ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS AND ORDER CONTINUING CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE
. Plaintiffs Laurel Bresaz, Donna Hayes, and Steven Marshall (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) bring this action against the County of Santa Clara, Aldo Groba, Kristin Anderson, Julian Quinonez, Mark Carrasco, Paula McAllister, and Does 4-50 (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated the. United States Constitution and various federal and state statutes in connection with an incident on December 10,2013, that led to the death of Brandon Marshall (the “Decedent”). Before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint. See ECF No. 86 (“Mot.”). The Court finds Defendants’ motion suitable for decision .without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-l(b). Accordingly, the Court VACATES the hearing set for October 1, 2015, at 1:30 p.m. In addition, the Court hereby CONTINUES the Case. Management Conference, currently set for October 1, 2015, at 1:30 p.m. to November
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Plaintiffs are relatives of the Decedent. Laurel Bresaz (“Bresaz”) is the wife and successor in interest to the Decedent. ECF No. 69 (“SAC”) ¶ 5. Donna Hayes is the mother of the Decedent, and Steven Marshall (“Marshall”) is ihe Decedent’s father. Id. ¶¶ 6-7. Aldo Groba (“Groba”) and Kristin Anderson (“Anderson”) are both deputies employed by the Santa Clara County Sheriffs Office (“SCCSO”), the local sheriffs department for the County of Santa Clara. Id. ¶¶ 9-11; Julian Quinonez (“Qui-nonez”), Marc Carrasco (“Carrasco”), and Paula McAllister (“McAllister”) are detective sergeants employed by the SCCSO. Id. ¶¶ 12-14.
This lawsuit stems from an incident that occurred on December 10, 2013. Id. ¶ 18. Decedent was an employee at Roku, Inc. (“Roku”) in Saratoga, California. Id. Plaintiffs allege that the Decedent “lost touch with reality and began to suffer from delusional beliefs” on December 10, 2013. Id. ¶ 19. Decedent may have been taking prescription medication on this date. Id. ¶ 20.
At some point in the late’ morning or early afternoon óf December 10, 2013, the Decedent entered a conference room in the Roku offices where a meeting was in progress. Id. The Decedent “appeared emotionally distressed and disoriented.” Id. While in the conference room, the Decedent called Marshall and requested that Marshall “pick him up from work' right away because he was having a problem.” Id. One or more Roku employees also called 911 to request help for the Decedent. No Roku employees who witnessed the Decedent’s behavior reported that the Decedent posed a threat of violence or criminal behavior. Id.
The Decedent then left the building and went to the Roku parking lot. Id. ¶ 21. At some point, employees with the Santa Clara County Fire Department arrived on the scene and spoke with the Decedent. Id. According to Fire Department employees, the Decedent appeared “manic.” Id. The Decedent voluntarily agreed to go to the hospital. Id. Subsequently, paramedics arrived on the scene and advised the Decedent that he could have a family member take him to the hospital. Id. ¶ 22. After the Decedent agreed to this proposal, a paramedic called Marshall on the Decedent’s mobile phone. Id. The paramedic told Marshall that the Decedent was not feeling well and needed to be taken to the hospital. Id. Marshall expressed at least twice to the paramedic a desire to take the Decedent to the hospital. Id. ¶¶ 22-23.
Subsequent to the arrival of the parar medics, Deputies Groba and Anderson arrived at the scene. Id. ¶ 24. A paramedic from the Santa Clara Fire Department “approached Anderson and informed her that [the Decedent] was a psychiatric patient, that he was experiencing á medication imbalance, and that he was agitated.” Id. ¶ 25. Plaintiffs allege that Groba and Anderson knew or should have known that “they were responding to a call seeking help for an emotionally distressed individual,” and that the Decedent “was experiencing mental health issues that required specialized medical assistance, procedures, and tactics.” Id. ¶ 28. Plaintiffs also allege that Groba and Anderson knew or should have known that the paramedics and other County personnel were “making arrangements ... to get appropriate medical care for [the Decedent].” Id. ¶ 30.
