IN THE MATTER OF THE ASSESSMENTS FOR TAX YEAR 2012 OF CERTAIN PROPERTIES OWNED BY CLIFTON THRONEBERRY AND E. W. CROWE, TRUSTEES OF PIPELINE INDUSTRY BENEFIT FUND AND LOCAL NO. 798 JOURNEYMEN AND APPRENTICES PLBG & PIPEFITTING, Petitioners/Appellees, v. JOHN A. WRIGHT, TULSA COUNTY ASSESSOR, Respondent/Appellant.
Case Number: 118243
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA
Decided: 02/09/2021
2021 OK 7
IN THE MATTER OF THE ASSESSMENTS FOR TAX YEAR 2012 OF CERTAIN PROPERTIES OWNED BY CLIFTON THRONEBERRY AND E. W. CROWE, TRUSTEES OF PIPELINE INDUSTRY BENEFIT FUND AND LOCAL NO. 798 JOURNEYMEN AND APPRENTICES PLBG & PIPEFITTING, Petitioners/Appellees,
v.
JOHN A. WRIGHT, TULSA COUNTY ASSESSOR, Respondent/Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TULSA COUNTY
Taxpayers were successful in their ad valorem tax protest proceeding in the District Court and in a subsequent appeal adjudicated by the Court of Civil Appeals. After appellate remand, taxpayers sought an award of postjudgment interest pursuant to
12 O.S. § 727.1 , and the Tulsa County Assessor stated interest on the protested tax payments should be based pursuant to68 O.S. § 2884 . The Honorable Linda G. Morrissey, District Judge, granted the taxpayers’ motion. Tulsa County Assessor appealed and Supreme Court retained the appeal sua sponte. We hold: the general postjudgment statute,12 O.S. § 727.1 , does not apply to taxpayers’ ad valorem tax protest appeal, and the procedure for interest on taxpayers’ protested tax payments is provided by the ad valorem statute,68 O.S. § 2884 .
DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED; CAUSE REMANDED TO DISTRICT
COURT FOR ADDITIONAL PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH OPINION
Leisa S. Weintraub, General Counsel, Tulsa County Assessor‘s Office, Tulsa Oklahoma, for Appellant.
Kelly F. Monaghan & Lori Gilliard, Holloway Monaghan King, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Appellees.
EDMONDSON, J.
¶1 Taxpayers were successful with their ad valorem tax protest appeal and they sought an award of postjudgment interest pursuant to
I. District Court Controversy
¶2 Property owners (taxpayers) appealed ad valorem tax assessments made during 2012-2015 to the Tulsa County District Court after their appeals to the Tulsa County Board of Equalization were denied. Taxpayers were successful in the District Court appeal by showing one parcel of property was exempt and a second parcel partially exempt from ad valorem taxation. The District Court determined the amounts of the tax refund and stated the Tulsa County Treasurer “pay the Petitioners interest on such amounts as allowed by law.”1
¶3 The Tulsa County Assessor appealed and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the District Court‘s judgment. In the Matter of Assessment for Tax Year 2012, etc. v. Yazel, 2019 OK CIV APP 2, 432 P.3d 1071. Mandate issued January 16, 2019, and on May 8, 2019, taxpayers filed a motion in the District Court for postjudgment interest. The motion relied on a statute and an opinion from this Court,
¶4 The Tulsa County Assessor responded to the motion for postjudgment interest and stated taxpayers had received “claim forms prepared and mailed to you on February 22, 2019 refunding taxes paid under protest, along with accrued interest.”3 The county assessor‘s response included correspondence from counsel for taxpayers stating the taxpayers objected to the assessor calculating interest “based upon the Treasurer‘s investments of such funds as provided under
¶5 Taxpayers replied and argued that in Sanders the Court rejected the specific-controls-general argument when it concluded interest on a judgment against a state entity should be paid based upon the interest-on-judgments statute in
¶6 The District Court granted taxpayers’ motion for postjudgment interest pursuant to
II. Summary of Appellate Controversy
¶7 The parties’ appellate briefs in this Court rely on different current statutes and different court opinions spanning approximately sixty-five years. A party‘s reliance on a particular opinion requires an examination of the context of the opinion in relation to both (1) the historical development of the jurisprudence of a taxpayer‘s claim in equity for interest in a tax refund proceeding, and (2) the subsequent creation of statutory language relating to investment of protested taxes in funds bearing interest while a taxpayer‘s refund proceeding is adjudicated, and the payment of that interest to a successful protesting taxpayer.
¶8 Although the parties do not explain an historical context for authorities they cite, historical context may be a component for judicial application of legislative intent.6 We are aware of issues which may arise when using historical events to explain a legal text.7 While we do not improperly conflate historical context or development of different areas of jurisprudence with a specific legislative intent for a particular legislative enactment, there is no doubt that historical events may have explanatory authority when used as part of a textual analysis of a specific legislative enactment.8
III. Analysis of Parties’ Arguments:
A. Statutes
¶9 Taxpayers state the postjudgment interest provided by ”
A. 1. Except as otherwise provided by this section, all judgments of courts of record, including costs and attorney fees authorized by statute or otherwise and allowed by the court, shall bear interest at a rate prescribed pursuant to this section.
2. Costs and attorney fees allowed by the court shall bear interest from the earlier of the date the judgment or order is pronounced, if expressly stated in the written judgment or order awarding the costs and attorney fees, or the date the judgment or order is filed with the court clerk.
B. Judgments, including costs and attorney fees authorized by statute or otherwise and allowed by the court, against this state or its political subdivisions, including counties, municipalities, school districts, and public trusts of which this state or a political subdivision of this state is a beneficiary, shall bear interest during the term of judgment at a rate prescribed pursuant to this section from the date of rendition. No judgment against this state or its political subdivisions, including counties, municipalities, school districts, and public trusts of which this state or a political subdivision of this state is a beneficiary, inclusive of postjudgment interest, shall exceed the total amount of liability of the governmental entity pursuant to The Governmental Tort Claims Act.
C. The postjudgment interest authorized by subsection A or subsection B of this section shall accrue from the earlier of the date the judgment is rendered as expressly stated in the judgment, or the date the judgment is filed with the court clerk, and shall initially accrue at the rate in effect for the calendar year during which the judgment is rendered until the end of the calendar year in which the judgment was rendered, or until the judgment is paid, whichever first occurs. Beginning on January 1 of the next succeeding calendar year until the end of that calendar year, or until the judgment is paid, whichever first occurs, the judgment, together with postjudgment interest previously accrued, shall bear interest at the rate in effect for judgments rendered during that calendar year as certified by the Administrative Director of the Courts pursuant to subsection I of this section. For each succeeding calendar year, or part of a calendar year, during which a judgment remains unpaid, the judgment, together with postjudgment interest previously accrued, shall bear interest at the rate in effect for judgments rendered during that calendar year as certified by the Administrative Director of the Courts pursuant to subsection I of this section. A separate computation using the interest rate in effect for judgments as provided by subsection I of this section shall be made for each calendar year, or part of a calendar year, during which the judgment remains unpaid in order to determine the total amount of interest for which the judgment debtor is liable. The postjudgment interest rate for each calendar year or part of a calendar year a judgment remains unpaid shall be multiplied by the original amount of the judgment, including any prejudgment interest, together with postjudgment interest previously accrued. Interest shall accrue on a judgment in the manner prescribed by this subsection until the judgment is satisfied or released.
