M.A. Ex Rel. E.S. v. State-Operated School District of NewarkM.A. Ex Rel. E.S. v. State-Operated School District of Newark
Case Information
*1 Oрinions of the United 2003 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit 9-16-2003
M.A. v. Newark Pub Sch
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential
Docket No. 02-1799
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PRECEDENTIAL Filed September 16, 2003 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT No. 02-1799 M.A., on behalf of E.S., M.A., A.T. on behalf of G.T., A.T.,
G.L. on behalf A.O., G.L., H.M. on behalf M.M., H.M., O.J. on behalf of O.D.J., O.J., A.E. on behalf of A.J.E.
and A.E., individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, Appellees, v.
STATE-OPERATED SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEWARK; NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION;
VITO A. GAGLIARDI, SR., in his individual capacity; WILLIAM L. LIBRERA, Commissioner, New Jersey Department of Education, in his official capacity; BARBARA GANTWERK, Director, Office of Special Education Programs, New Jersey Department of Education, in her official and individual capacities; MELINDA ZANGRILLO, Coordinator of Compliance, Office of Special Education Programs, New Jersey Department of
Education, in her official and individual capacities, Appellants, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Intervenor in D.C.). On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey District Court Judge: The Honorable Katherine S. Hayden
(01-CV-3389) Argued on October 31, 2002 Before: SLOVITER, FUENTES, Circuit Judges , and FULLAM,* District Judge (Opinion Filed: September 16, 2003) Peter C. Harvey Attorney General of New Jersey Patrick DeAlmeida (argued) Michael Lombardi Todd Schwartz Deputy Attorneys General R.J. Hughes Justice Complex P.O. Box 112 Trenton, NJ 08625 Attorneys for Appellants Ruth Deale Lowenkron (argued) Jennifer Weiser Education Law Center 60 Park Place Suite 300
Newark, NJ 07102 Lawrence Lustberg Shavar D. Jeffries Gibbons, Del Deo, Dolan, Griffinger & Vecchione One Riverfront Plaza Newark, NJ 07102 Attorneys for Appellees * The Honorable John P. Fullam, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
Sarah E. Harrington Kevin Russell (argued) Civil Rights Division United States Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Avenue Washington, DC 20530 Attorneys for Intervenor OPINION OF THE COURT FUENTES, Circuit Judge :
The present appeal is the latest chapter in the longstanding feud between citizens, public interest groups, municipal officials, and state agencies over the provision of public education in the City of Newark. In an earlier chapter, the New Jersey Department of Education (“NJDOE”) determined that the Newark Board of Education had failed to provide a thorough and efficient system of education and invoked its statutory powers [1] to establish the State-Operated School District of the City of Newark (“SOSD” or “Newark”) in July 1995. See generally Gonzalez v. State-Operated School District of the City of Newark , 784 A.2d 101, 102 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
Plaintiffs commenced this action on behalf of six minors attending public schools in Newark and on behalf of all others similarly situated (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), against the SOSD, NJDOE, and several state officials (collectively, “Defendants”). [2] They alleged violations of (a) the Individuals 1. N.J.S.A. §§ 18A:7A-34 to -52.
2. The state officials include Vito A. Gagliardi (“Gagliardi”), formеr Commissioner of the NJDOE; Barbara Gantwerk (“Gantwerk”), Director of the Office of Special Education Programs of the NJDOE; and Melinda Zangrillo (“Zangrillo”), Coordinator of Compliance in the Office of Special Education Programs. On August 19, 2002, the Clerk of Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion to amend the caption to include the current Commissioner of the NJDOE, William Librera and to retain Vito A.
Gagliardi as a defendant in his individual capacity only.
When appropriate, we refer to the NJDOE and the state officials collectively as the “State.”
with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”),
I. BACKGROUND A. The Statutory Frаmework of the IDEA The IDEA is a comprehensive scheme of federal legislation designed to meet the special educational needs of children with disabilities. See Dellmuth v. Muth , 491 U.S.
223, 225 (1989). The legislation was enacted in part based
on Congress’s findings that, prior to 1975,
[4]
“the special
educational needs of children with disabilities were not
being fully met,” and that “more than one-half of the
children with disabilities in the United States did not
receive appropriate educational services that would enable
such children to have full equality of opportunity.”
