*1 OF COOK TREASURER ILLI- COUNTY, ROSEWELL, et al. NOIS, LaSALLE NATIONAL BANK,
TRUSTEE Argued No. 79-1157. November 1980 Decided March *2 BRENNAN,J., opinion Court, Burger, delivered the which J.,C. White, BlacKMUn, Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J., concurring p. Stevens, opinion, post, filed a J., filed a dissenting opinion, Stewart, Marshall, Powell, JJ., in which joined, post, p. 529. argued
Henry petitioners. A. Hauser cause for With him on Carey were Bernard briefs Michael F. Baccash. L. Fox argued
James for respondent. the cause With him on the P. brief was Donald Colleton.* *3 the opinion delivered
Justice Brennan of the Court. The Tax of provides 1937 that “[t]he courts suspend district shall not or enjoin, restrain the assess- levy ment, of any collection tax under State where law plain, speedy remedy may and efficient in had the courts of such State.” S. question § U. 1341. The C. we must decide in this case is whether an Illinois which re- quires property owners contesting property their taxes to protest under and if successful obtain a refund in- without terest years two is “a speedy and plain, remedy” efficient within meaning the of the Act.1
I LaSalle National Bank is trustee of a land trust for Patricia Cook,2 the beneficial property improved owner of * Henry Rose and Michael A. County O’Connor filed a the brief for Cook Legal Assistance Foundation ex rel. Fred urging Schubert as amicus curiae affirmance. expressly This Court did not provide decide whether omission inter est on a application successful refund “plain, rendered a state speedy efficient,” Department Employment States, v. United of 355, (1966). U. S. Cook, Patricia the party interest, real is the of beneficial owner in' the low- building all-black apartment a 22-unit with Heights, Ill., community of located in Chicago East income alleged that, January 1, as of County.3 Respondent Cook $46,000. of had fair market value property her property her County ordinance, should with Cook accordance purposes of fair property been for tax have assessed 33% the Instead, year, market the $15,180.4 value — Illinois Land Trust No. of which LaSalle National Bank as serves party Although litigation, a named trustee. she was not this this respondent. opinion will refer nevertheless to her as largely respondent’s opinion facts drawn as stated in this are purposes consideration, allegations complaint. For our accepted Equipment, Inc. Food complaint Walker Process are true. Machinery Corp., & Chemical S. provides that, IX, subject (b), Article Illinois Constitution §4 prescribed by Assembly, General counties to limitations State’s County, may populations than 200,000, with of more which includes Cook classify property purposes real must be of taxation. The classification reasonable, Moreover, uniform within each class. assessments canpot highest level of assessment class exceed times the level 2% authority county. of the in the of the assessment lowest class Under Constitution, Assembly passed IX, Art. Illinois Illinois General § any legislation requiring that “such classification must be established county 501a Stat., ordinance board.” Ill. ch. Rev. authority, County Commissioners the Cook Board Pursuant passed following ordinance: *4 classes: following
“Section 2. Real estate is into assessment divided Unimproved 1: real estate. “Class residential farm, as used for 2: Real estate used or real estate
“Class building more improved house, of not purposes apartment when with a an units, cooperative living condominium, than six or residential a residential to be by required statute government-subsidized housing project or if category. assessed the lowest assessment which improved purposes 3: All real used for residential
“Class estate Class included in 2. corporation not-for-profit by a 4: Real estate owned and used “Class resi- unless used purposes furtherance set forth in its charter County property $52,150. assessed the Assessor As a result, respondent's property liability tax was instead $6,106 $4,331. of $1,775, overcharge County
Respondent also claimed that Assessor “know- governmental as or custom ingly policy official maintained, adopted promulgated policy or statements, de- regulations, systems cisions and of assessment which produced have egre- gious disparities throughout in assessments County." Complaint Plaintiff’s 11, App. particular, she cited ¶ study Department Illinois Local Government Affairs that, 1975, property in the showing same class as respond- as low high ent's assessed as and as as of fair 3% 973% market She alleged value. furthermore disparities that such greater assessments were “far in number and size older, city county inner areas, owned, inhabited used to a larger by poorer extent minorities and people.” Ibid. Fi- nally, she contended that the Assessor knew she had previously challenged the 1974, 1975, and 1976 assessments of her property.5 purposes.
dential If such real estate is used purposes for residential shall be classified in the appropriate residential class.
“Class 5: All real any estate not included in of the above four classes. “Section 3. The Assessor assess, shall and the Appeals Board of shall re- view assessments on real estate in the following various classes percentages of market value: “Class 1: —22%
“Class 2: — 17%
“Class 3: — 33%
“Class 4: — 30%
“Class 5: —40%” Ill., Ordinance, County, Cook Property Real Classification Assessment (originally through June 17, 1973, enacted Dec. as amended §§ 1977). Respondent’s qualified property Class real estate. 5 Respondent prop previously challenged had her erty assessments, then appealing Appeals, first to the Board of *5 508 remedy by
Respondent
first exhausted her administrative
unsuccessfully for a
of her 1977 assess-
appealing
correction
Ill.
County
Appeals.
Board of
Rev.
ment before the Cook
597,
(1), 596,
(1977).6
Her
Stat.,
598,
ch.
120, §§
pay the contested
only remaining state
was to
tax
objection
to the Cook
under
and then to
protest,
file
County
Judgment
Application for
before the Cir-
Collector’s
County
a reverse
for refund.7
cuit Court of Cook
effect
suit
—in
1975,
1976,
objecting in December
November
and December 1977
respectively
Applications
Judgment.
Collector’s
for
to the
annual
The
County, noting
parties
Circuit
agreed
Court of Cook
had
to a
compromise
pretrial conference,
and settlement at a
Stat.,
Ill. Rev.
ch.
120,
(1977),
separate judgments simultaneously
675a
three
issued
on
§
16, 1978,
respondent
erroneously
March
and ordered refunds to
on the
col-
portions
protested
payments,
$4,586.24,
lected
$3,656.29,
of her
tax
$3,937.66 respectively. Respondent
$5,700,
had asked for
refunds of
$4,750,
$5,452.41
years.
for the three
challenge
assessment,
property
County property
To
a
a Cook
specific statutory procedure.
owner must follow a
generally
&
Ganz
Laswell,
County
Review of Real Estate
(Chicago)
Assessments —Cook
vs.
Illinois,
Remainder
(1977);
John Marshall J. Prac. &
Par-
Proc.
ham,
Obtaining
Procedures For
Respect
Property
Relief
With
To
Rates,
(1973).
taxpayer may
Assessments
Bar
Ill.
J. 306
The
file
complaint
County
a written
with the
thereafter entitled
Assessor
hearing.
a
Stat.,
120,
(1977).
Ill. Rev.
ch.
If
relief is
no
§578
obtained,
taxpayer may appeal
Appeals
Cook
the Board of
County
596,
598,
(1),
597,
correction of the
599.
assessment.
§§
The
County
Board must
copy
complaint
forward one
seeking
court,
Assessor.
legal remedy
Before
the tax
in state
payer must
exhaust the available
before the Board
administrative
Appeals by filing
complaint.
People
Fulton
ex rel. Korzen v.
