PATRICIA NARCISO, Individually and Through her Conservators MARCELINA LUNA and TRACY NARCISO v. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, DEPUTIES DONALD FRANK and DARSHAUN DOUGLAS, and Does 1 to 10
Case No.: 20cv116-LL-MSB
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
August 17, 2022
[ECF Nos. 48, 49]
This matter is before the Court on Defendants County of San Diego (“County“), Deputy Donald Frank (“Frank“), and Deputy Darshaun Douglas‘s (collectively “Defendants“) Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion“) and Motion to File Under Seal Defendants’ Exhibits J & K Lodged in Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF Nos. 48, 49. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment has been fully briefed, and the Court deems it suitable for submission without oral argument. For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the Motion for Summary Judgment, and DENIES the Motion to File Under Seal.
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A. Factual Disputes
Unless otherwise stated, the Court finds the following material facts are supported adequately by admissible evidence and are undisputed. ECF No. 59-1, Joint Statement of Undisputed Facts (“JSUF“). They are “admitted to exist without controversy” for purposes of the Motion. See
B. Factual Background
At the time of the incident at issue, Plaintiff Patricia Narciso (“Plaintiff“) was a twenty-one-year-old woman who suffered from severe and chronic mental illness, including schizoaffective disorder, borderline intellectual functioning, and autism spectrum disorder. JSUF # 1. Since adolescence, Plaintiff has required multiple psychiatric hospitalizations and has been prescribed multiple antipsychotic medications, mood stabilizers, antidepressants, and hypnotic medications. Id. Plaintiff‘s mother and sister, Marcelina Luna and Tracy Narciso, have served as Plaintiff‘s conservators since 2018. Id. # 2.
In 2018, Plaintiff was attending Fred Finch Youth Center (“Fred Finch“), a school in Spring Valley that provides referral-based individualized special education services for students aged twelve through twenty-two and students dually diagnosed with both mental health illness and developmental disabilities. Id. # 4.
On the morning of November 27, 2018, at approximately 10:30 a.m., Plaintiff had an episode of irrational agitated behavior caused by her pre-existing conditions, and she attempted to leave Fred Finch‘s school campus. ECF No. 1, Complaint ¶ 12; id. # 6. Plaintiff was coaxed back to a classroom (dubbed the “serenity room“) by Fred Finch‘s staff members. Id. # 7. Fred Finch‘s school director, Bret Calhoun, called 9-1-1 for assistance with Plaintiff‘s episode. Complaint ¶ 12; id. # 8. When the 9-1-1 dispatcher
The remainder of the events was captured in video and audio through both deputies’ body cameras. See ECF No. 49-3, Ex. J, Douglas BWC video; ECF No. 49-3, Ex. K, Frank‘s BWC video; JSUF # 11. When the officers arrived to the scene, they found Plaintiff on the floor of the serenity room in a prone position, with four Fred Finch staff members physically restraining Plaintiff facedown and holding down each of Plaintiff‘s limbs. JSUF # 9, 10. Deputy Douglas handcuffed Plaintiff behind her back without incident. Complaint ¶ 14; JSUF # 13. The officers asked the Fred Finch staff members what had happened prior to their arrival, and Deputy Douglas escorted a couple of the staff members outside the serenity room to speak with them. Complaint ¶ 14; JSUF # 14, 15.
Deputy Frank remained in the serenity room with Plaintiff and at least one Fred Finch staff member. Complaint ¶ 15; JSUF # 15. During this time, Plaintiff began acting out again and stated “if you‘re gonna arrest me, I‘m gonna kill those children . . .” JSUF # 16. Deputy Frank then said “You‘re gonna what?“, “what kids are you talking about?” “kids right here.” Id. Deputy Frank contends that Plaintiff tried to slip a hand out of her handcuffs, and when he reached down to try and tighten the handcuffs, a physical struggle ensued. Id. # 17. Deputy Frank also contends that during this struggle, he felt a tug on his firearm holster. Id. # 19. This physical struggle lasted approximately fifteen seconds while Plaintiff remained handcuffed. Id. # 18. Deputy Frank pinned Plaintiff to the floor. Complaint ¶ 16; id. # 20.
After hearing this struggle from outside the serenity room, Deputy Douglas reentered the serenity room. Complaint ¶ 16; Douglas BWC video 4:00–4:10; id. # 20. At this point, the deputies determined Plaintiff qualified for a
As they were walking Plaintiff out, the deputies briefly loosened their hold and allowed Plaintiff to stand upright while she was still handcuffed. Complaint ¶ 20; JSUF # 26. The officers then began discussing which one of them would be transporting Plaintiff to the hospital when Plaintiff attempted to head-butt Deputy Douglas. JSUF # 26. The body cameras around this time of the incident capture video and audio, but do not capture Plaintiff‘s fall and how it happened. See Douglas BWC 5:38–5:50; Frank BWC 5:28–5:37. According to Plaintiff, the officers deliberately forced Plaintiff forward and slammed her on the asphalt, face first, with the officers landing on her back and shoulders. Complaint ¶ 20; Oppo. at 13. According to Defendants, Plaintiff‘s momentum was so powerful that it caused all three of them to rapidly fall forward on the asphalt. Motion at 14. Defendants and Plaintiff landed on the asphalt and both of Plaintiff‘s arms were broken. JSUF # 27.
Deputy Frank called for an ambulance, and the deputies removed Plaintiff‘s handcuffs while waiting for the medics to come. Id. # 28, 29. An ambulance took Plaintiff to Scripps Mercy Hospital for emergency medical treatment, where she was admitted and remained for twelve days for medical treatment. Complaint ¶ 21. The fractures to Plaintiff‘s arms were so severe that she had two surgeries where both upper arms required open reductions and the installation of hardware. Id. ¶ 22.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate if, viewing the evidence and drawing all
The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying the portions of the pleadings and record that it believes demonstrate the absence of an issue of material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The burden then shifts to the non-movant to show “there is a genuine issue of material fact.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585 (1986). In carrying their burdens, the parties can either cite to evidence supporting their own position or show the other side‘s position is either unsupportable or devoid of any genuine dispute.
In addition, when a videotape captures the events in question, and there is no indication that the videotape has been doctored or altered in any way, a court should look to the videotape as direct evidence of the events. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378–80 (2007). When a videotape of the events “blatantly contradicts” or “utterly discredit[s]” the account of a party such that “no reasonable jury could believe it,” the court “should not
III. DISCUSSION
Defendants move for summary judgment on each of Plaintiff‘s claims.1 The Court analyzes each of these causes of action in turn, first addressing the Section 1983 and qualified immunity standards and the disability discrimination claims before addressing the state law claims.
A. Section 1983 Excessive Force Claim
To prevail under a
1. Fourth Amendment Claim Against Deputies Douglas and Frank
Allegations of excessive force are examined under the Fourth Amendment‘s prohibition on unreasonable seizures.
“The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97. Therefore, “[t]he ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. at 396. Additionally, “[b]ecause [the excessive force inquiry] nearly always requires a jury to sift through disputed factual contentions, and to draw inferences therefrom, [the Ninth Circuit has] held on many occasions that summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law in excessive force cases should be granted sparingly.” Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 701 (9th Cir. 2005).
a. Severity of Intrusion
The first consideration is the type and amount of force inflicted after Plaintiff “attempted to head-butt Deputy Douglas” as they were walking her out of the school. JSUF # 25, 26. As to the type of force inflicted, Plaintiff claims that the two officers deliberately took her down to the “parking lot asphalt, one by pushing the other by pulling, with so much force.” Oppo. at 13. In addition, the amount of force employed by the officers was severe enough to break both of Plaintiff‘s arms and require two surgeries where both upper arms required open reductions and the installation of hardware. Complaint ¶ 22.
