KEO RATHA; SEM KOSAL; SOPHEA BUN; YEM BAN; NOL NAKRY; PHAN SOPHEA; SOK SANG, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. PHATTHANA SEAFOOD CO., LTD.; S.S. FROZEN FOOD CO., LTD.; RUBICON RESOURCES, LLC; WALES AND CO. UNIVERSE LTD., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 18-55041
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Filed February 25, 2022
D.C. No. 2:16-cv-04271-JFW-AS. Argued and Submitted September 13, 2019 Pasadena, California. Before: Marsha S. Berzon, Ryan D. Nelson, and Bridget S. Bade, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge Bade
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California John F. Walter, District Judge, Presiding
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act
The panel affirmed the district court‘s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants in an action brought under the civil remedy provision of the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act,
Assuming without deciding that
As to two foreign company defendants, the panel held that plaintiffs’ claims against Phatthana Seafood Co. Ltd. failed because Phatthana was not “present in the United States” at any time relevant to this lawsuit as
As to defendants Rubicon and Wales and Co. Universe Ltd., a Thai company registered to conduct business in California, the panel held that plaintiffs failed to produce evidence establishing a triable issue of defendants’ liability under
The panel further held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiffs’ motion for an extension of time to respond to defendants’ motions for summary judgment.
* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
Paul Hoffman (argued) and Catherine Sweetser, Schonbrun Seplow Harris Hoffman & Zeldes LLP, Los Angeles, California; Agnieszka M. Fryszman, Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, Washington, D.C.; Dan Stormer, Hadsell Stormer & Renick LLP, Pasadena, California; Anthony DiCaprio, Rye, New York; for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Bryan D. Daly (argued), Charles Lawrence Kreindler, and Barbara E. Taylor, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP, Los Angeles, California, for Defendants-Appellees.
William J. Aceves, California Western School of Law, San Diego, California, for Amicus Curiae Human Rights and Development Foundation.
Scott A. Gilmore and Carmen K. Cheung, Center for Justice and Accountability, San Francisco, California; Beth Van Schaack, Stanford University, Stanford, California; Ralph G. Steinhardt, George Washington University School of Law, Washington, D.C.; for Amicus Curiae Center for Justice and Accountability.
Eli Naduris-Weissman, Rothner Segall & Greenstone, Pasadena, California, for Amici Curiae Solidarity Center, International Labor Rights Forum, Worker Rights Consortium, Centro de los Derechos del Migrante, International Labor Recruitment Working Group, and EarthRights International.
Anne M. Voigts, King & Spalding LLP, Palo Alto, California; Amelia G. Yowell, King & Spalding LLP, Washington, D.C.; for Amici Curiae Freedom Network USA, Human Trafficking Legal Center, Public Counsel,
Robert A. DeHaan, McLean, Virginia, for Amicus Curiae National Fisheries Institute.
OPINION
BADE, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiffs-Appellants are Cambodian villagers who allege that they were trafficked into Thailand and subjected to forced labor at seafood processing factories. Plaintiffs allege that Thai companies perpetrated these offenses, and that companies present in the United States knowingly benefitted from their forced labor. Plaintiffs brought their claims under
We are asked to determine the extraterritorial reach of
I
A
In 2000, Congress enacted the TVPA “to ‘combat trafficking in persons, a contemporary manifestation of slavery whose victims are predominantly women and children, to ensure just and effective punishment of traffickers, and to protect their victims.‘” Ditullio v. Boehm, 662 F.3d 1091, 1094 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 102, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000) (codified as amended at
In 2003, Congress reauthorized and amended the TVPRA, adding a civil remedy provision codified at
An individual who is a victim of a violation of this chapter may bring a civil action against the perpetrator (or whoever knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value from participation in a venture which that person knew or should have known has engaged in an act in violation of this chapter) in an appropriate district court of the United States and may recover damages and reasonable attorneys fees.