Market
Storage Co.,
Cold
446-447,
452,
509 statutory Although §§ 716. Illinois’ 675, procedure refund theoretically provide could final resolution of dispute the setting grounds objection payment the second installment forth for the to Then, County publishes the tax. 675. the Collector of -Cook an ad- § giving notice and the date of his stating application vertisement intended County judgment fixing to the of Cook for Circuit Court the correct any protest. paid Although under 706. amount of the month § apparent target applying date judgment, 710, of October is the for for § County respondent applications contends that the Cook Collector’s are early December, Respond- late November or Brief made until for 14, applies The at the same time n. 14. Collector the Circuit ent delinquent judgment for sale of lands and lots whose owners have failed pay property tax bills. 706. their § Judgment Application for is filed with Once the Collector’s the Circuit objection Court, taxpayer application file a written to the must within by judge, period specified stating challenging his of time reasons for taxpayer may challenges The raise the tax. constitutional to the assess- County objection. Cook, 'National Bank v. ment in his LaSalle 57 Ill. of 318, 252, (1974). 324, filing E. 2d 2d 312 N. 255-256 After the objection, the court must hold a settlement conference between the two days. Stat., 120, sides within 90 Ill. 675a If no settle- Rev. ch. § reached, upon party ment the court must demand of either set the days conference, hearing within of and decide the matter case. 675a, Finally, judgment refund for 716. court enters and orders a §§ any erroneously by taxpayer. 675, The paid or all of the tax 716. §§ taxpayer may appeal any judgment higher courts such dissatisfied of Illinois. equitable by way injunction against collec grant
Illinois courts relief of when property law or taxes when the tax is unauthorized tion County v. exempt properties, National Bank the tax is levied on LaSalle Cook, supra, 2d, 255, basis 323, on the at 312 N. E. at remedy. It has adequate legal Ibid. statutory procedure refund is an fraudulently exces however, suggested, in certain cases of been inadequate assessments, statutory remedy will be found sive Korzen, supra, at equitable remedy Associates v. will lie. Clarendon Corp. Zaban, Chicago v. Accord, Sheraton 108, 2d, 306 N. E. at 303. dism’d, U. S. 998 85, 1318, 1322, appeal 92-93, 2d 2d 373 N. E. Ill. 323, County Cook, supra, v. (1978); LaSalle National Bank Cullerton, 2d Enterprises, Inc. F. 2d, 255; East Jackson N. E. (1976). Neither (CA7 denied, 423 S. 1073 439, 1975), 441-442 cert. under protest,8 of the tax re- year payment within one delay customary the time alleged spondent upon pro- receipt refund successful until payment accompanied by tax refund is not years.9 is two test Korzen, Associates v. Clarendon payment of interest.10 (1973); 2dE. 2d 306 N. Ill. Lakefront 422-423, Ill. 2d 167 N. Realty Lorenz, 2d Corp. v. E. Respondent property her 1977 taxes and in- refused *7 S. § 42 U. C. 1983 action brought stead United District of Illinois, District Court for Northern States permanent seeking preliminary injunctive pre- and relief to petitioner publishing from vent Rosewell11 advertisement and date of Application of notice the intended for Judgment, from for and applying judgment against order of sale her selling it. property, Respondent and from that, contended by requiring payment of taxes times the lawful amount, petitioners deprived equal her of protection and process due by the secured Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and violated state statutory constitutional and rights as well. Respondent further alleged that she had no plain, speedy, and efficient in the Illinois courts.
Petitioners moved dismiss, that claiming actions chal- lenging state tax assessments are cognizable not under 42 petitioners respondent nor suggests respondent that could have obtained equitable relief. instance, For respondent’s protest 1976 tax resolved one within year from payment. the date of 14, App. Complaint Plaintiff’s 9. ¶ purposes For of their motion to Court, peti dismiss in District Federal agreed tioners delay years. was two Arg. Oral Tr. of 9. 10Respondent that, claimed average prime based on an rate for 8% 3-year period during paid which she protest, taxes under she lost approximately $2,000 potential money. interest use her on the Complaint 14, Plaintiff’s App. '¶ 8-9. 11Respondent sued Rosewell, Edward J. County, Treasurer Cook and Thomas M. Tully, County Assessor. 1343,12 § Illinois’ stat and 28 U. C.
U. S. S. § C. speedy, efficient plain, rem utory is a procedure refund interest. Defendants’ though Motion edy even it fails to Dismiss, App. motion for respondent’s pre- The Court denied District for complaint want of liminary injunction and dismissed App. 1341.13 Pet. for jurisdiction C. under U. S. Cert. enjoined petitioner Rose 20a-21a. the court well However, against order of sale re- proceeding judgment appeal to the spondent’s United States property pending for Seventh Fed. Appeals Court of Circuit. Rule Civ. reversed (c). Appeals the District Proc. 62 did fed- Court, holding bar jurisdiction procedure eral court because Illinois’ district “a speedy no-interest was not years plain, refunds after two remedy.” and efficient 2d 536-537 (1979).14 F. petition rehearing A suggestion rehearing en banc Id., was denied. at 530. We S. granted certiorari, 925 (1980), and now reverse. *8 12 urge jurisdic Petitioners likewise that the District Court lacked here n §
tion (3). “Question under 28 U. S. C. 1343 Since the Presented” petition their issue, 2, for certiorari did refer to this Pet. for not Cert. question any we event, it is properly even before us. reso our lution unnecessary of the case makes it to address this additional contention. 13The District Court stated: availability equitable
“1. The declaratory of relief in the Illinois provides speedy state plaintiff ‘plain, courts with a and efficient' remedy. Tully Griffin, (1976). v. 429 U. 68S. non-payment
“2. The pursuant on to 675 of interest refunds Sections and 716 Chapter Statutes, of Revised does not render Illinois ” remedy ‘plain, speedy App. in Illinois courts Pet. and efficient.’ for Cert. 20a-21a. 14 availability Appeals The Court of also held that of a action in jurisdiction state court does In not bar federal under the Tax junction 2d, Act. F. case, of result in we 540. Because do not reach this issue.
II recognized it must be issue we outset, At the statutory Our task deter- construction. is to decide is one constitutes procedure Illinois refund “a mine whether remedy ... in the and efficient courts such plain, speedy Tax Injunction meaning Act, State” within the jurisdiction 1341, thereby barring grant S. C. § injunctive plain language relief. review of the Our Act, legislative history, underlying purpose per- its and its Appeals suades us that in holding erred that the Illinois plain, speedy is not “a and efficient remedy.”
A point The starting inquiry of our plain is the language the statute itself. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S. (1979); States, Cases Jam United See ERA v. Assn., National Stone Crushed
U. S. The Tax generally prohibits federal district courts ad- enjoining ministration except in instances where the state-court is not “plain, speedy and face, “plain, efficient.” On its speedy and efficient remedy” exception appears require state-court remedy that meets procedural certain minimal criteria. The Court has occasionally define sought to the meaning of the exception since passage of the Act in 1937. When however, it has so, done empha- the Court has sized a procedural interpretation in both defining the entire phrase and its individual word components.
Discussing the general meaning of Court, phrase, the Tully v. Griffin, Inc., 429 U. S. (1976), described its “basic inquiry” as “whether under New York law there ais 'plain, speedy and efficient’ way taxpayer] press [the *9 its constitutional claims while preserving right to chal lenge the amount of tax due.” More directly, in Great Lakes S. Huffman, 319 U. Co. v.
Dredge Dock & stated: (1943), the Court relief as when, withhold such duty court’s
“[I]t legislature the state appears it case, present in the any challenged tax to payment on provided has taxpayer may maintain officer, appropriate suit he In such a assert his it back. recover a suit to of them secure a review Court. rights and federal remedy to taxpayer, and at adequate This affords an undisturbed the state’s administra- time leaves the same added.)15 (Emphasis of its tion taxes.” Cromwell, (1946) Hillsborough protection full is “whether the State affords (issue rights”). history of legislative from the gleaned What little can remedy” phrase “plain, speedy on the and efficient the Act interpretation. support procedural further Senator lends Bone, primary sponsor, “plain, speedy the Act’s referred remedy” provision “Thus a full efficient and then stated: hearing judicial controversy determination of the is as- sured.” 81 Cong. Report Rec. 1416 The Senate ac- understanding, companying the mirrors Senator Bone’s Act appeal of the adding Supreme to the United “[a]n State is available No. 75th Rep. other cases.” S. 1st Cong., Sess., phrase in the plain, speedy remedy” “a and efficient Injunction language Act
Tax after was “modeled” verbatim 15Although availability the issue in of federal Great Lakes concerned the itself, declaratory scope Injunction relief rather than the predicated the decision persuaded on considerations which “[t]he equity grant federal courts of not to . which led to the relief . . and Injunction] S., enactment Act.” have no 319 U. at 300. We [Tax that, presented injunction doubt had suit, the case would the Court precluded have found under the Tax Act. *10 federal-court prohibiting an Act 1934,16 Act of in the Johnson by agen- state administrative orders issued with interference clear, As Bone made Senator public utilities. “[m]ost cies support of the were used Johnson arguments which Injunction Act. in like to the apply . manner” . . of the Johnson Our examination Rec. 1416 Cong. history procedural reveals the same em- legislative Act and its its legislative Act and the Tax as found phasis speedy and history. plain, on the words “a efficient gloss As remedy,” Report spoke on Johnson Act the Senate appeal for an from the determina- provided laws that agency party. Rep. by any tion of the state dissatisfied S. 1-2 Cong., Sess., 72d 1st The Senate Re- No. appeal continued: “This to the courts of port taken State, giving any controversy may thus to both sides which judicial hearing arise a determination the contro- full versy.” Id., 2 (emphasis added). no
There is doubt that pro Illinois state-court refund provides taxpayer judicial cedure with a “full hearing any determination” at which she ratee and all constitu objections tional to the tax. LaSalle National Bank v. County Cook, 57 2d 318, 324, 312 E. 2d 252, Ill. N.