In light of its findings, Congress made federal funds
available to assist states in providing educational services
to children with disabilities.
See
Under the IDEA, assistance is available on the condition
that states meet a number of substantive and procedural
criteria.
See
4. The IDEA was originally enacted in 1970 as the Eduсation of the
Handicapped Act (“EHA”), Pub. L. No. 91-230, 84 Stat. 175, §§ 601-662,
as amended
5
eligibility for federal funds under the IDEA is the
substantive right of disabled children to a “free appropriate
public education.”
In addition to the condition of ensuring free, appropriate public education, the IDEA requires states to guarantee certain procedural rights in order to qualify for funding.
Many of these procedural mechanisms have been implemented in the laws and regulations of New Jersey. See id. at 492 (“New Jersey fulfills its obligations [under the IDEA] through a complex statutory and regulatory scheme . . . .”). Several of the procedural rights bear upon the Plaintiffs’ allegations here.
First, a state must demоnstrate that it has a system in
place to identify, locate, and evaluate all children with
disabilities residing in the state.
See
This obligation is commonly referred to as the “child find” duty. Matula , 67 F.3d at 492. In New Jersey, if a parent requests an evaluation for his or her child, the request shall immediately be considered a referral to a Child Study Team (“CST”) to determine if the child should be classified as disabled. See N.J.A.C. § 6A:14-3.3(d)(2).
Second, after identifying and evaluating children with
disabilities, a state must develop and implement Individual
Education Programs (“IEP”) for all children classified as
disabled.
See
F.3d at 492 (“The primary mechanism for delivering a free
appropriate education is the development of a detailed
instruction plan, known as an Individual Education
Program . . . .”). Each IEP must take the form of a written
statement setting forth, among other things, the effect of a
child’s disability, measurable goals and benchmarks, the
special educational services to be provided to the child, and
the child’s progress under the IEP.
See
Both the IDEA and, in greater detail, the implementing laws of New Jersey delineate timetables for meeting various IDEA obligations. For instance, if a student is referred for an evaluation, the CST, including the child’s teacher, must convene a meeting with the child’s parents within 20 days.
See N.J.A.C. § 6A:14-3.3(e). A decision based on the evaluation should be made within 15 days of the meeting.
See
N.J.A.C. § 6A:14-2.3(e) and (f). If a child is determined
to be disabled, the CST must convene a meeting to develop
an IEP within 30 days.
See
Third, the IDEA affords parents a number of other
procedural safeguards. Parents have the right to (1)
examine аll records and participate in all meetings with
respect to the identification, evaluation, and educational
placement of their child,
Fourth, the IDEA requires states to provide “an
opportunity to present complaints with respect to any
matter relating to the
identification, evaluation, or
educational placement of the child, or the provision of a
free appropriate public education to such child.”
As the text of the IDEA suggests, state agencies and local educational agencies, or school boards, share the responsibility for complying with the requirements of the Act. Naturally, when decisions concerning the educational services of an individual child are at issue, the duties will tend to shift from those removed from the situation to the local educational agencies with greater access and knowledge. New Jersey’s statutory scheme for implementing the IDEA recognizes these shared duties. See N.J.A.C.
§ 6A:14-3.1(a) and (b) (school districts responsible for the development and review of IEPs, as well as the placement of children with disabilities). Nevertheless, as Plaintiffs allege, the participating state retains primary responsibility for ensuring compliance with the IDEA and for administеring educational programs for disabled children.
See
Because the IDEA offers conditional federal funds for state educational programs with full recognition of the importance of state laws and local educational agencies, courts have described the Act as a model of “cooperative federalism.” Beth V. , 87 F.3d at 82 (citations omitted).
B. Factual Background We turn to the specific factual allegations in the present case. At this point in the litigation, we accept all well- pleaded allegations in the Complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving parties.
Board of Trustees of Teamsters Local 863 Pension Fund v.
Foodtown, Inc.
,
are allegedly disabled children who, despite repeated requests by their parents, never receivеd an evaluation to determine eligibility for special education services, or never benefitted from the implementation of IEPs; and (2) O.D.J.
and A.J.E. were evaluated as disabled children and began receiving special education services, but only after years of neglect by local educational agencies and the state.
E.S. entered Newark’s public schools in September 1997 as a kindergartner. For several years, E.S. either failed or marginally passed most classes, but nevertheless advanced to the next grade level each year. Sometime during the 1999-2000 school year, E.S.’s mother requested help. As instructed by the School Principal, E.S.’s mother asked for an evaluation. Despite three separate follow-up requests, no evaluation was ever scheduled for E.S. School officials told E.S.’s mother that Newark lacked the resources to evaluate every potentially disabled child and that it would be a “wastе of time” to continue sending E.S. to school. Compl.
at ¶ 108.
G.T.’s mother initially requested an evaluation in September 2000, as a result of G.T.’s poor academic performance. School officials never responded. In 2001, a private physician diagnosed G.T. with Attention Deficit Hyperactive Disorder (“ADHD”) and Myasthenia Gravis. Id.
at ¶¶ 112-13. At the time, G.T. was in the third grade at a Newark public school. G.T.’s mother requested evaluations again on two separate occasions. Finally, school officials attempted to schedule an initial meeting to determine whether an evaluation was necessary, but postponed on numerous occasions. Despite G.T.’s diagnosed disabilities, “[a]fter five scheduled meetings to determine whether an evaluation was warranted, Newark has yet to decide whether an evaluation is warranted.” Id. at ¶ 125.
A.O. was diagnosed with Attention Deficit Disorder (“ADD”) and has been taking Ritalin for his ADD since the age of seven. Because of poor academic performance and behavioral problems, A.O. attended three different schools in three years. After numerous requests and three separate diagnoses by private physicians of possible “neuro-based learning disabilities” and ADD, A.O. finally received a CST evaluation on May 23, 2001. Id. at ¶ 133. Although the CST determined that A.O. had a “specific learning disability” and
9
developed an IEP for him, the IEP was never implemented.
Id. at ¶¶ 161-62. “Given the four years during which Defendants failed to address A.O.’s educational needs, [A.O.’s mother] remains extremely skeptical of whether or not Defendants will provide her son with the necessary services in the 2001-2002 school year.” Id. at ¶ 163.
M.M.’s mother first requested an evaluation for her son in March 1999. After that request went unheeded, M.M.’s mother went to a private physician, who diagnosed M.M.
with ADHD and prescribed Ritalin. Because of his hyperactivity and impulsive behavior, the physician recommended that M.M. be placed in a small classroom sеtting. M.M.’s mother again requested an evaluation at the start of the 1999-2000 school year. After several months, school officials merely suggested intervention strategies.
The entire school year passed without an evaluation by the CST. Although an eligibility evaluation finally took place in February 2001, “Newark conducted an incomplete evaluation. Moreover, Defendants have yet to provide M.M.
with special education and related services, and Defendants have not mentioned their obligation to provide M.M. with ‘compensatory education.’ ” Id. at ¶ 187.
The experiences of O.D.J. and A.J.E. differ from those of the first four children in that they were classified as disabled and ultimately began receiving special education services after repeated requests from parents and intervention by their families’ lawyers. However, neither O.D.J. nor A.J.E. have received the compensatory education for the time during which they were deprived оf appropriate education. Both of them failed to receive special education services for approximately two years before school officials implemented their IEPs.
Based on similar anecdotal evidence, Plaintiffs’ attorneys at the Education Law Center (“ELC”) filed a complaint investigation request with the NJDOE on July 24, 1998.
Although some of the parents identified in the complaint had earlier requested due process hearings in accordance 6. From the record it appears that the only child mentioned in the present action who was also named in the July 24, 1998 complaint investigation request is O.D.J. See App. at 84-85.
with the IDEA and state statutes, others had not. The ELC requested a formal investigation into Newark’s failure to identify and evaluate children with potential disabilities in both public and private schools and to conduct disability evaluations in a timely manner. Id. at ¶ 72.
ELC’s complaint resulted in two reports from the office of the NJDOE. The first Cоmplaint Investigation Report was dated December 28, 1998, signed by Director Gantwerk, and transmitted by Zangrillo. Notably, the NJDOE found that Newark had “ ‘failed to develop an efficient procedure to address the inordinately large number of incomplete, noncompliant initial cases.’ ” Id. at ¶ 77. Furthermore, the NJDOE acknowledged that “Newark was engaged in ‘systemic noncompliance with the requirements established in N.J.A.C. 6[A]:28 and N.J.A.C. 6A:14 regarding the identification and evaluation of potentially disabled pupils residing in the city of Newark.’ ” Id. at ¶ 83. The state recommended systemic corrective action. Id.
The NJDOE subsequently issued a Report of Findings on September 6, 2000, based on information gathered during a visit to Newark between May 8 and May 15, 2000. In the September Report, the NJDOE observed that Newark continued to suffer from a lack of and ineffective deployment of staff, which were continuing to impact Newark’s ability to adhere to statutory deadlines. Therefore, the Statе ordered an improvement plan to be implemented as soon as possible.
Despite the assurances in these reports about systemic corrective action and improvement plans, Plaintiffs contend that none of the students named in the July 24, 1998 complaint, and none of the children identified in the present Complaint, received the compensatory education to which they are entitled.
C. Procedural History
On the basis of these allegations, Plaintiffs filed a
Complaint in District Court asserting twelve causes of
action. The first eight allege violations of the IDEA against
all Defendants. The ninth and tenth causes of action assert
violations of Plaintiffs’ civil rights pursuant to
Pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and (b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the NJDOE and the State officials moved to dismiss the Complaint. Defendants advanced numerous grounds for dismissal. First, the State argued that the NJDOE and the named officials were immune from suit under the IDEA pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment.
Second, it contended that Plaintiffs’ IDEA and
Fourth, as to the state law claims, the District Court should abstain from asserting jurisdiction over them because of the State’s sovereign immunity.
7. The Abbott v. Burke mandates were set forth in a line of cases before the Supreme Court of New Jersey. See , e.g. , Abbott ex rel. Abbott v.
Burke
,
2000).
8. Newark also moved to dismiss the Complaint on various grounds. See App. at 6-7. Newark is not a party to this appeal as it did not file a notice of appeal. Nevertheless, it filed a supporting brief urging dismissal of the Complaint on the exhaustion grounds advanced by the state. In an Order dated October 29, 2002, we granted Plaintiffs’ motion to strike Newark’s brief. In any event, Newark’s contentions are addressed in connection with our discussion of the State’s exhaustion arguments.
The District Court denied the motions to dismiss in their entirety. The Court held that Congress validly abrogated the states’ sovereign immunity in enacting the IDEA and that, in any event, New Jersey had waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity by accepting IDEA funds. Second, the Court found the State’s exhaustion arguments unavаiling because Plaintiffs had alleged a widespread systemic breakdown of the provision of free, appropriate public education, a claim which could not be addressed sufficiently in administrative proceedings. Third, the Court entered a preliminary injunction against all Defendants in a separate order, reasoning that immunity was not available to the State and that the State was a proper party to the order. Fourth, having retained the federal claims, the Court exercised its supplemental jurisdiction over the State law claims in the Complaint.
The State’s appeal followed.
II. Jurisdiction
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to
Because the State reasserts nearly the full panoply of
defenses that it argued before the District Court, our
jurisdiction over this appeal requires some clarification. We
first consider whether we hаve jurisdiction over the District
Court’s rulings.
Hamilton County, Ohio , 527 U.S. 198, 204 (1999) (citations omitted). The final judgment rule calls into question several claims made by the State on appeal.
The denial of a motion to dismiss on the grounds of
failure to exhaust administrative remedies is not, by any
definition, a final judgment that ends the litigation on the
merits. The District Court’s decision merely indicates that
a decision on the merits of the IDEA and
that, until now, no court of appeals has been required to deal in a published opinion with a contention that rejection of an exhaustion argument is immediately appealable.” Davis v. Streekstra , 227 F.3d 759, 762 (7th Cir. 2000). In a similar situation, we held that a district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss for failure to submit to an informal dispute resolution procedure was not immediately аppealable. See Harrison v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A. , 111 F.3d 343, 352 (3d Cir. 1997). While we tend to agree with the State that the issue of exhaustion is important, we cannot conclude that the District Court’s decision was conclusive or that the exhaustion issue will be unreviewable on appeal after a decision on the merits. For these reasons, we lack jurisdiction to review the State’s exhaustion arguments at this stage of the litigation.