The 2008 amendments also added
(a) In general.-In addition to any domestic or extraterritorial jurisdiction otherwise provided by law, the courts of the United States have extraterritorial jurisdiction over any offense (or any attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense) under section
1581 ,1583 ,1584 ,1589 ,1590 , or1591 if-(1) an alleged offender is a national of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted
for permanent residence (as those terms are defined in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act ( 8 U.S.C. 1101 )); or(2) an alleged offender is present in the United States, irrespective of the nationality of the alleged offender.
B
In their complaint, Plaintiffs alleged that they were the victims of peonage, forced labor, involuntary servitude, and human trafficking, in violation of
Specifically, Plaintiffs say that they were recruited from their villages to work in factories in Thailand producing shrimp and seafood for export to the United States. Plaintiffs were promised well-paying jobs with free accommodations,
Phatthana and S.S. Frozen are foreign companies. Phatthana is a Thai company that owned two seafood processing factories in Thailand, including the factory in Songkhla province.3 Phatthana does not have an address, employees, factories, or other property in the United States. Phatthana had business relationships with Rubicon and Wales, which we describe in more detail below.
S.S. Frozen is also a Thai company and it owned a seafood processing factory in Songkhla province, next to Phatthana‘s Songkhla factory. S.S. Frozen does not have an address or employees in the United States, and it did not sell any seafood in the United States during the period at issue—August 2010 to October 2012. Unlike Phatthana, S.S. Frozen did not have any business relationships with Rubicon or Wales.
In October 2011, Rubicon ordered fourteen containers of shrimp from Phatthana‘s Songkhla factory for distribution to Walmart. Walmart rejected the shipment because it had concerns about working conditions in the factory. Rubicon returned the shrimp to Thailand. It did not successfully sell any shrimp from Phatthana‘s Songkhla factory in the United States during the period at issue in this case.
Wales is a Thai company registered to conduct business in California. Wales performs quality control, sales, and marketing for seafood processing factories. During the period at issue, Wales inspected the packaging of the fourteen containers of shrimp that Rubicon ordered from (and ultimately returned to) Phatthana before the shipment left Thailand, and it received a commission for these services.
C
At the outset of this case, the district court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ TVPRA claims, under Rules
The district court also granted Rubicon‘s and Wales‘s motions for summary judgment because it concluded that Plaintiffs failed to present a triable issue that these companies knowingly benefitted from participating in a venture that they knew or should have known had engaged in TVPRA violations. See
II
We review de novo a district court‘s grant of summary judgment. Nigro v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 784 F.3d 495, 497 (9th Cir. 2015). We may affirm on any ground supported by the record. Oyama v. Univ. of Haw., 813 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2015). We review a district court‘s denial of a motion for extension of time for abuse of discretion. Ahanchian v. Xenon Pictures, Inc., 624 F.3d 1253, 1258 (9th Cir. 2010).
We consider separately Plaintiffs’ claims against the foreign companies, Phatthana and S.S. Frozen, and their claims against the companies present in the United States, Rubicon and Wales.