(1974). Appeal higher authorized, Illinois courts is Stat., ultimately Rev. ch. 120, Ill. 675 (1977), § and review is available this Court, 28 S. C. Respondent U. does any not allege procedural defect remedy, in the Illinois other than delay,17that would preclude preservation and considera Act, 16 The Johnson (emphasis added), per states in S. C. § part: tinent , "The district courts enjoin, shall not suspend operation or restrain the of, compliance with, any order affecting chargeable by public rates utility and made a State agency rate-making body administrative aor political of a State subdivision, where n plain,speedy “(4) A remedy may be had in the courts efficient
such State.” argument This infra, discussed at 518-521. equal is free raise her rights, tion of since she her federal objections protection federal constitutional process and due proceedings during before the Application Judgment County.18 Rather, respondent's argu Circuit Cook *11 interest on the pay ment —that Illinois’ failure to tax refund remedy “plain, speedy appears makes the not efficient” — to concern. Whether she address a more substantive has any right” right “federal interest —a not receive she has express asserted and on which we no view—it appear would right she this in the proceeding. could assert state-court procedural The mechanism for correction of her bill re mains the same, however, paid whether interest or not.19 respondent Although could have raised federal constitutional claims objection in her the Application Judgment, expressly Collector’s for she objections prior declined to in her in 1974, 1975, do so and 1976. For example, objection her “Objector the 1976 tax bill stated: reserves to adjudication the federal rights courts the of its the under United States Objections . .” p. 8, Constitution . . for did 8. She claim ¶ ordinance and equal protection assessment were violations of and due process under Id., the Illinois Constitution. ¶ 19The opinion remedy dissent construes our to mean that “a state possibly which could any afford or had potential relief which jurisdiction.” (foot nominal Post, relief would defeat federal at 537 omitted). view, that, note dissent thus “a com concludes under our puterized calculation accompanied by rejection slip preprinted would a ” qualify 'plain, speedy Post, as a remedy.’ and efficient at 530. But our opinion suggests nothing a explicitly state that kind. We remedy “provid judicial must taxpayer hearing with a [e] 'full determination’ any objec at which she raise constitutional all Supra, tions to the computer- tax.” hypothetical at 514. The dissent’s hardly card requirement. would meet this
The Tax juris- Congress’ Act embodied to transfer decision over diction a class of substantive dis- federal claims from the federal trict courts to the state courts, procedures were long as state-court “plain, speedy and efficient” and review the substantive final claim could proce- be obtained in this Court. Under the Illinois refund dure, taxpayer may objections, including raise all constitutional those on based the State’s failure to return interest or to all unconstitu- tionally taxes, legal supra, collected in the proceeding, Illinois refund
B speedy plain, “a phrase interpretation procedural A Illi- sufficiency procedural remedy,” and efficient analysis phrase’s of the further supported remedy, are nois’ of Webster’s 1934 edition According to the words. individual “clear” or “mani- plain means Dictionary, New International “characterized means “quick,” means fest,” speedy efficient “legal means and a activity,” by effective Web- wrong.” ... obtain redress ... right recover English Language Dictionary of the International ster’s New 1934).20 (2d ed. 2106, 2418 819, 1878, meaning never addressed has the Court
While “plain” and interpreted the words it has “speedy,” word “uncertainty suggested that Thus, “efficient.” opportunity to review in litigants have an seek after which nothing contemplates more. Court. The Act *12 respondent specifies opinion below nor the brief for Neither the remedy “plain,” “speedy,” fails because it is not not not whether the difficulty “remedy” superficial linguistic “efficient,” a at all. The or not readily payments in can In describing interest these terms be observed. argument, difficulty deciding respondent’s had some deed at oral counsel remedy the Illinois foundered: under which of the words “QUESTION: you equate inadequate Do with inefficient? Yes, ‘Inadequate’ commonly in FOX: has been used the
“MR. sir. ‘PS&E,’ plain, speedy, court, sir, Justice, the federal Mr. Chief with efficient.
“QUESTION: you’re you Well, saying, me, that what it seems to is remedy not synonym ‘adequate.’ treat ‘efficient’ as a And this efficient, is, adequate, speedy. that because it isn’t plain. Nor is
“MR. FOX: “QUESTION: fancy Well, I’m Plain or not what it means. sure thing it’s important wouldn’t make much is whether difference. The really speedy adequate. adequate speedy whether it’s are And interrelated, they? aren’t so; yes. subsumed, speedy FOX: I they
“MR. believe I think that are generic.” adequate, is subsumed under the word which seems to be more Arg. 28, 34, Tr. of Oral 35. may
concerning
remedy
‘plain’
State’s
make it
less than
a
Tully Griffin,
Inc.,
v.
under 28 U. S. C.
1341.”
429 U.
S.,
making a direct connection
cases,
76. Earlier
without
“uncertainty”
surrounding
“plain,”
have held that
a
word
jurisdiction.
lifts the bar to federal-court
remedy
state-court
Cromwell, Hillsborough
S.,
Respond-
v.
at 625-626.21
U.
argument
ent
the Illinois refund procedure
has made no
or
uncertain
There is no question
otherwise unclear.
procedure,
under
the Illinois
court will hear
decide
any
delay
or
Paying
eliminating
claim.
interest
remedy any
“plain.”
would not make the
more
interpretation
This Court’s
of the word “efficient” has also
Tully,
procedural
In
stressed
elements.
the Court
com-
remedy
mented
“a
does not
‘inefficient,’
State’s
become
merely
taxpayer
because
must
line
travel
across
in order
challenge
to resist or
sought
imposed.”
the taxes
In
S.,
explicitly
without
addition,
mention-
ing
“efficient,”
word
we
permitted
federal-court
have
jurisdiction when
taxpayer’s
state-court
would
Banking
of suits, Georgia Railroad &
require
multiplicity
Redwine,
Co.
