*771Police officer trainee Bret Cornell, while off-duty and in street clothes, went for a run one morning in Golden Gate Park, stopping for a brief rest on a knoll called Hippie Hill. Two uniformed patrol officers in the area spotted him, thought he looked "worried," and grew suspicious because the bushes on Hippie Hill are known for illicit drug activity. As the patrolmen began to approach Cornell, but before they reached him or said anything to him, he resumed his run. The officers gave chase, joined in pursuit by two other officers who responded to a call for backup. One of the officers, with his gun drawn, eventually caught up to Cornell on a trail in some nearby woods.
Cornell claims he had no idea he was being chased or that the officers wished to speak with him. On the trail, he says he heard a shout from behind, "I will shoot you," and looked over his shoulder to see a dark figure pointing a gun at him. He darted away, ultimately finding what he thought was refuge with a police officer awaiting his arrival some distance away at the top of a stairway in AIDS Memorial Grove. But to his surprise when he arrived there, that officer ordered him to the ground. He was arrested at gun-point and searched, taken in handcuffs to a stationhouse for interrogation, and eventually to a hospital for a drug test, which was negative.
In the meantime, a team of officers went back to Golden Gate Park, spoke to people who had seen Cornell that morning, and conducted a search of the areas where he was known to have been, and of his parked truck. No evidence of involvement with drugs turned up, and after nearly six hours in custody, Cornell was released. As he was leaving the stationhouse, he was given a criminal citation for evading arrest in violation of Penal Code section 148. Other than cursory questioning by the officers who issued the citation, no one in a position of higher authority ever interviewed him or asked for his side of the story. Cornell was never prosecuted, but he lost his job as a result of the arrest and citation.
To recover for the damage done to him, Cornell sued the four arresting officers, the Chief of Police, and the City and County of San Francisco. Following phase one of a bifurcated jury trial on special verdict forms, the trial court, relying on findings of fact by the jury in the initial phase, determined that Cornell was arrested without probable cause, thereby establishing liability for false arrest, and prompting the defense to stipulate to liability for negligence. In phase two, the jury returned a verdict for Cornell on two remaining claims, tortious interference with economic advantage, and violation of Civil Code section 52.1 ( Section 52.1 ), awarding total damages of $575,231. Following trial, the court added $2,027,612.75 in attorney's fees and costs on the Section 52.1 claim.
*772These consolidated appeals are from the ensuing judgment and the award of attorney's fees and costs. The appellants argue 1) as a matter of law, the jury's phase one findings do not support the trial court's determination that probable cause was lacking, 2) the trial court should have declared a mistrial when the jury deadlocked on one of 18 questions put to it in the phase one special verdict form, 3) the trial court failed to address their argument that, under Penal Code section 847, subdivision (b), they are immune from claims for *360false arrest, and 4) even if the verdict on the tort claims is upheld, the Section 52.1 verdict and accompanying award of fees and costs must be reversed because there was insufficient evidence to submit that claim to the jury.
Seeing no error, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Evidence at Trial
In July 2010, Bret Cornell, a recent graduate of the police academy employed by the San Francisco Police Department as a field officer trainee, went for a morning jog in Golden Gate Park at around 7:00 a.m., after finishing a night shift. He was dressed in gray canvas pants cut off at mid-ankle, a plaid fleece jacket over a dark t-shirt, and running shoes. After running a considerable distance, at around 8:00 a.m., he ran across Sharon Meadow and stopped to rest at the top of Hippie Hill, just as a police cruiser drove through the trees up to the crest of the hill along a pedestrian pathway. He looked at the car, and not wanting to interfere with whatever the officers were doing, walked down to the bottom of the hill.
The two uniformed officers in the cruiser, David Brandt and Richard "Brett" Bodisco, considered Hippie Hill to be a high crime area. Both officers had made numerous narcotics arrests there, mostly involving drug transactions in the bushes, and there had been a homicide in the park a few days earlier. According to Officers Brandt and Bodisco, they drove up the pathway to gauge the reaction of people on the other side of the crest who could not see them coming. Cornell, a stranger to the officers, glanced at their car when they came into view, and then looked away. Cornell was by himself, not talking to anyone, had nothing in his hands, and was not doing anything specific to arouse suspicion. Officer Brandt described Cornell as having a *773"clean-cut" look, which he said was consistent with someone who was a recent parolee.
As the officers turned toward Cornell, and as he walked away from them, headed downhill, he looked back briefly in their direction and then began running. With their suspicions aroused, the officers decided to chase Cornell and detain him. Officer Bodisco jumped out of the car and made a radio call for backup to assist in setting up a perimeter to cut Cornell off from any escape. The call, which drew the assistance of two more uniformed officers, Jesse Farrell and Sergeant Wallace Gin, included a description of Cornell and the direction he was headed, but no other details. When Officer Bodisco's call for backup went out, the police dispatcher asked "What's the want?" Officer Bodisco responded, simply, "[R]unning." According to Officer Brandt, the call gave no specifics because at that point "we didn't have anything specific." Surveying the area from the top of the hill *361to see where Cornell went, Officer Bodisco testified he saw Cornell go off path through some bushes, reappearing below the hill without his plaid jacket and wearing only a dark shirt, which the officers took to be an attempt to throw them off his track.
When Cornell left Hippie Hill, he was unaware the officers wanted him to stop. His explanation for discarding his fleece jacket was that, after an hour's run, he was feeling hot. Having unsuccessfully tried to tie his fleece jacket around his waist while running at an earlier point on his route, he folded it and placed it on a tree stump to retrieve later. He said he had done that before and had no problem with anyone taking it, and even if someone did take it, the garment was inexpensive and easily replaceable. Once the officers caught sight of Cornell from their vantage point on Hippie Hill, Officer Bodisco set out after him on foot. Officer Brandt, still in the cruiser, drove down and around the hill, past some tennis courts, and along nearby Bowling Green Drive. As he drove, Officer Brandt stopped to ask two people along the way if they had seen someone matching Cornell's description; one person claimed to have seen someone running near the tennis courts, and another said he had heard some rustling in bushes up a winding dirt trail nearby.
Continuing in the direction these park users pointed out, Officer Brandt's search took him to the bottom of a trail known as the High Path, a dirt pathway lined on both sides by trees and brush, leading up a hill beyond Bowling Green Drive at the entrance to the AIDS Memorial Grove. Officer *774Farrell arrived and joined Officer Brandt at the bottom of the High Path, and the two of them began proceeding up the trail, with Officer Brandt in the lead. Officer Brandt described the trail as dark and having a "cave[-like] appearance." He unholstered his gun at this point and held it in a "low ready" position, not because of any specific threat, but because of "fear of the unknown." Officer Farrell, for his part, perceiving no threat, left his gun holstered.
Officer Brandt caught sight of Cornell walking up ahead and eventually came close enough to confront him. Officer Farrell was directly behind Officer Brandt, could see that Cornell appeared to be "clean cut," was not armed, had nothing in his hands, and was doing nothing threatening. Officer Brandt shouted something at Cornell. Both officers recall Officer Brandt unmistakably ordering Cornell to stop at that point,
Cornell-who testified he still had no idea he was being pursued by police officers during the encounter on the High Path-said he heard a "disturbance" behind him and then heard the words "I will shoot you," which prompted him to glance over his shoulder and see a dark figure pointing a gun. He said he took off sprinting in desperate flight from an unknown, armed attacker, and then tripped and fell down a steeply pitched slope through some trees, tumbling into the AIDS Memorial Grove. Standing at the top of a stairway across the meadow from where Cornell landed was Sergeant Gin. Cornell began to run toward the stairway, thinking he had *362found protection from the unknown assailant who had just accosted him on the High Path. To Cornell's surprise when he reached the bottom of the stairway, Sergeant Gin ordered him to stop and put his hands up.
At this point, Cornell surrendered without any protest or struggle. He raised his hands as directed, but Sergeant Gin testified that as Cornell began walking up the stairs he lowered his right hand to shoulder height, at which point Sergeant Gin drew his gun and ordered him to the ground. Cornell again complied. As he lay prone on the steps, Officers Bodisco, Brandt and Farrell arrived, and Officer Bodisco handcuffed him, with the cuffs binding his hands behind his back. Cornell remained cooperative and compliant throughout the handcuffing process.
*775Upon being handcuffed, Cornell was not advised he was under arrest or the basis of the arrest. None of the officers dispute, however, that he was under arrest. Having made the arrest, the officers conducted a full search incident-to-arrest. The search turned up nothing except Cornell's police identification and a standard-issue set of handcuffs in his back pocket. It was not until this point-some seven minutes after the initial encounter on Hippie Hill-that Cornell told the arresting officers he was a police officer and that he was just out for a run. When asked where his gun was, Cornell said it was in his truck, which was parked near Stowe Lake. Sergeant Gin decided at this point to take Cornell to Park Station for further interrogation. Cornell was then escorted up the steps and loaded into the back of a transport wagon, still bound in handcuffs behind his back.
As Cornell was being driven to Park Station, he began to feel light-headed, had trouble breathing, and he requested a double set of handcuffs to relieve discomfort. He repeatedly asked the driver for assistance, but was ignored. After the transport wagon left, headed for Park Station, several officers conducted a search in Golden Gate Park, looking for incriminating evidence. They found Cornell's plaid jacket discarded in the bushes, but there was nothing in it. They also located Cornell's truck, which was parked on Conservatory Drive, some distance from Stowe Lake where Cornell said he parked it; his gun was inside, where he had indicated it could be found.
Upon arrival at Park Station, Cornell still had not been told why he was under arrest. Officers Bodisco and Brandt surreptitiously recorded an interview of him and during the questioning Officer Brandt told Cornell "[y]ou're going to end up hanging yourself pretty hard by lying. I can tell you that right now." Cornell's repeated question, "What's the charge?," went unanswered. Responding to Cornell's insistence that he had been unaware he was being pursued by police and that no officer ever issued a command to stop running, Officer Brandt accused him of being a "professional"-meaning someone who has an "extensive history of criminal misconduct" who seeks to "work the system for their benefit"-and brushed off Cornell's denial of wrongdoing with the comment, "you can talk to them downtown."
While held in custody at Park Station, Cornell was handcuffed to a bench in full view of many officers, the "entire watch" as he put it, and he overheard several of them chuckling about him being a field officer trainee, which elicited comments such as "not anymore" and "another one bites the dust." Cornell continued to report being in physical distress while at Park Station, so paramedics were called, and he was taken to a hospital. In the ambulance, while the paramedics were taking Cornell to the hospital, Officer Brandt arranged to place a hidden audio recording device near *363him, "because *776[he] might say something stupid." The recording captured nothing incriminating. At the hospital, a sample of Cornell's blood was taken and tested for the presence of narcotics. The blood draw was negative.
Upon receiving medical clearance at the hospital, Cornell was returned to Park Station, where he was eventually released at 1:50 p.m., after nearly six hours in custody. While processing him for release, Officer Brandt said to Cornell "you know the drill" and handed him a misdemeanor citation accusing him of violating Penal Code section 148, subdivision (a), for resisting or delaying an officer in the course of his duties. The citation, signed by Officer Bodisco, and approved by Sergeant Gin, specified Hippie Hill as the location of the offense. No criminal charges were ever brought, but two days later, pursuant to a policy requiring termination for misconduct of any officer trainee-trainees are probationary employees-the San Francisco Police Department summarily released Cornell from its employ, ending his career as a San Francisco police officer and effectively disqualifying him from obtaining a law enforcement position with other departments or agencies.
B. Claims and Trial Proceedings
Cornell brought this action against Officers Brandt, Bodisco and Farrell, Sergeant Gin, San Francisco Police Chief George Gascon, and the City and County of San Francisco (the City). In his complaint, as amended, he pleaded claims for violation of Section 52.1, negligence, assault and battery, false arrest and imprisonment, and tortious interference with contract and/or economic advantage.
The case was tried to a jury over the course of 23 trial days in October and November 2013. At the close of the evidence, jury deliberations were bifurcated into two phases, with the first phase addressing the claims of assault and false arrest. A special verdict form for Phase I presented a series of 18 questions, beginning with a question asking the jury to decide whether Cornell had proved his assault claim, followed by a series of 17 factual questions pertinent to the legal issue of probable cause to arrest.