Plaintiffs, who are Cambodian villagers, allege that Phatthana and S.S. Frozen, both Thai companies, trafficked them into Thailand and then subjected them to peonage, forced labor, and involuntary servitude at their seafood processing factories. Thus, this case involves allegations by foreign Plaintiffs, against foreign Defendants, based on conduct occurring and injuries suffered in a foreign country. We must first consider the extraterritorial reach of
A
“Congress has the authority to enforce its laws beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States.” EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991), superseded in part by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 10-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 251 (1994). But “[i]t is a longstanding principle of American law ‘that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.‘” Id. (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)). When asked to decide whether a statute applies extraterritorially, we ordinarily apply a two-step framework. RJR Nabisco, 579 U.S. at 329, 337. At step one, we “presume that a statute applies only domestically” and “ask
Viewed in isolation,
We need not resolve this dispute to decide this case. Instead, we assume without deciding that Plaintiffs are correct and that
Second, we adhere to the “cardinal principle of judicial restraint,” which instructs that “if it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more.” Midbrook Flowerbulbs Holland B.V. v. Holland Am. Bulb Farms, Inc., 874 F.3d 604, 617 n.13 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting PDK Lab‘ys Inc. v. DEA, 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)). In addition to any extraterritorial application otherwise provided by law,
We therefore decline to decide whether
B
We turn now to Plaintiffs’ claims that Phatthana and S.S. Frozen trafficked them into Thailand and subjected them to peonage, forced labor, and involuntary servitude at their seafood processing factories. The question here is whether Plaintiffs’ claims satisfy
The TVPRA, in
The plain meaning of the adjective “present” is “in a particular place.” New Oxford American Dictionary 1381 (3d ed. 2010). Phatthana and S.S. Frozen are both Thai companies. Neither had any address, employees, or physical presence in the United States during the period at issue in this case. Nonetheless, Plaintiffs argue that Phatthana and S.S. Frozen were “present in” the United States for purposes of
1
Plaintiffs first maintain that we should construe the phrase “present in,” as used in
To support their position, Plaintiffs rely primarily on United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991), but that case hurts more than helps their argument. As relevant here, the defendant in Yunis challenged his conviction under the Hostage Taking Act,
Yunis discussed the “universal principle” theory of international law, which authorizes states to prosecute certain offenses that “the community of nations” recognizes are of “universal concern,” including the slave trade, “even absent any special connection between the state and the offense.” Id. at 1091 (citing Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States §§ 404, 423 (1987)). But Yunis considered the “universal principle” in a context that differs from the one presently before this court. See id. at 1090 (explaining the Hostage Taking Act covered an offender‘s conduct when “the offender is found in the United States” (emphasis added) (quoting
Contrary to Plaintiffs’ suggestion that Yunis supports an interpretation of the term “present in” that does not require physical presence, the court later analyzed a different statute requiring an offender to be “present in” a specific territory, and it concluded that the term “present in” has a parallel meaning to the term “found in.” Id. at 1091–92. Thus, the court held, the defendant was “present in” the United States “once in the United States” physically. Id. at 1092. If
Even assuming
General jurisdiction is not limited to claims arising out of or relating to the forum but rather “permits a court to hear ‘any and all claims’ against a defendant, whether or not the conduct at issue has any connection to the forum.” Id. (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919). Because the scope of general jurisdiction, once established, is broader than the scope for specific jurisdiction, “a plaintiff invoking general jurisdiction must meet an ‘exacting standard’ for the minimum contacts required.” Id. at 1069 (quoting CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., 653 F.3d 1066, 1074 (9th Cir. 2011)). Courts may exercise general jurisdiction over a defendant only if the defendant‘s connections to the forum state “are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [it] essentially at home” in the forum. Williams v. Yamaha Motor Co., 851 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 2017) (alteration in original) (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919). The paradigmatic examples of such connections are when the defendant is incorporated or has its principal place of business in the forum. Id.
The evidence in the record here does not support either specific or general jurisdiction as a basis for finding minimum contacts. To establish specific jurisdiction, three requirements must be satisfied. Axiom Foods, Inc. v. Acerchem Int‘l, Inc., 874 F.3d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir. 2017).
Acerchem Int‘l, Inc., 874 F.3d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir. 2017). First, “the defendant must either ‘purposefully direct his activities’ toward the forum or ‘purposefully avail[ ] himself of the privileges of conducting activities in the forum.‘” Id. (quoting Dole Food Co. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2002)). Second, “the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the defendant‘s forum-related activities.” Id. (quoting Dole Food, 303 F.3d at 1111). And third, “the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice, i.e. it must be reasonable.” Id. (quoting Dole Food, 303 F.3d at 1111). We will consider only the first element of specific jurisdiction because it presents the dispositive issue.