(1952)
(where remedy
authorities, also yet taxpayer railroad wanted taxes, to state applied school paid counties, to basis taxes on the same challenge remedy municipalities). Because the Illinois districts, and respondent requiring on ineffec- hardship imposes no unusual energy, or unnecessary expenditure time activity tual an say it is not “efficient.” we cannot meaning discussed expressly never This Court has squarely presented is “speedy,” issue word Illinois’ refund after whether must decide case. We remedy. “Speedy” per- a is years “speedy” two qualifies must concept, 2-year force we assess the de- relative and litigation. similar against surely for It lay the usual time no trial courts have been that state and federal beset secret delay many years.23 congestion Whether docket
22 remedy requires repetitive on A contest tax that suits the same years However, succeeding issue in be “efficient.” not on the record properly us, has not before the Illinois shown not “efficient.” itself appealed unsuccessfully It is respondent Appeals true that to the Board of swpra, 1974, 1976, straight years, for four see n. but appeal after her not until of Cook Circuit Court County judgment. Therefore, County rendered its neither Assessor yet judicial nor the weigh Board had had the benefit of a determination statutory their considerations. resort to the Further refund Illinois subsequent unnecessary would become should assessments reflect judgment Circuit Court's of the correct assessment. Respondent us, however, informs that her 1978 and 1979 tax assess- ments discriminatory level, were set the 1977 despite complaint filed with the for 1978 appeals years. Assessor to the Board for both Brief Respondent Together previous appeals, respondent with her four notes that has been she forced to take remedial action for six successive years. Id,., part n. 27. Because these additional facts are us, may pre- record we have before Respondent not considered them. sent these in her pending enjoin new facts suit in Federal District id., property collection of her 1978 tax. See at 2. instance, discussing For New York state courts in David Dudley Field noted that “[sjpeedy justice unknown; any thing is a justice, delays ruinous, without Vanderbilt, Improv almost most rare.” ing the Administration of Justice —Two Decades Development,
519 reasonable, a condition of necessary, a let alone 20th- fact of the century point: The matter litigation beside quickly resolved as as we would legal is that conflicts are not like. days complaint from 1976, filing
In median number of 13 urban trial disposition of a civil trial matter in courts from for State ranged Courts, 357 980. National Center of Delayed 10-11 7 over (1978).24 13, Justice 30% years of the civil took than two from to fin- cases more start Id., County ish. at 13. The Cook Circuit had simi- average time lar record: from 1974 to from date of filing S. Department to verdict was about 40 months. of Justice, State The of the Art Court Caseload Statistics: State (1978). 7 Federal district courts have not fared much better. filing disposition median As of time interval from months; going for civil cases to trial of those took was 10% (1957). Many L. long Cin. since lamented the Rev. have g., seeming e. inseparability judicial delay. proceedings See, of Na- and Courts, Delayed (1978); tional Center Lagging Justice, for State Justice (1960); Vanderbilt, supra; 328 Annuals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. Warren, Delay Congestion Courts, and in the Federal Am. Jud. Soc. J. (1958); Delay: Congestion Bibliography 7-8 and A Recent Selected Attorney Materials 1953-1958, in Proceedings of the Conference General's Congestion Delay Litigation (1958). on Court in 212-245 days For over half surveyed, median courts number of year Courts, over a and a Justice half. National Center for State (1978). Delayed Delay prob particularly pronounced been has generally metropolitan lem for state trial courts centers. located in Virtue, Metropolitan Courts, Delay Two Faces of Janus: in Trial & Lagging Justice, Annals Am. Acad. Soc. Sci. Pol. part population results in This an observed correlation between Administration, congestion. and calendar Calendar Institute Judicial Status, Proceedings Attorney on Court General’s Conference Delay Congestion Litigation example, For average jury time beginning from the suit until the commencement 750,000, populations trial was 18.8 with months counties over 11.4 500,000 750,000, between months counties months for 5.6 500,000. Ibid. counties under *15 of the Director of the Report Annual months.
more than 46 (1980). S. Courts A-30 of the U. Administrative Office for the Northern District District Court For the United States respondent brought suit, which Illinois, of the District months, with of all interval the median time 10% Id., at A-31.25 months. cases over 53 2-year wait, respondent’s regrettably, light, in this
Cast Injunction Act did in the Con not unusual. Nowhere speediest.26 must be the The suggest that gress history long delay in a the latest of Current statistics are problem Congress congestion in federal and state courts. of discussed congestion in courts in connection with the Tax federal district (remarks Bone) Cong. (1937) of (citing Rec. 1417 Sen. itself. portions Report applicable Act deemed of on the Johnson to the Tax In junction Act). year federal-ques ending June For the of 37.7% jury in tion law cases terminated without a 13 selected Federal District complete. Institute, Courts took months or more to American Law Study Courts, II, p. (1934). A of the Business of the Federal Pt. nonjury filing the median time interval for civil trials from
disposition Report in all federal district courts was 12.3 months. Annual Courts, of the Director of the Administrative Office of the Table 9 U. S. (1942). The median time for New York’s Southern District was 25 months. Ibid.
Unfortunately litigation state-court on statistics civil the 1930’s virtually 1940’sare The nonexistent. Institute of Judicial Administration major conducted the first compilation of state civil case data in 1953. Dept. Justice,
U. S. of State Caseload The of Statistics: State Art Even the time inter latest information on state-court complete vals more appellate litigation. than trial See National Center Courts, Report for State State Court Caseload Statistics: Annual problem Part of delay very inheres in the nature of state tax administration. yet universally There taxing system has to be devised a speedy enough viewed as complaints. largely because resolve This is procedures for “[t]he mass assessment and collection of state taxes and adjudication for administration and taxpayers’ disputes with tax officials generally complex are necessarily designed operate according to established Ledesma, 82, 128, rules.” Perez (1971) n. 17 (BreNNAN, J., concurring part dissenting part). property especially tax is vulnerable criticism over its adminis-
payment might more tolerable, interest make wait but necessary it would not amount of time to adjudicate affect the respondent’s Limiting federal claims. to the cir ourselves case, say instant we cannot respond cumstances 2-year delay boundary ent’s falls outside the of a “speedy” remedy.27 usually
tration. or taxes Unlike income sales can be calculated automatically price taxpayer’s good service, income or of a property tax is on levied the value real estate. This element necessarily judgment a degree subjective introduces individualized understandably frequent give taxpayer assessor that would rise to chal- *16 lenges place pressure procedures. appellate and on the generally review Schoettle, F. Oldman & State Local and and Taxes Finance 262-265 (1974); Advisory Relations, Prop- on Intergovernmental Commission The erty Changing Aaron, Pays (1974); in a Environment 3-20 H. Who Property Tax?, (1975); Pomp, the Happening 59-67 What Is to the Tax, Property 15 Assessors Journal relies The dissent on four factors which it believes “combine to make unjust.” Post, demonstrably the Illinois remedial scheme at 538-541. unjust” Leaving “demonstrably phrase aside the issue whether the describes inquiry, proper the these four factors boil down to the same two elements delay opinion. pay of failure Court’s and to addressed in this interest gross The first themselves reveal dissent’s factor —“the tax assessments alleged post, merely has inequities,” respondent that states 539— jurisdic surely violation, ground for federal-court constitutional not a “notwithstand tion here. The second—that overassessment continues ing taxpayer’s] protests error and the manifest formal [the admin require original assessment,” error-free appear ibid.—would Indeed, guarantee. procedures istration that could even the best not not sur assessment, judicial absent a determination of the correct Assessor protests” persuade prising respondent’s “formal failed to that Here, supra. Appeals n. of their “manifest error.” See Board of two within challenges years resolved respondent’s tax were three were explicitly challenges years single proceeding. court Those in a duty fed of hardly the grounds, it is on federal constitutional based supra. we As questions. N. to intervene in state-law tax eral courts pending respondent’s supra, Federal suggest, District n. the “efficient” light of claim in her latest litigation evaluate are Appeals of Board analysis, Assessor and now of our prong c is consistent of the Tax overall purpose remedy” efficient speedy “plain, the view
with only designed to prohibition was Act’s exception satisfy procedural cri- certain the state require such procedure meets criteria. refund Illinois’ and that teria, practice, principles equity its roots in “has The statute imperative need of a recognition federalism, and Tully operations.” own fiscal to administer its State Grif- last Inc., 73.28 This consideration was the fin, 429 U. atS., legislation the Act: this force behind motivating principal drastically limit district foremost a vehicle first and important with con- jurisdiction to interfere so local court Cong. (1937) the collection taxes. Rec. cern Dredge Lakes Bone); Great & Dock Co. v. (remarks Sen. Huffman, S., (Act “predicated upon at 301 desira- bility freeing, from interference the federal courts, state litigation challenging which authorize procedures after paid”).29 tax has been County’s adjudication apparently aware Circuit Court Cook repeated prior practices. have nevertheless their assessment delay—and The dissent’s third fourth factor —failure to factor — interest —are addressed above. *17 Injunction only reflecting The Tax Act was one of statutes con several hostility injunctions gressional to federal against issued state in the officials parte Young, 123, aftermath this Court's Ex decision in 155— (1908) (holding that the Amendment does bar Eleventh enjoining officers). from courts unconstitutional of state See actions Ledesma, generally J., Perez supra, concurring v. at 106-115 (BrennaN, part and dissenting part). Rep. Cong., in in See also S. No. 75th Sess., (1937) (“This 1st legislation principle, does not introduce a new Congress passed since the import”). has of similar statutes Appeals suggested purpose The Court of of the was to that Act prevent suits, corporations, through diversity delaying out-of-state from payment of during litigation state taxes pendency of federal while in pay state citizens litigate would have to first and in courts. then 2d, particularly 604 F. at 535. It is true that drafters of the Act were sys- that state tax knew Act, Congress passed
itWhen under protest of taxes commonly payment for provided tems remedy. The as their exclusive subsequent with refund to noted: Report Senate the Act for the various practice
“It the common statutes is col- enjoin to forbid State courts States actions law is county lection taxes unless tax of State and exempt taxation, and from property invalid or the may con- taxpayers generally provide these that statutes payment under only test their refund actions after taxes it protest. legislation possible makes type This State agencies while the States and their various survive long-drawn-out litigation progress.” Rep. is in S. Sess., Cong., 75th (1937). No. 1st H. Rep. Cong., Sess., (1937). See R. 75th 1st See No. also Matthews S. Rodgers, (1932). v. 284 U.