After a day and a half of Phase I deliberations, the jury reported being "hopelessly stuck" on two of the questions submitted to it. The court admonished the jury to keep trying. Late that afternoon, a Friday, the jury again reported it was still stuck on two questions, this time adding that there was "no other testimony or evidence that will change any of our minds." With the jury at an impasse, the court recessed for the weekend, after first excusing a juror who had a schedule conflict and substituting an alternate juror. The reconstituted jury began deliberations anew the following week, but after two additional days of deliberating, remained hung, though on only one question. The court decided to take the Phase I verdict at that point despite the unanswered question, over an objection from the defense.
In its Phase I verdict, the jury found unambiguously for the appellants on the assault claim. Beyond that, however, the results were mixed, with some findings tending to favor the officers' version of events, and some findings tending to favor Cornell's version. In the findings favorable to Cornell, the jury found that Officers Brandt and Bodisco never said anything or otherwise communicated to Cornell their desire to speak to him on Hippie Hill; that it was not reasonable for them to believe Cornell had come out of the bushes on *778Hippie Hill; and that, contrary to Officer Bodisco's testimony, they did not see Cornell run off trail through the bushes when he left Hippie Hill. The jury deadlocked on the question whether it was reasonable for Officers Brandt and Bodisco to believe Cornell fled from them on Hippie Hill.
In the findings favoring the defense, on the other hand, the jury found that Officers Bodisco and Brandt considered Hippie Hill to be a high crime area; that the officers' knowledge of the types of crimes committed there "could lead them to suspect" Cornell may have been engaged in criminal activity; that the officers reasonably believed that Cornell appeared "nervous or evasive" when he saw them; that they reasonably believed Cornell shed his jacket in an effort to avoid being detected; that when Officers Brandt and Farrell encountered Cornell on the High Path, they reasonably believed he knew they were police officers; that a reasonable officer would not have believed Cornell was fleeing from the use of unreasonable force against him by Officer Brandt; that, contrary to Cornell's testimony, he went down the hill from the High Path into the AIDS Memorial Grove intentionally, not accidentally; and that it was reasonable for the *365officers to believe he was trying to evade capture in doing so.
Based on the jury's Phase I findings, the court ruled as a matter of law that defendants did not have reasonable suspicion to detain Cornell and that he was arrested without probable cause. In the hiatus between Phases I and II, the defense stipulated to liability on the part of all defendants on the negligence claim, leaving only the tortious interference with economic advantage claim and the Section 52.1 claim for decision in Phase II. Moving on to the next phase of the jury deliberations, the court posed a series of Phase II questions pertaining to these two claims and to issues of causation and damages on all claims. With liability for false arrest and negligence established in Phase I, the jury returned a Phase II special verdict finding liability on the tortious interference and Section 52.1 claims, awarding total damages of $575,231, including $234,007 in past economic damages, $266,224 in future economic damages, and $75,000 in past non-economic damages, with judgment entered accordingly.
*779These timely appeals followed, from the judgment and from the attorney's fee award.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Probable Cause to Arrest
Where the facts are not in conflict, the issue of probable cause is a question of law reviewable de novo on appeal. ( Giannis v. City and County of San Francisco (1978)
The legal standard we apply to assess probable cause is an objective one in which the subjective motivations of the arresting officers have no role. ( *366Whren v. United States (1996)
Of course, temporary detention on grounds short of probable cause is also constitutionally permissible in some circumstances. ( Terry v. Ohio (1968)
Our Supreme Court recently explained that " '[a] detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the detaining officer can point to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that the person detained may be involved in criminal activity.' [Citation.] Such reasonable suspicion cannot be based solely on factors unrelated to the defendant, such as criminal activity in the area." ( People v. Casares (2016)
Cornell was arrested for the offense of "willfully resist[ing], delay [ing], or obstruct[ing] [a] ... peace officer ... in the discharge ... [of a] duty of his or her office" under Penal Code section 148, subdivision (a). To violate this statute, the obstructive conduct must impede the lawful performance of an officer's duty. ( People v. Curtis (1969)
We agree with the trial court that there was no reasonable suspicion to detain and hence no probable cause to arrest. This incident took place in broad daylight in one of the most heavily used public recreation areas in San Francisco. The jury found that when the chase commenced, Officers Brandt and Bodisco knew little more than that they had seen Cornell at a location where drug crimes often took place, but with nothing connecting him to any criminal activity. The man had nothing in his hands, made no furtive movements, and was speaking to no one. Nothing about the way he was dressed indicated he might be hiding something under his clothing, and Officers Brandt and Bodisco gave him no directions that he disobeyed. (See Casares , supra , 62 Cal.4th at p. 838,
On the strength of testimony from Officer Bodisco that Cornell "looked worried" and avoided making eye contact with him and his partner, the jury found the officers reasonably believed Cornell seemed "nervous or evasive." But " '[l]ooking at a police officer and then looking away does not provide the officer with "a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity." ' " ( People v. Pitts (2004)
The jury's finding that the officers' knowledge of Hippie Hill as a hotspot for crime "could lead them to suspect that Cornell may be involved in criminal activity" was equally true of anyone else in the vicinity. Because these two officers had insufficient information to do anything more than seek a consensual encounter with Cornell as they watched him on Hippie Hill (see *782Casares , supra , 62 Cal.4th at p. 838,
Pointing to the fact Cornell shed his jacket after starting to run, a move the jury found gave Officers Brandt and Bodisco reasonable grounds to believe he was trying to "avoid detection," appellants emphasize that evasive flight can provide reasonable suspicion, especially when the experience of officers with crime in a particular area connects a fleeing person to illicit activity. It is true that, in a high crime area, "unprovoked flight upon noticing the police" may provide reasonable suspicion in some circumstances ( Wardlow , supra , 528 U.S. at p. 124,
What is important here is whether the circumstances known to the officers, in totality, connected Cornell to suspected criminal activity, not whether, as a standalone matter, they perceived him to be fleeing from them when he began to run. The jury made no finding, and there was no evidence, that Cornell was carrying something Officers Brandt and Bodisco thought could be contraband and discarded it as he ran. Nor was there any finding that Cornell was desperate, panicked or in "[h]eadlong flight" ( *783Wardlow , supra , 528 U.S. at p. 124,
Appellants rely heavily on People v. Rodriguez , supra ,
*784Shifting their focus slightly, appellants point to Cornell's later actions on the High Path, where he defied an order to stop and launched into a sprint through the woods with desperate abandon, scrambling down the side of a hill into the AIDS Memorial Grove. This sequence of events on the High Path, they say, was part of a fluid series of events leading up to the moment of arrest. By then, appellants contend, the jury's findings establish without doubt that Cornell was in full flight, clearly indicating consciousness of guilt. They argue that, given the evolving nature of the situation, we must not limit the question to what Officers Brandt and Bodisco knew at the outset of the chase, but must consider all the circumstances known to them prior to Cornell's surrender. We agree, but the problem for appellants is that what happened on the High Path was provoked. The jury's finding that Officers Brandt and Farrell reasonably perceived Cornell to be running away from them at that point does not negate the obvious: Foolishly or not, Cornell ran away at the point of a gun and a threat of "I will shoot you." Other than *370this panicked reaction-which Officer Brandt brought about-there was no greater cause to detain Cornell on the High Path than there was on Hippie Hill.
Granted, the better and certainly the safer course for Cornell was to surrender on the High Path, but in order for his defiance to constitute a violation of Penal Code section 148, Officers Brandt and Farrell still had to be acting in the lawful performance of their duties, which places the focus back on what happened at the beginning of the chase. Because Officers Brandt and Bodisco did not have reasonable suspicion to detain in the first place, the trial court properly concluded that none of the appellant officers acted in the lawful course of his duties at later points in time. Thus, when Cornell darted away on the High Path, it made no difference whether he took off out of fright, still unaware he was being chased by police officers (as he claims), or out of a desire not to be caught, despite having looked straight at two uniformed officers, in defiance of their command to stop (as the officers claim). Officer Brandt chased down and trained a weapon on a running man about whom he knew virtually nothing, except that this was someone who had the temerity to try to elude capture. Without something objectively tying him to criminal activity, we conclude that none of the appellant officers had a *785legal basis to detain-much less probable cause to arrest-on Hippie Hill, on the High Path, or in AIDS Memorial Grove.
B. Incomplete Phase I Special Verdict
In addition to claiming there was reasonable suspicion to detain and thus probable cause to arrest, appellants challenge the Phase I verdict on procedural grounds. After many days of deliberation in Phase I, and after the jury had sent multiple messages to the court asking about specific questions posed on the Phase I Verdict Form, and after repeatedly reporting an inability to reach a verdict on a number of those questions, the jury finally managed to reach a verdict on all but one question, Question No. 8. Appellants argue that this question-which asked the jury to find whether Officers Brandt and Bodisco reasonably believed Cornell was fleeing from them when he began running on Hippie Hill-was so material to the issue of reasonable suspicion that it was reversible error to accept the Phase I verdict without an answer to it. On that basis, they contend it was an abuse of discretion to deny their motion for a mistrial. We cannot agree.
Even assuming the acceptance of an incomplete Phase I Verdict Form was error, we do not see the factual issue presented by Question No. 8 as so material to the total mix of facts that it would have changed the outcome on the issue of reasonable suspicion had it been decided in favor of appellants. Cornell would have been entitled to walk away had the officers approached him on Hippie Hill, as we note above. Our analysis of the circumstances when he left Hippie Hill assumes Officers *371Brandt and Bodisco did perceive he ran from them, as they testified, and as Question No. 8 asked the jury to find, but even granting that assumption we do not think the totality of what they knew at that stage points to anything more than a hunch that he could have had some connection to criminal activity on Hippie Hill. We thus conclude the court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellants' motion for a mistrial. (See Blumenthal v. Superior Court (2006)
C. Statutory Immunity Under Penal Code Section 847, Subdivision (b)
Next, appellants argue we should reverse because the trial court never "specifically addressed" whether the appellant officers are statutorily immune for the false arrest of Cornell. Penal Code section 847, subdivision (b) provides that "[t]here shall be no civil liability on the part of, and no cause of *786action shall arise against, any peace officer ..., acting within the scope of his or her authority, for false arrest or false imprisonment arising out of any arrest" under specified circumstances, and one of those circumstances, set forth in subdivision (b)(1), is that "[t]he arrest was lawful, or the peace officer, at the time of the arrest, had reasonable cause to believe the arrest was lawful."
We see no error here either. California courts speak of "reasonable cause" and "probable cause" interchangeably ( Pool v. City of Oakland (1986)
While novel, appellants' argument has worthy bona fides. It is based on a reading of the language of Penal Code 847, subdivision (b), that was first advocated in 1963 by the eminent scholar of governmental immunity in California, Professor Arvo Van Alstyne. Focusing his attention on the fact that the statute, by its literal terms, affords immunity for false arrest if "the arrest was lawful, or the peace officer, at the time of the arrest, had reasonable cause to believe the arrest was lawful" (italics added), Professor Van Alstyne argued that the disjunctive phrase "reasonable cause to believe" would be surplusage if it did not defeat liability for unlawful arrests as well as lawful ones. (See "A Study Relating to Sovereign Immunity" (Jan. 1963) 5 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1963), at pp. 407-408 (1963 Van Alstyne *372Study).) To trigger the protection of the statute, he argued, an officer should only be required to show he in fact believed the arrest was justified. (Id . at p. 408.)
Cornell is correct that Venegas II held that the federal qualified immunity "does not apply to actions brought under ... [S]ection 52.1" ( 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1246,
We do not agree that Penal Code section 847 provides that authorization. Subdivision (b)(1) of Penal Code section 847 is coextensive with the doctrine of probable cause ( Hamilton , supra , 217 Cal.App.3d at p. 846,
Understood within the context provided by the legislative history, therefore, the reference to both "lawful arrest" and arrest on "reasonable cause" in section 847, subdivision (b)(1), is not surplusage. It is simply descriptive of the two-part holding in Dragna that the Legislature recognized as foundational. Shorn of its textual premise, the policy rationale for Professor Van Alstyne's reading of the statutory language-that peace officers should have protection from civil liability for arrests made upon reasonable mistake-is already fundamental to the modern concept of probable cause and its close *790cousin reasonable suspicion. Without clear and definite legislative authorization, we are not inclined to announce that, after all these years, we have discovered in section 847, subdivision (b) an additional layer of protection from civil liability beyond what already exists through the doctrine of probable cause, or to use section 847 as the statutory basis for importing federal qualified immunity into California law.
1. The Bane Act
On the recommendation of a commission appointed by then Attorney General John Van de Kamp, the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act (Stats.1987, ch. 1277, §§ 3-4, pp. 4544-4548) (the Bane Act) was enacted in 1987 "as part of a comprehensive package of legislation to combat hate crimes." ( Venegas II , supra , 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1242,
The centerpiece of civil enforcement under the Bane Act is subdivision (a) of Section 52.1, which provides, "If a person or persons, whether or not acting under color of law, interferes by threat, intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere by threat, intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the rights secured by the Constitution or laws of this state, the Attorney General, or any district attorney or city attorney may bring a civil action for injunctive and other appropriate equitable relief in the name of the people of the *376State of California, in order to protect the peaceable exercise or enjoyment of the right or rights secured. ..." Private actions by aggrieved individuals are authorized under Section 52.1, subdivision (b), which provides for recovery of compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive relief, civil penalties, and attorney's fees. "The creation of civil causes of action by victims of ... conduct" in violation of Section 52.1 is central to the Bane Act's enforcement scheme. ( Stamps v. Superior Court (2006)
Claims may be brought under Section 52.1, subdivision (a), against rights-interfering conduct by private actors as well as by public officials ( Jones , supra , 17 Cal.4th at p. 338,
The model for Section 52.1 is a similarly worded Massachusetts statute, Massachusetts Civil Rights Act of 1979 ( Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 12, §§ 11H, 11I ) (MCRA). ( Jones, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 335,
*377*7932. Appellants' Contentions
Appellants argue we should reverse the finding for Cornell on his Section 52.1 claim along with the accompanying award of statutory attorney's fees because there was insufficient evidence to submit that claim to the jury. This attack on the Section 52.1 verdict here is three-pronged. First, appellants point out that since the jury rejected Cornell's assault claim, it necessarily rejected his claim of excessive force. Relying on the requirement that a Section 52.1 claim must rest on evidence of "threat[ ], intimidation or coercion," they contend it was error for the trial court to submit this statutory claim to the jury. We reject the premise of this argument. Nothing in the Phase I Special Verdict Form required the jury to make any express finding on the issue of unreasonable force. The Phase I jury instruction on assault defined unreasonable force using the Fourth Amendment multifactor articulation of excessive force in Graham v. Connor (1989)
Cornell's theory was that Officer Brandt and Sergeant Gin committed an assault by pointing a gun at him, putting him in fear of being shot. In support of this theory, he presented evidence that the gun-pointing by both officers in a low-threat level situation violated the San Francisco Police Department's policy on the use of deadly *378force and officer training standards for handling weapons. Indulging all inferences in favor of reconciling the Phase I and Phase II verdicts, as we must, a rational jury in Phase II could have concluded that, under the circumstances, the threatened use of deadly force was *794unreasonable (see Robinson v. Solano County (9th Cir. 2002)
The explanation for the finding against Cornell on the assault claim, but in his favor on the Section 52.1 claim, may also be one of timing. In resolving the assault claim, the jury may have decided in Phase I that Officer Brandt and Sergeant Gin were privileged to use force under Penal Code section 835a ["[a]ny peace officer who has reasonable cause to believe ... [an arrestee] has committed a public offense may use reasonable force to effect the arrest]", but then, following the court's determination of no probable cause, concluded in Phase II that there was no such privilege.
Second, appellants argue that Cornell proved a false arrest, at most, and that liability under Section 52.1 cannot be based on false arrest alone. (See Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015)
Then, upon Cornell's release, he was cited for the misdemeanor offense of violating Penal Code section 148, subdivision (a). That citation was referred to the internal affairs unit of the San Francisco Police Department, and without further investigation by internal affairs, the citation became the basis of a misconduct charge, resulting in Cornell's firing. Officer Brandt, who gave Cornell the citation, admitted not knowing the factual basis for the Penal Code section 148 charge, and Sergeant Gin, who approved the citation, admitted he had no independent knowledge about why it was issued. According to Alice Villagomez, the head of Human Resources in the San Francisco Police Department, any experienced officer would have understood the citation would likely result in Cornell's termination. All of this evidence supports an inference not only that Officer Brandt and Sergeant Gin arrested Cornell unlawfully, but that they acted spitefully toward him as well since they knew or should have known the career-ending Penal Code section 148 citation they gave him upon his release was baseless.
Third, appellants invoke Shoyoye v. County of Los Angeles (2012)
Reversing a plaintiff's jury verdict for Shoyoye on the Bane Act claim while affirming on the false imprisonment claim, the appellate panel in Shoyoye set forth its analysis of Section 52.1 liability in two steps, first concluding that, "[t]he statutory framework of section 52.1 indicates that the Legislature meant the statute to address interference with constitutional rights involving more egregious conduct than mere negligence." ( Shoyoye , supra , 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 958,
*7973. Shoyoye is a Jail Overdetention Case that Began with A Lawful Arrest
To begin with, the record here supports a finding of more than negligence or lack of courtesy. More importantly, we view the second step of the court's Section 52.1 analysis in Shoyoye -its independent from inherent coercion test-as inapplicable where, as here, a Bane Act plaintiff pleads and proves a constitutionally unlawful arrest. We reach this conclusion upon a close reading of Shoyoye , paying careful attention to its facts and to the claims at issue there. The situation leading to plaintiff Shoyoye's mistaken incarceration started with his arrest, and originally he alleged a constitutionally unreasonable seizure, but as the case proceeded there was never any dispute that the arrest was lawful. In fact, he conceded there was probable cause to arrest him. ( Shoyoye, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 951, fn. 2,
*381At trial, Shoyoye presented evidence that, while in jail, he inquired repeatedly about why he had not been released, but was ignored by his jailers until, through a friend, he managed to have a member of the Legislature look into his circumstances, which ultimately triggered his release. ( Shoyoye, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at pp. 951-953,
When the court announces that Section 52.1 requires "coercion independent from the coercion inherent in the wrongful detention itself" ( Shoyoye, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 959,
Shoyoye uses a variety of terms to describe the scienter it has in mind (see 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 958,
We agree that the use of excessive force can be enough to satisfy the "threat, intimidation or coercion" element of Section 52.1, but we do not accept the premise that Shoyoye applies in unlawful arrest cases. Because, read closely, Shoyoye 's discussion of coercion "independent from the coercion inherent in the wrongful detention itself" was aimed at separating tort liability from statutory liability in the specific context of a jail overdetention following a lawful arrest-on a record where no legally viable claim of any constitutional violation was pleaded or proved-we view its "independ[ence] from inherent coercion" test as simply inapplicable. The case before us is not a jail overdetention case. A constitutionally unlawful arrest was proved, and, as noted above, we have more than a simple false arrest. Under these circumstances, the better approach, in our view, is to focus directly on the level of scienter required to support a Section 52.1 claim, without the trappings of Shoyoye 's frame of analysis.
4. Where an Unlawful Arrest is Properly Pleaded and Proved, the "Threat, Intimidation or Coercion " Element of Section 52.1 Requires a Specific Intent to Violate Protected Rights
We acknowledge that some courts have read Shoyoye as having announced "independen[ce] from inherent coercion" as a requisite element of all Section 52.1 claims alleging search-and-seizure violations, but we think those courts misread the statute as well as the import of *383Venegas .
In Venegas -which rejected a construction of Section 52.1 limiting its applicability to "threat[s], intimidation or coercion" against minorities and other statutorily protected groups-the Supreme Court declined to place "added restrictions on the scope of section 52.1" beyond its plain language, concluding that that "would appear to be more a legislative concern than a judicial one." ( Venegas, supra , 32 Cal.4th at p. 843,
The phrase "under color of law" indicates, without doubt, that the Legislature intended to include law enforcement officers within the scope of Section 52.1 if the requisites of the statute are otherwise met. (See ante , fn. 16.) Much of what law enforcement officers do in settings that test the limits of their authority is "inherently coercive." Given that reality, it seems to us inconsistent with an intent to bring law enforcement within the scope of the statute-which is what the phrase "under color of law" does-to say, categorically, even where an unlawful arrest is properly pleaded and proved, that "where[ever] coercion is inherent in the constitutional violation alleged, ... the statutory requirement of 'threats, intimidation, or coercion' is not met." ( Shoyoye , supra , 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 959,
In federal court, where Section 52.1 claims are frequently brought along with Section 1983 claims under federal pendent jurisdiction, "[t]he Bane Act's requirement that interference with rights must be accomplished by threats [,] intimidation or coercion 'has been the source of much debate and confusion.' " ( McKibben v. McMahon (C.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2015, No. EDCV 14-02171 JGB (SPx)),
In doing so, we are not obliged to follow the construction the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts placed on the MCRA in what appears to be some brief, fugitive dicta at the end of the opinion in Longval v. Commissioner of Correction (1989)
Accordingly, we hold that, where, as here, an unlawful arrest is properly pleaded and proved, the egregiousness required by Section 52.1 is tested by whether the circumstances indicate the arresting officer had a specific intent to violate the arrestee's right to freedom from unreasonable seizure, not by whether the evidence shows something beyond the coercion *802"inherent" in the wrongful detention. (See In re M.S. , supra , 10 Cal.4th at p. 713,
We recognize, obviously, that Section 52.1 is civil, while Section 241 is criminal, but in adopting the Screws standard we find it particularly significant that so much of the text and structure of Section 52.1 appears to descend from Section 241. It seems to us that, when our Legislature enacted hate crime legislation in 1987, it chose not to adhere strictly to the federal scheme by adopting a civil enforcement statute on the model of Section 1983, covering "deprivations" of rights and limiting the statute to public officials or other conduct evincing state action. Instead, it used as a model Section 241-a criminal conspiracy statute-giving the statute enough breadth to reach a wide range of "interference" with "secured rights" by means of fear-inducing conduct, whether undertaken by private actors or public officials. In essence, the Legislature created a hybrid of the historic federal civil rights enforcement scheme, using Section 241 as a unitary model for criminal as well as civil enforcement. The burden of proof is fundamentally different in these two arenas, of course, but other than that we see no reason why the applicable mens rea element ought to differ.
*386*8035. Application of the Specific Intent Standard
The application of the Screws specific intent standard here is straightforward. As explained in Lashley , supra ,
Applying the first step of this test here, the "right at issue" is Cornell's federal and state constitutional right to be free from arrest without probable cause. Legally, there is nothing vague or novel about that claim under the circumstances of this case. Viewing the Phase I evidence in the light most favorable to Cornell, the protected right he asserts was "clearly delineated and plainly applicable." Thus, we reject appellants' contention that, as a matter of law, the Section 52.1 claim never should have been submitted to the *804jury. The second requirement, a question of fact, is whether appellants acted with the "particular purpose" of depriving Cornell of his right to be free from arrest without probable cause. Subjective "spite" was relevant here, along with all of the objective circumstances surrounding the unlawful arrest, both before it and after it. But whether the appellant officers understood they were acting unlawfully was not a requirement. Reckless disregard of the "right at issue" is all that was necessary.
In Phase II, the jury was instructed that "Plaintiff Cornell claims ... Defendants Brandt and Gin intentionally interfered with or attempted to interfere with his civil rights by threats, intimidation, or coercion." According to the jury instructions, to return a verdict for Cornell on the Section 52.1 claim, the jury was required to find that he proved "all of the following: [¶] 1. That the Defendant made threats of violence against Plaintiff causing Plaintiff to reasonably believe that if he exercised his right to be free from unlawful detention or unlawful arrest, Defendant would commit violence against him and that Defendant had the apparent ability to *387carry out the threats; [¶] 2. That Plaintiff was harmed; and [¶] 3. That the Defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff's harm." ( CACI No. 3066.) These instructions properly focused the jury on intentional violation of Cornell's right to be free from unreasonable seizure.
Although Cornell's primary theory at trial was that the gun-pointing made his false arrest particularly egregious (hence the focus on "threats of violence" in the instructions), it must be borne in mind that he also submitted proof that the harm he suffered from the arrest-his job loss, in particular-was inflicted out of spite. Considering the evidence surrounding Cornell's arrest in its full context, it seems to us a rational jury could have concluded not only that Officer Brandt and Sergeant Gin were unconcerned from the outset with whether there was legal cause to detain or arrest him, but that when they realized their error, they doubled-down on it, knowing they were inflicting grievous injury on their prisoner. On this reading of the evidence, these two officers had every opportunity to exercise restraint as it became clearer and clearer that their initial suspicions of Cornell were unfounded, but rather than let the matter go when they finally released him, they retaliated against him as a way of undermining his ability to claim to superiors he was arrested without probable cause. This apparent effort to obstruct Cornell's ability to assert his right to freedom from unreasonable seizure violated Section 52.1 just as surely as his actual arrest did, while compounding the harm. On this record, we have no trouble concluding the specific intent standard was met.
*805III. DISPOSITION
The judgment and the award of attorney's fees and costs are affirmed. Respondent shall recover costs on appeal.
We concur:
Ruvolo, P.J.
Rivera, J.
Cornell testified that when he saw the officers' car, he thought it "odd" they were driving on a pedestrian path, "figured ... they were doing some kind of official operation," and wanted to avoid them because "I didn't need to get myself involved in any official operations" while off-duty. He explained that "in field training we are not allowed to have any off-duty contact. We are not supposed to be getting involved in official police matters if we can avoid it."
On cross-examination, Officer Brandt admitted Cornell's appearance was also consistent with that of a recent graduate of the police academy.
What exactly Officer Brandt shouted was disputed (Officer Brandt-"stop[,] police"; Farrell-"some sort of command," cannot recall exact words; Cornell-"I will shoot you," and did not think whoever said it was a police officer because "I will shoot you" is not an appropriate police command), but there is no dispute he yelled at least the words "I will shoot you."
Prior to trial, the court granted summary judgment to Chief Gascon because there was no evidence of his personal involvement in the alleged acts giving rise to liability. It initially granted summary adjudication to all defendants on Cornell's Section 52.1 claim, but due to an intervening change in the applicable law, reconsidered that ruling and granted Cornell leave to amend, resulting in a second amended complaint upon which the case was tried.
The specific questions, crafted jointly by the parties with input from the court, were as follows: (1) Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant assaulted plaintiff? (2) Did either or both Officer Brandt or Bodisco see Cornell running across Sharon Meadow before they saw him on Hippie Hill? (3) Was Hippie Hill known to Officer Brandt and Bodisco as a high crime area? (4) Was it reasonable for the officers to believe that Cornell had come out of the bushes on Hippie Hill? (5) Did the officers have knowledge of the types of criminal activity in the Hippie Hill area that could lead them to believe that Cornell may be involved in criminal activity near Hippie Hill? (6) Did the officers reasonably believe that Cornell appeared nervous or evasive on Hippie Hill because of the presence of the officers? (7) Did the officers do or say anything on Hippie Hill that would have communicated to Cornell that they wanted to contact him? (8) Did the officers reasonably believe that Cornell fled from them on Hippie Hill? (9) Did the officers reasonably believe that Cornell removed his jacket to change his appearance in order to avoid detention? (10) Did the officers observe Cornell run off trail through the bushes? (11) Were Officer Brandt's only words said to Cornell, "I will shoot you!"? (12) Did Officer Brandt or Farrell do or say anything on the path above the AIDS Memorial Grove that would have communicated to Cornell that they wanted him to stop? (13) Did the officers see Cornell glance back on the path above the AIDS Memorial Grove? (14) Did the officers reasonably believe that Cornell knew or should have known that they were police officers? (15) Did Officer Farrell see Officer Brandt pointing his gun in Cornell's direction? (16) Would an objectively reasonable officer believe that Cornell ran away from Officer Brandt in order to resist the use of unreasonable force? (17) Did Cornell go down the hill into the Grove accidentally or intentionally? (18) Was it reasonable for the officers to believe that Cornell went down the hill into the Grove with the intent of evading them?
Defense counsel objected "for the record" to this procedure and insisted upon answers to all of the Phase I special verdict questions. In a colloquy with the court when the jury first reported an impasse on November 8, counsel had previously taken the position the court had discretion to decide "what facts the Court needs to make" a probable cause determination.
In the Phase II verdicts, the jury found liability against only Officers Brandt and Bodisco on the intentional interference claim and against only Officer Brandt and Sergeant Gin on the Section 52.1 claim. Based on the verdicts for Phase I and Phase II and on the stipulation by all appellants to liability for negligence, judgment was entered against all appellants on the false arrest claim and the negligence claim, against Officer Brandt, Sergeant Gin and the City on the Section 52.1 claim, against Officers Brandt and Bodisco on the intentional interference with economic relations claim, and in favor of all appellants on the assault claim. The judgment awards the total damages jointly and severally against all appellants.
See, e.g., People v. Ramirez(1997)
The trial court's function is to draw legal conclusions from the facts found by special verdict (Code Civ. Proc., § 624 ), and, unless the findings are incomplete, inconsistent or "hopelessly ambiguous"-which is not the case here-the court may interpret the verdict in view of the pleadings, evidence and instructions. (Woodcock v. Fontana Scaffolding & Equipment Co.(1968)
The jury answered "No" to Question No. 10, which indicates it did not find credible the testimony from Officer Bodisco that Cornell ran off-trail through the bushes, consistent with its earlier "No" response to Question No. 4, indicating it had also rejected the officers' testimony that they believed Cornell emerged from the bushes at the top of Hippie Hill when they first saw him.
We might have been inclined to conclude otherwise if the jury had found that Cornell, in reaction to a command from Officer Brandt to stop, had committed some crime posing a threat to any of the appellant officers or to the public. Under Brown v. Illinois(1975)
Penal Code Part 2, Title 3, Chapter 5, section 833 et seq.
Statute 1957, chapter 2147, section 5, page 3806; Assembly Bill No. 1857, approved by Governor July 8, 1957 (1957 Reg. Sess.).
"At the Legislature's request, the California Law Revision Commission submitted a comprehensive report in 1963, which gave rise to the statutory system that now governs the field of public entity tort liability. ... [¶] Professor ... Van Alstyne was the California Law Revision Commission's chief consultant and much of his work gave rise to the present statutory system." (Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles(1991)
Venegas II is one of a series of appellate opinions arising out of a suit brought by plaintiff David Venegas against the County of Los Angeles and various deputies of the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department seeking damages in connection with his alleged wrongful detention and arrest. It was decided on remand following the California Supreme Court's opinion in Venegas v. County of Los Angeles(2004)
(See also Miller v. Glass(1955)
In response to the California Supreme Court's landmark decision recognizing the exclusionary rule in People v. Cahan(1955)
It is worth noting that the High Court's decision to create for law enforcement officers the added level of protection against Section 1983 liability provided by the doctrine of qualified immunity was announced by a closely divided 5-4 vote, over a vigorous dissent from Justice Stevens, who pointed out that such an immunity is unnecessary because "the probable-cause standard itself recognizes the fair leeway that law enforcement officers must have in carrying out their dangerous work. The concept of probable cause leaves room for mistakes, provided always that they are mistakes that could have been made by a reasonable officer." (Anderson,
(See Attorney General's Com. on Racial, Ethnic, Religious and Minority Violence, Final Report (April 1986) (Final Report of the Van de Kamp Commission); Assem. Bill No. 63 (1987-1988 Reg. Sess.); Letter from John H. Van de Kamp to Hon. Larry Stirling, Chairman, Assembly Public Safety Committee (March 18, 1987) ["This bill implements the recommendations of the Attorney General's Commission on Racial, Ethnic, Religious and Minority Violence ...."].) Attorney General Van de Kamp's letter to Chairman Stirling is included in the Assembly Public Safety Committee's bill file for Assembly Bill No. 63. On our own motion, under Evidence Code sections 452, subdivision (c) and 459, we take judicial notice of the Final Report of the Van de Kamp Commission as well as the Van de Kamp letter to Chairman Stirling. (See Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.(2001)
The use of parallel criminal and civil enforcement mechanisms follows the pattern of post-Civil War federal civil rights legislation. (See
While the citation to Section 241 in the Final Report of the Van de Kamp Commission provides fairly clear evidence of the genesis of Section 52.1, the language of Section 52.1 is also traceable to Section 241 by direct comparison. Section 52.1 adopts the signature structure of Section 241, which prohibits interference with the "free exercise" or "enjoyment" of a broadly-defined class of "secured" civil rights. And Section 52.1, like Section 241, targets the use of fear-inducing conduct to carry out the interference. Where Section 52.1 prohibits "interfere[nce]" by "threats, intimidation or coercion," Section 241 prohibits attempts to "injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate" someone in the exercise of protected rights. In addition, the modern adaptation of Section 241's rights-interference structure in other federal legislation can be seen in the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which uses language nearly identical to that of Section 52.1. (See
By contrast, the text of Section 1983 and its criminal counterpart Section 242-statutes which are limited to state action, and focus on " 'depriv[ation]' " of rights instead of interference with rights-bears almost no similarity to Section 52.1, other than common use of the phrase "under color of law." Section 1985(3), the civil counterpart to Section 241, also differs significantly from Section 241. Section 1985(3) is limited to private acts of "conspir[ing] or go[ing] in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving ... any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws ...." Based on its limiting language, a requisite element of any Section 1985(3) claim is that it must be based on "some racial [or] ... otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action" (Griffin v. Breckenridge(1971)
The court's assault instruction, adapted from Judicial Council Of California Civil Jury Instructions (CACI) Nos. 1301 (Assault-Essential Elements) and 1305 (Battery by Police Officer), advised the jury that, to prove assault, Cornell must establish that (1) a defendant threatened to touch him in a harmful or offensive manner, (2) it reasonably appeared to him the threat was about to be carried out, (3) the threat constituted unreasonable force, (4) he did not consent to the touching, (5) he was harmed, and (6) the threatening conduct was a substantial factor in causing his harm.
The trial court gave a Phase I instruction under Penal Code section 835a in connection with the assault claim, but did not re-instruct on Penal Code section 835a in Phase II. Appellants contend the omission of a Penal Code section 835a instruction in Phase II was error, but they made no specific request for such an instruction in Phase II, and as a result, they have waived the issue. Even had they made one, however, they would not have been entitled to another Penal Code section 835a instruction, since, as noted, by that point-given the trial court's no probable cause determination at the conclusion of Phase I-the requirement in Penal Code section 835a that Officer Brandt and Sergeant Gin acted with "reasonable cause to believe the person to be arrested has committed a public offense" was lacking.
Cf. Gillan, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at pages 1047, 1052-1053,
Shoyoye, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at pages 951-952,
No doubt because the issue was never raised, Shoyoye is silent on a key threshold question: Did plaintiff Shoyoye assert a legally viable right "secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the rights secured by the Constitution or laws of this state"? It is not evident to us that he did. Because the reasonableness of a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes is judged at the time of an arrest or detention, once Shoyoye conceded there was probable cause for his arrest he appears to have conceded away at the same time any legal basis for a claim of unreasonable seizure beyond that point. (See Rivera v. County of Los Angeles(9th Cir. 2014)
The test for false imprisonment in jail overdetention cases established in Sullivan"requires either that the sheriff have actual knowledge that the imprisonment of the plaintiff is unlawful or alternatively that he have some notice sufficient to put him, as a reasonable man, under a duty to investigate the validity of the incarceration." (Sullivan, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 719,
(See, e.g., Lyall v. City of Los Angeles(9th Cir. 2015)
The uncertainty engendered by Shoyoye here in California appears to be mirrored among courts applying Longval in Massachusetts. (Compare Nuon v. City of Lowell(D. Mass. 2011)
See Hon. Paul J. Watford, Screws v. United States and the Birth of Federal Civil Rights Enforcement(2014)
Our reading of Section 52.1 is consistent with the view taken by "the majority of federal district courts in California[, which] have held [in Bane Act cases] that '[w]here Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure or excessive force claims are raised and intentional conduct is at issue, there is no need for a plaintiff to allege a showing of coercion independent from the coercion inherent in the seizure or use of force.' " (Simmons, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 1126,
By way of illustration, we observe that the Section 52.1 claim in Shoyoye likely would have not have met this first step of the specific intent standard because the plaintiff in that case appears to have alleged no viable theory of constitutional violation. (See fn. 26, ante.) The same is true of a recent case applying Shoyoye, Julian v. Mission Community Hospital(2017)
Appellants present no separate argument in support of their appeal of the award of statutory attorney's fees and costs, apart from the contention that the Section 52.1 verdict should be reversed. Having concluded there is no infirmity in the Section 52.1 verdict, we will sustain the accompanying award of fees and costs. Appellants also suggest in their reply brief that they seek to appeal from the judgment on the negligence and interference with economic advantage claims, but there, too, they present no separate argument and thus they have waived any defect in the judgment insofar as it rests on liability for those claims.