Because the TVPRA‘s “civil remedy provision creates a cause of action that sounds in tort,” Ditullio, 662 F.3d at 1096, “we employ the purposeful direction test” derived from Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), see Axiom Foods, 874 F.3d at 1069. To satisfy the purposeful direction test, the defendant must have “(1) committed an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum state.” Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 805 (quoting Dole Food, 303 F.3d at 1111).11
Here, Plaintiffs have not satisfied the purposeful direction prong of the minimum contacts analysis. They primarily point to Rubicon‘s order of fourteen containers of shrimp from Phatthana‘s Songkhla factory for distribution in
Assuming Phatthana‘s attempt to sell shrimp to Walmart, and some other sales to entities in the United States, constituted intentional acts expressly aimed at the United States, Plaintiffs have produced no evidence suggesting that those sales caused “harm that [Phatthana] [knew was] likely to be suffered in the” United States. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 805 (quoting Dole Food, 303 F.3d at 1111). Plaintiffs’ evidence thus does not show that Phatthana or S.S. Frozen purposefully directed their activities to the United States in the sense required to establish specific personal jurisdiction over a personal injury claim.13
2
We next consider Plaintiffs’ second argument—that Phatthana and S.S. Frozen were present in the United States through an agency relationship or joint venture with Rubicon—and conclude it is unconvincing.
Plaintiffs assert that Phatthana is “present in” the United States for purposes of
Plaintiffs contend that Rubicon‘s marketing activities, on-site visits to Phatthana‘s factories, management of the
Plaintiffs further maintain that Phatthana was present in the United States because it and Rubicon were engaged in a joint venture to market and sell shrimp in the United States. This argument fails largely for the same reasons Plaintiffs’ agency argument fails.
To establish a joint venture under California law, Plaintiffs must show “an agreement between the parties under which they have a community of interest, that is, a joint interest, in a common business undertaking, an understanding as to the sharing of profits and losses, and a right of joint control.” Connor v. Great W. Sav. & Loan Ass‘n, 447 P.2d 609, 615 (Cal. 1968) (quoting Holtz v. United Plumbing & Heating Co., 319 P.2d 617, 620 (Cal. 1957)); accord Ramirez v. Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 128, 137 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). To support their joint venture argument, Plaintiffs rely on the same
To the contrary, the limited liability company agreement creating Rubicon states that Rubicon was formed as a joint venture between Brian Wynn (the CEO and manager of Rubicon), Wales, Thailand Fishery Cold Storage Public Co. (whose share in Rubicon was later transferred to another company), and P&M Holding Co.; that those four entities would share in Rubicon‘s net income and losses; and that Wynn had “exclusive authority to manage the operations and affairs of” Rubicon. Neither the original agreement nor its subsequent amendments identifies Phatthana as a member of the joint venture.
Plaintiffs rely on filings by “Rubicon Group” submitted to the Commerce Department as part of an antidumping proceeding.14 The “Rubicon Group” is not synonymous with Rubicon Resources, LLC, but rather is the term used in a Commerce Department antidumping proceeding to describe a collection of “affiliated firms, collapsed for [antidumping] analysis pursuant to
At most, these filings confirm that there is a joint venture relationship between the entities named as members of Rubicon Resources in the Rubicon joint venture agreement and that there is some relationship between at least one of those entities and Phatthana. But neither these filings nor Plaintiffs’ briefs explain what it means for Phatthana to be “integrated” into the overall Rubicon Group business structure, or what it means that a Rubicon subgroup “encompasses” a sub-subgroup such as Phatthana. Plaintiffs offers no evidence of any direct agreement between Rubicon and Phatthana regarding the sharing of profits and losses or a joint right of control. In light of the existence of a Rubicon joint venture agreement that does not include Phatthana, as well as the evidence that Rubicon and Phatthana‘s relationship was that of a purchaser and a supplier, these Commerce Department filings alone cannot support the inference that Phatthana and Rubicon were engaged in a joint venture.