The District Court’s decision to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the claims under New Jersey state law is
also not final. While we have said that a discretionary
remand that takes place pursuant to
Pursuant to the collateral order doctrine, howеver, we
have jurisdiction to review the state’s claim of Eleventh
Amendment immunity.
See Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer
Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc.
, 506 U.S. 139, 147 (1993)
(“We hold that States and state entities that claim to be
9. The State reasserted the sovereign immunity argument in their motion
to dismiss the
‘arms of the State’ may take advantage of the collateral order doctrine to appeal a district court order denying a claim of Eleventh Amendment immunity.”). Because the protection of the Eleventh Amendment is akin to absolute immunity from suit, rather than an affirmative defense, that protection is lost if the suit is permitted to proceed without an appeal. See id. at 144.
As to the entry of injunctive relief, we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1) over the state’s interlocutory appeal. Therefore, our analysis below is confined to these two aspects of the District Court’s judgment.
Our reviеw of the denial of sovereign immunity is plenary, and we review the entry of injunctive relief for abuse of discretion. See Lavia v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections , 224 F.3d 190, 194 (3d Cir. 2000); Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharmaceuticals Co. , 290 F.3d 578, 586 (3d Cir.
2002).
III. ANALYSIS A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
2002), cert. denied , 123 S. Ct. 1353 (2003), the Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed the fundamental constitutional protections embodied in state sovereignty.
See College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expense Board
, 527 U.S. 666, 669-70 (1999);
Alden v. Maine
,
Louisiana , the Supreme Court held that the Eleventh Amendment also barred a citizen from bringing suit against his own state in federal court, as Plaintiffs seek to do here.
134 U.S. 1 (1890); see also Atascadero State Hospital v.
Scanlon , 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985).
As we observed in MCI Telecommunication Corp. v. Bell Atlantic-Pennsylvania , there are only three narrowly circumscribed exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity: (1) abrogation by Act of Congress, (2) waiver by state consent to suit; and (3) suits against individual state officials for prospective relief to remedy an ongoing violation of federal law. 271 F.3d 491, 503 (3d Cir. 2001), cert.
denied , 123 S. Ct. 340 (2002); see also College Savings Bank , 527 U.S. at 670. Here, the District Court held that Congress had validly abrogated the states’ sovereign immunity in enacting the IDEA and that New Jersey had waived its Eleventh Amendment protection by accepting IDEA funds. We find, however, that the waiver analysis controls the outcome in this case and that, therefore, a lengthy discussion of abrogation is unnecessary. See Douglas v. California Dept. of Youth Authority , 271 F.3d 812, 820 (9th Cir.) (“If we conclude that California waived its sovereign immunity by accepting Federal Rehabilitation Act funds, we need not reach the question whether Congress validly abrogated the states’ sovereign immunity under the Rehabilitation Act.”), amended by 271 F.3d 910 (2001), cert. denied , 536 U.S. 924 (2002); see also Koslow , 302 F.3d at 169 (reserving consideration of abrogation of sovereign immunity under the Rehabilitation Act, while finding that Pennsylvania had waived Amendmеnt protection). [10] its Eleventh
The Supreme Court recently reiterated that a state’s
sovereign immunity is “ ‘a personal privilege which it may
waive at pleasure.’ ”
College Savings Bank
,
U.S. (20 How.) 527, 529 (1858)). A finding of waiver is
appropriate only where the state’s consent is “stated by the
most express
language or by such overwhelming
implications from the text as [will] leave no room for any
other reasonable construction.”
Edelman v. Jordan
, 415
U.S. 651, 673 (1974). Courts are instructed to “ ‘indulge
every reasonable presumption against waiver’ ” of sovereign
immunity.