Anderson, “[d]espite lacking a reasonable belief that [the Decedent] presented any threat of harm to anyone...ap
At some point, the Decedent “started to fidget with his keychain, which had keys on one end of the chain and a short, thin, rounded aluminum rod at the other.” Id. ¶ 35. When Anderson asked the Decedent if the Decedent’s keychain was a weapon, the Decedent responded in the affirmative. Id. During this interaction, Deputy “Gro-ba overreacted and moved quickly towards [the Decedent] with his gun drawn,” “possibly causing [the Decedent] to fear for his life.” Id. ¶ 36. The Decedent, possibly in self-defense, swung his keychain at Groba and Anderson. Id. Groba then shot the Decedent in the stomach. Id.
At the time Groba shot the Decedent, Marshall was on the phone with one of the paramedics at the scene. Id. ¶ 39. Marshall heard the gunshot over the phone, and heard the Decedent cry out in pain. Id. Marshall heard the Decedent cry out a second time before the paramedic ended the call. Id.
Either Groba or Anderson, or both deputies, proceeded to restrain the Decedent’s legs with zip ties. Id. ¶ 40. Plaintiffs also claim that Groba and Anderson otherwise “delay[ed] critical medical treatment for the gunshot wound.” Id. Santa Clara County Emergency Medical Services eventually transported the Decedent to Santa Clara Valley Medical Center, where Bresaz, Marshall, and Hayes, as well as other members of the Decedent’s family, subsequently arrived. Id. ¶ 42. Plaintiffs were “repeatedly told that staff were stabilizing [the Decedent’s] condition.” Id. However, at approximately 3:45 p.m., on December 10, 2013, a hospital surgeon informed Plaintiffs that the Decedent had died. Id. According to Plaintiffs, after the Decedent’s death, “deputies of the-SCCSO insensitively pressed [the] family for information.” Id. ¶ 44. Some of these conversations, Plaintiffs allege, were secretly recorded. Id.
B. Procedural History
On August 26, 2014, Plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit in this Court, alleging eleven causes of action under the U.S. Constitution and various federal and state statutes. See ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”), Bresaz, as successor in interest to the Decedent, asserted a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Decedent’s rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution; under 42 U.S.C. § 12132 for violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act .(“ADA”); under California Civil Code § 52.1 for violation of the Bane Act;, under California Code of Civil-Procedure § 377.30 for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress; and for negligence. Id. ¶¶ 45, 52, 63, 77, 85, 90, & 97. The Plaintiffs collectively asserted causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and California Code of Civil Procedure § 377.60 for violation of their Fourteenth Amendment right to familial relationships with, the Decedent; under California Code of , Civil Procedure § 377.60 for wrongful death; and, under California Civil Code § 52.1 for violation of the Bane Act. Id. ¶¶ 58, 71, & 82. Marshall individually asserted a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Id. ¶ 104.
On. November 5, 2014, Defendants moved to dismiss six of the eleven causes of action in Plaintiffs’ original Complaint, see ECF No. 13 (“First MTD”), which
On April 29, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint. ECF No. 41 (“FAC”). Almost immediately thereafter, Plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint. ECF No: 42. The Court granted this motion during a Case Management Conference held on June 3, 2015, for reasons stated on the record. ECF No. 68.
On June 3, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 69 (“SAC”)), asserting nine causes of action against the various Defendants. Bresaz, as successor in interest to the Decedent, asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Decedent’s rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution; under 42 U.S.C. § 12132 for violation of the ADA; and under California Civil Code § 52.1 for violation of the Bane Act. SAC ¶¶ 56, 63, 74, 89, 101. Hayes and Marshall assert claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of the Decedent’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and under California Civil Code § 52.1 -for violation of the Bane Act. Id. ¶¶ 69, 94. Marshall asserts a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Id. ¶ 97. All Plaintiffs assert a claim under California Code of Civil Procedure § 377.30 for wrongful death. Id: ¶ 83.
On August 11, 2015, Defendants moved to dismiss. several of the claims in the SAC. Defendants contend that (1) Bresaz’s ADA claim “fails to allege facts sufficient to establish that [the Decedent] was a qualified individual with a disability,” that (2) Hayes and Marshall “do not have standing” to bring a claim under the Bane Act, and that (3) Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims cannot be asserted against the County “because the County cannot be liable for the manner in which the Sheriff.. .sets policy and trains deputies on usé of force and conducting searches.” Mot. at 1-2. Plaintiffs filed a response to Defendants’ motion to dismiss on August 25, 2015, see ECF No. 98 (“Opp’n”), and Defendants filed a reply on September 1, 2015, see ECF No. 105 (“Reply”).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Motion to Dismiss
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a defendant may move to dismiss an action for failure to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
Nonetheless, the Court is not required to “‘assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations.’ ” Fayer v. Vaughn,
B. Leave to Amend
Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, leave to amend “shall be freely granted when justice so requires,” bearing in mind “the underlying purpose of Rule 15 to facilitate decision on the merits, rather than bn the pleadings or technicalities.” Lopez v. Smith,
III. DISCUSSION
A. Bresaz’s Claim Under the ADA
Bresaz, as successor in interest to the Decedent, alleges that the Decedent “was an individual' with' a disability within the meaning of the ADA” and that Defendants deprived the Decedent “of his rights under Title II of the ADA by denying him the benefit of the County’s emergency health services.” SAC ¶¶ 77, 79, Bresaz alleges that Defendants “failed reasonably to acr commodate [the Decedent’s] mental health disability in responding to the call for help with his mental illness.” Id. ¶ 80. Defendants respond by arguing that Bresaz’s ADA claim fails to sufficiently allege that the Decedent had a disability as defined by the ADA and, in the alternative, that the police were under ,no obligation to accommodate the Decedent’s disability.
The Court -will undertake its analysis in two parts. First, the Court will determine whether the ADA applies to arrests. Next, the Court will analyze whether the' SAC has alleged facts sufficient to show that the Decedent had a disability within the meaning of the ADA.
1. The ADA Applies to Arrests
Title II of the ADA prohibits a public entity from discriminating against a qualified individual’with a disability on the basis of that disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12132; Weinreich v. L.A. Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth.,
The Court, however, notes that the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to rule on this question. See City and Cnty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, — U.S.-,
Thus, this Court must follow the rule of the Ninth Circuit and apply the ADA to arrests. See Sheehan v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco,
2. The Decedent Was Not Disabled . Within the Meaning of the ADA
In order to state a claim of disability discrimination under Title'll, including a reasonable .accommodation claim, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) the plaintiff is an individual-with a disability; (2) the plaintiff is otherwise qualified to participate in or receive the benefit of some public entity’s services, programs, or activities; (3) the plaintiff was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the public entity’s services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (4) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of the plaintiffs disability. Weinreich,
With respect to the first element, the ADA defines “disability” as:
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). The phrase “physical or mental impairment” means,- inter alia, “any mental or psychological disorder” including “emotional or mental illness.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.104. The phrase “a record of such an impairment” means, inter alia, having a “history of.. .mental -or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” Id.
Here, Bresaz argues that the Decedent was disabled within the meaning of the ADA under either 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) or 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C) — that is, that the Decedent suffered from a physical or mental impairment that substantially .limited one or more major life activities (sub-paragraph (A)), or that the Decedent was regarded as having suffered from such an impairment (subparagraph (C)). The Court
1. Under Subparagraph(C), Defendants Were Not Obligated to Provide the Decedent Reasonable Accommodations as a Matter of Law
As to subparagraph (C), that the Decedent was regarded as having a disability, Bresaz’s reasonable accommodation claim cannot proceed as a matter of law. Bresaz asserts the. ADA claim against various public entities under Title II. However, under 42 U.S.C. § 12201(h), “a public entity under subchapter II
2. Under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A), the SAC Fails to Allege That the Decedent Suffered From A Qualifying Physical or Mental Impairment
In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A), Bresaz must demonstrate that the Decedent had “a physical or mental impairment” that “substantially limit[ed] one or more.. .major life activities.” In analyzing this claim, the Court acknowledges that the Court’s previous order granting in part and denying in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss, issued on March 17, 2015, failed to fully appreciate the impact of the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”) and failed to discuss subsequent Ninth Circuit precedent analyzing the impact of the ADAAA
Thus, in this order; the Court will begin its analysis by reviewing the legal framework established for ADA claims prior to the ADAAA. The Court will next discuss and summarize some of the pertinent statutory changes enacted under the ADAAA. The Court will then review Ninth Circuit case law interpreting these changes. Finally, the Court will examine whether these changes, along with the allegations made in Plaintiffs’ SAC, are sufficient to demonstrate that the Decedent suffered a disability under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A).
Prior to the enactment of the ADAAA, Ninth Circuit case law held that, in deciding whether a disability “substantially limits” a “major life activity,” relevant factors “that should be'• considered include ‘[t]he nature and severity of the impairment; [t]he duration or expected duration of the impairment; and [t]he permanent or long-term impact, or the expected permanent or long-term impact of or resulting from the impairment.’.” E.E.O.C. v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.,
In 2008, Congress amended the ADA in the following ways relevant to the current dispute. First, Congress sought “[t]o convey congressional intent that the standard created by the Supreme Court.. .and applied by lower courts in numerous decisions, ha[d] created an inappropriately high level of limitation necessary to obtain coverage under the ADA” 29 C.F.R. Part 1630, App. Intro. Second, Congress sought
Accordingly, the amended version of 42 U.S.C. § 12102 now provides .courts and administrative agencies ' with ' certain “[rjules of construction regarding the definition 'of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4). “The definition of disability.. .shall be construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals.' . . to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A). Specifically, “[t]he term ‘substantially limits’ shall be interpreted consistently with the findings and purposes of the [ADAAA].” 42 - U.S.C. § 12102(4)(B). Finally, - “[a]n impairment that is episodic or in remission [may still be considered] a -disability if it would substantially limit a major life activity when active.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D). EEOC regulations interpreting these ADAAA provisions further provide that- “ ‘[s]ub-stantially limits’ is' not meant to be a demanding standard.” 29 C.F.R. -§ 1630.2(j)(1)(i).
' In Weaving v. City of Hillsboro,
It is unclear whether case law that predates the ADAAA, such as United Parcel, remains good law in light of the rationale behind the ADAAA and the reasoning behind the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Weaving. On the one hand, the ADAAA appears to make clear Congress’s intent to broaden the scope of disability discrimination coverage under the ADA. On the other hand, Weaving also appears to highlight that there are still limits, which a court must draw, between meritorious and non-meritorious claims under the ADA. It is therefore certainly possible 'that factors considered by courts prior to the ADAAA’s enactment — such as the nature, severity, duration, and impact of an alleged impairment — remain pertinent after the ADAAA’s enactment, even though 'these factors may no longer be listed in the regulation for “substantially limits” a major life activity.
With these considerations in mind, the Court finds that the SAC sufficiently alleges that the Decedent was substantially limited in a major life activity. Several factors weigh in support of such a finding. First, as the Court has noted, the ADAAA instructs courts to interpret the “substantially limits” requirement broadly, and accompanying regulations specify that “ ‘[substantially limits’, is not meant to be a demanding standard.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i). Second, Weaving makes explicit that courts within the Ninth Circuit are to adopt a lenient standard regarding the “substantially limits” requirement. Third, new allegations in the SAC strengthen the Decedent’s case that the Decedent was “substantially limit[ed]” in a “major life activity.” “[M]ajor life activities include, but are not limited to... concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). Bresaz
Here, the SAC states that the Decedent lost touch with reality and began to have delusions on December 10, 2013. These delusions were severe to the point that the Decedent was entering meetings where the Decedent was not invited and “appeared emotionally distressed and disoriented.” SAC ¶ 20. The Decedent also expressed a belief that “guns [were] trained on him” and that the Secret Service was after him. Id. ¶ 33. The Decedent’s actions prompted “[o]ne or more Roku employees [to] call[] 911 to seek help.” Id. ¶ 20. Furthermore, according to the SAC, the Decedent’s delusional state of mind “substantially limited his ability.. .to concentrate, think, communicate, and interact with the SCCSO deputies.” Id. ¶ 77. If the Decedent did in fact suffer from such severe delusional beliefs, then Decedent would have certainly been “limited in his ability to work compared to most people in the general population.” Weaving,
Although some of these allegations in the SAC largely recite the elements of the statute, several others provide depth and detail on the magnitude of the Decedent’s limitations. For instance, in contrast to the original Complaint, which alleged generally that the Decedent “appeared ‘manic’” and that the Decedent suffered from “mental illness,” the SAC describes the specific symptoms afflicting the Decedent. Compare Compl. ¶¶ 16, 18 with SAC ¶¶ 33-34. This specificity shows the extent of the Decedent’s limitations, as required under the statute.
Although the Court finds that, the Decedent was substantially limited in performing a major life activity, the Court also finds that the SAC fails to sufficiently allege that the Decedent suffered from a qualifying physical or mental impairment as defined by the ADA. Several , factors counsel in favor of this finding. First, unlike the “substantiaEy limits” requirement, the ADAAA did, not specifically instruct courts to apply, a more lenient standard with respect to the qualifying physical or mental impairment requirement. This, indeed, appears to be the interpretation given to the ADAAA by the Ninth Circuit in Weaving — that is, to interpret “substan-tiaEy limits” broadly, but not necessarily to apply a similarly broad construction to the “physical or mental impairment” requirement. See Weaving,
Third, and most importantly, the SAC faüs to address the shortcomings identified by the Court in the Court’s previous order granting in part and denying in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ original Complaint. As this Court previously noted, where, as here, a party alleges that he or she is disabled under the ADA,
Although these cases were decided prior to 2008, even cases decided after the ADAAA’s enactment appear to retain a similar specificity requirement. See Bolmer v. Oliveira,
As these cases demonstrate, a successful plaintiff will usually, allege that he or she suffered from a specific, recognized mental or physical illness. Here, on the other hand, the SAC contains no allegations that the Decedent suffered from a specific mental disorder or that the Decedent was ever medically diagnosed with having a specific mental disorder. In fact, in contrast to the original Complaint, the SAC no longer even alleges that the Decedent “had a history of .mental illness for which he had taken prescription medication.” See Compl. ¶ 16. Instead, the SAC appears to only allege facts showing that the Decedent suffered from delusional beliéfs on a single day — December 10, 2013. Plaintiffs have cited no authority to suggest that a single episode, suffered by an individual with no diagnosis of mental illness and no history of mental illness, is sufficient to constitute a mental impairment under the ADA. The Court has found none in the Court’s own research.
The Court also rejects Plaintiffs’ argument that “[i]t is immaterial that [the Decedent’s] mental illness ‘disrupted [only] a single day at work.” Opp’n at 5. Plaintiffs point to 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D), which states that “[a]n impairment that, is episodic.. .is a disability if it would substantially limit a major life activity when active.” However, a single alleged episode on a single day at work is not “episodic.”
Indeed, legislative history provides that “[t]his provision is intended to reject .the reasoning of court decisions concluding that certain individuals with certain conditions — such as epilepsy or post traumatic stress disorder — were not protected.. .because their conditions were episodic or intermittent.” 29 C.F.R. Part 1630, App. § 1630.2(j)(1)(vii) (emphasis added). Similarly, courts have interpreted this provision to treat episodic as implying that a condition occurs intermittently or occasionally but, at minimum, that the condition occurs more than once. In E.E.O.C. v. AutoZone, Inc.,
Plaintiffs have cited no case law, and the Court has found none, where a party has stated a cognizable ADA disability discrimination claim based on a single, isolated incident of mental illness, particularly where there is no diagnosis of mental illness or history of mental illness. The Court also emphasizes .that these shortcomings were documented in the Court’s previous order, with the Court specifically instructing Plaintiffs to “cure the deficiencies identified herein by including some factual specificity as to Plaintiffs’ claim.” Order at 15. Plaintiffs have failed to do so, and have even removed some supporting allegations that were in the original Complaint, such as the fact that the Decedent “had a history of mental illness for which he had taken prescription medication.” Compl. ¶ 16. The Court therefore concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to plead facts sufficient to show that the Decedent suffered from a qualifying mental impairment under the ADA.
In sum, the Court concludes that the ADA applies to arrests and that the Decedent was substantially limited in a major life activity. However, the Court finds that the SAC fails to establish that the Decedent had a mental impairment as defined by the ADA. Plaintiffs have failed to cure the deficiencies identified in the Court’s prior order. Granting leave to amend would therefore be both futile and cause undue delay to the proceedings. -See Lead-singer,
B. Hayes and Marshall’s Claim Under the Bane Act
In the original Complaint in this case, Plaintiffs alleged that “Defendants’ conduct.. .interfered with... [the Decedent’s] rights under [various federal and state laws].. .through violence or the threat of violence.” Compl. ¶ 83. “As a direct and proximate result of defendants’ conduct,” Plaintiffs sought damages under the Bane Act. Id. ¶ 84. In this Court’s order addressing Defendants’ first motion to dismiss, this Court stated that “[a] party lacks standing to bring a claim under the Bane Act when the party does not claim to have personally suffered a violation of a constitutional or statutory right.” Order at 16 (emphasis added). Because “Plaintiffs d[id] not allege that they have suffered a constitutional or statutory injury independent of the Decedent,” this Court dismissed with prejudice Plaintiffs’ Bane Act claim. '
Hayes and Marshall (but not Bresaz) have nonetheless re-asserted a nearly-identical Bane Act claim in the Second Amended Complaint. Hayes and Marshall argue that Defendants’ conduct interfered with Hayes and Marshall’s fundamental interest in maintaining a familial relationship .with the Decedent. This interest, Hayes and Marshall claim, represents a protected .liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. See.Opp’n at 9.
As before, the California Court of Appeal’s decision in Bay Area Rapid Transit District v. Superior Court (“BART”),
. BART governs the instant case. Hayes and Marshall have’ provided the Court with no authority to suggest otherwise. Indeed, the Court has found none in its own research. As this Court made clear in its previous order, per BART, Hayes and Marshall have not “themselves been the subject of violence or threats.” BART,
For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Hayes land Marshall’s claim under the Bane Act. Moreover, consistent with this Court’s prior order, the Court finds this claim barred' as a matter of law and finds that granting leave to amend would be futile. Hayes and Marshall’s claim is’therefore dismissed with prejudice. See Lopez,
C. Plaintiffs’ Claims Against the County Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Finally, ’ Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against the County should be dismissed because the Santa Clara County Sheriff is a state actor, and state actors are immune from suit under § 1983. As Plaintiffs point out, Defendants’ argument is somewhat unusual, as the Santa Clara County Sheriff is not even a named party to the instant case. Opp’n at 10-11. Defendants contend, however, that Plaintiffs, “have sued the County on the basis that the County is responsible for [setting the] alleged unconstitutional policies or practices of the Sheriffs Office.” Reply at 9. Yet, according to Defendants, “the County has no direct control over the Sheriffs performance of law-enforcement functions.” Id. at 9. That control, Defendants argue, is exercised by the state. Thus, the County should be dismissed with respect to Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims, and neither the state nor the Sheriffs Office may, as a matter of law, be sued under § 1983.
Defendants’ argument is without merit. In Jackson v. Barnes,
Defendants in the instant case acknowledge the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Jackson.
Defendants also acknowledge that the Ninth Circuit considered (and rejected) the various state court decisions that Defendants now urge this Court to rely upon. Mot. at 14-15. In essence, Defendants’ contentions represent merely an attempt to re-litigate Jackson. .
These contentions are not well taken. Even if this Court were persuaded about the relative merits of Venegas, this Court could not, as a matter of law, depart from the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Jackson. In order for a district court to reexamine the holding of a prior Ninth Circuit decision, “the relevant court of last resort [here, the California Supreme Court] must' have undercut the theory or reasoning underlying the prior circuit precedent in such a way that the -cases, are clearly irreepncilable.” Miller v. Gammie,
IY. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Hayes and Marshall’s Bane Act claim and Bresaz’s ADA claim are GRANTED with prejudice. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is otherwise DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Notes
. See Van Hulle v. Pacific Telesis Corp.,