3
Plaintiffs’ third argument also falls short. Focusing on the phrase “an alleged offender” as used in
* * *
Plaintiffs have not raised a triable issue that Phatthana and S.S. Frozen were “present in the United States,” as required by
We next consider Plaintiffs’ claims against Rubicon and Wales. Plaintiffs allege that Rubicon and Wales knowingly benefitted from Phatthana‘s alleged human trafficking and forced labor abuses, financially and by accessing a steady stream of imported seafood. We conclude that summary judgment for these Defendants was appropriate because Plaintiffs failed to produce evidence establishing a triable issue of Rubicon‘s or Wales‘s liability under
In
We separately address the claims against Rubicon and the claims against Wales. We first explain why no reasonable jury could infer from the evidence that Rubicon benefitted, financially or otherwise, from Phatthana‘s alleged TVPRA violations. We then explain why Plaintiffs have not raised a triable issue on whether Wales knew or should have known that Phatthana was engaged in alleged
1
Plaintiffs assert that there is “sufficient evidence” that Rubicon benefitted from Phatthana‘s alleged TVPRA violations. They point to three distinct benefits that Rubicon allegedly obtained from its relationship with Phatthana. But none of those allegations presents a triable issue of material fact.
Plaintiffs first argue that Rubicon “benefitted from marketing the shrimp produced by Phatthana.” They point to materials stating that “Rubicon has 13 factories,” including Phatthana‘s Songkhla factory, “that are 100% owned and captive to Rubicon Resources.” But the page touting Rubicon‘s production capabilities and a “Factory Index” that includes the Songkhla factory are undated. And Plaintiffs have offered no evidence or explanation of the purpose of these materials, when they were produced, or when (or even whether) they were distributed to potential customers. Moreover, Plaintiffs’ argument rests on Rubicon‘s marketing role, not on any ownership or production role. We thus find these materials insufficient for a reasonable jury to infer that Rubicon benefitted from its alleged marketing of Phatthana‘s products.
We reject Plaintiffs’ second argument—that Rubicon obtained a “competitive advantage” through its association with Phatthana—for a similar reason. Plaintiffs point to “[d]eclarations from Louisiana shrimpers attest[ing] to the competitive advantage and the impact on American industry” of the Thai shrimp industry. But these general statements from American shrimpers about international market conditions do not suggest that Rubicon benefitted
Perhaps realizing these deficiencies, Plaintiffs advance a third argument: that an attempt to benefit satisfies
Moreover, Congress‘s decision to impose civil liability on those who “benefit” but not those who “attempt to benefit” is significant because attempt liability is plainly authorized elsewhere in the TVPRA. See, e.g.,
2
Turning to Plaintiffs’ claims against Wales, we conclude that Plaintiffs failed to present evidence to support a reasonable inference that Wales knew or should have known that Phatthana was engaged in conduct violating the TVPRA when it received a benefit from the alleged venture. Wales admits that on February 23, 2012, it became aware of a news article published in the Phnom Penh Post detailing allegations from Plaintiff Ratha‘s whistleblower report.17 In light of this admission, we bifurcate our analysis into the periods before and after February 23, 2012. We first conclude that Plaintiffs have not presented a triable issue on whether Wales knew or should have known of Phatthana‘s alleged TVPRA violations before February 23, 2012. We then conclude that Plaintiffs have not presented a triable issue on whether Wales benefitted from the alleged venture on or after February 23, 2012.
a
We first consider whether a reasonable factfinder could infer from the evidence that Wales knew or should have
As we explain in the following sections, this evidence falls short of creating a genuine dispute of material fact on whether Wales knew or should have known of Phatthana‘s alleged TVPRA violations before February 2012. “[T]he phrase ‘knew or should have known’ usually connotes negligence.” Mayview Corp. v. Rodstein, 620 F.2d 1347, 1358 (9th Cir. 1980). And “[n]egligence is a less culpable mental state than actual knowledge . . . or recklessness.” Erickson Prods., Inc. v. Kast, 921 F.3d 822, 833 (9th Cir. 2019). Assuming
i
Plaintiffs first point to evidence generally establishing that abusive labor practices were common in Thailand, particularly in the shrimp industry. They rely upon the 2009
Plaintiffs’ reliance on a January 2008 report from the AFL-CIO‘s Solidarity Center, The Degradation of Work: The True Cost of Shrimp, is likewise insufficient to overcome their burden at summary judgment. The only reference to Phatthana in this forty-page report appears in a section addressing whether Thai seafood workers earned minimum wage (191 baht per day, as an industry source estimated). The report includes the following statement based on information from a 2005 interview with a worker at a different Phatthana factory: “[A] pay stub from a worker at the Pattana [sic] Seafood Company in Samut Sakhon showed a reported pay of 191 baht per day, but daily take-home pay was closer to 160 baht after deductions for equipment and permits.” But Plaintiffs offer no argument or evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that this reference to one worker‘s statement, concerning wages at an entirely different processing facility, long before the
Plaintiffs assert that news reports referencing the Solidarity Center Report, published between April and June 2008, “identif[ied] Rubicon‘s customers as the consumers” of shrimp produced in Thailand. Plaintiffs are correct that one of these articles identified “nine big U.S. supermarket chains” that “sell[ ] Thai shrimp in the U.S.,” including Walmart, one of Rubicon‘s customers. Another article identified Walmart as a retailer that imports shrimp from Thailand. This article, however, also stated that the Solidarity Center report “makes clear not all shrimp imports into the United States from Thailand and Bangladesh come from problem plants.” These articles do not identify any Thai companies, much less Phatthana, as a bad actor engaged in labor abuses, and they do not state that Walmart or any of the other U.S. supermarket chains were selling shrimp produced by forced labor. Therefore, these articles establish nothing more than reported labor abuses in Thailand in 2008 and that some U.S. supermarkets were selling shrimp produced in Thailand. This evidence cannot support a reasonable inference of Wales‘s knowledge of
Finally, Plaintiffs cite pages excerpted from the 2010, 2011, and 2012 editions of the U.S. Department of State‘s Trafficking in Persons Report. These reports also fail to include any company-specific information and do not mention Phatthana. Instead, they include Thailand on the Tier Two Watch List and contain general statements about labor abuses in Thailand and the Thai government‘s response to those problems. The reports thus do not support a reasonable inference of Wales‘s knowledge of labor abuses at the Songkhla factory from 2010 to 2012.
We conclude that the reports and articles Plaintiffs have identified are insufficient to create a triable issue of fact on Wales‘s knowledge of Phatthana‘s alleged labor abuses before February 2012.
ii
Plaintiffs further argue that a reasonable factfinder could infer that Wales negligently failed to investigate whether Phatthana was engaging in labor abuses at the Songkhla factory given the prevalence of labor abuses in the Thai seafood industry. To support this argument, Plaintiffs rely on reports from their retained experts, Luis DeBaca, Marc Bendick, and Samir Goswami.19 We consider these reports in turn.
The Bendick and Goswami reports do opine on the issue at hand, but they are not helpful because they rely on the same generalized evidence of country conditions that we have already determined is insufficient to create a triable issue of material fact. Although the Bendick report explicitly focuses on the 2010–2012 period, its conclusions are generalities based on unsupported assumptions. It states, for example, that Rubicon‘s senior management “can be assumed to have been fully aware of how prevalent were labor practices such as are alleged at Songkhla,” and that Phatthana would have “routinely shared information with Rubicon on production issues [and] labor matters including those involving migrant workers would inevitably be part of that information.” The report also lists several ways in which audits of the Songkhla factory in 2011 and 2012 did not meet certain standards, but never opines that such audits were even necessary under the circumstances or that a business‘s failure to conduct such audits would be negligent.
In sum, Plaintiffs’ expert reports fail to bridge the gap between their generalized evidence of labor conditions in the Thai shrimp industry and the specific allegations that Wales knew or should have known of the alleged labor abuses at Phatthana‘s Songkhla factory before February 23, 2012.20 We therefore affirm the district court‘s entry of summary judgment in favor of Wales on Plaintiffs’ claims predating February 23, 2012.
b
We now turn to Plaintiffs’ claims against Wales to the extent they arise from conduct occurring after February 23, 2012. As previously noted, we assume here that the evidence supports a finding that Wales knew of the
The only benefit Wales obtained from its alleged venture with Phatthana is a commission “for product inspection services rendered in connection with shrimp ordered by Rubicon and processed at Phatthana‘s Songkhla factory.” The purchase orders for those containers of shrimp are dated October 13, 14, and 31, 2011, and include shipping dates ranging from October 2011 to December 2011. Thus, Wales‘s inspection of shrimp “destined for the U.S.” apparently occurred before the product left Thailand, and therefore before February 23, 2012.
Plaintiffs point to no facts that would support a reasonable inference that Wales inspected those shipments on or after February 23, 2012, or that Wales otherwise benefitted from the alleged venture after it became aware of Ratha‘s allegations. To be sure, Wales‘s president declared that the inspection services took place “in late 2011–early 2012.” Although that statement may be consistent with the possibility that Wales knowingly benefitted from the alleged venture after it learned of Ratha‘s allegations, we find the statement, without more, to be “insufficient to allow a reasonable juror to conclude that [Plaintiffs‘] position more likely than not is true.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993); see also Brit. Airways Bd. v. Boeing Co., 585 F.2d 946, 952 (9th Cir. 1978) (“A mere scintilla of evidence will not do, for a jury is permitted to
Because the payment for inspection services is the only benefit Plaintiffs allege Wales received during the relevant time period, and the evidence is insufficient to create a triable issue that this occurred after February 23, 2012, we affirm the district court‘s summary judgment in favor of Wales.
IV
Finally, we consider whether the district court abused its discretion by denying Plaintiffs’ motion for an extension of time to respond to Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. Relying on Ahanchian, 624 F.3d at 1257-60, Plaintiffs argue that the district court abused its discretion by denying their motion because the Thanksgiving holiday effectively reduced their limited response time to three business days and Defendants’ motions were accompanied by hundreds of pages of documents. But the circumstances here are significantly different from those presented in Ahanchian and do not support Plaintiffs’ claims of prejudice.
In Ahanchian, the plaintiff filed his opposition to a motion for summary judgment three days after the filing deadline with a motion for the court to accept the late filing. Id. at 1257. The district court denied the plaintiff‘s motion to file his opposition. Id. It then granted the defendant‘s motion for summary judgment after “review[ing] only the defense evidence, even though it knew the opposition papers were already filed,” id. at 1258, and awarded significant attorney‘s fees to defense counsel, id. at 1255, 1257–58. We concluded that the district court abused its discretion and “effectively flouted” Ninth Circuit precedent, which “bars
Here, in contrast to the circumstances in Ahanchian, Plaintiffs have not shown that the district court flouted precedent or that they were prejudiced by the district court‘s order denying their motion for an extension. Plaintiffs argue that they were prejudiced because they were rushed in preparing their responses and omitted exhibits from their separate statement of facts. But Plaintiffs stipulated to the motion deadline. And Plaintiffs filed a notice of errata and supplemented their separate statement of facts with additional exhibits they had inadvertently omitted. Critically, unlike in Ahanchian, Plaintiffs do not assert that the district court refused to consider any evidence or arguments they submitted in their opposition to summary judgment. Thus, notwithstanding any stringent case management deadlines the Central District of California may impose in accordance with its local rules, the district court‘s order denying Plaintiffs’ motion for an extension was not an abuse of discretion.
V
The district court did not err by entering summary judgment for Defendants. And the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Plaintiffs’ motion for an extension of time.21
AFFIRMED.