It
only
presume
common
also
Congress
sense
was
aware that some of
same States did not
interest on
these
to taxpayers,
following
their refunds
the then-familiar
rule
interest
actions
ex-
refund
recoverable
when
pressly
allowed
statute.
3 T.
Law of
Cooley,
Taxation
practice
Rep.
concerned with this
corporations.
No.
out-of-state
S.
1035, supra,
1-2;
Cong.
Bone).
(1937) (remarks
Rec. 1416
of Sen.
expansive
But the
language
Congress
of the statute
notion that
belies the
exclusively
was concerned
problem.
Congress
with this
wanted
If
had
solely
issue,
surely
by limiting
address
would
so
have done
jurisdictional
Act’s
diversity
bar
brought
jurisdiction.
to suits
in federal
addition,
In
Appeals’
Court of
interpretation
narrow
of the Act’s
purpose might
perverse
have the
making
effect of
Act
moot.
year after its passage,
one
diversity
this Court
held
federal courts
apply
general
suits must
statutory
case
law
well as
law
Tompkins,
Erie R. Co.
State.
unreasonable, tax matters to interference mean that federal-court taxpayers pay- States not Congress wanted nevertheless unimpaired access to the on to have fed- ing interest refunds Congress If had meant to carve such eral out courts. expect would to find some mention expansive exception, one language prophylactic of it. broad is incom- The statute’s patible interpretation. with such an
Ill her part, respondent per- For the most on the rests case syllogism: Injunction suasiveness the Tax Act is coter- pre-1937 minous equity with federal treatment of challenges to state federal equity practice at time viewed taxes; no-interest refund as inadequate;31 therefore, must follow that the Tax Act would view a no- interest refund remedy as inadequate, thereby authorizing jurisdiction. federal Respondent Brief for argu- 21. This 30 suggested One source the “apparent weight authority” sup ported opposite rule —that interest was allowable even in the absence of a statute. 112 Annot., (1938). A. L. R. 1183-1184 But even that acknowledged source contrary view, existence of the one that “ha[d] been asserted frequently somewhat more in recent at 1184. Id., cases.” Accord, Annot., 57 A. L. R. 357-364 31See Corp. Ward, 386, Educational Films (1931); v. 2 379, 282 U. S. n. Hopkins v. Southern Telephone Co., 393, 399-400 California (1928); Procter & Distributing Sherman, 165, Gamble 2 Co. 2d v. F. (SDNY 1924). These cases’ treatment of a no-interest refund was undercut later expressly addressing issue, cases. Without the Court Rodgers, two day, cases decided the same Matthews 521, U. S. (1932) (Mississippi remedy); refund Stratton v. St. Louis Co., Southwestern R. 530, (Illinois (1932) remedy), U. S. refund adequate found two state refund apparently remedies that did not pay interest, Gulf, & County, M. O. R. Co. v. Webster Miss. Realty (1943); Lorenz, So. 2d Corp. v. Lakefront 2d Ill. 422-423, Therefore, N. E. 2d prior equity practice ais two-sided sword.
525
Appeals’
for the Court
part of the basis
ment also forms
petitioners,
even
533, n. 4. And
2d,
decision.
604 F.
at
Injunction
Tax
that
40, suggest
for Petitioners
Brief
prior
of the Court’s
fed
confirmation
Act is “a congressional
32
state and local taxation.”
eral
in the area of
equity practice
post-1937
It
is true that
unpersuaded.
areWe
Injunction
recognized
the Tax
Act
suggested
cases have
that
Moe
practice. See
pre-existing
equity
and
federal
sanctioned
Tribes,
470
Hills
(1976);
v.
& Kootenai
resolved. P. P. Hart & D. & H. 1973); System (2d Wechsler’s Federal Courts and the Federal ed. Berry, A Prop Federal Forum Deprivation for Broad Constitutional erty Assessment, Most believe Calif. Rev. 833-834 L. equivalent although the Act is not prior equity practice, federal they agree See, g., do not quantity quality on the e. of difference. Comment, scope (1980) (Act Ilarv. L. Rev. 1021-1022 reduces equity); Comment, Regulating Jurisdiction to Enforce Federal Statutes State Imbroglio, Taxation: The Eleventh 70 Yale Amendment-Section (1961) (Act Note, equity); L. J. limited relief available under Federal Court Interference of State with the Assessment Collection Taxes, equity (1946) (Act Harv. L. Rev. limited procedural relief from courts). defects in state course, Of say this is not prior equity cases be instructive on whether a “plain, speedy and efficient.” And even where the Tax bar federal-court inter would not equity may ference in state tax administration, principles never- of federal Indeed, things, to solve an among legislated other Congress, equity jurisdiction. by cutting back federal existing problem practice “existing commented that Senator Bone tax-injunction suits courts to entertain Federal make[s] corporations to withhold a State possible foreign taxes in such vast amounts its subdivisions governmental disrupt State and periods county as to long finances, such *20 corporations such possible and thus make determine they pay.” taxes will Cong. for themselves the amount of 81 added). Rep. (1937) (emphasis 1035, Rec. 1416 S. No. (1937). 75th 1st He furthermore noted Cong., Sess., bill not to “[p] pend- revision is made affect suits ing the time of its enactment.” Cong. Rec., 1415. plainly Congress permit did not intend to Thus, the federal passage Injunction courts after the Tax Act to entertain suits in all cases them cognizable prior to the Act.34 Furthermore, Congress equate did not § “plain, 1341’s speedy and with equity’s efficient” “plain, adequate and com- plete.” Ever since the early days of Congress, “plain, this adequate and complete”. standard of equity practice federal had been statutory codified into form. Stat. 82.35 itAnd years not until more than 10 passage after 1948, theless withholding counsel the Dredge of relief. See Great & Dock Lakes Huffman, Co. v. (1943) (Act mandatory S. not “a with- equity drawal from power [federal of their traditional decline courts] jurisdiction discretion”). in the exercise of their 34Senator Bone noted that Injunction away the Tax Act “does not take any equitable right taxpayer, deprive day of a court,” him of a judicial because “full hearing controversy” determination of the remained Cong. assured. 81 Rep. Rec. 1416 See S. No. Cong., 75th Sess., 1st 2 (1937); Rep. Sess., Cong., H. R. No. 75th 1st merely general This declaratory statement was Act’s continuation exception jurisdictional against its broad bar federal injunctive relief. equity “[S]uits shall not be sustained in either of the courts of the States, any adequate United plain, complete case where may be had at law.” 82. Stat. § Equity” “Suits in statute was Injunction Act, Tax ed.) (repealed June (1946 S. repealed. § 28 U. C. interpret will not 1948). we Against background, substantially redundant of 384. as IV supporting federal non- Finally, we note that the reasons today they as were in just compelling interference are available, If injunctive relief were thrown into disarray, “state tax be might administration ordinary procedural taxpayers escape re- might During pendency law. quirements imposed by state collection of revenue under the the federal suit the consequent with challenged might obstructed, law damage budget, perhaps to the State’s a shift insolvency. Moreover, of taxpayer the State risk to turn on likely ques- federal constitutional issues are regula- tions of state tax like of state law, which, issues tory courts.” law, properly are more heard in the state *21 Ledesma, (1971) Perez v. n. 17 82, 128, dissenting part). in J., concurring part in (Brennan, The is under- compelling nature of considerations these by of receipt scored on the dependency budgets of state local tax over of their revenues. States derived 61% revenue other taxes. Ad- property, sales, income, and visory Signifi- Relations, Commission on Intergovernmental cant For Illi- Features of Fiscal Federalism Ibid. The nois, percentage was higher even —67.4%. by source of tax reve- property important tax is far the most year 1977-1978, nue for For almost cities counties. prop- of from the local all their income nationwide came 33% erty tax; for Illinois’ local amount governments, Id., at 78. greater —39.2%. County itself demonstrates how experience
The of Cook potential be the for havoc should federal ominous would collected injunctive widely county be available. relief year for in real taxes $1.5 over billion estate & of Estate Assessments —Cook Laswell, Ganz Review Real County Illinois, of Remainder John Marshall (Chicago) vs. (1977). During year, & n. same J. Prac. Proc. County Cook Board complaints number filed with the of Id., Appeals may readily of totaled n. 61. We 22,262. appreciate county encountered should difficulties portion rightful substantial of tax revenue tied up its injunction complaints actions.36 If each of these alleged to a refund $5,000, respondent, entitlement of around as does $113 potentially over million revenues could be encum City bered in litigation. York, federal-court See also of New Report Annual of the Tax Commission Fiscal Year 1978- 1979, p. (1979) (41,449 applications for correction taxes concerning owed 48,170 parcels land, 40,793 ap which plications concerning 47,512 parcels of land hearings). involved
Accordingly, hold legal remedy we that Illinois' that pro- property vides paying property protest owners taxes under refund without years interest two plain, “a speedy efficient remedy” under the Tax Act.
Reversed. Justice Blackmun, concurring. join
I the Court's but I must opinion, confess doing Iso participate in the decision with a distinct lack enthusiasm. I am just aware frustrating how it can be a conscientious property taxpayer ap- what who encounters 36It that, is true inadequate if we found the Illinois because its failure interest, county any problems the State could avoid *22 federally enjoined payments by pay choosing interest. See United Livingston, States v. (EDSC 1959) (three-judge Supp. 179 F. court), per aff’d curiam, surely Congress U. S. 281 But did not intend that injunctive threat used of federal relief be as a lever force to appropriate payable States funds for interest to their taxpayers.
pears himto to be unfairness, arbitrariness, and delay, inadequacy of though might redress even he ultimately pre- vail on his basic contentions about existing property tax as- every sessment Nearly and collection methods. municipality encounters like criticism. Justice Stevens’ how- dissent, ever, indicates County’s system surely that Cook is not one of the better ones.
But the Tax Injunction Act passed specific for a pur- pose very and I much doubt cure, although that provide a headache, is worse than disease. opinion
The Court’s I demonstrates, the rem- think, edy provided by Illinois law though qualifies, perhaps only barely, “plain, speedy as efficient,” within the meaning Act, jurisdiction grant injunctive statutorily relief is therefore Illi- barred. particularly nois—and Cook County may have little reason — proud to be of the system, pass but it seems to muster under the Act. might hope, One well though even forlornly, that system and its administration improved will be so that uncomfortable and distressing litigation like this case need pursued.
Justice Stevens, with whom Stewart, Justice Justice and Justice Marshall, Powell join, dissenting.
In its discussion of jurisdictional presented question by this case, the Court correctly the adminis- assumes that tration of Cook County’s system property real has taxing respondent’s violated rights. federal constitutional question whether is she equitable must be denied relief a federal court because plain, speedy Illinois affords her “a remedy.” efficient year
Year after County respondent Cook requires actually tax that is three times as great the amount due 2-year after a refunds the over- then, delay, county assessment without outcome of this interest. Because the ritual taxpayer’s remedy “plain” annual predictable, *23 litigation proc- is because about the Nation’s 70% remedy “speedy also and efficient.” rapidly, essed more is consequence Congress the Court’s view that That is the procedural more than “minimal was concerned with nothing my Act.1 In when it enacted the Tax criteria” remedy of the State’s must also be view substance con- remedy If is irrelevant, sidered. of the a com- the substance puterized accompanied by preprinted rejection calculation qualify “plain, speedy and efficient slip remedy.” would as a reading I persuaded of the Because am federal statute manifestly to such absurd result is that would lead an incor- the Illinois rect, remedy fairly and because refund cannot I adequate, respectfully dissent. characterized
I If one reads the against 1937 Act background, its historical Congress the conclusion inescapable did not intend inadequate jurisdic- to oust a federal court tion over a taxpayer’s constitutional claim. This has often recognized that has its pre-existing statute roots in equity practice. Moe v. Tribes, Salish & Kootenai 463, 470 (1976); Great Dredge Huffman, Lakes & Dock Co. v. S. U. Tully Inc., also v. Griffin, S. Both (1976).2 statutory judicial pred- and the face, “On its ‘plain, speedy ap remedy’ exception and efficient pears require a state-court proce meets minimal certain dural Ante, criteria.” at 512. procedural “The mechanism for correction of her remains the tax bill
same, however, whether paid Ante, interest or not.” at 515. procedural “A interpretation phrase plain, speedy ‘a and effi- remedy,’ procedural cient sup- sufficiency remedy, of Illinois’ are ported by analysis further phrase’s Ante, individual words.” interpretation “This Court’s pro- of the word ‘efficient’ has also stressed Ante, cedural elements.” at 517. 2 In & Tribes, Salish Kootenai through the Court enactment stated that 1341, Congress “gave explicit pre-existing sanction emphasized Injunction of the Tax ecessors substance Judiciary 16 of the remedy. Section Act of the state *24 equity in shall not be in provided that “suits sustained either States, any in courts the United case plain, of the where remedy may be adequate complete had at law.” 1 and Stat. recognizing In while Court, 82. the the force of this enjoin the collection of equity rule of in suits state taxes, the of the importance indicated nevertheless substance of the remedy: 16 of the Judiciary “The effect of Act of 1789], [Section declaratory but which was of the rule in equity, estab- before long adoption, emphasize lished its is to the rule to forbid in terms extraordinary and recourse the right remedies where the equity fully asserted he protected Reinhard, law. See Deweese at v. Guaranty
386, 389; New York Memphis Co. v. Water Co., S.U. 214.
“The reason for guiding principle peculiar this is of suit, force in cases where the like present one, brought enjoin the collection of a state tax courts of a different, though paramount sovereignty. The scru- pulous regard- for rightful independence gov- of state ernments which should at all times the federal actuate courts, proper by injunction reluctance to interfere with their operations, fiscal require such relief should be denied in every right case where the asserted federal may he preserved without it. question Whenever has been presented, uniformly Court has held that the mere illegality or unconstitutionality a state equity practice.” Dredge S., Co., U. Great Lakes & Dock In the Court described the imposed jurisdiction restraints equity on federal prior the passage of Injunction “Congress Act and noted that recognized gave sanction practice to this equity of federal courts Injunction] [Tax Inc., S., Act.” Tully Griffin, at 298. v. again the Court noted that “the equity practice statute has its roots in ....” S., 429 U. at 73. equitable re- ground not itself municipal tax is If the United States. lief the courts aggrieved adequate, complete, plain, law is . . state courts . party left to that (Emphasis Rodgers, 521, 525. 284 U. Matthews S. added.)3 does history of the Tax
The legislative toAct alter intended the support Congress notion that of the substance by eliminating consideration the standard Act, Sena- remedy. principal sponsor of the state hearing “a full assured Bone, tor the statute indicated Cong. controversy.” judicial determination Cong., Rep. S. No. 75th Rec. 1416 See also *25 Sess., Report). The (1937) 1937 Senate (hereinafter 1st surely im- “judicial hearing” and determination” terms “full may Indeed, remedy empty be an ritual. ply away “the take emphasized Senator Bone bill does not day equitable deprive or him of a any right taxpayer, of a in court.” 81 See also 1937 Senate Cong. Rec. 1416 Report, justify 2.4 legislative history at The does not miserly reading Court’s of the statute. Corp. (1931), Ward, Educational Court Films v. S. 379 by stating that remedy important indicated that the substance of the inadequate. remedy the absence of on a interest refund rendered a state Co.,
Id.,
Hopkins
Telephone
at
n. 2. See
Southern
also
California
of the from a determination federal courts law to a considera- adequate complainant had an at equity tion of he had a sufficient whether —either Although Congress thus or courts.7 law—in the state by cut- gave important to state administration protection to no reason jurisdiction, there is equity back federal ting types of expansion of the intended the Congress believe that accompanied jurisdiction be federal remedies that defeat given to those rem- scrutiny by a drastic relaxation In- relaxation, the Tax intend such If did Congress edies.8 equity shallow indeed. junction roots in are Act’s adequacy consistently employed equity This has Weehsler); Bator, Wright, Federal Courts 215-217 Mishkin, Shapiro, C. & (hereinafter (3d 1976) Wright). ed. 7 equitable remedy equity prior practice, a state would Under Calla jurisdiction v. equity Bohler not defeat the of the federal courts. (1925) (state equitable remedy enjoin way, 486-488 U. S. equity jurisdic assessment would not defeat federal collection of excessive Co., S. tion). Stratton v. St. Louis Southwestern 284 U. See R. equitable remedy, however, would bar federal Such jurisdiction 2d Bamford, See 538 F. under the Act. Garrett O’Cheskey, denied, (1976); (CA3), Horn v. cert. (NM 1974). enacted, deprived originally Supp. F. statute As jurisdiction “plain, efficient speedy, district courts whenever equity remedy may such State.” at law in in the courts of had added). equity” phrase was (emphasis law or in St-at. 738 The “at H. R. dropped “unnecessary” in the of the statute. 1948 revision Wright, Sess., Rep. Cong., 1st C. No. 80th A120 4237, p. Miller, Cooper, A. & E. Federal Practice Procedure § (1978) (hereinafter Wright, Cooper). Miller, & intended Court is Act not correct when it asserts that was permit them cognizable the federal courts to entertain suits in cases all clearly prior equity jurisdiction to the Act. Given the on restrictions Judiciary by Congress, intended of 16 of redundant jurisdiction Act of Stat. 82. Thus the the broader fact permitted by pas Equity years after the Suits Act existed for 10 sage Injunction Act, ante, 526-527, of the Tax see does not indicate Congress prior equity apply did not intend the a determi standard to adequacy nation of the remedies under Act. the Tax *27 Act. In the 1944— construing standard passed Court after the Act was stated years seven —the of because jurisdiction “the uncer the District Court had remedy.” of the Connecticut tainty surrounding adequacy the McLaughlin, S. Service, Inc. v. 323 U. Motor Spector Cromwell, Hillsborough v. 105-106. U. S. “uncertainty” as to the Court held that whether 620, 625, remedy to protection rights” “affords full the federal the state adeq remedy the to demonstrate that was not was sufficient Tully Griffin, Inc., And recently, U. atS., uate.9 74, the Court indicated that to be sufficient under the statute permit taxpayer press “to its remedy the must the constitu preserving right challenge claims while the to tional the support amount of the tax due.” Thus our cases the the- correctly The Court notes that the Cromwell Court held that because Jersey it whether New was unclear courts would follow the constitu rule, by City Bridge tional this established Court in Sioux Co. v. Dakota County, (1923), require may that a State not party suffering upward discrimination to seek an revision the taxes class, “uncertainty of other members of the surrounding there was such adequacy remedy justify the state to District Court in re jurisdiction taining S., Although cause.” Court “uncertainty” remedy reasons this demonstrates that the procedurally ante, not “plain,” at 516-517, the Court fails to note that the clearly Cromwell remedy Court indicated if that even were a certain one, jurisdiction. it would be insufficient to defeat noting federal After long that “a Jersey line” taxpayer of New “held that a decisions who has singled been discriminatory equalization out for by taxation obtain assessment,” “[h~|is remedy reduction of his own and that is restricted to proceedings against other purpose members of his class for the having increased,” their taxes the Court stated that the basis of that rule “[o]n plain adequate protect respondent’s the state is not rights under the S., federal Constitution.” 326 U. at 624. Thus the Court was remedy. cleaTlvconcerned about the substance 10 interprets language convey procedural require however, challenge “right ment. The due,” the amount ar guably would not complete provide satisfied that did not protection Moreover, Tully right. remedy, the state *28 making unexplained ory rather than and Congress, that equity standard as to the traditional ade- change drastic apply.11 would that the standard quacy, prior assumed Injunction Act and his- of Tax its interpretation the This By of the Act. includ- tory purposes with the is consistent exception and to the ing “plain, speedy the efficient” stat- declaratory imposition accompanied the judgment challenging the by injunction period tolling the within which the tax- preliminary a time assessment, remedy payer challenge if a such could the amount adequate. existed, clearly substantively was construing Injunction Tax Act noted the Act Our decisions the that Tully equity Griffin, recognition prior practice. Inc., a the Tribes, 463, 470 68, (1976); Moe v. Salish & Kootenai U. S. S. Dredge Huffman, 293, 298 (1976); & Dock Co. v. Great Lakes agree the (1943). Although that commentators that the Court states prior Injunction the Tax Act was a confirmation of issue whether resolved,” equity practice “definitively ante, has never been n. equitable agree has the and most commentators do that Court used statutory Bator, interchangeably. Mishkin, Shapiro, standards & (“the major opinions the Supreme seem to use Wechsler three Court argued be interchangeably”); (“Although Wright terms 216-217 it can remedy ‘adequate’ equity that need the sense the traditional regarded Supreme has jurisdiction, order to defeat federal Court the ” ‘adequate’ 'plain, speedy thing and meaning efficient’ the as same (footnote omitted)); Miller, 4237, pp. (“plain, Wright, Cooper 420-421 & speedy ‘adequate’ de remedy equated efficient” “has been with scribing remedy”); Berry, A Broad Constitutional Federal Forum for Deprivation by Property Assessment, Tax L. Rev. 65 Calif.
(1977) (Supreme continuing over “implied concern decisions equitable fairness of relief. proceedings state and the of state narrowness adequacy language language Since efficiency substitution of the generally ignored’ ‘has ”); Note, been with Interference Federal Court Assessment 784r-785 L. Taxes, Collection of 59 Harv. Rev. State only (1946) (arguing jurisdiction where “Congress permit intended to procedural there sub were not where limitations in the state “[tjhere stantive defects of has been alleged,” law were noting but by inadequacy created distinguish definite failure to between uncertainty any suit, the fact as to outcome of substantive taxpayer con judicial litigating complete has available a means troversy .”). in the state courts . . jurisdiction, Congress
utory equity of federal prohibition jurisdiction preserve its clear intent to federal-court indicated If remedy existed. the federal courts are unless some state Act to a consideration of limited and are forbidden remedy, procedural mechanics then rem- remedy, of such a state consider the substance edy any afford relief or which had possibly could not which relief potential nominal would defeat federal jurisdiction.12 interpretation This form-over-substance ren- *29 exception meaningless, the the because ders contained in denying to purpose remedy there would be little a federal litigant pursue a him to to sending state court a state remedy quick a and certain one—that no provided —albeit remedy A not relief.13 futile state is significantly different remedy from no at all. rem- Similarly, inadequate an state edy is not analytically procedure different from a that state only remedy provides a to portion litigant’s as a Such incomplete remedy claims. will not defeat federal jurisdiction. Georgia Redwine, Banking Railroad & Co. v. 342 303 (1952).14 U. S. Therefore, my view, if the 12 example, For the “procedural that *30 (“Since judicial practice the 1937 was intended a of statute codification it prior passage, Supreme its the have found both and this court Court interpreting the background pre-1937 the useful to draw on of decisions v. Shepherd, Inc. purposes policies it”); which underlie Charles R. Monaghan, jurisdic (CA5 1958) (federal F. 2d no 256 884 court has adequate remedy provided tion under the Tax Act if is “an recovery & Nashville improperly collected”); back if Louisville see also (state 1980) R. Comm’n, (CA6 Co. v. Public Service 631 2d 426 F. upward did not seeking taxpayers’ limited to assessments revision of other 959; post, jurisdiction p. denied, bar federal-court 1341), under cert.. (if 1977) (CA5 Corp. City Houston, Alnoa G. v. 772 F. 2d 563 of city potential arbitrary council opportunities for abuse in of the form adequacy reality, reassessing “the taxpayer’s property decisions became 435 denied, questioned”), might seriously the state then cert. 476, Helmsley 2d (1978); City Detroit, U. S. 970 320 F. McHann, (CA6 1963) (remedy complete”); Bland v. “adequate was (CA5 2d 1972), denied, F. cert. Litigation Clement, A Property Cf. Discrimination in Assessment: Real Strategy Pennsylvania, U. Pitt. L. Rev. apparent is that four factors combine to make the Illinois demonstrably . unjust.
remedial scheme themselves First, gross the tax assessments reveal inequities. only respondent’s property Not admittedly was assessed at proper value, times its assessment but other properties in widely divergent the same class have been at assessed rates, tiny from fraction actual value ranging to amounts ap- proximately times the true worth.16 The county’s prac- apparently tices assessor give a license to engage in and invidious arbitrary discrimination.
