35 F.4th 1159
9th Cir.2022Background
- Seven Cambodian villagers sued under 18 U.S.C. § 1595 (TVPRA civil remedy), alleging they were trafficked to Thailand and forced to work at Thai seafood processors Phatthana Seafood Co., Ltd. and S.S. Frozen Food Co., Ltd.
- Plaintiffs also sued Rubicon Resources, LLC (Delaware LLC with principal place in California) and Wales & Co. Universe Ltd. (Thai company registered in California) as U.S.-present companies that knowingly benefitted from the alleged forced labor.
- District court denied initial Rule 12 motions but granted summary judgment for Phatthana and S.S. Frozen because plaintiffs failed to show those foreign firms were “present in the United States” under 18 U.S.C. § 1596(a)(2); it granted summary judgment for Rubicon and Wales for failure to raise triable issues on § 1595(a) elements (knowing benefit/knowledge of violations).
- On appeal, the Ninth Circuit assumed (without deciding) that § 1595 may reach extraterritorial conduct via § 1596 but affirmed summary judgment: Phatthana and S.S. Frozen were not "present in" the U.S., and plaintiffs failed to show Rubicon or Wales knowingly benefitted from a venture that they knew or should have known involved TVPRA violations.
- The Ninth Circuit also held the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs’ motion for an extension of time to respond to summary judgment motions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 1595 reaches extraterritorial conduct via § 1596 | §1595 incorporates §1596 so civil claims may reach foreign conduct if §1596’s prerequisites are met | §1595 is silent on extraterritoriality; §1596 governs criminal jurisdiction and should not be read to create civil extraterritorial claims | Court assumed arguendo that §1595 can reach extraterritorial conduct through §1596 but did not decide the question finally because outcome same either way (affirmed on other grounds) |
| What it means to be “present in the United States” under §1596(a)(2) | “Present in” need not require physical presence; could be satisfied by minimum contacts (Int’l Shoe) or by agency/joint venture relationships | “Present in” means physical presence; alternative theories (minimum contacts, agency, joint venture) do not show Phatthana or S.S. Frozen were present in U.S. | Court required more than plaintiffs’ evidence; neither Phatthana nor S.S. Frozen were “present in” U.S. during relevant period (no physical presence or sufficient contacts/agency/joint-venture ties) |
| Whether Rubicon and Wales are liable under §1595 as persons who “knowingly benefit … from participation in a venture which that person knew or should have known has engaged in” TVPRA violations | Rubicon marketed/sold Phatthana shrimp to U.S. buyers (Walmart shipment) and attempted to benefit; Wales performed inspections and received commissions—both thus benefited and knew/should have known of abuses | Rubicon’s attempted sales and marketing do not show an actual benefit; attempted benefit is not covered by §1595; Wales’s knowledge before Feb 23, 2012 is unsupported and post-Feb 23 benefit (inspections) occurred before Wales received the whistleblower article | Summary judgment affirmed: plaintiffs failed to create triable issues that Rubicon or Wales knowingly benefited from a venture they knew or should have known involved TVPRA violations |
| Whether district court abused discretion denying plaintiffs’ extension to respond to summary judgment motions | Shortened deadline around Thanksgiving and voluminous defense filings prejudiced plaintiffs; district court should have granted extension | Plaintiffs stipulated to the deadline, later supplemented omitted exhibits, and the court considered their filings—no prejudice like in Ahanchian | No abuse of discretion: denial of extension did not prejudice plaintiffs or ignore submitted evidence |
Key Cases Cited
- RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 579 U.S. 325 (U.S. 2016) (two-step extraterritoriality framework)
- Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe, 141 S. Ct. 1931 (U.S. 2021) (step-one extraterritoriality presumption and "clear, affirmative indication" test)
- Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (U.S. 2010) (distinguishing merits inquiry from jurisdiction; focus on domestic application)
- EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (U.S. 1991) (presumption against extraterritorial application)
- Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (U.S. 1945) (minimum contacts standard for personal jurisdiction)
- United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (statutory interpretation of “found in”/“present in” requires physical presence)
- Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (U.S. 1984) (purposeful direction test for torts)
- Ahanchian v. Xenon Pictures, Inc., 624 F.3d 1253 (9th Cir. 2010) (standard for reviewing district court denial of extension and court consideration of untimely opposition)