D. If a rate of interest is specified in a contract, the rate specified shall apply and be stated in the journal entry of judgment. The rate of interest shall not exceed the lawful rate for that obligation. Postjudgment interest shall be calculated at the contractual rate and accrued in the same manner as prescribed in subsection C of this section.
The statute next provides for prejudgment interest, § 727.1 (E) & (F),9 then “if exemplary or punitive damages are awarded in an action for personal injury or injury to personal rights,” 727.1 (G),10 then “if a judgment is rendered establishing the existence of a lien against property and no rate of interest exists,” § 727.1 (H),11 and next for the method for computing postjudgment interest, § 727.1 (I) & (J). Paragraphs (I) & (J) state as follows.
I. For purposes of computing postjudgment interest as authorized by this section, interest shall be the prime rate, as listed in the first edition of the Wall Street Journal published for each calendar year and as certified to the Administrative Director of the Courts by the State Treasurer on the first regular business day following publication in January of each year, plus two percent (2%). For purposes of computing prejudgment interest as authorized by this section, interest shall be determined using a rate equal to the average United States Treasury Bill rate of the preceding calendar year as certified to the Administrative Director of the Courts by the State Treasurer on the first regular business day in January of each year.
J. For purposes of computing postjudgment interest, the provisions of this section shall be applicable to all judgments of the district courts rendered on or after January 1, 2005. Effective January 1, 2005, the method for computing postjudgment interest prescribed by this section shall be applicable to all judgments remaining unpaid rendered prior to January 1, 2005.
The last paragraph of § 727.1 contains a provision for computing prejudgment interest.
¶10 Section 727.1 provides that “judgments . . . against this state or its political subdivisions, including counties, . . . shall bear interest during the term of judgment at a rate prescribed pursuant to this section from the date of rendition.” It further provides this postjudgment interest shall accrue until the judgment is paid. Taxpayers argue this language applies to the ad valorem tax refund judgment. Taxpayers also argue they are entitled to prejudgment interest pursuant to
¶11 The county assessor argues interest is paid to a taxpayer as provided by ”
A. The full amount of the taxes assessed against the property of any taxpayer who has appealed from a decision affecting the value or taxable status of such property as provided by law shall be paid at the time and in the manner provided by law. If at the time such taxes or any part thereof become delinquent and any such appeal is pending, it shall abate and be dismissed upon a showing that the taxes have not been paid.
B. When such taxes are paid, or by December 31, whichever is earlier, the persons protesting the taxes shall give notice to the county treasurer that an appeal involving such taxes has been taken and is pending, and shall set forth the total amount of tax that has been paid under protest or required by law to be paid prior to April 1 that will be paid under protest. The notice shall be on a form prescribed by the Tax Commission. If taxes are paid in two equal installments and the amount paid under protest does not exceed fifty percent (50%) of the full amount of assessed taxes, all protested taxes shall be specified in the second installment payment. If such amount does exceed fifty percent (50%) of the full amount of assessed taxes, then the portion of protested taxes that exceeds fifty percent (50%) of the full amount of assessed taxes shall be specified in the first installment payment and the entire second installment shall be specified to be paid under protest. The taxpayer shall attach to such notice a copy of the petition filed in the court or other appellate body in which the appeal was taken. For railroads, air carriers, and public service corporations, the amount of taxes protested shall not exceed the amount of tax calculated on the protested assessed valuation specified in the complaint filed pursuant to the provisions of subsection A of Section 2881 of this title.
C. It shall be the duty of the county treasurer to hold taxes paid under protest separate and apart from other taxes collected. Any portion of such taxes not paid under protest shall be apportioned as provided by law. Except as otherwise provided for in this subsection, the treasurer shall invest the protested taxes in the same manner as the treasurer invests surplus tax funds not paid under protest, but shall select an interest-bearing investment medium which will permit prompt refund or apportionment of the protested taxes upon final determination of the appeal. In cases where the amount of the protested ad valorem taxes by a taxpayer is in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars ($15,000.00), the taxpayer may elect to choose the type of investment and where the investment of the protested funds will be deposited as long as the investment is of a type authorized for the county, the depository institution qualifies as a county depository, and the depository institution is located in the applicable county.
D. 1. Prior to January 31 of each year, the county treasurer shall determine the amount of ad valorem taxes paid under protest and those ad valorem taxes that will be paid under protest pursuant to subsection B of this section. The county treasurer shall then notify the State Auditor and Inspector of the total amount of paid protested ad valorem taxes and anticipated protested ad valorem taxes, the total amount of protested taxes and anticipated protested taxes by each individual taxpayer, and how such paid protested ad valorem taxes and anticipated protested ad valorem taxes would have been apportioned to each school district and technology center school district by fund had such amount of protested ad valorem taxes not been protested.
2. The State Auditor and Inspector shall compile all of the information submitted by the county treasurers in a format which shall set forth the total amount of paid and anticipated protested taxes for each school district and technology center school district by fund and a total for each school district and technology center school district by fund. This information shall then be submitted by the State Auditor and Inspector to the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, the Director of the Oklahoma Department of Career and Technology Education, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate. If any of the information submitted to the State Auditor and Inspector changes after being submitted, the county treasurer shall notify the State Auditor and Inspector and the State Auditor and Inspector shall submit revised information to the parties enumerated in this paragraph within thirty (30) days of such change.
3. Within ten (10) days of the release of the escrowed ad valorem taxes by the county treasurer, as required by subsection E of this section, the county treasurer shall submit a schedule showing the disposition of the released funds, separated by fund for each school district and technology center school, to the State Auditor and Inspector. The State Auditor and Inspector shall certify the apportionment schedule and transmit a copy to the State Superintendent of Public Instruction and the Director of the Oklahoma Department of Career and Technology Education.
4. The State Auditor and Inspector shall promulgate any necessary rules to implement the provisions of this subsection.
E. 1. In cases involving taxpayers other than railroads, air carriers, or public service corporations, if upon the final determination of any such appeal, the court shall find that the property was assessed at too great an amount, the board of equalization from whose order the appeal was taken shall certify the corrected valuation of the property of such taxpayers to the county assessor, in accordance with the decision of the court, and shall send a copy of such certificate to the county treasurer. Upon receipt of the corrected certificate of valuation, the county assessor shall compute and certify to the county treasurer the correct amount of taxes payable by the taxpayer. The difference between the amount paid and the correct amount payable, with accrued interest, shall be refunded by the treasurer to the taxpayer upon the taxpayer filing a proper verified claim therefor, and the remainder paid under protest, with accrued interest, shall be apportioned as provided by law.
2. If upon the final determination of any appeal, the court shall find that the property of the railroad, air carrier, or public service corporation was assessed at too great an amount, the State Board of Equalization from whose order the appeal was taken shall certify the corrected valuation of the property of the railroads, air carriers, and public service corporations to the State Auditor and Inspector in accordance with the decision of the court. Upon receipt of the corrected certificate of valuation, the State Auditor and Inspector shall certify to the county treasurer the correct valuation of the railroad, air carrier, or public service corporation and shall send a copy of the certificate to the county assessor, who shall make the correction as specified in Section 2871 of this title. The difference between the amount paid and the correct amount payable with accrued interest shall be refunded by the treasurer upon the taxpayer filing a proper verified claim, and the remainder paid under protest with accrued interest shall be apportioned according to law.
F. If an appeal is upon a question of valuation of the property, then the amount paid under protest by reason of the question of valuation being appealed shall be limited to the amount of taxes assessed against the property for the year in question less the amount of taxes which would be payable by the taxpayer for that year if the valuation of the property asserted by the taxpayer in the appeal were determined by the court to be correct. If an appeal is timely filed by a taxpayer pursuant to subsection A of Section 2880.1 of this title, the amount of taxes payable by the taxpayer shall not exceed the amount based upon the value originally submitted by the assessor to the county board of equalization. If an appeal is timely filed by the county assessor pursuant to subsection A of Section 2880.1 of this title, the amount of taxes payable by the taxpayer shall not exceed the amount of taxes based upon the value assessed by the county assessor and submitted to the board of equalization.
G. If an appeal is upon a question of assessment of the property, then the amount paid under protest by reason of the question of assessment being appealed shall be limited to the amount of taxes assessed against the property for the year in question less the amount of taxes which would be payable by the taxpayer for that year if the assessment of the property asserted by the taxpayer in the appeal was determined by the court to be correct.
¶12 The county assessor argued an ad valorem tax protest appeal from a county board of equalization to a District Court is provided by
¶13 Taxpayers argued the language in § 2884 stating “upon final determination of the appeal” refers to the journal entry of judgment of a District Court, and such language makes the § 2884 interest a form of prejudgment interest. The county assessor argued the interest provided by § 2884 applies from payment of the protested tax until the taxpayer files a proper verified claim after a county assessor has computed and certified the proper assessment to the county treasurer. This event occurred in the present controversy after the appellate remand to the District Court upon conclusion of the appeal in In the Matter of Assessment for Tax Year 2012, etc. v. Yazel, 2019 OK CIV APP 2, 432 P.3d 1071.
III. Analysis of Parties’ Arguments:
B. Construing the Statutes by the Parties and the Standard of Review
¶14 The parties disagreed on which canon of statutory construction should apply. The county assessor argued postjudgment interest language in
¶15 Legislative intent controls statutory interpretation.21 This intent is usually expressed by the plain meaning of the statutory language.22 We examine a whole legislative act in light of its general purpose and object,23 and give effect to the legislature‘s intent by construing and applying the language in a manner which does not destroy the obvious purpose and design of the statutory language.24 We start with a reading of the statutory language which gives full force and effect to each relevant statutory provision expressing the legislature‘s intent by the plain meaning of the language therein.25 We employ rules of statutory construction when legislative intent cannot be ascertained as in a case of ambiguity, conflict, or uncertainty in meaning, and a statute contains an ambiguity if it is susceptible to more than one meaning.26
¶16 A well-known canon of statutory construction states a specific statute controls a general statute on the same subject.27 This canon only applies if the two statutes conflict with one another when they may not be harmonized.28 This analysis starts with the language of the statutes at issue, and whether statutory language is ambiguous, conflicting, or its meaning uncertain, and this analysis presents a question of law reviewed de novo by the Court.29
¶17 Taxpayers do not expressly state § 2884 is ambiguous, but such is the effect of their argument. They argue the term “interest” in
¶18 The assertion of ambiguity in § 2884 is presented by taxpayers in the context of their argument stating any doubt as to possible meaning in § 2884 must be resolved in favor of the taxpayers. Taxpayers rely on In re Holt, 1997 OK 12, 932 P.2d 1130, 1134, and Video Gaming Techs., Inc. v. Tulsa Cty. Bd. of Tax Roll Corrs., 2019 OK 84, ¶ 11, 455 P.3d 918, 921, and statements stating doubts concerning tax laws are to be resolved in favor of a taxpayer.
¶19 This argument for a construction of a tax statute in favor of these taxpayers is not applicable for several reasons, three of which we may immediately note since they are necessarily raised by taxpayers’ argument. First, when language is ambiguous, uncertain, conflicting, or creating doubt in a tax statute exacting a tax, then the language may be construed against the state when such construction may be accomplished without a discriminatory effect.30 We have stated an explanation for this rule: “The rule means that the provisions of statutes levying taxes will not be extended by implication beyond the clear import of the language used.”31 The
¶20 Secondly, doubts must arise from ambiguous, conflicting, or uncertain statutory language in the tax law itself, and not from a failure by a party in applying the plain and ordinary meaning of language in a tax statute.33 As we explain herein, the tax statute at issue,
¶21 Thirdly, this Court has previously explained the ad valorem tax remedy procedures provide exclusive means for judicial redress of a legal claim within the scope of the ad valorem statutory remedies.34 The exclusivity of this ad valorem statutory procedure over a general civil statutory procedure occurs, for example, when the ad valorem statute is not silent on the legal issue, i.e., the legislature has affirmatively stated in the ad valorem statute how the legal issue should be determined.35 Again, we explain herein the legislative goal in § 2884 is to provide interest during the entire time an ad valorem protest appeal is prosecuted by the taxpayer, and this § 2884 procedure for interest is part of the exclusive ad valorem tax protest remedy.
¶22 The county assessor‘s appellate briefs rely on legislative amendments to section 2884 dating from 1988. Language in § 2884 has an historical context relating to a taxpayer‘s equitable claim to accrued interest in certain tax protests, and as we explain herein this context supports the assessor‘s construction of § 2884. The historical context supports the conclusion that in a successful tax protest § 2884 paragraph (E)(1) provides “accrued interest” payable to the taxpayer calculated from the time the protested payment is deposited into the interest-bearing account until after the county assessor computes and certifies to the county treasurer the correct amount of taxes payable by the taxpayer as determined by the District Court, and when the taxpayer files a proper verified claim therefor.
¶23 The assessor‘s conduct required by § 2884 in computing and certifying the proper ad valorem assessment for the treasurer to use when computing “accrued interest” occurs at the conclusion of the protest proceeding, and in our case today it occurred after an appellate remand to the District Court.
¶24 When we consider taxpayers’ argument relying on the phrase “upon final determination of the appeal,” and the absence of the qualifying term “prejudgment” in § 2884, we may not limit our analysis to these words alone and we must consider the context of the terms.36 When we consider the county assessor‘s argument alleging a conflict in statutes, we include an examination of the intent of the legislature to determine if an actual conflict exists, and this examination may include the historical context of the legislation,37 including court opinions and previous codified versions of the legislation at issue explaining this context.38 We must construe a statute to accomplish the legislative goals intended by the legislature.39 Taxpayers’ argument raises the issue whether their view of § 2884 accomplishes or destroys the legislative goals in § 2884.
III. Analysis of Parties’ Arguments:
C. Summary - Development of Jurisprudence Before Interest in Ad Valorem Statutes
¶25 In the years prior to and including State ex rel. Oklahoma Employment Security Commission v. Sanders, the primary authority invoked by taxpayers: (1) We originally held interest was not paid on an ad valorem tax refund; (2) Federal courts authorized using equity to award interest as a form of damages in some, but not all, state tax refund controversies adjudicated in federal courts; (3) Congress created the Tax Injunction Act,
¶26 In the years after Sanders: (1) Payment of interest as a necessary component for an adequate state tax remedy continued to be an issue for application of
III. Analysis of Parties’ Arguments:
D. Introduction to Interest and State v. Sanders
¶27 Interest is defined in one Oklahoma statute as “the compensation allowed for the use or forbearance or detention of money, or its equivalent.”41 Historically, prejudgment interest served to compensate for the loss of use of money due as damages from the time the claim accrues until judgment is entered, thereby achieving full compensation for the injury those damages are intended to redress.42 This historical prejudgment interest, as one type of damages, was an “element of the total liability adjudicated.”43 This prejudgment interest was calculated by the trial court and the amount was stated in the judgment.44
¶28 We have observed that “at common law, judgments do not bear interest,”45 and “it is a well-settled rule that the recovery of interest on a judgment must be predicated on statute.”46 In contrast to prejudgment interest having a source in the concept of a complete compensation for a loss, postjudgment interest has its source in the concept of a penalty for delayed payment of the judgment.47 In contrast to prejudgment interest, postjudgment interest is calculated from the date of judgment until the date of payment.48
¶29 The distinction between postjudgment interest and prejudgment interest is important because (1) taxpayers’ arguments rely upon this distinction, and (2) taxpayers rely on our 1956 opinion in State ex rel. Oklahoma Employment Security Commission v. Sanders, supra. Sanders relied on a federal court opinion applying an equitable right to prejudgment interest as authority for holding a postjudgment interest statute applied to a judgment against a state entity. Prior to Sanders we had previously approved of postjudgment interest in an equity proceeding,49 and of course, a general statute providing payment of interest on a court judgment usually applies to both an action at law as well as a decree in equity requiring payment.50 The Sanders Court used a claim in equity for interest as damages in support of the Court‘s conclusion relating to postjudgment interest, and the distinction is important to taxpayers’ arguments herein and the legislature‘s changes to the ad valorem statutes after Sanders.
III. Analysis of Parties’ Arguments:
E. Interest in Federal Courts as a Proper Award in Equity with Some
Tax Refund Controversies, The Tax Injunction Act in Federal Court, and
From Eaton v. St. Louis to State, etc. v. Sanders
¶30 Prior to 1913, courts of equity in Oklahoma, pursuant to both statute51 and the general equity powers, granted injunctions against the collection of taxes alleged to be illegal and void and provided tax refund relief.52 Statutory enactments partially based upon equity procedure53 occurred in 1913 and 1915 and resulted in this Court explaining the former injunctive relief in equity was no longer used to prevent payment of taxes alleged to be illegal when the new statutory remedy was plain, speedy, adequate, and exclusive.54 After creation of the statutory remedies we continued to explain the availability of injunctive and declaratory relief was restricted in scope,55 and remained for only a few types of controversies,56 including one involving a federal constitutional right when the adequacy of a state‘s remedy was an issue.57 Although an injunction in equity could not be used to prevent payment or seek a refund of a taxpayer‘s tax and replace the then new statutory remedies, the nature of the statutory tax refund judicial proceeding remained a proceeding governed by equitable principles58 with the statutes providing the mandatory manner and method by which the claim for a refund was adjudicated.59
¶31 This mandatory statutory method for a tax refund dating from 1913-1915 did not expressly include interest to be paid to a taxpayer. Our 1925 opinion in Eaton v. St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co.,60 explained the taxes were paid under protest, the partes’ rights were limited to the statutory tax refund procedure which did not authorize interest, and we modified the trial court‘s judgment so that interest on the tax refund would not be awarded.61 At the time Eaton was decided a general statute for postjudgment interest had been in effect for several years, R.L. 1910 § 1008, but the statute was not discussed in Eaton. Although Eaton had concluded interest was not proper for the tax refund, legal authors and other courts at this time began to recognize that interest was proper based upon equitable principles in some, but not all, state tax refund controversies.
¶32 Five years after Eaton, three authors discussed equity and the propriety of federal injunctions in state tax refund cases. They stated if interest was not allowable under state law, then a taxpayer clearly suffered a loss which equity may properly prevent.62 They relied on Judge Learned Hand‘s opinion in Proctor & Gamble Distributing Co. v. Sherman, 2 F.2d 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1924),63 and his well-known observation on a taxpayer not receiving interest while the tax protest proceeding was being adjudicated.
While I have been referred to no decision on the point it seems to me plain that it is not an adequate remedy, after taking away a man‘s money as a condition of allowing him to contest his tax, merely to hand it back, when, no matter how long after, he establishes that he ought never to have been required to pay at all.
Proctor & Gamble Distributing Co., 2 F.2d at 166.
The three authors also relied on a 1928 U. S. Supreme Court opinion which affirmed a U. S. Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit opinion which had explained the laws of California did not allow interest for one who recovered a wrongfully collected tax paid under protest until after judgment, and the court made a comparison to Judge Hand‘s opinion in Proctor & Gamble, supra, discussing a taxpayer‘s injury from not receiving interest for the time the tax had been paid under protest.64 This equitable claim to interest was recognized in 1939 by the U. S. Supreme Court in Board of Comm‘rs of Jackson County, Kansas, v. United States.65
¶33 In Board of Comm‘rs of Jackson County, the Court concluded that in an intergovernmental dispute in the absence of a federal statute, and assuming applicable quasi-contract principles, i.e., equity, interest was not recovered against a state entity on an illegal state tax according to a rigid theory of compensation for money withheld; but compensatory interest may be granted based on (1) considerations of federal and state concerns, and (2) the fairness and equity of the award.66 The Court also noted compensatory interest should be denied when granting it would be ineq
uitable. In Board of Comm‘rs of Jackson County, the Supreme Court examined a controversy arising in Kansas which, as previously noted by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, had statutes similar to those in Oklahoma which did not award interest on a tax refund.67 Although prejudgment interest was not awarded in Board of Comm‘rs of Jackson County, because of fairness,68 this same standard has been used to award prejudgment interest as a form of compensation to balance the equities in other controversies.69¶34 A few years after the Supreme Court‘s 1939 opinion, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided controversies arising in Oklahoma and applied Board of Comm‘rs of Jackson County, supra. In 1942 the federal appellate court disallowed a district court‘s award of interest, and the issue was not raised when the controversy was subsequently before the U.S. Supreme Court.70 However, one year earlier in Bryan County v. United States, the Tenth Circuit Court explained the federal trial court correctly refused interest on the taxes from the date of their collection but correctly allowed judgment for equitable interest from the date of its rendition,71 and this opinion was used by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in 1951 when awarding statutory postjudgment interest against a state entity.
¶35 In 1951, we addressed the issue of interest on a judgment against the State as “a question of first impression in this court.” State ex rel. Comm‘rs of Land Office v. Warden, 1951 OK 334, 242 P.2d 129. Warden did not involve an ad valorem tax refund. However, in support of its rationale our Court cited the Tenth Circuit Court‘s opinion in Bryan County v. United States, supra, as an example when interest was allowed on a judgment against a State.72 We stated the then general statute providing interest on a judgment applied.73 This statute was
¶36 A few years after Warden a taxpayer sought a refund of an overpayment of unemployment taxes plus interest in State ex rel. Oklahoma Employment Security Commission v. Sanders, 1956 OK 262, 304 P.2d 287. We relied upon Warden and
¶37 In our case today, taxpayers argued that Sanders rejected the specific-controls-general argument when it concluded interest on a judgment against a state entity should be paid based upon the interest-on-judgments statute in
¶38 In State, etc. v. Sanders, the Court‘s reasoning noted interest was not an expressly authorized item to be awarded by (1) a statute authorizing a refund of overpaid unemployment taxes, or (2) a statutory remedy for a refund of an ad valorem tax as interpreted by the Court in 1925 in Eaton v. St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co., supra.78 We concluded in Sanders that recovery of interest was prohibited on the taxpayer‘s overpayment of unemployment taxes, a type of prejudgment interest, but recovery of interest would be allowed on the amount of the judgment to be refunded; i.e., the postjudgment interest statute would apply.79
¶39 Neither Warden nor Sanders, involved an ad valorem tax refund, but in allowing postjudgment interest against the state our Court relied on the Tenth Circuit Court‘s opinion in Bryan County imposing a form of equitable interest on an ad valorem state tax refund judgment, and our Court also relied on
¶40 Although Warden and Sanders temporarily settled the issue that postjudgment interest would apply to an Oklahoma tax refund judgment using a postjudgment statute against a state entity, the issue whether prejudgment interest on a protested tax payment should be considered a potential part of a tax remedy due to equity was not settled by those two opinions. The growth of using equity in a federal court to challenge a state tax had been slowed when Congress created the
¶41 For example, in 1959 and after both Warden and Sanders and the enactment of the
¶42 A few years later in Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U.S. 355, 358, 87 S.Ct. 464, 17 L.Ed.2d 414 (1966), the U. S. Supreme Court declined to decide “whether omission to provide interest on a successful refund application renders the state remedy here an inadequate one within the meaning of
¶43 The U. S. Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit in Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat‘l Bank, a 1981 opinion which explained the taxpayer‘s claim of no interest on a tax refund was a “substantive concern;” but the “plain, speedy and efficient remedy” requirement of the
¶44 We need not delve into related issues such as listing examples of what constitutes a tax for purposes of the
¶45 The importance of these federal cases to our controversy today is fivefold: (1) They recognized for some, but not all, controversies an equitable and substantive right for interest on a state tax refund as a form of damages; (2) Due to the equitable nature of the interest, the damages could be awarded from the time the taxpayer paid the protested tax payment until the taxpayer received his or her refund, or only as a form of postjudgment interest, or another period of time could be used for calculating the interest; (3) This concept of an equitable interest was used in support of reasoning by our Court in Warden and Sanders when applying a postjudgment interest statute to a refund controversy controlled by a statute which was silent on the issue of postjudgment interest; (4) This concept of an equitable and substantive interest expressly recognized from 1924 -1981 in these opinions was also being raised in tax refund controversies in the courts of several states; and (5) This jurisprudence, including Sanders, occurred prior to important changes to our ad valorem statutes which began in the 1980s.
III. Analysis of Parties’ Arguments: F. Split of Authority in States Recognizing Interest on a State Tax Refund
¶46 When the U. S. Supreme Court was deciding the lack of interest on a state tax refund could not be used as a sufficient reason for avoiding application of the
¶47 One of the reasons used in support of not paying interest on a tax refund was based upon a court not imputing delay to the government: “the theory that a contract for interest is implied only when there is either delay or default on the part of the debtor and such delay or default will not be attributed to the government since it is presumed that the government always stands ready to pay what it owes promptly.”97 This principle was stated by the United States Supreme Court in 1879: “whenever interest is allowed either by statute or by common law, except in cases where there has been a contract to pay interest, it is allowed for delay or default of the debtor. But delay or default cannot be attributed to the government. It is presumed to be always ready to pay what it owes.”98
¶48 Not imputing delay to the government was a public policy at odds with the public policy expressed by Judge Hand in Proctor & Gamble Distributing Co., supra, which expressed the equitable and substantive inadequacy of a tax refund remedy denying interest during the time a government entity possessed a protested tax payment. The determination which of two conflicting public policies should be given prominence is ordinarily a matter within the domain of a legislative body.99
¶49 Related issues being litigated at this time involved payment of interest on a tax refund when no statute created authority for the government official to invest the protested taxes while the protest was being adjudicated.100 Another issue being litigated in state courts was whether interest could be awarded in the presence of state constitutional provisions prohibiting payments from the state treasury in the absence of a legislative act or resolution authorizing interest as part of the award.101
¶50 During this period and prior to 1987, the two primary ad valorem tax protest statutes
III. Analysis of Parties’ Arguments: G. Bd. of Educ., etc. v. Hensley, Bison, etc v. Lucas
¶51 A county treasurer investing protested taxes and a dispute as to an entitlement to the interest resulted in litigation in Oklahoma. In 1983 our Court of Civil Appeals addressed the issue when a county treasurer invested the protested tax payments and obtained interest, but the treasurer was not expressly required at that time by the ad valorem statutes to make the investment. Bd. of Educ., Woodward Pub. Schools v. Hensley, 1983 OK CIV APP 31, 665 P.2d 327. The alternative solutions championed by the parties were to award the interest to either school districts or the county general fund. The Court of Civil Appeals relied on the well-known principle stating that “The interest earned on this separate and distinct fund prior to its apportionment becomes a part of the principal of the fund which generates it.”102 This principle has been recognized by both this Court103 and the U. S. Supreme Court.104 The Court of Civil Appeals stated the following.
When a tax protest is filed it becomes the ministerial duty of the county treasurer to hold the money so paid. The money is held in trust by the county, either for refund or for the proper fund to which it respectively belongs. . . . When the final determination of Oklahoma Nitrogen‘s protest was made it was the duty of the county treasurer to apportion the entire fund, consisting of both principal and the interest it had earned, to the various entities entitled to the fund.
Bd. of Educ., Woodward Pub. Schools, 665 P.2d at 331.
This opinion was persuasive and non-precedential authority for the proposition that if a county treasurer obtained interest on a protested tax fund, then a taxpayer entitled to any refund from that fund would also be entitled to prorated interest accumulated from the date of investment until the conclusion of the protest proceeding.105
¶52 The issue of interest on a judgment, as opposed to interest on the fund of protested taxes, arose again in Bison Nitrogen Prod. Co. v. Lucas, 1987 OK 46, 738 P.2d 147, and we stated the following.
Appellants have also asked this Court to hold them entitled to interest on any excess taxes paid under protest, The rule in State ex rel. Okla. Employment Security Commission v. Sanders, Okl., 304 P.2d 287 (1956) applies. Appellants are not entitled to any interest on overpaid tax monies prior to the rendition of a final judgment.
Bison, 738 P.2d at 151 (emphasis added).
Bison was decided on June 2, 1987. The ad valorem tax protest procedure in effect and applied was the 1981 version of
¶53 In Bison we stated taxpayers were “not entitled to any interest on overpaid tax monies prior to the rendition of a final judgment,” but we did not give any reason other than a citation to State ex rel. Okla. Employment Security Commission v. Sanders, supra. In Bison, we did not address (1) a taxpayer‘s right to interest based upon a county treasurer‘s investment, or (2) Bd. of Educ., Woodward Pub. Schools v. Hensley, supra, and the authority cited therein, or (3) whether the treasurer had invested the protested tax payments in a fund bearing interest during the Bison litigation. Although Bison relied on Sanders and like Sanders was decided when the ad valorem statute at issue, here
III. Analysis of Parties’ Arguments: H. Recent Amendments to Ad Valorem Statutes
¶ 54 In April 1987 the legislature started amending the ad valorem statutes after the then recent: (1) federal court litigation limiting, but not completely extinguishing, a taxpayer‘s equitable claims to interest as a form of damages, (2) recent decisions in other states showing disagreement on (a) an implied contract theory taxpayer‘s right to interest, and (b) the necessity of a statute requiring investment of protested taxes and payment of interest on a refund; and (3) an opinion by the Court of Civil Appeals recognizing a taxpayer‘s right to accumulated interest if the protested payment had been invested by a county treasurer.
¶55 The legislature started amending the ad valorem statutes and initially made three important changes. The Legislature amended
¶56 This statutory scheme followed the principle in Bd. of Educ., Woodward Pub. Schools v. Hensley, supra, which stated interest upon the protested tax would be apportioned to the taxpayer based upon the amount of taxpayer‘s refund. The legislature determined between conflicting public policies on the issue of paying interest on an ad valorem tax refund and provided a procedure for accomplishing payment of interest.
¶57
¶58 The statutory language requiring investment of the protested payment by the county treasurer and payment of “accrued interest” to the taxpayer appeared in the 1991 and 2001 versions of
¶59 In 2001 the treasurer was required to “invest the protested taxes in the same manner as the treasurer invests surplus tax funds not paid under protest,” but the investment medium had to permit a “prompt refund.”114 This language was amended in 2008 to require the treasurer to invest tax payments in an “interest-bearing” investment which would permit a prompt refund.115 More importantly, in 2008 the legislature expanded a taxpayer‘s rights by adding language giving a taxpayer the right to select an investment for a protested tax payment when in excess of Fifteen Thousand Dollars ($15,000.00).
¶60 This portion of
¶61 We have addressed the taxpayers’ arguments herein to determine if “accrued interest” is ambiguous as well as addressing the assessor‘s claim of conflicting statutes in order to determine if
¶62 The phrase “final determination of the appeal” is not tied to the date the “accrued interest” shall be calculated in
¶63 The language of
IV. Summary
¶64 When the Court decided State ex rel. Oklahoma Employment Security Commission v. Sanders, 1956 OK 262, 304 P.2d 287, the ad valorem statutes were silent on both a county treasurer‘s duty to invest the protested tax payment and payment of accrued interest to a taxpayer. We have recently explained that we apply “the specific tax statute authorizing interest which is applicable to the specific controversy,” and we held interest was not to be awarded when the specific statute authorizing payment from a particular fund did not also authorize interest from the fund.123 The statutory authority for payment of the refund upon a successful tax protest is based upon the same statute providing for investment of the segregated and protested tax payment to earn interest, as well as a corrected assessment by the county assessor certified to the county treasurer, and payment with accrued interest upon a taxpayer‘s verified claim.
¶65 The holding in State ex rel. Oklahoma Employment Security Commission v. Sanders, 1956 OK 262, 304 P.2d 287, authorizing application of a general postjudgment interest statute to a tax refund proceeding shall not apply to an ad valorem tax protest appeal where
¶ 66 The development of the jurisprudence of interest on a protested state tax refund was the subject of much litigation prior to 1987 when our legislature began making a protested ad valorem tax payment a fund to accrue interest. The litigation prior to 1987 shows that courts and legislatures were concerned with equitable and legal claims for interest the entire time a protested tax payment was held by a government entity, and not merely the categories of prejudgment and postjudgment interest. This explains, in part, why the legislature did not use the terms “prejudgment interest” and “postjudgment interest” in a statute speaking of “accrued interest” on a protested tax payment.
V. Conclusion
¶67 We hold the taxpayers may not use the general statute for postjudgment interest,
¶68 The judgment of the District Court of Tulsa County awarding to taxpayers postjudgment interest pursuant to
¶69 CONCUR: DARBY, C.J.; KAUGER, EDMONDSON, COMBS, GURICH, and ROWE, JJ.
¶70 CONCUR IN RESULT: WINCHESTER, and KANE, JJ.
FOOTNOTES
Citationizer© Summary of Documents Citing This Document
| Cite | Name | Level |
|---|---|---|
| None Found. | ||
Citationizer: Table of Authority
| Cite | Name | Level | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals Cases | |||
| Cite | Name | Level | |
| 2019 OK CIV APP 2, 432 P.3d 1071 | IN THE MATTER OF THE ASSESSMENT FOR TAX YEAR 2012 OF CERTAIN REAL PROPERTIES | Discussed at Length | |
| 1983 OK CIV APP 31, 665 P.2d 327 | Board of Educ., Woodward Public Schools, Independent School Dist. No. 1, Woodward County v. Hensley | Discussed at Length | |
| Oklahoma Supreme Court Cases | |||
| Cite | Name | Level | |
| 1987 OK 46, 738 P.2d 147, 58 OBJ 1576 | Bison Nitrogen Products Co. v. Lucas | Discussed | |
| 1987 OK 47, 738 P.2d 151, 58 OBJ 1574 | Johnson v. District Court of Oklahoma County | Cited | |
| 1987 OK 54, 742 P.2d 1087, 58 OBJ 1828 | Fleming v. Baptist General Convention of Oklahoma | Discussed | |
| 1987 OK 121, 747 P.2d 947, 58 OBJ 3434 | Equity Mut. Ins. Co. v. Spring Valley Wholesale Nursery, Inc. | Discussed | |
| 1988 OK 16, 755 P.2d 622, 59 OBJ 531 | Withrow v. Red Eagle Oil Co. | Discussed at Length | |
| 1989 OK 14, 768 P.2d 898, 60 OBJ 260 | Berry v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Public Employees Retirement System | Discussed | |
| 1990 OK 27, 789 P.2d 1287, 61 OBJ 858 | City of Oklahoma City v. Oklahoma Tax Com‘n | Discussed | |
| 1992 OK 71, 832 P.2d 14, 63 OBJ 1622 | So-Lo Oil Co., Inc. v. Total Petroleum, Inc. | Discussed | |
| 1992 OK 95, 836 P.2d 1283, 63 OBJ 1926 | Whig Syndicate, Inc. v. Keyes | Discussed | |
| 1992 OK 145, 846 P.2d 362, 63 OBJ 3023 | Smicklas v. Spitz | Discussed | |
| 1993 OK 18, 848 P.2d 571, 64 OBJ 745 | Childs v. State ex rel. Oklahoma State University | Discussed | |
| 1993 OK 122, 872 P.2d 910, 64 OBJ 2885 | Strelecki v. Oklahoma Tax Com‘n | Discussed at Length | |
| 1993 OK 128, 864 P.2d 815, 64 OBJ 2958 | Shanbour v. Phillips 66 Natural Gas Co. | Discussed | |
| 1993 OK 166, 867 P.2d 451, 65 OBJ 23 | Houck v. Hold Oil Corp. | Cited | |
| 1948 OK 272, 201 P.2d 922, 201 Okla. 86 | VILBIG CONST. CO. v. WHITHAM | Discussed | |
| 1994 OK 96, 879 P.2d 137, 65 OBJ 2539 | Private Truck Council of America, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Com‘n | Discussed | |
| 1994 OK 54, 880 P.2d 877, 65 OBJ 1837 | Nation v. State Farm Insurance Co. | Discussed | |
| 1997 OK 12, 932 P.2d 1130, 68 OBJ 586 | In re Holt | Discussed | |
| 2001 OK 49, 32 P.3d 829, 72 OBJ 1807 | WORLD PUBLISHING CO. v. MILLER | Discussed at Length | |
| 1946 OK 113, 167 P.2d 884, 196 Okla. 633 | MAGNOLIA PIPE LINE CO. v. OKLAHOMA TAX COMM‘N | Discussed | |
| 1936 OK 41, 53 P.2d 1106, 175 Okla. 530 | BONAPARTE v. TRADESMEN‘S NAT‘L BANK | Discussed | |
| 1917 OK 165, 163 P. 717, 63 Okla. 155 | WEATHERLY v. SAWYER | Discussed | |
| 1956 OK 208, 299 P.2d 787 | CHAPMAN v. TULSA USED LUMBER & WRECKING COMPANY | Discussed | |
| 1956 OK 262, 304 P.2d 287 | STATE v. SANDERS | Discussed at Length | |
| 1932 OK 725, 17 P.2d 441, 161 Okla. 54 | BONAPARTE Co. Treas. et al v. AMERICAN VINEGAR MFG. CO. | Discussed | |
| 1999 OK 87, 20 P.3d 135, 70 OBJ 3149 | May-Li Barki, M.D., Inc. v. Liberty Bank & Trust, Co. | Discussed at Length | |
| 1964 OK 254, 397 P.2d 494 | VARNER v. ABOUSSIE | Discussed | |
| 1966 OK 209, 423 P.2d 447 | SAUTBINE v. KELLER | Discussed | |
| 2002 OK 71, 55 P.3d 1072 | OKLAHOMA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION v. OKLAHOMA DEPT. OF CENTRAL SERVICES | Discussed | |
| 1995 OK 99, 904 P.2d 604, 66 OBJ 3071 | City of Bethany v. Public Employees Relations Bd. of State of Okl. | Discussed | |
| 1995 OK 129, 910 P.2d 972, 66 OBJ 3710 | R.R. Tway, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm. | Discussed | |
| 1995 OK 150, 945 P.2d 469, 66 OBJ 1818 | Sholer v. State ex rel. Department of Public Safety | Discussed | |
| 2003 OK 12, 67 P.3d 333 | HUMPHRIES v. LEWIS | Discussed | |
| 2004 OK 48, 98 P.3d 1061 | APACHE CORP. v. STATE ex rel. OKLAHOMA TAX COMMISSION | Discussed | |
| 2004 OK 84, 102 P.3d 670 | HEAD v. McCRACKEN | Discussed | |
| 2005 OK 77, 124 P.3d 227 | PHILLIPS v. HEDGES | Discussed at Length | |
| 1930 OK 570, 298 P. 249, 148 Okla. 97 | BROWN v. BOARD OF ED. | Discussed | |
| 2007 OK 21, 158 P.3d 461 | OKLAHOMA CITY ZOOLOGICAL TRUST v. STATE ex rel. PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RELATIONS BD. | Discussed | |
| 2007 OK 37, 160 P.3d 978 | ST. JOHN MEDICAL CENTER v. BILBY | Discussed | |
| 2007 OK 95, 177 P.3d 551 | IN RE: DE-ANNEXATION OF CERTAIN REAL PROPERTY FROM THE CITY OF SEMINOLE | Discussed | |
| 1929 OK 533, 283 P. 784, 140 Okla. 233 | GRUBB v. SMILEY | Discussed | |
| 2009 OK 17, 206 P.3d 589 | LANG v. ERLANGER TUBULAR CORP. | Discussed | |
| 2010 OK 3, 230 P.3d 853 | ROGERS v. QUIKTRIP CORP. | Discussed at Length | |
| 2011 OK 12, 248 P.3d 356 | ATKINSON v. GURICH | Discussed | |
| 2011 OK 53, 260 P.3d 1251 | THOMAS v. HENRY | Discussed | |
| 2011 OK 57, 270 P.3d 113 | TULSA INDUSTRIAL AUTHORITY v. CITY OF TULSA | Discussed at Length | |
| 2012 OK 8, 276 P.3d 989 | IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF STANFIELD | Discussed at Length | |
| 1975 OK 133, 541 P.2d 848 | ESTATE OF KASISHKE v. OKLAHOMA TAX COMMISSION | Discussed | |
| 2013 OK 88, 313 P.3d 917 | HOLLEY v. ACE AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY | Discussed | |
| 1980 OK 56, 609 P.2d 1289 | Lekan v. P & L Fire Protection Co. | Discussed | |
| 2015 OK 64, 360 P.3d 499 | BALL v. MULTIPLE INJURY TRUST FUND | Discussed | |
| 2015 OK 74, 362 P.3d 205 | KRUG v. HELMERICH & PAYNE, INC. | Discussed at Length | |
| 1978 OK 34, 577 P.2d 1278 | PHILLIPS v. OKLAHOMA TAX COM‘N | Discussed | |
| 2016 OK 69, 376 P.3d 212 | NELSON v. ENID MEDICAL ASSOCIATES, INC. | Discussed | |
| 2016 OK 106, 383 P.3d 269 | STEVENS v. FOX | Discussed | |
| 1979 OK 62, 594 P.2d 1210 | WILSON v. STATE EX REL. OKL. TAX COM‘N | Discussed | |
| 1979 OK 64, 596 P.2d 530 | NEUMANN v. TAX COM‘N | Discussed | |
| 2018 OK 54, 435 P.3d 90 | COMPSOURCE MUTUAL INSUR. CO. v. STATE ex rel. OKLA. TAX COMM. and OKLA. ASSOC. OF ELECTRIC SELF INSURERS FUND v. STATE OF OKLA. TAX COMM. | Discussed at Length | |
| 2019 OK 2, 435 P.3d 109 | KOHLER v. CHAMBERS | Discussed | |
| 2019 OK 84, 455 P.3d 918 | VIDEO GAMING TECHNOLOGIES v. TULSA COUNTY BD. OF TAX ROLL CORRECTIONS | Discussed | |
| 2020 OK 28, 473 P.3d 22 | HAMILTON v. NORTHFIELD INSURANCE CO. | Discussed | |
| 2020 OK 56, 473 P.3d 475 | INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT # 52 v. HOFMEISTER | Discussed at Length | |
| 2020 OK 88, 475 P.3d 862 | IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF FORESEE | Discussed | |
| 1999 OK 91, 995 P.2d 1098, 70 OBJ 3444 | Whitehead v. Whitehead | Discussed | |
| 1925 OK 673, 251 P. 1032, 122 Okla. 143 | EATON v. ST. LOUIS-S. F. R. CO. | Discussed at Length | |
| 1926 OK 51, 248 P. 841, 118 Okla. 196 | METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. v. LILLARD | Discussed | |
| 1997 OK 126, 947 P.2d 525, 68 OBJ 3329 | IN THE MATTER OF INCOME TAX PROTEST OF REDBIRD | Discussed | |
| 1998 OK 2, 953 P.2d 329, 69 OBJ 208 | McNEILL v. CITY OF TULSA | Discussed | |
| 1982 OK 112, 652 P.2d 283 | Phillips Petroleum Co., Matter of | Discussed | |
| 1926 OK 734, 249 P. 412, 119 Okla. 236 | KUBATZKY v. PITTSBURGH PLATE GLASS CO. | Discussed | |
| 1951 OK 334, 242 P.2d 129, 206 Okla. 223 | STATE ex rel. COMMISSIONERS OF LAND OFFICE v. WARDEN | Discussed | |
| 1998 OK 20, 955 P.2d 233, 69 OBJ 933 | BRANDON v. ASHWORTH | Discussed | |
| 1998 OK 26, 957 P.2d 107, 69 OBJ 1167 | MUSKOGEE FAIR HAVEN MANOR v. SCOTT | Discussed at Length | |
| 1998 OK 92, 967 P.2d 1214, 69 OBJ 3242 | City of Tulsa v. State ex rel. Public Employees Relations Board | Discussed | |
| 1998 OK 99, 968 P.2d 1227, 69 OBJ 3504 | Price v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission | Discussed | |
| 1999 OK 41, 982 P.2d 1071, 70 OBJ 1551 | Neer v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission | Discussed | |
| 1944 OK 85, 146 P.2d 996, 194 Okla. 40 | MID-CONTINENT PIPE LINE CO. v. SEMINOLE CTY. EXCISE BD. | Discussed | |
| 1944 OK 86, 146 P.2d 113, 193 Okla. 609 | PAYNE v. JONES | Discussed at Length | |
| 1943 OK 109, 135 P.2d 46, 192 Okla. 293 | STATE ex rel. OKLAHOMA EMPL. SEC. COM. v. TULSA FLOWER EXCH. | Discussed | |
| 1983 OK 86, 671 P.2d 672 | Walker v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. | Discussed | |
| 1984 OK 57, 687 P.2d 132 | Darnell v. Chrysler Corp. | Discussed | |
| 1984 OK 70, 690 P.2d 1048 | Sisney v. Smalley | Discussed | |
| 1985 OK 110, 714 P.2d 198, 57 OBJ 22 | Maule v. Independent School Dist. No. 9 of Tulsa County | Discussed | |
| Title 12. Civil Procedure | |||
| Cite | Name | Level | |
| Postjudgment Interest on Judgments Rendered After January 1, 2005 - Prejudgment Interest on Actions Filed After January 1, 2010 | Discussed at Length | ||
| Void Judgment, Illegal Tax or Nuisance May Be Enjoined - Petition - No Bond Required | Discussed | ||
| Production of Documents and Things and Entry upon Land for Inspection and Other Purposes | Cited | ||
| Title 15. Contracts | |||
| Cite | Name | Level | |
| Renumbered as 12 O.S. § 727 by Laws 1971, HB 1298, c. 252, § 2 | Discussed at Length | ||
| Interest Defined | Cited | ||
| Title 43. Marriage | |||
| Cite | Name | Level | |
| Past Due Support Payments as Judgment - Arrearage Payment Schedule | Cited | ||
| Title 68. Revenue and Taxation | |||
| Cite | Name | Level | |
| Repealed | Discussed at Length | ||
| Repealed | Discussed at Length | ||
| Short Title | Cited | ||
| Value of Return | Cited | ||
| Right to Appeal - Notice of Appeal - Duty of District Attorney - Presumption | Discussed at Length | ||
| Payment of Full Amount of Taxes with Notice to Appeal | Discussed at Length | ||
| Duty to Pay Taxes Where Illegality of Tax and Laws Provide No Appeal | Discussed at Length | ||
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Notes
“E. Except as provided by subsection F of this section, beginning November 1, 2009, if a verdict for damages by reason of personal injuries or injury to personal rights including, but not limited to, injury resulting from bodily restraint, personal insult, defamation, invasion of privacy, injury to personal relations, or detriment due to an act or omission of another is accepted by the trial court, the court in rendering judgment shall add interest on the verdict at a rate prescribed pursuant to subsection I of this section from the date which is twenty-four (24) months after the suit resulting in the judgment was commenced to the earlier of the date the verdict is accepted by the trial court as expressly stated in the judgment, or the date the judgment is filed with the court clerk. No prejudgment interest shall begin to accrue until twenty-four (24) months after the suit resulting in the judgment was commenced. The interest rate for computation of prejudgment interest shall begin with the rate prescribed by subsection I of this section which is in effect for the calendar year which is twenty-four (24) months after the suit resulting in the judgment was commenced. This rate shall be in effect until the end of the calendar year in which interest begins to accrue or until the date judgment is filed, whichever first occurs. Beginning on January 1 of the next succeeding calendar year until the end of that calendar year, or until the date the judgment is filed, whichever first occurs, and for each succeeding calendar year thereafter, the prejudgment interest rate shall be the rate in effect for judgments rendered during each calendar year as certified by the Administrative Director of the Courts pursuant to subsection I of this section. After the computation of all prejudgment interest has been completed, the total amount of prejudgment interest shall be added to the amount of the judgment rendered pursuant to the trial of the action, and the total amount of the resulting judgment shall become the amount upon which postjudgment interest is computed pursuant to subsection A of this section.
F. If a verdict of the type described by subsection E of this section is rendered against this state or its political subdivisions, including counties, municipalities, school districts, and public trusts of which this state or a political subdivision of this state is a beneficiary, the judgment shall bear interest at the rate prescribed pursuant to subsection I of this section from the date the suit was commenced to the earlier of the date the verdict is accepted by the trial court as expressly stated in the judgment or the date the judgment is filed with the court clerk. The interest rate for computation of prejudgment interest shall begin with the rate prescribed by subsection I of this section which is in effect for the calendar year in which the suit resulting in the judgment is commenced. This rate shall be in effect until the end of the calendar year in which the suit resulting in judgment was filed or until the date the judgment is rendered as expressly stated in the judgment, whichever first occurs. Beginning on January 1 of the next succeeding calendar year until the end of that calendar year, or until the date judgment is rendered, whichever first occurs, and for each succeeding calendar year thereafter, the prejudgment interest rate shall be the rate in effect for judgments rendered during each calendar year as certified by the Administrative Director of the Courts pursuant to subsection I of this section. After the computation of prejudgment interest has been completed, the amount shall be added to the amount of the judgment rendered pursuant to the trial of the action, and the total amount of the resulting judgment shall become the amount upon which postjudgment interest is computed pursuant to subsection B of this section. No award of prejudgment interest against this state or its political subdivisions, including counties, municipalities, school districts, and public trusts of which this state or a political subdivision of this state is a beneficiary, including the amount of the judgment awarded pursuant to trial of the action, shall exceed the total amount of liability of the governmental entity pursuant to The Governmental Tort Claims Act.”
Compare, Redbird v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 1997 OK 126, ¶¶ 10-15, 947 P.2d 525, 527-529 (to be an exclusive state tax remedy it must also be adequate, clear, and certain for a federal constitutional challenge), and Strelecki v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 1993 OK 122, 872 P.2d 910 (Due Process provision of the Oklahoma Constitution required refund of overpayment of tax when it was not paid under protest and the Tax Commission agreed an adverse judicial decision would apply to non-party taxpayers), and Phillips v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 1978 OK 34, 577 P.2d 1278 (injunctive state-wide relief ordered to restrain Oklahoma Tax Commission from assessing and collecting a tax when statute violated the U. S. Constitution).
See also Tulsa Industrial Authority v. City of Tulsa, 2011 OK 57, nn. 45, 46, & ¶ 25, 270 P.3d 113, 126 (
The 1951 version is cited in the Court‘s Syllabus in State ex rel. Oklahoma Employment Security Commission v. Sanders, 1956 OK 262, 304 P.2d 287, and the 1941 version is referenced in the opinion, 304 P.2d at 288.
All judgments of courts of record and justices of the peace shall bear interest from the day on which they are rendered at the rate of six per cent. per annum: Provided, that when a rate of interest is specified in any contract, that rate shall continue until full payment is ade, and any judgment rendered on any such contract shall bear the same rate of interest mentioned in the contract, which rate shall be specified in the judgment; but in no case shall such rate exceed the legal contract rate at the date of such obligation.
In all cases where illegality of the tax is alleged to arise by reason of some action from which the laws provide no appeal, the aggrieved person shall pay the full amount of the taxes and give notice of any lawsuit by such person at the time an in the manner provided by Section 2884 of this title. It shall be the duty of the county treasurer to hold, invest and disburse such taxes only in the manner provided for by Section 2884 of this title.