College Savings Bank
, 527 U.S. 682 (quoting
Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy ex rel. Bogash
,
In recent years, there have been a number of suits
against sovereign states under federal remedial legislation
and, as a result, substantial contributions to Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence.
See
,
e.g.
,
Koslow
, 302 F.3d at
168. Based on the case law, we discern at least two ways
in which a state may consent to suit in federal court and
waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity. First, a state may
make an unambiguous statement that it intends to subject
itself to suit in, for example, state legislation or an
interstate compact.
See
,
e.g.
,
Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri
Bridge Commission
, 359 U.S. 275, 277-82 (1959). The
second scenario—the one relevant to the present appeal—
occurs when Congress bestows a gift or gratuity, to which
the state is not otherwise entitled, with the condition that
the state waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity, and the
state accepts that gift or gratuity.
See MCI
,
To the extent that the State disputes Congress’s authority to exercise its spending authority in a manner that demands a waiver of sovereign immunity, we disagree.
While the applicable test for assessing a state’s waiver of sovereign immunity is unquestionably stringent, the recent cases have also made clear that “ ‘Congress may require a waiver of state sovereign immunity as a condition for receiving federal funds, even though Congress could not order the waiver directly.’ ” Koslow , 302 F.3d at 172 (quoting Jim C. v. United States , 235 F.3d 1079, 1081 (8th Cir. 2000)); see also MCI , 271 F.3d at 505 (“A fair reading of College Savings suggests that Congress may, pursuant to its regulatory power under [Article I of] the Commerce Clause, require a state to waive immunity in order to receive a benefit to which the state is not entitled absent a grant or gift from Congress.”).
Based on this recent jurisprudence, we conclude that
three requirements must be met before a court may
determine that a state has waived its sovereign immunity
by accepting a Congressional gift or gratuity: (1) Congress
must state in clear and unambiguous terms that waiver of
sovereign immunity is a condition of receiving the gift or
gratuity; (2) in accepting the gift or gratuity, states must
exercise that choice knowingly and voluntarily, fully
cognizant of
the consequence—waiver of Eleventh
Amendment immunity; and (3) the federal program
bestowing the gift or gratuity must be a valid exercise of
Congress’s authority.
See College Savings Bank
,
We turn to the specific provisions of the IDEA on which
the District Court and Plaintiffs rely in support of their
contention that New Jersey waived its Eleventh Amendment
immunity. As we noted above, the IDEA provides federal
funds for state education programs in return for meeting a
number of conditions.
There is no dispute in this case that New Jersey has
accepted IDEA
funds. One clear and unmistakable
component of the IDEA is a state’s waiver of Eleventh
Amendment immunity. Section 1403 of the IDEA states: “A
State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment
to the Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal
court for a violation of this chapter.”
See Bradley v. Arkansas Dept. of Education , 189 F.3d 745, 753 (8th Cir. 1999), overruled on other grounds , Jim C. v.
United States
, 235 F.3d 1079 (8th Cir. 2000). Taken
together,
See
id
. Given the unmistakable
loss of Eleventh
Amendment immunity set forth in
Notwithstanding the structural clarity of the IDEA, and
particularly
The State correctly observes that other federal legislation effecting a waiver of the states’ sovereign immunity makes explicit reference to receipt of federal funds. For instance, amendments to the Rehabilitation Act enacted in 1986 contain such language:
A State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal court for a violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [29 U.S.C.A. § 794 ], title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 [20 U.S.C.A. § 1681 et seq. ], the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 [42 U.S.C.A. § 6101 et seq. ], title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d et seq.], or the provisions of any other Federal statute prohibiting discrimination by recipients of Federal financial assistance .
Despite the mention of “Federal financial assistance” in
The absence of any mention of receipt of federal funds does
not change the fact that the language and the structure of
the IDEA condition the receipt of federal funds on a state’s
waiver of sovereign immunity.
See Board of Education of
Oak Park and River Forest High School Dist. No. 200 v. Kelly
E.
, 207 F.3d 931, 935 (7th Cir.) (although
824 (2000). In this case, we see no upside to squinting
myopically at the final phrase of
This is especially true where the operative waiver language
—that which limits Eleventh Amendment immunity—is
almost identical in
Second, the State argues that there is some meaning to
the fact that the heading of
Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co.
, 331 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1947)
(“[M]atters in the text which deviate from those falling
within the general pattern are frequently unreflected in the
headings and titles. Factors of this type have led to the wise
rule that the title of a statute and the heading of a section
cannot limit the plain meaning of the text.”). We underscore
again that a plain reading of
Our discussion above should not be mistaken for a
casual acceptance of legislative ambiguity. We agree with
the Eighth Circuit that “
Despite the clarity of the condition of waiver in the IDEA,
the State also contends that it could not knowingly and
intelligently waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity
because it reasonably believed that Congress had already
abrogated its sovereign immunity by operation of
According to the NJDOE, “Congress cannot indicate an
intent to abrogate sovereign immunity, as it did in
This argument is borrowed from the Second Circuit’s
decision in
Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Sciences Center of
Brooklyn
, where the court held that New York did not waive
its sovereign immunity from suit under the Americans with
Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act when it accepted
federal funds for a state university medical school because
New York had reasonably believed that Congress had
abrogated its Eleventh Amendment immunity.
See Pace v. Bogalusa City School Board
,
For several reasons, we find the State’s argument
unavailing. To begin with, the reasoning proceeds from an
unrealistic assumption. As we noted above, the fact that
Congress employed the term abrogation does not change
the language and structure of the IDEA, which clearly
effects a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity. The
NJDOE would have us believe that it could reasonably close
its eyes to the integrated structure of
In addition, the state’s argument makes little sense from a temporal perspective. In an alternative Eleventh Amendment argument, the NJDOE contends that although Congress had attempted to abrogate its sovereign immunity, that attempt exceeded Congress’s constitutional authority to do so. In support of this argument, the state cites a line of cases in which the Supreme Court invalidated six separate statutes purporting to limit the states’ sovereign immunity. Appellants’ Brief, at 19. This line of cases begins with the Supreme Court’s June 1997 decision in City of Boerne v. Flores , 521 U.S. 507 (1997), and 11. On July 17, 2003, the Fifth Circuit granted appellant’s petition for rehearing en banc in Pace v. Bogalusa City School Board , No. 01-31026, 2003 WL 21692677 (5th Cir. July 17, 2003).
includes decisions from 1999-2001.
[12]
What the State seems
to be saying is that while it began to formulate, as early as
June 1997, its belief that the purported abrogation in the
IDEA might be unconstitutional, it nevertheless accepted
IDEA funds without any awarenеss of the possible
consequence of waiver of its sovereign immunity. The
argument borders on the disingenuous, for the State readily
accepted IDEA funds well after June 1997, during the
critical time periods relevant to this dispute, that is, when
the children named in the Complaint had failed to receive
a free, appropriate public education. In
Garcia
, the Second
Circuit recognized that a knowing waiver might result when
a state had reason to believe that an attempt to abrogate
was invalid.
See Garcia
,
For these rеasons, in the context of this case, we are
unpersuaded by the State’s argument and the rationale
borrowed from
Garcia
that the NJDOE reasonably believed
that it had lost its sovereign immunity, and therefore, could
not waive it. Given the NJDOE’s emphatic assertions about
the invalidity of the abrogation in
Our inquiry turns briefly to the third requirement of the test outlined above—the requirement that the federal program bestowing the gift or gratuity must be a valid exercise of Congress’s authority. We note that the NJDOE addresses this issue only in passing in its Opening Brief.
12. See also Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educational Expense Board v.
College Savings Bank , 527 U.S. 627 (1999); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents , 528 U.S. 62 (2000); United States v. Morrison , 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett , 531 U.S.
356 (2001).
Appellants’ Brief, at 27. We also note that any objections to the validity of Congress’s exercise of authority under the IDEA would have been unavailing.
Because the gift bestowed on the states under the IDEA
is federal funds, wе understand Congress to proceed from
its authority under the Spending Clause.
As in Dole , where Congress conditioned receipt of federal highway funds on states’ adoption of a minimum drinking age of twenty-one, we find the IDEA to be squarely within Congress’s authority to disburse funds in pursuit of the general welfare. 483 U.S. at 207. As discussed above, the availability of federal funds was also clearly and unambiguously conditioned on a waiver of sovereign immunity. As to the relatedness requirement, we stated in Koslow that “one need only identify a discernible relationship” between the statutory condition and the federal interest in the program. 302 F.3d at 175. Here, Congress has clearly expressed an interest in remedying the problems inherent in providing a free, appropriate public education to disabled children. The funds disbursed through the IDEA are targeted directly at remedying those problems. And the condition of waiver of sovereign immunity from IDEA claims is directly related to promoting the substantive and procedural rights embodied in the IDEA. As a result, we cannot conclude that the financial inducements of the IDEA were “so coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’ ” Dole , 483 U.S. at 211 (citations omitted).
25 For the reasons set forth above, we hold that by accepting IDEA funds, the state of New Jersey waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity from claims brought pursuаnt to the IDEA in federal court. The condition of waiver was clear and unambiguous, the state was fully aware of the consequence, and the IDEA funds accepted by the state flowed from a valid exercise of Congress’s authority under the Spending Clause. We note that two of our sister circuits addressing this same issue also held that the federal funds available under the IDEA are conditioned upon a state’s waiver of sovereign immunity. Oak Park , 207 F.3d at 935; Bradley , 189 F.3d at 753; but see Pace , 325 F.3d at 617-18 (holding that the state of Louisiana’s acceptance of IDEA funds did not effect a valid waiver of its Eleventh Amendment immunity).
B. The Preliminary Injunction The remaining issue on appeal for which we have jurisdiction is the preliminary injunction entered against Defendants compelling them to continue providing IEPs to E.S. and G.T., as long as they remain eligible for such services. To the extent that the state believes that sovereign immunity bars the entry of injunctive relief, our discussion above disposes of that argument. This is true for the individual state officials as well, for the state’s waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity renders them unable to assert a right that no longer exists. See Bradley , 189 F.3d at 754 (“The only immunities that can be claimed in an official-capacity action are forms of sovereign immunity that the entity, qua entity, may possess, such as the Eleventh Amendment.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
The State’s primary argument on appeal appears to be that it is an improper party to the injunction because Newark, and not the State, is the party responsible for providing the IEPs. Neither the IDEA nor case law supports the State’s view. As we noted in Part I.A., supra , the State has the primary responsibility under the IDEA to provide a 13. For this reason, we need not address Plaintiffs’ alternative argument that Ex Parte Young , 209 U.S. 123 (1908), permits Plaintiffs to proceed with their claims against the State Officials.
free, appropriate public education and to ensure compliance with the requirements of the Act. Therefore, we agree with the District Court thаt the State is a proper party to the preliminary injunction at this stage of the litigation.
Of course, it is incumbent on courts to proceed with a
complete inquiry into the considerations relevant to a grant
of injunctive relief. Specifically, the District Court should
have considered: (1) the likelihood that the Plaintiffs would
succeed on the merits of their claims; (2) the extent to
which E.S. and G.T. would suffer irreparable harm without
injunctive relief; (3) the potential harm to the Defendants if
an injunction is issued; and (4) the public interest.
See
Novartis
,
Nevertheless, we are persuaded that the Court touched upon all of these factors in its analysis of the various issues raised in Defendants’ motions to dismiss. Specifically, the District Court discussed the NJDOE’s Complaint Investigation Reports which conceded that Newark had failed to provide an efficient system of identifying, locating, and evаluating disabled children, which, in turn, substantiated some of Plaintiffs’ claims. In addition, the Court noted implicitly that E.S. and G.T. had already suffered from years of neglect, and the potential harm to them from continuing failure to provide appropriate educational services was readily apparent. In that regard, the potential harm to Defendants appears to have been minimal because they undertook to provide these services by participating in the IDEA. And finally, the maintenance of appropriate education services to disabled children is in the public interest, as Congress has detailed in the IDEA.
For these reasons, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in entering preliminary injunctive relief against the Defendants.
IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court, insofar as it held that the state of New Jersey had waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity by accepting IDEA funds. Furthermore, we will affirm the entry of preliminary injunctive relief against the state of New Jersey.
A True Copy:
Teste:
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit