Matthew Warman v. Mount St. Joseph Univ.Matthew Warman v. Mount St. Joseph Univ.
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Ronald A. Berutti, MURRAY-NOLAN BERUTTI LLP, Cedar
OPINION
COLE, Circuit Judge. Matthew Warman, a former graduate student at Mount St. Joseph University (MSJU), objected to taking the COVID-19 vaccine on religious grounds. When MSJU announced that it would require all students and employees to be vaccinated, Warman applied for a religious exemption. Soon after, two officers with the MSJU Police Department (MSJPD) allegedly detained him at the campus police station for an hour, attempting to convince him to get the vaccine and disparaging his religious beliefs. Warman later sued MSJU, MSJPD, and multiple individual employees. The district court dismissed his complaint. We affirm the district court in part and reverse in part. We affirm the district court‘s dismissal of Warman‘s free exercise, equal protection, and disability discrimination claims with prejudice, and we affirm the dismissal of MSJPD from all counts with prejudice. But because Warman plausibly pleaded that the two officers who detained him violated his Fourth Amendment rights, we reverse the district court‘s dismissal of Warman‘s wrongful detention claim and reinstate the claim against those defendants. And we vacate the district court‘s declination of supplemental jurisdiction over Warman‘s state-law claims and remand for reconsideration.
I.
Because this case comes to us on an appeal of a motion to dismiss, “we recite the facts as they are alleged in the complaint.” Savel v. MetroHealth Sys., 96 F.4th 932, 937 (6th Cir. 2024).
MSJU is a Catholic university in Cincinnati, Ohio. Around December 2020, Matthew Warman enrolled in MSJU‘s graduate nursing program. A former Marine, Warman was medically discharged from the military due to internal injuries and brain tumors and suffered from “post-discharge depression and anxiety[.]” (Second Am. Compl., R. 18, PageID 315.) The Veterans Administration paid for Warman‘s schooling at MSJU, though this support was potentially subject to repayment if he failed to complete his studies.
MSJU began developing a COVID-19 vaccination policy and, upon commencement of the Fall 2021 term, informed students that it was going to require vaccination. On September 9, 2021, Warman proactively sought a religious exemption. He also submitted a medical exemption letter from his doctor stating that Warman had a “medical need to avoid taking the COVID vaccines.” (Id. at PageID 320.) A few days later, MSJU formally released its vaccine policy, which required all current students and employees to be fully vaccinated and to submit proof of vaccination by December 15, 2021, unless they obtained an exemption from the university.
On September 15, 2021, MSJPD‘s Chief of Police, Kevin Koo, called Warman to campus “to speak with him about [Warman‘s] decision to refuse the vaccine.” (Id. at PageID 321.) After receiving six phone calls and an email, Warman arrived at the campus police station around 1:00 p.m. Koo and MSJPD Captain Norb Koopman “took [Warman] into a back room . . . and would not allow him to leave[.]” (Id.) The officers held Warman there for approximately
During that hour, Koopman and Koo berated Warman. They called Warman a “f*****g idiot” and told him that he should “get a new religion[,]” that his “beliefs were wrong[,]” and that he should “grow the f*** up and get the damn shot.” (Id. at PageID 321.) They also handed him Veterans Administration paperwork and “told him to fill it out in order to resign from the [u]niversity[,]” said that they “would take him to the student center to get vaccinated[,]” and made other disparaging statements. (Id. at PageID 321–22.) Once Koopman and Koo learned that Elliott was unable to come to the police station, they allowed Warman to leave.
On September 17, 2021, MSJPD posted a memorandum from Koopman and Koo addressed to all officers that contained a picture of Warman, provided his class schedule, described his car, and listed both his license plate and student permit numbers. The memorandum included the following instruction:
Below is the photograph of Matthew Warman. If you see him on Campus, stop him and check to see how he is doing. Politely ask why he is here. You are not to arrest him or tell him to leave Campus. Just keep an eye on him. (Keep in mind that he is a student here and has the right to be on Campus).
(Id. at PageID 323; Ex. A. of Compl., R. 1-1, PageID 30.) After the memorandum was posted, Warman described being watched and followed by campus police officers, including one incident where Koopman watched Warman take a call with his doctor.
On September 20, 2021, MSJU‘s Health Services Manager, Amy Metzger, denied Warman‘s requested religious exemption to MSJU‘s vaccination policy and referred Warman to MSJU‘s General Counsel, Paige Ellerman. The next day, Elliott called Warman to meet at her office. Koopman “stationed himself outside the door” of Elliott‘s office. (Second Am. Compl., R. 18, PageID 324.) During the meeting, Warman complained that he was being harassed by MSJPD officers, though Elliott did not follow up on Warman‘s concerns. Instead, Elliott explained to Warman the necessities of getting vaccinated and that vaccination did not violate Catholic edicts.
Undeterred by his meeting with Elliott, Warman appealed the denial of his religious exemption on September 22, 2021, reiterating that his “sincerely held religious beliefs precluded him, in his conscience, from accepting the vaccine.” (Id. at PageID 325.) Warman also attempted to obtain a religious exemption from a hospital where he was set to perform clinical work but was informed by the Assistant Dean of MSJU‘s Department of Nursing, Nancy Hinzman, that he could only obtain an exemption through MSJU. On October 4, 2021, Metzger denied Warman‘s appeal for a religious exemption.
Believing that he was still being harassed by MSJPD officers, Warman filed a complaint on the campus police website but received no response. After Warman filed this complaint, MSJPD retaliated by reporting Warman to the FBI and having FBI Agent Ron Willison contact Warman‘s psychiatrist. That call, according to Warman, sought “to cause [] Warman‘s psychiatrist to falsely believe that [] Warman presented a physical danger to students and staff on campus, a risk of danger to himself, and a risk for causing campus violence[.]” (Id. at PageID 328.)
As a result of this “harassment” and “intimidation[,]” Warman withdrew from MSJU and was obligated to return stipend funds he had received from the Veterans Administration for attending graduate
Warman sued MSJU, MSJPD, and the individual employees he believed were responsible for his harassment on campus and the implementation of MSJU‘s vaccination policy. He filed an amended complaint, which defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court denied defendants’ motion and granted Warman leave to further amend the complaint to add new evidence.
In his second amended complaint, Warman sued MSJU and its Director of Mission and Ministry Karen Elliott, Health Services Manager Amy Metzger a/k/a Amy Demko, General Counsel Paige Ellerman, and the Assistant Dean in MSJU‘s Department of Nursing Nancy Hinzman. He also sued MSJPD and MSJPD officers Kevin Koo and Norb Koopman. He further sued “John Does” and “ABC Agenc[ies]” which acted like the named parties toward Warman and/or were responsible for creating and administering MSJU‘s vaccine policy. Additionally, he brought claims against the FBI and FBI Agent Ron Willison, though he later voluntarily dismissed his claims against both.
Warman brought several federal and state claims against these defendants. Under
Again, defendants moved to dismiss. This time, the district court granted the motion and dismissed Warman‘s federal claims with prejudice. Upon dismissal of all federal claims, the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Warman‘s state claims. Warman timely appealed.
II.
We review grants of motions to dismiss de novo. Nugent v. Spectrum Juv. Just. Servs., 72 F.4th 135, 138 (6th Cir. 2023). In doing so, we accept all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and view the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Courtright v. City of Battle Creek, 839 F.3d 513, 518 (6th Cir. 2016). To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must present facts that, if accepted, “sufficiently ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.‘” Coley v. Lucas County, 799 F.3d 530, 537 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). We “must reverse the district court‘s dismissal unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Meriwether v. Hartop, 992 F.3d 492, 498 (6th Cir. 2021) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Warman‘s federal causes of action can be grouped into two categories: three claims brought under
III.
We begin with Warman‘s three claims under
Warman alleges the denial of his rights against unlawful detention under the
A.
1.
The
Bringing his unlawful detention claim against MJPD, Koopman, and Koo, Warman alleges that MSJPD officers seized him at various points.3 His only substantive allegation stems from his detention by Koopman and Koo at the campus police station for approximately one hour. Considering the totality of the circumstances, Warman has plausibly alleged that he was seized for
also took Warman into the back room of the station, as opposed to the front office or another public space
The defendants argue and the district court determined that a reasonable person in Warman‘s position would have felt free to leave. Warman, however, specifically alleges that “Koo and Koopman took [] Warman into a back room of the campus police station and would not allow him to leave . . . .” (Second Am. Compl., R. 18, PageID 321 (emphasis added).) This is a factual allegation—not a conclusory legal statement.
Defendants also maintain that Koopman and Koo acted as fellow veterans concerned for Warman‘s wellbeing and only intended to encourage Warman to get vaccinated. That may be true. But a “police officer‘s subjective intent in detaining an individual is irrelevant so long as that intent is not conveyed to the individual in a way that results in the individual believing that he or she is not free to leave.” United States v. Campbell, 486 F.3d 949, 954 (6th Cir. 2007).
Since a reasonable person would not feel free to leave when directed by police to remain, Warman was seized for
2.
Having determined that Warman has alleged facts showing a plausible violation of his
i.
For an entity that is not an individual or a corporation, the “[c]apacity to sue or be sued[,]” and therefore be deemed sui juris, is generally governed “by the law of the state where the court is located[.]”
MSJPD “is the police and public safety department of MSJU[.]” (Second Am. Compl., R. 18, PageID 313.) It is also a state-commissioned law enforcement agency, operating under
Warman argues that, as a state-commissioned law enforcement agency, MSJPD is a public entity subject to suit. Defendants respond that, as a subdivision of MSJU and under its control, MSJPD is not sui juris. The district court agreed with the defendants, citing to circuit precedent that holds, as subdivisions of their municipalities, municipal police departments and sheriff‘s offices are not sui juris.
Indeed, police departments are generally not sui juris under Ohio law. See, e.g., Petty v. County of Franklin, 478 F.3d 341, 347 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting that, “under Ohio law, a county sheriff‘s office is not a legal entity capable of being sued for purposes of § 1983“) (abrogated on other grounds by Bailey v. City of Ann Arbor, 860 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2017)); Carmichael v. City of Cleveland, 571 F. App’x 426, 435 (6th Cir. 2014) (collecting cases). Rather, they are “sub-units” of the municipalities or counties that they serve. Jones v. Marcum, 197 F. Supp. 2d 991, 997 (S.D. Ohio 2002). Like a municipal police department is a sub-unit of its municipality, a private campus police department is a sub-unit of its university and “merely [a] vehicle[] through which the [university] fulfills its policing functions.” Williams v. Dayton Police Dept., 680 F. Supp. 1075, 1080 (S.D. Ohio 1987).
The district court thus correctly determined that MSJPD is not a legal entity subject to suit; MSJU is the proper defendant. See Fleck v. Trs. of Univ. of Pa., 995 F. Supp. 2d 390, 402 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (determining that a private university‘s police department is “not an entity capable of being sued” and the “[u]niversity itself . . . is the proper defendant for purposes of a § 1983 suit“). But Warman does not name MSJU in his
We recognize that the campus police department of a private university differs from a municipal police department in important ways, particularly for plaintiffs like Warman seeking relief under § 1983. Had Warman been detained by a municipal department, he could have sued the municipality, which is a state actor. Yet, despite Ohio law endowing campus officers with the same powers as municipal police officers, the appropriate sui juris entity for a campus police department is a private university. This complication, however, does not preclude Warman from obtaining relief under § 1983, as private individuals or entities may still be considered state actors for § 1983 purposes.
We therefore affirm the district court‘s dismissal of all claims against MSJPD on the basis that it is not an entity subject to suit.
ii.
We next consider whether Warman has carried his burden of showing that the remaining defendants—Koopman and Koo—are state actors and therefore subject to liability under § 1983. See Inner City, 87 F.4th at 757; Howell, 976 F.3d at 752. He has met his burden.
Private individuals may be considered state actors for the purposes of § 1983 actions if they “exercise power ‘possessed by virtue of state law’ and if they are ‘clothed with the authority of state law.‘” Carl, 763 F.3d at 595 (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)). We ask whether the private individual‘s “conduct is fairly attributable to the State.” Howell, 976 F.3d at 752 (quoting Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 383 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted)). And we can also inquire: (1) whether the state compelled the individual‘s conduct (“the state-compulsion test“); (2) whether a symbiotic relationship existed between the state and the individual (“the nexus test“); and (3) whether the individual engaged in an action traditionally handled exclusively by the state (“the public-function test“). Nugent, 72 F.4th at 140 (internal citation omitted); Ciraci v. J.M. Smucker Co., 62 F.4th 278, 281 (6th Cir. 2023).
First, a brief examination of the state statute that delegates police power to MSJPD reveals that Ohio clothed MSJPD‘s officers with the authority of state law. When examining the powers granted to campus police officers by
exercises a function of government, namely the basic police power of enforcing laws and maintaining the peace within its jurisdiction. Its officers therefore have the power to search and confiscate property, to detain, search, and arrest persons, and to carry deadly weapons.
Id. at 54. Indeed, § 1713.50 expressly vests each member of a campus police department appointed under it “with the same powers and authority that are vested in a police officer of a municipal corporation or a county sheriff” and permits them to exercise,
concurrently with the law enforcement officers of the political subdivisions in which the private college or university is located, the powers and authority granted to them . . . to preserve the peace, protect persons and property, enforce the laws of [Ohio], and enforce the ordinances and regulations of the political subdivisions in which the private college or university is located[.]
Our traditional state actor inquiry leads to the same outcome. The public function test is the most useful of the three inquiries for these circumstances, and our precedent on private security guards is analogous. For example, in Romanski v. Detroit Ent., L.L.C., 428 F.3d 629, 637 (6th Cir. 2005), we decided that “[w]here private security guards are endowed by law with plenary police powers such that they are de facto police officers, they may qualify as state actors under the public function test.” The court relied on “[t]he fact that [the state] delegated a part of the police power to licensed private security guards, which it had traditionally and exclusively reserved for itself,” to find state action. Lindsey v. Detroit Ent., LLC, 484 F.3d 824, 831 (6th Cir. 2007) (discussing Romanski). In other words, what differentiates a private security force considered a state actor from a purely private security force is some “identifiable police power” that is “not possessed by citizens of [a state] at large, but instead reside[s] only in the state, its agents, and those persons
Like the private security guards in Romanski, MSJPD‘s officers are subject to certain statutory limitations and the oversight of the university, but they exercise police powers that typically reside only in the state. Moreover, MSJPD holds itself out as being “a commissioned law enforcement agency by the State of Ohio, that operates under [Ohio Rev. Code §] 1713.50” on its website. MSJ Police Department and Public Safety, Mount St. Joseph University, https://www.msj.edu/student-life/public-safety-campus-police/ (last visited May 7, 2025). Its website includes a photograph of its uniformed officers and its vehicles, which are emblazoned with “POLICE” in large letters. Id. MSJPD officers, therefore, both possess the same powers and appearance of public officers, even if the “uniforms, vehicles, and badges of members of a campus police department” are required to be “distinct from those of the law enforcement agencies of the political subdivisions which the private [university] . . . is located.”
The Third Circuit has held similarly in the campus police context. In Henderson v. Fisher, 631 F.2d 1115 (3d Cir. 1980), it determined that the University of Pittsburgh‘s campus police qualified as state actors, in part, because the “Pennsylvania legislature ha[d] delegated to the campus police of the University of Pittsburgh the very powers which the municipal police force of Pittsburgh possesses.” Id. at 1118. Consequently, the Third Circuit reasoned that “the delegation of police powers, a government function, to the campus police buttress[ed] the conclusion that the campus police act under color of state authority.” Id.; see also Fleck, 995 F. Supp. 2d at 400 (determining that campus police officers, endowed by law with plenary police powers, acted as state actors and were subject to liability under § 1983).
Accordingly, where Koopman and Koo “exercised power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because [they were] clothed with the authority of state law[,]” they meet the “traditional definition” of acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Koopman and Koo did so when detaining Warman at the campus police station. Koopman and Koo thus qualify as state actors subject to § 1983 liability for Warman‘s
iii.
Based on the foregoing, Warman‘s complaint properly pleads a violation of his
It is “well established” that public police officers may assert qualified immunity. United Pet Supply, Inc. v. City of Chattanooga, 768 F.3d 464, 479 (6th Cir. 2014). But, although MSJPD is a state-commissioned law enforcement agency, it is also a sub-unit of a private university. Therefore, it is not apparent whether its officers should be considered akin to public police officers who may assert qualified immunity or considered private actors endowed with plenary police powers by Ohio law and so potentially ineligible. No clear authority from this court or the Supreme Court offers an answer. See Hoggard v. Rhodes, 141 S. Ct. 2421, 2422 (2021) (Thomas, J., respecting denial of certiorari) (“[W]hy should university officers, who have time to make calculated choices about enacting or enforcing unconstitutional policies, receive the same protection as a police officer who makes a split-second decision to use force in a dangerous setting? We have never offered a satisfactory explanation to this question.“). Therefore, as other federal courts have observed, “the question [of] whether university-employed [] police can even assert qualified immunity is a complicated one.” Wheeler v. Am. Univ., 619 F. Supp. 3d 1, 22 (D.D.C. 2022).
The framework to resolve this question offered by the Supreme Court in Richardson and Filarsky “demands a fact-intensive analysis.” United Pet Supply, 768 F.3d at 479. But neither side meaningfully engages with the required inquiry. When asserting qualified immunity below, the defendants did not cite to any authority that establishes their entitlement to a qualified immunity defense. Warman briefly challenged that entitlement in his reply below, citing Justice Thomas‘s concurrence in Hoggard, but going no further. 141 S. Ct. at 2422. The district court, for its part, did not address the issue.5
We largely do not consider waived arguments. See United States v. Ellison, 462 F.3d 557, 560 (6th Cir. 2006). Only “exceptional cases” justify deviating from this general rule, for
example, occasions where “failing to consider the argument would result in a ‘plain miscarriage of justice.‘” Id. (quoting Pinney Dock & Transp. Co. v. Penn Cent. Corp., 838 F.2d 1445, 1461 (6th Cir. 1988)). If we agreed with the district court that Warman fails to overcome Koopman‘s and Koo‘s qualified immunity defense, this would likely be that rare case. While the district court “did not expressly state” that Koopman and Koo were eligible to raise a qualified immunity defense, “such a conclusion was necessarily implied by the court‘s ruling” that qualified immunity barred Warman‘s
But, even if we assume without deciding that Koopman and Koo can raise a qualified immunity defense, that defense—briefed fully by both parties—fails on this motion to dismiss. It is “generally inappropriate for a district court to grant a [Rule] 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity.” Wesley v. Campbell, 779 F.3d 421, 433 (6th Cir. 2015). We make an exception, however, where plaintiff‘s allegations fail to “state a claim of [a] violation of clearly established law.” Johnson v. Moseley, 790 F.3d 649, 653 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)).
As discussed above, Warman plausibly alleges a violation of his
Warman does so. The right to be free from seizure without probable cause is “clearly established.” See Tlapanco v. Elges, 969 F.3d 638, 648 (6th Cir. 2020); see also Centanni v. Eight Unknown Officers, 15 F.3d 587, 592 (6th Cir. 1994). And, as discussed above, Koopman and Koo lacked
Accordingly, we reverse the district court‘s grant of qualified immunity. In doing so, we leave open the question of whether Koopman and Koo may assert qualified immunity in the first instance. While resolving the question may “materially advance” the progress of litigation, the issue was not “presented with sufficient clarity and completeness” below to justify us exercising our “limited” discretion to reach it here. Pinney, 838 F.2d at 1461; see also In re Hood, 319 F.3d 755, 760 (6th Cir. 2003). If Koopman and Koo again raise a qualified immunity defense at a later stage in this litigation, the district court should then resolve the question.
B.
We next consider Warman‘s free exercise claim. The Free Exercise Clause, applied to the states through the
Warman brings his free exercise claim against MSJU, MSJPD, Elliott, Metzger, Ellerman, Hinzman, Koopman, and Koo. He alleges that these defendants “acted to discriminate and/or retaliate against [] Warman for [] freely exercising his religious preference, based upon his sincerely held beliefs, not to be vaccinated.” (Second Am. Compl., R. 18, PageID 331.) Warman‘s free exercise allegations fall into two categories: (1) Koopman‘s and Koo‘s disparaging remarks about Warman‘s religion, and (2) the denial of Warman‘s requested religious exemption under MSJU‘s vaccine policy, as carried out by MSJU administrators.
For the first category, Warman has not shown that his religious exercise was burdened. “While [Warman] has presented facts suggesting that [he] was exposed to religious information [by Koopman and Koo] with which [he] did not agree, [he] has given no indication that the information coerced [him] into doing or not doing anything.” Nikolao v. Lyon, 875 F.3d 310, 316 (6th Cir. 2017). And while he also presented facts that Koopman and Koo disparaged his religious beliefs, “actions that merely offend or cast doubt on religious beliefs do not on that account violate free exercise.” Mozert v. Hawkins Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1068 (6th Cir. 1987) (quoting Grove v. Mead School Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528, 1543 (9th Cir. 1985)). Rather, “[a]n actual burden on the profession or exercise of religion is required.” Id.
For the second category, Warman has not shown that the defendants involved in the exemption process under MSJU‘s vaccine policy were “engaged in state action.” See Lindke v. Freed, 601 U.S. 187, 195 (2024). Warman alleges that MSJU‘s vaccine policy was implemented by school administrators Karen Elliott, Amy Metzger, Paige Ellerman, and Nancy Hinzman. (See Second Am. Compl., R. 18, PageID 311, 320 (stating that these defendants “created and acted to carry out” the University‘s vaccine policy, including “assessing religious exemption requests“).) But MSJU is a private school, and all the administrators alleged to be involved in handling Warman‘s exemption requests were private employees.
Warman argues only that the administrators are state actors “with respect to their direction of MSJPD.” (Appellant Br. 18–19.) As Warman sees it, Koo and Koopman were state actors because they exercised state police power “traditionally exclusively
Consequently, we affirm the district court‘s dismissal of Warman‘s free exercise claim as to all defendants.
C.
Warman‘s equal protection claim fares no better. The Equal Protection Clause prohibits state actors from “intentionally treat[ing] one differently than others similarly situated without any rational basis for the difference.” TriHealth, Inc. v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 430 F.3d 783, 788 (6th Cir. 2005).
Warman brings his equal protection claim against MSJU, MSJPD, Elliott, Metzger, Ellerman, Hinzman, Koopman, and Koo. His complaint states that “[n]umerous other students were on campus, including others who were unvaccinated, and none received the treatment provided to [] Warman[.]” (Second Am. Compl., R. 18, PageID 323.) But he fails to “allege, with particularity, facts that demonstrate what each defendant did” to single him out or treat him differently from other similarly situated MSJU students or employees. See Ondo v. City of Cleveland, 795 F.3d 597, 610 (6th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). A “critical aspect of the § 1983 universe is that to be held liable, a plaintiff must demonstrate ‘that each [state actor] defendant, through the [defendant‘s] own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.‘” Robertson v. Lucas, 753 F.3d 606, 615 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676). Warman‘s equal protection claim largely consists of nonspecific allegations that various defendants, through their mere involvement in enacting the university‘s vaccine policy, violated his constitutional rights by attributing wrongful acts to the whole group. This is insufficient. See Ondo, 795 F.3d at 611.
Warman thus fails to plausibly allege that any defendant violated his rights under the Equal Protection Clause. Since establishing the denial of a constitutional right is one of the “two essential elements” required to sustain a § 1983 claim, Graham v. Nat‘l Collegiate Athletic Ass‘n, 804 F.2d 953, 957 (6th Cir. 1986), we affirm the district court‘s dismissal of Warman‘s equal protection claim as to all defendants without proceeding to the next step of the analysis.
IV.
Next, we consider Warman‘s disability discrimination claim under
Even when pleading under the correct provision, the claim falls short.
Warman alleges that “at different times, in different ways, and in different combinations, [the defendants] purposely discriminated against [] Warman based on his actual and/or perceived disabilities.” (Second Am. Compl., R. 18, PageID 332.) Even setting aside the failure to plead with particularity, Warman‘s complaint fails to allege how MSJU or its employees discriminated against him solely by reason of his disabilities when they refused his exemption request, even if they disregarded a doctor‘s note that apparently set out a medical need to avoid the vaccine. Warman does not allege what medical condition caused him not to take the vaccine. And he also does not allege that MSJU or its employees forced his withdrawal from the university for failing to receive the vaccine—rather, Warman withdrew from the university prior to the date mandating all students to demonstrate proof of vaccination.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court‘s dismissal of Warman‘s disability discrimination claim against all defendants.
V.
Warman also asks us to reinstate his state-law claims in light of the district court‘s decision to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. We review a district court‘s declination of supplemental jurisdiction for an abuse of discretion. Veneklase v. Bridgewater Condos, L.C., 670 F.3d 705, 709 (6th Cir. 2012).
The district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction because it had dismissed all federal claims. Because we reinstate Warman‘s
VI.
Finally, Warman contends that the district court abused its discretion by dismissing his claims with prejudice and denying him leave to amend. A district court‘s dismissal of a complaint with prejudice is generally reviewed for abuse of discretion. Crosby v. Twitter, Inc., 921 F.3d 617, 622 (6th Cir. 2019). While, ordinarily, a district court dismissing a claim with prejudice must state its reasons for doing so, a plaintiff is first required to file a formal motion for leave to amend the complaint. Id. at 627. It is, therefore, not an abuse of discretion for a district court to dismiss a claim with prejudice if the party has not moved to amend or proposed an amended complaint. CNH Am. LLC v. Int‘l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agr. Implement Workers of Am. (UAW), 645 F.3d 785, 795 (6th Cir. 2011).
Warman did not file a formal motion to amend. As such, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying him leave to amend. In any case, on appeal, Warman seeks leave to amend specifically to clarify that Koopman and Koo told Warman that he was not free to leave. Since Warman already plausibly alleged that he was not free to leave in his complaint, further opportunity to draft his complaint would offer no additional evidence or argument for the district court to consider. See, e.g., Libertarian Nat‘l Comm., Inc. v. Holiday, 907 F.3d 941, 948 (6th Cir. 2018).
VII.
For the foregoing reasons, the district court‘s decision is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded in accordance with this opinion.