ROBERT MCFARLANE v. JOSEPH HOLLY, et al.,
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:23-1185
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
March 11, 2025
(JUDGE MANNION)
Cаse 3:23-cv-01185-MEM-SH Document 27 Filed 03/11/25 Page 1 of 27
On August 21, 2021, Plaintiff Robert McFarlane was brutally assaulted by another inmate while he was incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Mahanoy, in West Mahanoy Township, Schuylkill County, Pennsylvania (SCI-Mahanoy), leading to severe injuries, including nerve damage and multiple facial fractures. Plaintiff brings this pro se Section 1983 action, (Doc. 1), asserting First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims against a multitude of prison officials and inmates, alleging that the prison officials were warned of the threats against him and failed to protect him, and that the prison officials subsequently stole his property and lеgal documents while he was being transported to another correctional facility. Presently pending before this Court is Defendants‘, Major Michael Dunkle, Security Lieutenant Phillip Woods, Security Lieutenant Jodi Cobain, Unit Manager Joseph Holly, Unit Manager Traci Jacobson, Superintendent Michael Gourley, Corrections Superintendent‘s Assistant Tonya Heist, and Unit
I. BACKGROUND
At all times relevant to the Complaint, Plaintiff was an inmate in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC“), assigned to various correctional institutions. (Doc. 1, p. 3). The events that give rise to this action begins at SCI-Mahanoy, when Plaintiff‘s cellmate, Michael Pennypacker – the nephew of Joseph Koran, the leader of the 215 prison gang – and other 215 gang members accused Plaintiff of being a “rat” and threatened to stab him and have his “throat slit at night while [he] was sleeping.” (Id., pp. 7-8). Plaintiff alleges that in the months of October and November of 2020, he informed Defendants Holly, Dunkle, Cobain, Woods and Jacobson of these threats and asked for help. (Id., pp. 8-9). Such
Around this time, Defendant inmate Jeff Lafferty involved himself in the situation and started threatening 215 gang members on behalf of Plaintiff against Plaintiff‘s wishes. (Id., p. 8). Finding himself “caught up between the Latin Kings [prison gang] and the 215,” Plaintiff told his unit manager about the trouble Lafferty was causing. As a result, Plaintiff was moved to a different block on April 23, 2021. (Id.). The new block (J-Block) “was a worst block” and so Plaintiff reached out to Defendants Jacobson and Holly again about the threats to his life. (Id., pp. 8-9). Plaintiff gets moved again to a different block (B-Block) and feels safe for a short period of time, until Lafferty gets moved over on the same block as Plaintiff on the orders of Defendant Holly. (Id., p. 9).
Plaintiff complains again of the threats he is facing by members of 215 and solicits the help of his mother to call prison officials on his behalf. Despite the requests for a transfer, Plaintiff remains in B-Block where he shares yard time with Pennypacker, Koran, and Lafferty. (Id.). Around that time, Lafferty recruits another inmate, Defendant David Reppert, to assault Plaintiff. (Id.). Then, on August 21, 2021, an unsuspecting Plaintiff is struck in the head with a bag of bocce balls by Reppert. (Id.). As a result, Plaintiff suffered severe
At first, Plaintiff was not aware of who the assailant was. Plaintiff alleges that prison staff refused to provide him with the name of his attacker or give him the information he needed to file prison grievances. (Id.). When Plaintiff was moved out of the infirmary, he was held in administrative custody in the Restricted Housing Unit (RHU) for three months, pending a transfer to a different institution. He was then transferred to SCI-Camp Hill, and ultimately to SCI-Phoenix. (Id., p. 10). Plaintiff alleges that during these transfers, prison staff stole his legal work and other property. (Id.).
Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a Complaint on July 12, 2023. (Doc. 1). He brings failure-to-protect claims under the Eighth Amendment related to the assault, and Fourteenth Amendment due process claims and First Amendment denial of access of courts related to the alleged theft of his property. (See id., pp. 6-7). Plaintiff does not specify what particular claims he brings against each individual Defendant. He seeks monetary damages from all Defendants, an order compelling security to charge inmates Lafferty and Koran for their role in the assault, and а single cell housing assignment on the safest block in the prison. (Id., p. 11).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Motion to Dismiss
In accordance with
“A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the sufficiency of the complaint against the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a).” I.H. ex rel. D.S. v. Cumberland Valley Sch. Dist., 842 F. Supp. 2d 762, 769–70 (M.D. Pa. 2012). “Under
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court “‘must accept all facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.‘” Krieger v. Bank of Am., N.A., 890 F.3d 429, 437 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Flora v. Cty. of Luzerne, 776 F.3d 169, 175 (3d Cir. 2015)). But a court “need not credit a complaint‘s bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). A court also need not “assume that a plaintiff
Following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, it must recite factual allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff‘s claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation. In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a three-step analysis:
First, the court must “tak[e] note of thе elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Second, the court should identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Finally, “where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.”
Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (footnote and citations omitted) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675, 679).
A complaint filed by a pro se litigant is to be liberally construed and “‘however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.‘” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). However, pro se complaints
B. Motion to Compel Discovery
The scope and conduct оf discovery are within the sound discretion of the trial court. In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 343 F.3d 658, 661–62 (3d Cir. 2003); see also McConnell v. Canadian Pacific Realty Co., 280 F.R.D. 188, 192 (M.D. Pa. 2011) (“Rulings regarding the proper scope of discovery, and the extent to which discovery may be compelled, are matters consigned to the Court‘s discretion and judgment.“).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claims
Plaintiff brings forth claims under the Fourteenth Amendment, alleging that Defendants violated his due process rights “when they stole all [his] property, and legal work...” (Doc. 1, p. 5). DOC Defendants contend that the Fourteenth Amendment claims against them fail as matter of law since Plaintiff had access to an adequate post-deprivation remedy through the prison grievance process. The Court agrees.
It has been established that when a citizen has been deprived of property, by persons acting under color of state law, the focus of the court‘s
In Parratt, the Supreme Court of the United States made the distinction between cases where the injured party was deprived of his property interest without a pre-deprivation hearing when the deprivation was authorized by an established state procedure, from those cases where it was the “result of a random and unauthorized act by a state employee.” Id. at 541. The Supreme Court found that where it was the result of an authorized state procedure, due process required pre-deprivation notice and a hearing in order to serve as a check on the possibility that a wrongful deprivation would occur. Id. at 538. It further held that when the deprivation is the result of a random and unauthorized act by some state employee, where the state cannot predict when such might occur and is, therefore, unable to provide a hearing prior to it taking place, procedural due process is satisfied if there is “available somе meaningful means by which to assess the propriety of the State‘s action at some time after the initial taking.” Id. at 539.
The holding in Parratt was expanded by the Supreme Court, three years later, in Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984). In Hudson, the Supreme Court held that meaningful post-deprivation hearings satisfy procedural due process, even when the unauthorized acts of state
that when deprivations of property are effected through random and unauthorized conduct of a state employee, predeprivation procedures are simply “impracticable” since the state cannot know when such deprivations will occur. We can discern no logical distinction between negligent and intentional deprivations of property insofar as the ‘practicability’ of affording predeprivation process is concerned. The state can no more anticipate and control in advance the random and unauthorized conduct of its employees than it can anticipate similar negligent conduct.
Id. The Supreme Court qualified that holding, as did the Supreme Court in Parratt, by adding “intentional deprivations do not violate the [Due Process] Clause provided, of course, that adequate state post-deprivation remedies are available.” Id. Thus, in order to succeed on a due process claim, an inmate must not only show that his property was confiscated but that he was not afforded a post-deprivation administrative remedy. Ball v. Campbell, 2011 WL 7080692, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 9, 2011), R & R adopted as the Opinion of the Court in 2012 WL 201846 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 23, 2012). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has found that adequate post-deprivation remedies include the ability to file a state tort
Here, Plaintiff avers that he filed grievances against the DOC Defendants related to the alleged theft of his property at both SCI-Mahanoy and SCI-Phoenix. (Doc. 1, pp. 10, 13, and 16). While Plaintiff may not be satisfied with the responses he received for such grievances, the availability of the grievance process to him constitutes an adequate post-deprivation remedy and effectively “forecloses any due process claim.” Horn, 1996 WL 510090, at * 6. Accordingly, Plaintiff‘s Fourteenth Amendment due process claims will be dismissed with prejudice.
B. First Amendment Access-to-Court Claim
Plaintiff brings forth a claim under the First Amendment, alleging that DOC Defendants barred his access to courts. DOC Defendants argue that such a claim should be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to plead his
The law surrounding an access-to-the-courts claim has been aptly set forth as follows:
“The right of access to the courts is sourced from both ‘the First and Fourteenth Amendments,’ and is typically framed as a due process right in the inmate context, but in other contexts as ‘an aspect of the First Amendment right to petition the Government for redress of grievances[.]‘” Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 295 n.17 (3d Cir. 2018) (citations omitted). “It is now established beyond doubt that prisоners have a constitutional right of access to the courts.” Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977). There are two general categories of actionable federal claims based upon an alleged denial of access to the courts. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 413 (2002).
The first category is forward-looking claims. Id. The essence of such a claim is that official action is frustrating the plaintiff in preparing or filing a legal action at the present time. Id. The opportunity to litigate “has not been lost for all time, however, but only in the short term; the object of the denial-of-access suit, and the justification for recognizing that claim, is to place the plaintiff
in a position to pursue а separate claim for relief once the frustrating condition has been removed.” Id. The second category is backward-looking claims. Id. at 413–14. Such a claim does not look forward to future litigation, “but backward to a time when specific litigation ended poorly, or could not have commenced, or could have produced a remedy subsequently unobtainable.” Id. at 414 (footnotes omitted). “The ultimate object of these sorts of access claims, then, is not the judgment in a further lawsuit, but simply the judgment in the access claim itself, in providing relief obtainable in no other suit in the future.” Id.
The ultimate justification for recognizing each kind of access claim is the sаme. Id. “Whether an access claim turns on a litigating opportunity yet to be gained or an opportunity already lost, the very point of recognizing any access claim is to provide some effective vindication for a separate and distinct right to seek judicial relief for some wrong.” Id. at 414–15. The right of access to the courts “is ancillary to the underlying claim, without which a plaintiff cannot have suffered injury by being shut out of court.” Id. at 415. Therefore, a plaintiff must establish an actual injury by identifying a nonfrivolous, arguable underlying claim blocked or lost by the alleged denial of access to the courts. Id. The underlying cause of action, whether anticipated or lost, is an element of the access claim. Id.
Wyatt v. Wilson, 2025 WL 539687, at *12 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 18, 2025) (quoting Talley v. Wetzel, No. 22-cv-1712, 2023 WL 5163289 at *8–9 (M.D. Pa. July 17, 2023)).
Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff‘s complaint does not allege an actual injury—i.e., that he lost a chance to pursue or is currently being hindered from pursuing a nonfrivolous, arguable underlying claim. The Court further finds, as DOC Defendants correctly argue, that Plaintiff‘s complaint does not describe the nature of the nonfrivilous, arguable underlying claim well enough to show that it is “more than hope[.]” See Christopher, 536 U.S. at 415 (footnote omitted). In other words, Plaintiff‘s Complaint does not plead his access-to-courts claim in a manner that satisfies Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, although Plaintiff‘s comрlaint sets forth numerous allegations to show that his legal paperwork was stolen from him
C. Claims Against Defendants Gourley, Stracco and Heist
DOC Defendants note that the Complaint states that Defendants Gourley, Stracco and Heist were all employed by SCI-Camp Hill and that none of them were made aware of Plaintiff‘s issues with the 215 gang prior to the August 2021 assault. (Doc. 1, pp. 5-6). Accordingly, the Court agrees with DOC Defendants, that any claims related to events prior thereto are inapplicable to those Defendants (particularly, Plaintiff‘s Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claims).
In the Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Stracco moved Plaintiff to a cell that was “one cell away from Joseph Koran‘s Co-defendant
To state a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must plausibly plead that (1) “he was engaged in constitutionally protected conduct,” (2) he suffered an “adverse action” by prison officials sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his First Amеndment rights, and (3) the plaintiff‘s protected conduct was a “substantial or motivating factor” in the prison officials’ decision to take the adverse action. Id. (quoting Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001)). “Although the elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim remain constant, the underlying concepts that they signify will vary with the setting—whether activity is ‘protected’ or an action is ‘adverse’ will depend on context....” Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 388 (6th Cir. 1999). The fact of incarceration and the valid penological objectives of deterrence of crime, rehabilitation of prisoners, and institutional security justify limitations on the exercise of constitutional rights by inmates. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822–23 (1974). Thus, a prison inmate “retains [only] those rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a
First, Plaintiff‘s movement to another cell is not inconsistent with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system at SCI-Camp Hill. By Plaintiff‘s own admission, “DOC continued to move [him] around and transfer [him]...” to different cells and blocks. (Doc. 1, p. 10). He summarily asserts that each of those moves placed in “harm[‘]s way” but fails to demonstrate how Plaintiff‘s grievance filing was the motivating faсtor in the prison officials’ decision to move him. (Id.). At best, Plaintiff states that Defendant Stracco spoke with Plaintiff‘s “former unit manager Joseph Holly concerning [Plaintiff‘s] pardon”2 and, vaguely, “[i]n retaliation for filing grievances, and a pending [c]ivil [c]omplaint [Stracco] moves [Plaintiff] to K-Block 23 cell one cell away from Joseph Koran‘s Co-defendant Robert Monacelli both 215 gang members.” (Id.). “To establish the causation element of a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must prove that the exercise of his First Amendment rights played some substantial role in motivating the adverse action.” Conklin v. Warrington Twp., 2007 WL 4248214, at *3
Second, Plaintiff admits that his temporary cell neighbor, Monacelli, did not know of Plaintiff‘s identity, was unfamiliar with Plaintiff‘s past encounters with the 215 gang, and never threatened or attacked Plaintiff before he was later moved again to SCI-Phoenix. Neither did Plaintiff demonstrate that Stracco knew of Monacelli‘s gang affiliation. Plaintiff makes the abstract allegation that the cell transfer placed him in a “potential risk of serious danger.” (Doc. 1, p. 10). This is nothing more than Plaintiff‘s naked speculation and this Court is not required to assume that the Plaintiff can use the discovery process to prove facts not alleged. Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.2d 347, 353–354 (3d Cir. 2005). Accordingly, Plaintiff suffered no harm nor an
As to Defendants Gourley and Heist, Plaintiff alleges the following:
“I properly file a grievance in response to both complaint‘s and both Facility Manager M. Gourley, and Facilities Manager assistant T. Heist both cover up the crimes they [c]omitted against me. Violating my protected Constitutional Rights, [m]y due process of law, and a [b]latant [d]enial to access the Court....
So they now decided to transfer me again on February 24th 2023 in which they [s]tole my legal work and the rest of my proрerty with the consent of Superintendent M. Gourley, and T. Heist. Now also defendants in my civil action lawsuit.”
(Doc. 1, p. 10). As explained above, the theft of property — Fourteenth Amendment due process — claim will be dismissed. Thus, Plaintiff‘s remaining allegations against Defendants Gourley and Heist appear to either relate to their responses to certain grievances he filed or their role as supervisors.
Individual liability can be imposed under Section 1983 only if the state actor played an “affirmative part” in the alleged misconduct, and “cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.” Evancho, 423
Allegations of personal involvement must be made with appropriate particularity in that the complaint must allege the particulars of conduct, time, place, and personal responsibility. Evancho, 423 F.3d at 354; Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207–08. Subsequent knowledge of an incident is insufficient to demonstrate that a state actor played an “affirmative part” in the alleged misconduct. See Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207–08 (the after-the-fact submission of a grievance is “simply insufficient” to establish a defendant‘s knowledge of an underlying constitutional violation at the time it occurred); Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020) (Grievance Coordinator and Superintendent‘s involvement in review and denial of grievance insufficient to establish personal involvement). It is the plaintiff‘s burden to “show that each and every defendant was ‘personal[ly] involve[d]’ in depriving him of his rights.” Kirk v. Roan, No. 1:04-CV-1990, 2006 WL 2645154, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 14, 2006) (quoting Evancho, 423 F.3d at 353). Allegations that broadly implicate multiple defendants without delineating individual conduct are
Here, to the extent the allegations against Defendants Heist and Gourley relate to their responses to his grievances, such allеgations are insufficient to establish these Defendants’ personal involvement in the challenged conduct under §1983. See Watkins v. Horn, 1997 WL 566080 at *4 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (concurrence in an administrative appeal process is not sufficient to establish personal involvement); Mitchell v. Keane, 974 F.Supp. 332, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“it appears from the submissions before the court that [Plaintiff] filed grievances, had them referred to a prison official, and received a letter reporting that there was no evidence to substantiate his complaints. [Plaintiff]‘s dissatisfaction with this response does not constitute a cause of action.“); Caldwell v. Beard, 2008 WL 2887810, at *4 (W.D. Pa. July 23, 2008) (“Such a premise for liability [i.e., for performing a role in the grievance process] fails as a matter of law.“), aff‘d, 2009 WL 1111545 (3d Cir. April 27, 2009); Orrs v. Comings, 1993 WL 418361, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 1993) (“But an allegation that a defendant failed to act on a grievance or complaint does not state a Section 1983 claim.“). “[T]he failure of a prison official to act favorably on an inmate‘s grievance is not itself a constitutional violation.” Little v. Mottern, 2017 WL 934464, at *11 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 7, 2017)
D. Official Capacity Claims
In his form Complaint, Plaintiff has marked that he brings claims against the DOC Defendants in bоth their individual and official capacities. (Doc. 1, pp. 3-6). DOC Defendants contend that official capacity claims for money damages are foreclosed and should be dismissed with prejudiced. The Court agrees.
The
This immunity is not absolute. Three exceptions to sovereign immunity exist: (1) abrogation by an act of Congress; (2) waiver by state consent to suit; (3) suits against individual state officials for prospective relief to remedy an ongoing violation. M.A. ex rel. E.S. v. State-Operated Sch. Dist., 344 F.3d 335, 344–45 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing MCI Telecomm Corp. v. Bell Atl. Pa., 271 F.3d 491, 503 (3d Cir. 2001)).
After review, Plaintiff‘s Section 1983 claims do not fit within these exceptions. Congress has not abrogated states’ sovereign immunity by enacting Section 1983 and neither states nor employeеs acting in their official capacities are recognized as “persons” under that statute. See Will, 491 U.S. at 66, 71. Pennsylvania has also expressly invoked its sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment by statute.
E. Motion to Compel Discovery
In his motion to compel discovery, Plaintiff avers that on August 25, 2023, he “served Chief Counsel Timothy Holmes, Plaintiff‘s First Request for Production of Documents, [w]hich was mailed via U.P.S. first class mail on 8-28-2023.” (Doc. 21, ¶ 3). Yet, DOC Defendants counter that Mr. Holmes is not a party to this case and does not represent any defendant in this action. (Doc. 23, p. 2). Furthermore, DOC Defendants note that Plaintiff did not allege that he served any DOC Defendant or their undersigned counsel with the request for production of documents at issue in his motion, or with any other request for discovery. (Id.; see also Docs. 21-22). The Court is constrained to agree.
Pursuant to
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court will GRANT DOC Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 19) and DENY Plaintiff‘s motion to compel discovery (Doc. 21). An appropriate order follows.
MALACHY E. MANNION
United States District Judge
Date: 3/11/25