pace asks this en banc court to rule that Congress — acting under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment — in fact abrogated Louisiana‘s Eleventh Amendment immunity, leaving Louisiana subject to suit on Pace‘s ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and IDEA claims. As we hold that Louisiana waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to the Rehabilitation Act and the IDEA, it is not necessary for us to address Pace‘s contention that Louisiana‘s immunity to suit under those statutes was also abrogated. Neither is it necessary for us to consider whether Title II of the ADA abrogates Eleventh Amendment immunity in this case. First, the Supreme Court, in Tennessee v. Lane,72 held that Title II abrogates sovereign immunity to the extent that it implicates the accessibility of judicial services, but refused to consider its application to other rights, including those considered to be fundamental under the Constitution.73 Because (1) the Supreme Court has never before recognized access to public education74 or freedom from disability discrimination in education75 to be fundamental rights, and (2) it is unnecessary to address Pace‘s Title II claims given that its rights and remedies are identical to and duplicative of those provided in
Second, when ADA claims are directed at architectural barriers, as they are here, the rights and remedies are exactly the same as those provided under the Rehabilitation Act. This circuit, as well as others, has noted that, because the rights and remedies under both statutes are the same, case law interpreting one statute can be applied to the other.76 The implementing regulations for
III. MERITS
We turn now to the merits of Pace‘s arguments that the district court erred in denying relief to him under the
A. IDEA
We agree with and adopt that portion of the panel opinion affirming the district court‘s judgment which in turn affirmed the administrative determination that Pace was not entitled to relief under the
We pause only to emphasize the somewhat unusual nature of a proceeding under the
B. ADA AND SECTION 504
In addition to his IDEA claims, Pace also asserted claims under the
As indicated above, the
The goal of the
Admittedly different from those underlying the
The primary difference between the
With this background, we turn to Pace‘s specific argument that his accessibility claims under the
Congress required in a 1997 amendment to the
Pace presents no argument that the accessibility standards for new construction of school buildings under the
New construction and alterations of public facilities under Title II of the
Pace, as he was required to do by the
The only significant summary judgment evidence Pace presented to the district court on his ADA/504 claims was the report and deposition testimony of Donald MaGinnis, an architectural expert. The point of his testimony is that structural changes to the Bogalusa campus failed to comply with the ADAAG. Although this same standard applied to Pace‘s claim under the
The only argument Pace presents to us on the applicability of the 1997 amendment was presented for the first time in his petition for en banc review. He argued in that petition and argues to the en banc court that the amendment was not triggered because no evidence was presented that “IDEA funds” were used to make the improvements to the Bogalusa campus. Pace relies on the following language in the 1997 amendment to
§ 1404. Acquisition of equipment; construction or alteration of facilities
(a) In general
If the Secretary determines that a program authorized under this chapter would be improved by permitting program funds to be used to acquire appropriate equipment, or to construct new facilities or alter existing facilities, the Secretary is authorized to allow the use of those funds for those purposes.
Neither the amendment nor the existing statute purports to require a plaintiff to prove the use of IDEA funds or any other fact as a predicate to seeking relief under the
In Weber‘s Special Education Law and Litigation Treatise, he rejects this suggestion in his cogent discussion of the interplay between the
Schools covered by Title II and Section 504 owe obligations not only to students with disabilities but to all persons with disabilities whom they serve. In this sense, the laws are more inclusive than the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), whose beneficiaries are children with disabilities who need special education. Nevertheless, by requiring school districts to provide an appropriate education in the least restrictive environment, IDEA overlaps with Section 504 and Title II in terms of the children it covers. Thus, IDEA may require a school district to modify programs or facilities to achieve these ends for an individual student. IDEA funds may be used for removal of architectural barriers or other improvements to accessibility in order to promote appropriate education for children with disabilities. (Footnotes omitted)101 (emphasis added)
Weber further describes a school‘s duty under the
The Hearing Examiner tried this controversy on the premise that the entire IDEA statute, including the 1997 amendment, applied to Pace‘s claims, and no one argued to the contrary.
After three hearings, the Hearing Examiner issued her report finding that Bogalusa High had provided Pace with a FAPE. The Hearing Examiner explicitly found that the ADAAG guidelines applied, meaning that she concluded that Pace‘s accessibility concerns regarding improvements made to the campus triggered the application of the 1997 amendment to
EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge, with whom E. GRADY JOLLY, JERRY E. SMITH, RHESA HAWKINS BARKSDALE, EMILIO M. GARZA and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges, join, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in the court‘s discussion of the merits of Pace‘s claims, but I respectfully dissent from the majority‘s conclusion that the State of Louisiana, by accepting federal education funds from 1996 to 1998 (the period here at issue), validly waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit for violations of
Alexander Hamilton wrote:
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent. This is the general sense and the general practice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every state in the Union.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 487-88 (Clint Rossiter ed., 1961). The Eleventh Amendment protects States from suit in federal court precisely out of the recognition of their continued status as co-sovereigns. Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146, 113 S.Ct. 684, 689, 121 L.Ed.2d 605 (1993). For over one hundred years, the Supreme Court has “extended a State‘s [constitutional] protection from suit to suits brought by the State‘s own citizens.” Idaho v. Coeur d‘Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 267-68, 117 S.Ct. 2028, 2033, 138 L.Ed.2d 438 (1997) (referring to Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890)).
There are two carefully construed exceptions whereby States may become subject to suits by private citizens. Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to
Travis Pace advances both abrogation and waiver theories in support of his claims against Louisiana. The majority agrees with Pace that Louisiana waived its sovereign immunity as a condition of accepting federal funds under
I. WAIVER
As a fundamental constitutional component, “[s]tate sovereign immunity, no less than the right to trial by jury in criminal cases, is constitutionally protected.” Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 682, 119 S.Ct. at 2229. The same test used in evaluating waiver of other fundamental constitutional rights must be employed in the Eleventh Amendment context as well. As the Court held, there is no justification for creating a separate and distinct test for Eleventh Amendment waiver purposes. Thus, “[t]he classic description of an effective waiver of a constitutional right is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Id. (citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis added). According to the sole applicable test, therefore, “waiver must have been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1141, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (emphasis added). Moreover, “courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and ... do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). This circuit, at least until today, adhered to this uniform approach. “Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences[.]” United States v. Newell, 315 F.3d 510, 519 (5th Cir.2002)(quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970)) (emphasis added). A valid waiver requires “actual knowledge of the existence of the right or privilege, full understanding of its meaning, and clear comprehension of the consequences of the waiver.” Id. (quoting Hatfield v. Scott, 306 F.3d 223, 230 (5th Cir.2002)) (emphasis in original).
The test for a State‘s waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity is no different because Congress sought to effect waiver under the Spending Clause. The Supreme Court “has repeatedly characterized... Spending Clause legislation as `much in the nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the [recipients] agree to comply with federally imposed conditions.\‘” Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 186, 122 S.Ct. 2097, 153 L.Ed.2d 230 (2002) (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981)). “Just as a valid contract requires offer and acceptance of its terms, the legitimacy of Congress’ power to legislate under the spending power ... rests on whether the [recipient] voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the contract.” Barnes, 536 U.S. at 186, 122 S.Ct. 2097 (citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis added); see also Pennhurst, 465 U.S. 99, 104 S.Ct. at 907 (the State‘s consent to suit must be “unequivocally expressed“). As a result, the “test for determining whether a State has waived its immunity from federal-court jurisdiction is a stringent one.” Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241, 105 S.Ct. 3142, 3146, 87 L.Ed.2d 171 (1985).
Despite this clear authority, the majority has crafted a novel waiver test for Spending Clause cases. Relying on South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 107 S.Ct. 2793, 97 L.Ed.2d 171 (1987), the majority draws two conclusions: (1) a State‘s waiver is knowing so long as Congress satisfies the “clear statement rule,” and (2) the State‘s waiver is voluntary so long as it is “non-coercive.” Although I agree with the latter conclusion, the former is incorrect.2 College Savings Bank controls the Eleventh Amendment waiver inquiry and demands more than a congressional “clear statement” — it also requires the State to make a “clear declaration” of its intent to waive its immunity. In College Savings Bank, the Supreme Court recognized that for a State “knowingly” to waive its sovereign immunity, not only must Congress make clear its intention to so condition federal funds, but the State must expressly and unequivocally waive its immunity. “There is a fundamental difference between a State‘s expressing unequivocally that it waives its immunity and Congress‘s expressing unequivocally its intention that if the State takes certain action it shall be deemed to have that immunity.” Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 680-81, 119 S.Ct. at 2228. “In the latter situation, the most that can be said with certainty is that the State has been put on notice that Congress intends to subject it to suits brought by individuals.” Id.
Despite the majority‘s assertion to the contrary, College Savings Bank confirms that Dole‘s “clear statement” requirement is only half of the waiver equation. See Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Sci. Ctr. of Brooklyn, 280 F.3d 98, 113-14 (2d Cir.2001) (concluding that “a clear expression of Congress‘s intent ... alone is not sufficient... to find that [the State] actually waived its sovereign immunity by accepting federal funds“). “The whole point of requiring a `clear declaration\’ by the State of its waiver is to be certain that the State in fact consents to suit.” Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 680, 119 S.Ct. at 2228 (emphasis in original). “Whether Congress clearly required that a State waive its immunity before accepting federal funds (the first inquiry) is not the same thing, however, as whether the State clearly declared its knowing waiver (the second inquiry).” Douglas v. Cal. Dep‘t of Youth Auth., 285 F.3d 1226, 1228 (O‘Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en banc)(emphasis in original). “The mere receipt of federal funds cannot establish that a State has consented to suit in federal court.” Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 246-47, 105 S.Ct. 3142.3
For a State to evince its “clear declaration” of intent to waive sovereign immunity, it must possess “actual knowledge of the existence of the right or privilege, full understanding of its meaning, and clear comprehension of the consequences of the waiver.” Newell, 315 F.3d at 519 (citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis in original). In all but the rarest of circumstances, acceptance of federal funds offered in accordance with the “clear statement rule” will meet this test. This case represents an exception to the general rule.
The majority ignores the fact that until the mid-1990‘s, it was assumed that Congress could abrogate state sovereign immunity in legislation enacted pursuant to its
Surely Louisiana should not be penalized for construing the ADA — and counterpart abrogation language in
The majority offers two principal arguments against this result. First, the majority conflates abrogation and waiver when positing that “Louisiana did have Eleventh Amendment immunity to waive by accepting the clearly conditioned federal funds.” See Majority Op., at 285. (emphasis in original). On the contrary, Coolbaugh confirmed, until Garrett and Reickenbacker overruled it, that Congress had validly exercised its abrogation authority, rendering Louisiana amenable to suit notwithstanding the Eleventh Amendment. The majority‘s suggestion that Congress can abrogate sovereign immunity, but still permit the States to retain their Eleventh Amendment immunity, misapprehends the import of abrogation.7
Still, Congress may, in its discretion, choose to trigger enforcement of any federal statute, even after it has abrogated sovereign immunity, on the receipt of federal funds. In response, a State, by refusing federal funds, may reject the terms of the “contract” and potentially avoid statutory liability to private individuals. But whether it can avoid liability based upon a contractual/waiver theory is a different question from whether it retained Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity post-abrogation.8 Thus, the relevant Eleventh Amendment inquiry remains whether Louisiana reasonably believed, based on objective evidence, that the Rehabilitation Act and the IDEA validly abrogated its sovereign immunity — not whether it could have chosen to reject the federal funds anyway.
Second, the majority contends that requiring the State to make a “clear declaration” problematically “engraft[s] a subjective-intent element onto an otherwise objective Spending Clause waiver inquiry.” See Majority Op. at 284. Unfortunately, the majority misunderstands the nature of the “clear declaration” requirement, a requirement consonant with the Supreme Court‘s longstanding objective approach to waiver. The Supreme Court uniformly applies a “totality of the circumstances” test to waiver questions involving fundamental constitutional rights. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 2572, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979). “Only if the totality of the circumstances ... reveal both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the ... rights have been waived.” See Burbine, 475 U.S. at 421, 106 S.Ct. at 1135. Hence, the Supreme Court considers a variety of objective factors, not subjective intent, to determine whether a constitutional right has validly been waived. Fare, 442 U.S. at 725, 99 S.Ct. at 2572; see also United States v. Sonderup, 639 F.2d 294, 298 (5th Cir.1981) (relying on the objective indicia to determine whether a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver was made). College Savings Bank‘s “clear declaration” requirement reiterates the Supreme Court‘s waiver test in the Eleventh Amendment context, and so would I.9
Given this court‘s ruling in Coolbaugh that the State had no immunity to waive, followed by an unsuccessful en banc poll and the Supreme Court‘s denial of certiorari in that case, it is inconceivable that Louisiana somehow, based on the “straightforward objective facts,” knowingly chose to waive a right that was non-existent when it acted. In a sense, the State of Louisiana is being forced, by today‘s majority, to bear the burden of this court‘s mistake of law in Coolbaugh. Consider this analogy: the police instruct a criminal defendant, “for his own good,” to sign a waiver of counsel form, while telling him that the waiver is “meaningless, because you have no counsel rights to waive.” Who would argue that the waiver is knowing, especially if the police showed him a court decision confirming this view? That the dupe is an individual defendant rather than the State does not, per College Savings, make this a different case, nor does the fact that the waiver falls under the Spending Clause rather than some other type of enactment. The majority‘s opinion violates College Savings Bank.
In this rare instance, Louisiana could not have knowingly waived its sovereign immunity in the relevant time period before the Garrett decision. The majority‘s approach strangely counsels States to disregard governing caselaw when Supreme Court doctrine is evolving. Such an argument makes no more sense in this unusual context than it would in any other.
II. ABROGATION
Pace alternatively argues, and this dissent must determine, whether Congress abrogated Louisiana‘s sovereign immunity with respect to claims brought under Title II,
I agree with the majority‘s dicta that suggests Lane is currently of limited application. Moreover, because Lane was written very narrowly, I conclude that this court‘s decision in Reickenbacker remains valid in holding that ADA Title II, apart from the Lane scenario, does not validly abrogate States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Reickenbacker, 274 F.3d at 983. The fate of
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that during a narrow period of time, based on uncertainty in the Supreme Court‘s evolving Eleventh Amendment doctrine, the State of Louisiana did not knowingly waive its Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity when it accepted federal funds under
I respectfully dissent.
Notes
An express written statement of waiver of the right to remain silent or the right to counsel is usually strong proof of the validity of that waiver, but it is not inevitably either necessary or sufficient to establish waiver. The question is not one of form, but rather whether the defendant in fact knowingly and voluntarily waived the rights delineated in the Miranda case.
North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 374, 99 S.Ct. 1755 (1979)
... Any construction of new facilities or alteration of existing facilities under subsection (a) of this section shall comply with the requirements of —
(1) appendix A of part 36 of title 28, Code of Federal Regulations (commonly known as the “Americans with Disabilities Accessibility Guidelines for Buildings and Facilities“); or
(2) appendix A of part 101-19.6 of title 41, Code of Federal Regulations (commonly known as the “Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards“).
(c) Accessibility standards. Design, construction, or alteration of facilities in conformance with the Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards (UFAS) ... or with the Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines for Buildings and Facilities (ADAAG) ... shall be deemed to comply with the requirements of this section with respect to those facilities ...
Section 605 of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, states that any construction of new facilities or alteration of existing facilities with use of program funds shall comply with the requirements of Americans with Disabilities Accessibility Guidelines (Appendix A of Part 36 of Title 28, Code of Federal Regulations) or Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards (Appendix A of Part 101-19.6 of Title 41, Code of Federal Regulations). (R. 63).
(a) Authorization for use of funds
In the case of any program authorized by this chapter, if the Secretary determines that such program will be improved by permitting the funds authorized for such program to be used for the acquisition of equipment and the construction of necessary facilities, the Secretary may authorize the use of such funds for such purposes. (West 1996).
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies under ... the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ... title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ... or other Federal laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities ...