Lead
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We consider whether a law enforcement official can, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, attempt to stop a fleeing motorist from continuing his public-endangering flight by ramming the motorist’s car from behind. Put another way: Can an officer take actions that place a fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death in order to stop the motorist’s flight from endangering the lives of innocent bystanders?
I
In March 2001, a Georgia county deputy clocked respondent’s vehicle traveling at 73 miles per hour on a road with a 55-mile-per-hour speed limit. The deputy activated his blue flashing lights indicating that respondent should pull over. Instead, respondent sped away, initiating a chase down what is in most portions a two-lane road, at speeds exceeding 85 miles per hour. The deputy radioed his dispatch
Following respondent’s shopping center maneuvering, which resulted in slight damage to Scott’s police car, Scott took over as the lead pursuit vehicle. Six minutes and nearly 10 miles after the chase had begun, Scott decided to attempt to terminate the episode by employing a “Precision Intervention Technique (‘PIT’) maneuver, which causes the fleeing vehicle to spin to a stop.” Brief for Petitioner 4. Having radioed his supervisor for permission, Scott was told to “‘[g]o ahead and take him out.’” Harris v. Coweta Cty.,
Respondent filed suit against Deputy Scott and others under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, alleging, inter alia, a violation of his federal constitutional rights, viz. use of excessive force resulting in an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. In response, Scott filed a motion for summary judgment based on an assertion of qualified immunity. The District Court denied the motion, finding that “there are material issues of fact on which the issue of qualified immunity turns which present sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury.” Harris v. Coweta Cty., No. 3:01-CV-148-WBH (ND Ga., Sept. 23,2003), App. to Pet. for Cert. 41a-42a. On interlocutory appeal,
II
In resolving questions of qualified immunity, courts are required to resolve a “threshold question: Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right? This must be the initial inquiry.” Saucier v. Katz,
Ill
A
The first step in assessing the constitutionality of Scott’s actions is to determine the relevant facts. As this case was decided on summary judgment, there have not yet been factual findings by a judge or jury, and respondent’s version of events (unsurprisingly) differs substantially from Scott’s version. When things are in such a posture, courts are required to view the facts and draw reasonable inferences “in the light most favorable to the party opposing the [summary judgment] motion.” United States v. Diebold, Inc.,
There is, however, an added wrinkle in this case: existence in the record of a videotape capturing the events in question. There are no allegations or indications that this videotape was doctored or altered in any way, nor any contention that what it depicts differs from what actually happened. The videotape quite clearly contradicts the version of the story told by respondent and adopted by the Court of Appeals.
“[T]aking the facts from the non-movant’s viewpoint, [respondent] remained in control of his vehicle, slowed for turns and intersections, and typically used his indicators for turns. He did not run any motorists off the road. Nor was he a threat to pedestrians in the shopping center parking lot, which was free from pedestrian and vehicular traffic as the center was closed. Significantly, by the time the parties were back on the highway and Scott rammed [respondent], the motorway had been cleared of motorists and pedestrians allegedly because of police blockades of the nearby intersections.” Id., at 815-816 (citations omitted).
The videotape tells quite a different story. There we see respondent’s vehicle racing down narrow, two-lane roads in the dead of night at speeds that are shockingly fast. We see it swerve around more than a dozen other cars, cross the double-yellow line, and force cars traveling in both directions to their respective shoulders to avoid being hit.
At the summary judgment stage, facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a “genuine” dispute as to those facts. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(c). As we have emphasized, “[w]hen the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’ ” Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
That was the case here with regard to the factual issue whether respondent was driving in such fashion as to endanger human life. Respondent’s version of events is so utterly discredited by the record that no reasonable jury could have believed him. The Court of Appeals should not have relied on such visible fiction; it should have viewed the facts in the light depicted by the videotape.