The circumstances are not such in this case as to reasonably warrant the type and the
b. Government‘s Interest in the Use of Force
With respect to the second consideration, the government‘s interest in the use of force, courts will consider “three primary factors, (1) ‘whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others,’ (2) ‘the severity of the crime at issue,’ and (3) ‘whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.‘” Glenn, 673 F.3d at 872 (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.). The most important of these factors is whether the suspect posed “an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others.” Smith, 394 F.3d at 702. Additionally, in some cases, the availability of alternative methods of capturing or subduing a suspect may be a factor to consider. See Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1441 n.5 (9th Cir. 1994). However, an officer need not employ the “least intrusive” degree of force possible for their actions to be deemed reasonable. See Gregory v. County of Maui, 523 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 831 n.15 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining that the “settled principle” that police officers are not required to employ the least intrusive amount of force possible does not conflict with the “equally settled principle” that requires officers to at
Here, in regard to the severity of the crime, a jury could conclude that the police were not called to Fred Finch on a suspicion of a “crime,” but rather in response to a call indicating that Plaintiff was attempting to leave campus and was acting “verbally and physically violent towards staff” while having an episode of irrational, agitated behavior. Complaint ¶ 12; ECF No. 53-1, Exs. 8, 9 (San Diego County Sheriff‘s Department Officer Reports reported by Deputies Douglas and Frank regarding the incident). Further, as stated above, Defendants never claim that Plaintiff was actively trying to evade arrest or flee the scene. ECF No. 53-1, Exs. 8, 9. The second and third factors therefore point decisively away from the officers’ interest in using force to bring Plaintiff down to the ground.
In assessing the first and most important factor, Defendants contend that Plaintiff posed an immediate threat to their safety at the time of the incident because she “became suddenly violent, assaultive, and made an (albeit unsuccessful) attempt to injure Deputy Douglas. Id.; ECF No. 59 (“Reply“) at 5. They also claim that “the deputies’ quick-thinking attempt to take Plaintiff to the ground in order to regain control of her, without . . . any additional deployment(s) of force, clearly falls within the spectrum of reasonableness.” Reply at 7. However, a “simple statement by the officer that he fears for his safety or the safety of others in not enough; there must be objective factors to justify such a concern.” Bryan, 630 F.3d at 826 (citing Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272, 1281 (9th Cir. 2001)). Moreover, “[a] desire to resolve quickly a potentially dangerous situation is not the type of governmental interest that, standing alone, justifies the use of force that may cause serious injury.” Id.
In this case, ample facts exist that would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that Plaintiff did not pose a threat to anyone‘s safety. It was apparent that Plaintiff was unarmed. Further, given the nature of the call and after determining that Plaintiff qualified for a
Ultimately, Defendants’ claims of fear for their safety rest on the notion that Plaintiff had attempted to head-butt Defendant Douglas. Motion at 13. Although this is a form of “active resistance,” which justifies the use of more force than against “passive resistance,” Plaintiff remained handcuffed and within the deputies’ control during the incident at issue. See Forrester v. City of San Diego, 25 F.3d 804, 805 (9th Cir. 1994) (passive resistance has been described to include actions like “remaining seated, refusing to move, and refusing to bear weight.“). The deputies were confronted by, at most, a disturbed and upset individual. Plaintiff never broke free from the officers’ holds, and she was unarmed. It was implausible to believe that Plaintiff posed a large threat to the deputies even if Plaintiff was trying to head-butt Defendant Douglas. Additionally, the officers cannot claim Plaintiff posed a threat to others because there were no bystanders within close proximity of Plaintiff when they were exiting Fred Finch to approach Douglas‘s patrol car. Thus, even the nature of Plaintiff‘s “active resistance” fails to establish a strong governmental interest in using significant physical force.
c. Balancing Severe Force Against Government‘s Interest
Here, in balancing the severity of the intrusion experienced by Plaintiff against the government‘s interest, some force was surely justified in initially restraining Plaintiff so she could not injure herself, the Fred Finch staff members, or the arresting officers. However, after Plaintiff was handcuffed and walked out of Fred Finch onto the parking lot,
Additionally, as stated above, Plaintiff was a mentally disturbed individual not wanted for any crime, and a detainee‘s mental illness must be reflected in any balancing of the government‘s interest against the need in the use of force. See Deorle, 272 F.3d at 1283 (“Even when an emotionally distraught individual is ‘acting out’ and inviting officers to use deadly force to subdue him, the governmental interest in using such force is diminished by the fact that the officers are confronted, not with a person who has committed a serious crime against others, but with a mentally ill individual.“). As such, the officers’ interest in quickly using significant force against Plaintiff is undermined by their knowledge of Plaintiff‘s mental disability; their knowledge that Plaintiff was unarmed; and their failure to consider less intrusive alternatives before bringing her down to the ground.
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff and resolving all disputed facts in her favor, a reasonable jury could find that the degree of force used against Plaintiff violated her Fourth Amendment right against excessive force.
2. Qualified Immunity
Deputies Frank and Douglas argue that even if they used excessive force against Plaintiff, they cannot be held personally liable for the injuries that Plaintiff suffered under qualified immunity. Motion at 22–26. Given this Court‘s determination above that there are triable issues of fact to be resolved in determining whether there has been a violation
“Public officials are immune from suit under
Importantly, while a case directly on point is not required to determine whether an officer violated clearly established law, existing precedent must place the lawfulness of the particular action beyond debate. Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015). There can be “the rare ‘obvious case,’ where the unlawfulness of the officer‘s conduct is sufficiently clear even though existing precedent does not address similar circumstances.” Vazquez v. City of Kern, 949 F.3d 1153, 1164 (9th Cir. 2020). The relevant inquiry is “whether the officer had fair notice that her conduct was unlawful.” Nicholson v. City of Los Angeles, 935 F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 2019).
In the instant case, taking Plaintiff‘s version of the events as true, Plaintiff has not shown that the use of the officers’ bodies and the force in the manner deployed violated a clearly established constitutional right. No case at the time of the incident clearly establishes that an officer‘s takedown of a mentally ill person who was actively resisting
The facts here also do not approximate those in other cases involving a mentally disturbed individual. In Bryan v. MacPherson, the Ninth Circuit explained that even when a mentally disturbed person behaves erratically, erratic behavior does not entitle an officer to use force, and any force used must be proportional to the actual danger posed. 630 F.3d
Although a case directly on point with the exact same factual circumstances is not required, there is no existing precedent that could have clearly established the violative nature of the officers’ particular conduct in the specific context of the case. See Vos v. City of Newport Beach, 892 F.3d 1024, 1035 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015)). This Court has found no clearly established law predating November 2018 that would put every reasonable officer on notice that the force used in this scenario constitutes a constitutional violation. Even construing uncertainties in Plaintiff‘s favor here, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity.
Plaintiff‘s experts have opined that Frank and Douglas disregarded California Police Officer standards and San Diego Sheriff‘s Department training regarding officer contacts with mentally ill subjects. Oppo. at 11. According to Plaintiff‘s experts, Plaintiff “could have been safely secured on the [ambulance] stretcher‘s multi-point soft restraint system . . . while being transported to a hospital for evaluation and treatment” instead of deciding to walk her handcuffed to “one of their patrol cars, and have one of them drive her, alone.” Id. (citing ECF No. 53-2 ¶¶ 6–7, ECF No. 53-3 ¶¶ 13–14). However, Plaintiff has not pointed to evidence indicating the officers were required to do this in every situation. See ECF No. 53-2 (“Declaration of Scott A. DeFoe“) ¶ 7 (“For psychological emergencies, activation of and/or referral to the EMS system may be appropriate. Where the patient may be in danger to self or others, activation of the EMS system as well as proper officer/public safety tactics are critical.“) (emphasis added). There is also no authority the officers were required to do so when the undisputed facts indicate that Fred Finch‘s school director
B. ADA Claim
Defendants also seek summary judgment on Plaintiff‘s ADA claim, which Plaintiff asserts against County Defendant for “failing to provide [Plaintiff] with safe transportation to a psychiatric facility for evaluation and treatment of her condition, and by retaliating against Plaintiff for engaging in behaviors that were the result of her disability and not volitional action.” Complaint ¶ 49; see Motion at 26–29. Plaintiff and the County agree that Plaintiff is an individual with a disability who is qualified to participate in or receive reasonable accommodation. JSUF # 1, 3. Defendant County, however, argues Plaintiff has not established the County failed to reasonably accommodate her disability. Motion at 27.
To state a claim of disability discrimination and recover monetary damages under Title II of the ADA, including a reasonable accommodation claim, the burden is on the plaintiff to show that: (1) the plaintiff is an individual with a disability; (2) the plaintiff is otherwise qualified to participate in or receive the benefit of some public entity‘s services, programs, or activities; (3) the plaintiff was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the public entity‘s services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (4) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of the plaintiff‘s disability. Bresaz v. County of Santa Clara, 136 F. Supp. 3d 1125, 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (citing Weinreich v. Los Angeles Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth., 114 F.3d 976, 978 (9th Cir. 1997)).
Here, Plaintiff presents evidence in the form of declarations from police practices
The Ninth Circuit‘s decision in Vos v. City of Newport Beach is illuminating here. 892 F.3d 1024, 1037 (9th Cir. 2018). While acknowledging that police officers are forced to make split-second decisions when presented with immediate threats, the Ninth Circuit in Vos nevertheless found summary judgment inappropriate for the defendants because the officers had an opportunity to wait for backup and employ the accommodations that the plaintiff asserted were necessary, “including de-escalation, communication, or specialized help.” Id. The officers had the time to employ less confrontational tactics and assess the situation such that further accommodation was possible. Id. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has stated that the reasonableness of accommodation is an entirely different fact question than an excessive force claim. Id. Similar to the defendants in Vos, Defendants had the time and opportunity to assess the situation and employ the type of further accommodations identified by Plaintiff and failed to do so. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff has offered sufficient evidence of a reasonable accommodation to survive summary judgment.
Finally, the County argues that there is no evidence of intentional discrimination on the basis of Plaintiff‘s disability. Motion at 27. Deliberate indifference is the appropriate test. Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138 (9th Cir. 2001). “Deliberate indifference requires both knowledge that a harm to a federally protected right is substantially likely and a failure to act upon that the likelihood.” Id. at 1139 (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989)). “When the plaintiff has alerted the public entity to his need for accommodation (or where the need for accommodation is obvious, or
Here, there is no question that the officers who responded to the call were aware of Plaintiff‘s mental illness, and Mr. Calhoun also informed the officers that Plaintiff was suffering from mental health troubles. ECF No. 53-1, Exs. 8, 9 (San Diego County Sheriff‘s Department Officer Reports reported by Deputies Douglas and Frank stating they were aware of Plaintiff‘s mental condition); see also JSUF # 14. Defendants Douglas and Frank also had engaged with Plaintiff around ten to fifteen minutes before the incident, during a time in which Plaintiff exhibited symptoms of her mental disabilities. See ECF No. 49-3, Exs. J-K. Defendant Douglas had also previously responded to calls from Fred Finch around “20 to 25 times” and was aware the students there were “having behavioral issues at the time.” Dep. of Douglas 25:3-6, 25:25. Despite all of this, Defendants Frank and Douglas at no point undertook any accommodations, such as calling in special medical forces trained to deal with individuals with mental health issues.
Accordingly, the Court finds it can be factually disputed whether the County failed to act upon its knowledge that harm to Plaintiff was substantially likely. The Court finds that there is evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that the County intentionally discriminated against Plaintiff on the basis of her disability. Therefore, summary judgment is denied as to the claim against the County.
IV. STATE LAW CLAIMS
A. Rehabilitation Act of 1973
Plaintiff alleges that the County violated her right under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which provides that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”
B. California Civil Code §§ 51.7 and 52.1
Plaintiff alleges that she is entitled to recovery under California‘s Ralph Act (
Additionally, in Mendez v. County of Los Angeles, the Ninth Circuit explained that “the California Supreme Court has held that immunity applies only to policy decisions, not to operational decisions like the [officers‘] decision to enter the [plaintiff‘s] residence.” 897 F.3d 1067, 1084 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Caldwell v. Montoya, 10 Cal. 4th 972, 981 (1995)). “Moreover, this ‘discretionary immunity’ does not apply to excessive force claims.” Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 487 (9th Cir. 2007); Scruggs v. Haynes, 252 Cal. App. 2d 256, 267–68 (1967). Therefore, unlike the § 1983 excessive force claim, the officers here are not entitled to qualified immunity.
As the Court has previously determined there are triable issues of fact as to whether Defendants violated Plaintiff‘s Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force, there
C. Battery
Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiff‘s battery claim against all Defendants, contending that Defendants did not deploy excessive force, nor that Plaintiff was ultimately injured by a deployment of excessive force. Motion at 30. Under California law, “[a] state law battery claim is a counterpart to a federal claim of excessive use of force. In both, a plaintiff must prove that the peace officer‘s use of force was unreasonable.” Brown v. Ransweiler, 89 Cal. Rptr. 3d 801, 811 (Ct. App. 2009); see also Avina v. United States, 681 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2012) (“In California, claims that police officers used excessive force in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop or other seizure of a free citizen are analyzed under the reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.“).
As the Court has already established above, there is a factual dispute as to whether Defendants Frank and Douglas‘s use of force was reasonable. Accordingly, summary judgment is denied as to Plaintiff‘s battery claims, as they relate to excessive force.
D. Liability of the County for Plaintiff‘s State Law Causes of Action
Finally, the Court considers the liability of the County for Plaintiffs’ state law claims. On the issue of municipal liability, California law diverges from federal law.
V. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO SEAL
There is a “strong presumption in favor of access” and a “general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and documents.” Kamakana v. City and County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Nixon v. Warner Communs., Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 n.7 (1978)). This is especially true for dispositive motions, where the parties must “articulate compelling reasons supported by specific factual findings” for why these materials should be sealed. Id. at 1179.
“In general, ‘compelling reasons’ sufficient to outweigh the public‘s interest in disclosure and justify sealing court records exist when such ‘court files might have become a vehicle for improper purposes,’ such as the use of records to gratify private spite, promote public scandal, circulate libelous statements, or release trade secrets.” Id. Under the compelling reasons standard, “the party seeking protection bears the burden of showing specific prejudice or harm will result if no [protection] is granted.” Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210–11 (9th Cir. 2002). If public access to the documents to be sealed would “promot[e] the public‘s understanding . . . of [a] significant public event[ ],” that fact weighs against sealing the judicial record. Valley Broad. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Nevada, 798 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1986).
Here, Defendants do not meet their burden, and their justifications to seal the records are unsupported by the facts. Defendants seek to seal Exhibits J and K, consisting of body camera footage of the incident, submitted in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendants argue that these exhibits were designated as “confidential” pursuant to the protective order in this case, but do not explain, even in a general way, why the information is confidential. Defendants do not assert any exception to the presumption of public access or offer any authority that supports sealing material merely because its contents are sensitive and particularly where, as here, the footage contains evidence that is highly probative to the case.
Moreover, these body camera videos are of significance to the public, who has an
VI. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court:
- GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to the § 1983 claim for excessive force against Defendants Donald Frank and Darshaun Douglas;
- DENIES Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to the ADA claim against Defendant County of San Diego;
- DENIES Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 claim against Defendant County of San Diego;
- DENIES Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to the California Civil Code §§ 51.7 and 52.1 claim against Defendants County of San Diego, Donald Frank, and Darshaun Douglas;
- DENIES Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to the state law battery claim against Defendants County of San Diego, Donald Frank, and Darshaun Douglas; and
- DENIES Defendants’ Motion to File Under Seal.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: August 17, 2022
Honorable Linda Lopez
United States District Judge