B
Judging the matter on that basis, we think it is quite clear that Deputy Scott did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Scott does not contest that his decision to terminate the car chase by ramming his bumper into respondent’s vehicle constituted a “seizure.” “[A] Fourth Amendment seizure [occurs] . . . when there is a governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied.” Brower v. County of Inyo,
Respondent urges us to analyze this case as we analyzed Garner,
Respondent’s argument falters at its first step; Garner did not establish a magical on/off switch that triggers rigid preconditions whenever an officer's actions constitute “deadly force.” Gamer was simply an application of the Fourth Amendment’s “reasonableness” test, Graham, supra, at 388, to the use of a particular type of force in a particular situation. Garner held that it was unreasonable to kill a “young, slight, and unarmed” burglary suspect,
2
In determining the reasonableness of the manner in which a seizure is effected, “[w]e must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.” United States v. Place,
But wait, says respondent: Couldn’t the innocent public equally have been protected, and the tragic accident entirely avoided, if the police had simply ceased their pursuit? We think the police need not have taken that chance and hoped for the best. Whereas Scott’s action — ramming respondent off the road — was certain
Second, we are loath to lay down a rule requiring the police to allow fleeing suspects to get away whenever they drive so recklessly that they put other people’s lives in danger. It is obvious the perverse incentives such a rule would create: Every fleeing motorist would know that escape is within his grasp, if only he accelerates to 90 miles per hour, crosses the double-yellow line a few times, and runs a few red lights. The Constitution assuredly does not impose this invitation to impunity-earned-by-recklessness. Instead, we lay down a more sensible rule: A police officer’s attempt to terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase that threatens the lives of innocent bystanders does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when it places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death.
* * *
The car chase that respondent initiated in this case posed a substantial and immediate risk of serious physical injury to others; no reasonable jury could conclude otherwise. Scott's attempt to terminate the chase by forcing respondent off the road was reasonable, and Scott is entitled to summary judgment. The Court of Appeals’ judgment to the contrary is reversed.
It is so ordered.
Notes
Scott says he decided not to employ the PIT maneuver because he was “concerned that the vehicles were moving too quickly to safely execute the maneuver.” Brief for Petitioner 4. Respondent agrees that the PIT maneuver could not have been safely employed. See Brief for Respondent 9. It is irrelevant to our analysis whether Scott had permission to take the precise actions he took.
Qualified immunity is “an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Mitchell v. Forsyth,
None of the other claims respondent brought against Scott or any other party are before this Court.
Prior to this Court’s announcement of Saucier’s “rigid ‘order of battle,’ ” Brosseau v. Haugen,
Justice Stevens suggests that our reaction to the videotape is somehow idiosyncratic, and seems to believe we are misrepresenting its contents. See post, at 392 (dissenting opinion) (“In sum, the factual statements by the Court of Appeals quoted by the Court . . . were entirely accurate”). We are happy to allow the videotape to speak for itself See Record 36, Exh. A, available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/ video/scott_v_harris.html and in Clerk of Court’s case file.
Justice Stevens hypothesizes that these cars “had already pulled to the side of the road or were driving along the shoulder because they heard the police sirens or saw the flashing lights,” so that “[a] jury could certainly conclude that those motorists were exposed to no greater risk than persons who take the same action in response to a speeding ambulance.” Post, at 391. It is not our experience that ambulances and fire engines careen down two-lane roads at 85-plus miles per hour, with an unmarked scout car out in front of them. The risk they pose to the public is vastly less than what respondent created here. But even if that were not so, it would in no way lead to the conclusion that it was unreasonable to eliminate the threat to life that respondent posed. Society accepts the risk of speeding ambulances and fire engines in order to save life and property; it need not (and assuredly does not) accept a similar risk posed by a reckless motorist fleeing the police.
This is not to say that each and every factual statement made by the Court of Appeals is inaccurate. For example, the videotape validates the court’s statement that when Scott rammed respondent’s vehicle it was not threatening any other vehicles or pedestrians. (Undoubtedly Scott waited for the road to be clear before executing his maneuver.)
Justice Stevens incorrectly declares this to be “a question of fact best reserved for a jury,” and complains we are “usurping] the jury’s factfinding function.” Post, at 395. At the summary judgment stage, however, once we have determined the relevant set of facts and drawn all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party to the extent supportable by the record, see Part III-A, supra, the reasonableness of Scott’s actions— or, in Justice Stevens’ parlance, “[wjhether [respondent’s] actions have risen to a level warranting deadly force,” post, at 395 — is a pure question of law.
Respondent, like the Court of Appeals, defines this second precondition as “‘necessary to prevent escape,’” Brief for Respondent 17;
The Court of Appeals cites Brower v. County of Inyo,
Contrary to Justice Stevens’ assertions, we do not “assum[e] that dangers caused by flight from a police pursuit will continue after the pursuit ends,” post, at 394, nor do we make any “factual assumptions,” post, at 393, with respect to what would have happened if the police had gone home. We simply point out the uncertainties regarding what would have happened, in response to respondent’s factual assumption that the high-speed flight would have ended.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion and would underscore two points. First, I do not read today’s decision as articulating a mechanical, per se rule. Cf. post, at 389 (Breyer, J., concurring). The inquiry described by the Court, ante, at 383-385 and this page, is situation specific. Among relevant considerations: Were the lives and well-being of others (motorists, pedestrians, police officers) at risk? Was there a safer way, given the time, place, and circumstances, to stop the fleeing vehicle? “[AJdmirable” as “[an] attempt to craft an easy-to-apply legal test in the Fourth Amendment context [may be],” the Court explains, “in the end we must still slosh our way through the factbound morass of‘reasonableness.’” Ante, at 383.
Second, were this case suitable for resolution on qualified immunity grounds, without reaching the constitutional question, Justice Breyer’s discussion would be engaging. See post, at 387-389 (urging the Court to overrule Saucier v. Katz,
Concurrence Opinion
concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion with one suggestion and two qualifications. Because watching the video footage of the car chase made a difference to my own view of the case, I suggest that the interested reader take advantage of the link in the Court’s opinion, ante, at 378, n. 5, and watch it. Having done so, I do not believe a reasonable jury could, in this instance, find that Officer Timothy Scott (who joined the chase late in the day and did not know the specific reason why the respondent was being pursued) acted in violation of the Constitution.
Second, the video makes clear the highly fact-dependent nature of this constitutional determination. And that fact dependency supports the argument that we should overrule the requirement, announced in Saucier v. Katz,
Sometimes (e. g., where a defendant is clearly entitled to qualified immunity) Saucier’s fixed order-of-battle rule wastes judicial resources in that it may require courts to answer a difficult constitutional question unnecessarily. Sometimes (e.g., where the defendant loses the constitutional question but wins on qualified immunity) that order-of-battle rule may immunize an incorrect constitutional ruling from review. Sometimes, as here, the order-of-battle rule will spawn constitutional rulings in areas of law so fact dependent that the result will be confusion rather than clarity. And frequently the order-of-battle rule violates that older, wiser judicial counsel “not to pass on questions of constitutionality . . . unless such adjudication is unavoidable.” Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. McLaughlin,
It is not surprising that commentators, judges, and, in this case, 28 States in an amicus brief have invited us to reconsider Saucier’s requirement. See Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 1249, 1275 (2006) (calling the requirement “a puzzling misadventure in constitutional dictum”); Dirrane v. Brookline Police Dept.,
While this Court should generally be reluctant to overturn precedents, stare decisis concerns are at their weakest here. See, e. g., Payne v. Tennessee,
Third, I disagree with the Court insofar as it articulates a per se rule. The majority states: “A police officer’s attempt to terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase that threatens the lives of innocent bystanders does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when it places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death.” Ante, at 386. This statement is too absolute. As Justice Ginsburg points out, ibid., whether a high-speed chase violates the Fourth Amendment may well depend upon more circumstances than the majority’s rule reflects. With these qualifications, I join the Court’s opinion.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
Today, the Court asks whether an officer may “take actions that place a fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death in order to stop the motorist’s flight from endangering the lives of innocent bystanders.” Ante, at 374. Depending on the circumstances, the answer may be an obvious “yes,” an obvious “no,” or sufficiently doubtful that the question of the reasonableness of the officer’s actions should be decided by a jury, after a review of the degree of danger and the alternatives available to the officer. A high-speed chase in a desert in Nevada is, after all, quite different from one that travels through the heart of Las Vegas.
Relying on a de novo review of a videotape of a portion of a nighttime chase on a lightly traveled road in Georgia where no pedestrians or other “bystanders” were present, buttressed by uninformed speculation about the possible consequences of discontinuing the chase, eight of the jurors on this Court reach a verdict that differs from the views of the judges on both the District Court and the Court of Appeals who are surely more familiar with the hazards of driving on Georgia roads than we are. The Court’s justification for this unprecedented departure from our well-settled standard of review of factual determinations made by a district court and affirmed by a court of appeals is based on its mistaken view that the Court of Appeals’ description of the facts was “blatantly contradicted by the record” and that respondent’s version of the events was “so utterly discredited by the record that no reasonable jury could have believed him.” Ante, at 380.
Rather than supporting the conclusion that what we see on the video “resembles a Hollywood-style car chase of the most frightening sort,” ibid.,
Omitted from the Court’s description of the initial speeding violation is the fact that respondent was on a four-lane portion of Highway 34 when the officer clocked his speed at 73 miles per hour and initiated the chase.
The police sirens also minimized any risk that may have arisen from running "multiple red lights,” ibid. In fact, respondent and his pursuers went through only two intersections with stop lights and in both cases all other vehicles in sight were stationary, presumably because they had been warned of the approaching speeders. Incidentally, the videos do show that the lights were red when the police cars passed through them but, because the cameras were farther away when respondent did so and it is difficult to discern the color of the signal at that point, it is not entirely clear that he ran either or both of the red lights. In any event, the risk of harm to the stationary vehicles was minimized by the sirens, and there is no reason to believe that respondent would have disobeyed the signals if he were not being pursued.
My colleagues on the jury saw respondent “swerve around more than a dozen other cars,” and “force cars traveling in both directions to their respective shoulders,” ibid., but they apparently discounted the possibility that those cars were already out of the pursuit’s path as a result of hearing the sirens. Even if that
In sum, the factual statements by the Court of Appeals quoted by the Court, ante, at 378-379, were entirely accurate. That court did not describe respondent as a “cautious” driver as my colleagues imply, ante, at 380, but it did correctly conclude that there is no evidence that he ever lost control of his vehicle. That court also correctly pointed out that the incident in the shopping center parking lot did not create any risk to pedestrians or other vehicles because the chase occurred just before 11 p.m. on a weekday night and the center was closed. It is apparent from the record (in-eluding the videotape) that local police had blocked off intersections to keep respondent from entering residential neighborhoods and possibly endangering other motorists. I would add that the videos also show that no pedestrians, parked cars, sidewalks, or residences were visible at any time during the chase. The only “innocent bystanders” who were placed “at great risk of serious injury,” ibid., were the drivers who either pulled off the road in response to the sirens or passed respondent in the opposite direction when he was driving on his side of the road.
I recognize, of course, that even though respondent’s original speeding violation on a four-lane highway was rather ordinary, his refusal to stop and subsequent flight was a serious offense that merited severe punishment. It was not, however, a capital offense, or even an offense that justified the use of deadly force rather than an abandonment of the chase. The Court’s concern about the “imminent threat to the lives of any pedestrians who might have been present,” ante, at 384, while surely valid in an appropriate case, should be discounted in a case involving a nighttime chase in an area where no pedestrians were present.
What would have happened if the police had decided to abandon the chase? We now know that they could have apprehended respondent later because they had his license plate number. Even if that were not true, and even if he would have escaped any punishment at all, the use of deadly force in this ease was no more appropriate than the use of a deadly weapon against a fleeing felon in Tennessee v. Garner,
Although Gamer may not, as the Court suggests, “establish a magical on/off switch that triggers rigid preconditions” for the use of deadly force, ante, at 382, it did set a threshold under which the use of deadly force would be considered constitutionally unreasonable:
“Where the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force. Thus, if the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon or there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm, deadly force may be used if necessary to prevent escape, and if, where feasible, some warning has been given.”471 U. S., at 11-12 .
Whether a person’s actions have risen to a level warranting deadly force is a question of fact best reserved for a jury.
“At the time of the ramming, apart from speeding and running two red lights, Harris was driving in a non-aggressive fashion (i. e., without trying to ram or run into the officers). Moreover, . . . Scott’s path on the open highway was largely clear. The videos introduced into evidence show little to no vehicular (or pedestrian) traffic, allegedly because of the late hour and the police blockade of the nearby intersections. Finally, Scott issued absolutely no warning (e. g., over the loudspeaker or otherwise) prior to using deadly force.”433 F. 3d 807 , 819, n. 14 (CA11 2005).
If two groups of judges can disagree so vehemently about the nature of the pursuit and the circumstances surrounding that pursuit, it seems eminently likely that a reasonable juror could disagree with this Court’s characterization of events. Moreover, under the standard set forth in Gamer, it is certainly possible that “a jury could conclude that Scott unreasonably used deadly force to seize Harris by ramming him off the road under the instant circumstances.”
The Court today sets forth a per se rule that presumes its own version of the facts: “A police officer’s attempt to terminate a dangerous high-speed ear chase that threatens the lives of innocent bystanders does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when it places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death.” Ante, at 386 (emphasis added). Not only does that rule fly in the face of the flexible and case-by-case “reasonableness” approach applied in Garner and Graham v. Connor,
I respectfully dissent.
I can only conclude that my colleagues were unduly frightened by two or three images on the tape that looked like bursts of lightning or explosions, but were in fact merely the headlights of vehicles zooming by in the opposite lane. Had they learned to drive when most high-speed driving took place on two-lane roads rather than on superhighways — when split-second judgments about the risk of passing a slowpoke in the face of oncoming traffic were routine — they might well have reacted to the videotape more dispassionately.
According to the District Court record, when respondent was clocked at 73 miles per hour, the deputy who recorded his speed was sitting in his patrol car on Highway 34 between Lora Smith Road and Sullivan Road in Coweta County, Georgia. At that point, as well as at the point at which Highway 34 intersects with Highway 154 — where the deputy caught up with respondent and the videotape begins — Highway 34 is a four-lane road, consisting of two lanes in each direction with a wide grass divider separating the flow of traffic.
While still on the four-lane portion of Highway 34, the deputy who had docked respondent’s speed turned on his blue light and siren in an attempt to get respondent to pull over. It was when the deputy turned on his blue light that the dash-mounted video camera was activated and began to record the pursuit.
Although perhaps understandable, because their volume on the sound recording is low (possibly due to sound proofing in the officer’s vehicle), the Court appears to minimize the significance of the sirens audible throughout the tape recording of the pursuit.
In noting that Scott’s action “was certain to eliminate the risk that respondent posed to the public” while “ceasing pursuit was not,” the Court prioritizes total elimination of the risk of harm to the public over the risk that respondent may be seriously injured or even killed. Ante, at 385 (emphasis in original). The Court is only able to make such a statement by assuming, based on its interpretation of events on the videotape, that the risk of harm posed in this case, and the type of harm involved, rose to a level warranting deadly force. These are the same types of questions that, when disputed, are typically resolved by a jury; this is why both the District Court and the Court of Appeals saw fit to have them be so decided. Although the Court claims only to have drawn factual inferences in respondent's favor “to the extent supportable by the record,” ante, at 381, n. 8 (emphasis in original), its own view of the record has clearly precluded it from doing so to the same extent as the two courts through which this case has already traveled, see ante, at 376,378-379.
In its opinion, the Court of Appeals correctly noted: “We reject the defendants’ argument that Harris’ driving must, as a matter of law, be considered sufficiently reckless to give Scott probable cause to believe that he posed a substantial threat of imminent physical harm to motorists and pedestrians. This is a disputed issue to be resolved by a jury.” Harris v. Coweta Cty.,
In total, there are four police tapes which captured portions of the pursuit, all recorded from different officers’ vehicles.
It is unclear whether, in referring to “innocent bystanders,” the Court is referring to the motorists driving unfazed in the opposite direction or to the drivers who pulled over to the side of the road, safely out of respondent’s and petitioner’s path.
“Stop sticks” are a device which can be placed across the roadway and used to flatten a vehicle’s tires slowly to safely terminate a pursuit.