Second, because the of respondent’s overassessment prop- year erty repeated year, after notwithstanding her formal protests original the manifest error assessment, apparent county’s procedures it is that do not adequately repetitive risk of avoid the error.17 The case might well be if it revealed an affecting different isolated mistake only one study According Department to a conducted Illinois Public respondent’s complaint, ranged Affairs and cited in these assessments ante, 507; App. of actual value to of actual value. See 3% 973% ante, assumes, respondent’s that the amount of refund typical, disputed claim is and the Court *31 1978 and assess assertion, part record, not of that the made the against Brief her has continued. indicate that the discrimination ments overassessments, from Respondent 2. The four consecutive sufficiently of the in repetitive the nature through demonstrate App. jury respondent. See to remedy must State’s of the an evaluation year. But the refund the of fairness only not consideration
involve
ability to
the
prevent
taxpayer’s
the
but also
procedure,
year
year.18
after
being made
same mistake
county re-
which the
2-year period
although the
Third,
if
well be tolerable
might
refund claim
process
to
quires
time
all other respects,
adequate
were
its
Indeed,
shortcomings.19
of the other
each
period aggravates
actually
pay
to
interest —it
the
factor —the failure
like
fourth
to
overassess-
incentive
make
county with an
provides the
of the tax-
county
the cost-free use
ments,
has
because
money
processed.
while her
payer’s
being
claim
any interest at
in combina
all,
the failure to
Finally,
certainty
makes it a virtual
foregoing factors,
tion with
recovery
taxpayer’s
will be worth
ultimate
wrong.
county’s
of the
harm
fraction
actual
caused
prior
to the Tax
indicated that
Cases decided
provide
payment
state remedies which did not
for the
in
equity
terest were not
to
jurisdiction.
sufficient
defeat federal
Ward,
See Educational
n. 2
Corp.
Films
541
(EDSC 1932) (three-judge court); Procter & Gamble Dis
Sherman,
tributing
Co. v.
2
(SDNY
F. 2d
1924).
Maw,
Rosenberry,
also
&
Lockwood,
The Use of the Fed
eral
in Constitutional Litigation, 43
L.
Harv.
Rev.
426,
(1930).20
provide
Post-Act
support
cases
for the
provide
that a refund must
contention
in
interest
order to
United States
jurisdiction.
defeat federal
Livingston,
v.
curiam,
Supp.
(EDSC)
F.
per
(three-judge court),
aff’d
United
Department
States v.
364 U. S.
(1960);
Rev
enue,
requirement recoupment bond be did posted provide a which not analogous of the cost of the bond was to the failure to award interest on adequate remedy. Wright, refunds and therefore was not an See also Miller, Cooper 4237, p. & eases, pay certainly enough In some failure to interest would not be inadequate. remedy to small, render a If the amount of interest were necessary either because the amount of the was small to refund or the time short, obtain pay the refund was to then the failure interest would not be Group Proposal- remedy. Assisting substantial defect in the Sewer See City Ansonia, Abernathy (Conn. Ansonia v. Supp. 1978); F. Carpenter, curiam, Supp. 793, (WD per 1962), 208 F. Mo. aff’d U. S. 241 1023- Comment, also L. Rev. Harv. Sherman, In Procter & Gamble 2d Distributing Co. v. F. (SDNY Judge uncertainty 1924), of the Learned held Hand availability remedy inadequate. of a refund noted: rendered a He further quite independently
“But inadequate because doubts, of such is relief express of the to refusal to referred allow . been interest. . . While I have point, adequate no decision on the it plain to me not an seems that it is remedy, taking away money allowing after him a man’s aas condition of tax, merely after, long contest his back, when, hand no matter how ought he required establishes that he never to have been all. Whatever have been interest, our in modern archaic notions about to-day financial communities a doEar next dollar is worth than a more year, ignore and to the interval as immaterial is well-settled to contradict present thing my money beliefs about value. The use of itself is value, and, get compensation I loss, my if no alto- for its does not gether Id., right my wrong.” at 166. Court seems assume that the nonpayment of inter
est has no effect on the amount of time that will spent processing my opinion refund claims.24 quite Court is wrong. paid no interest When is when the rate of inter —or judgments est on is lower significantly than the prevailing dilatory market rate —the rewards the law defendant who can postpone day the ultimate reckoning long possi as ble. The same market forces powerful are work when body public is the Whether not defendant. agrees one opinion Appeals with the the payment ingredient of any of interest an essential adequate refund that, given remedy, perfectly it seems clear the factors dis by record, closed by afforded Illinois is indeed dequate.25 ina
It jurisdiction follows that federal defeated *34 judgment the Court Ap- should peals therefore affirmed. payment tolerable, but it “The wait might of interest make the more necessary adjudicate respondent’s
would not affect the amount of time Ante, claims.” at 520-521. rely the four factors I effect of Because would on cumulative discussed, alone, to hold that the pay and not on the failure to interest to the Court’s respond inadequate, need to there is no many States point, ante, aware have been Congress must aware may been have pay Congress did not interest on refunds. even have refunds that some States did not interest on Congress to believe is no reason practice, sanctioned the but there County by Cook remedy provided implicitly inadequate approved the case. notes the mechanism” recovery respondent’s the of tax bill would be interest the same whether paid Ante, is or not. procedural at 515. The be mechanism would also the if prohibited same the any state statute of of refund excess 10% the amount claimed. purpose insuring The a remedy proce that state meets minimal dural standards prevent is to erecting procedural States from barriers taxpayer’s that would make recovery the of a difficult as be refund so to See, g., Georgia worthless. Banking Redwine, e. Railroad & Co. v. (1952) (remedy U. S. requiring taxpayer suits bring to over 300 in 14 inadequate). substantively counties remedy If inade the state quate, however, purpose procedurally the requirement underlying the of a adequate remedy disappears. 14 Redwine, plaintiff enjoin railroad ad sought to collection of by valorem taxes assessed every county, district, State and school municipality through argued which the railroad’s The lines ran. State that a suit for payment only refund after remedy taxes, available respect with payable to taxes speedy State, “plain, would protection adequate to the provide not remedy does remedy to be continues available.15 right, federal a federal II procedure is much more Illinois inadequacy on If overassessments. interest than a failure mere complaint must, as as we true, allegations we take the Noting remedy such a. refund would the statute. that efficient” under controversy, held apply less the total taxes the Court than 15% jurisdiction that not defeat federal and stated that would adequate portion controversy of the taxes in “[a]n deprive jurisdiction over the entire con- does federal court troversy.” Id., 303, and n. recognized Lower courts have that statute codified ("the Bamford, 2d, prior adequacy Garrett v. at 67 standard. F. no than 'plain, speedy and efficient’ means more decisions indicate ”); Montana, equity 'adequacy’ Dillon prior standard of v. (CA9 1980) Congress gave explicit (recognizing F. 2d equity practice pre-existing stating sanction to remedial "[t]he certainty empowered to contemplated forum be that a state relief”) ; adequate consider claims that a tax is and to unlawful issue 1979) Pipe (CA5 Whitman, United Gas Line Co. F. 2d
Notes
notes such assessments provide county year. $113 an with each But fed additional million litigation eral-court if it as could encumber this entire amount inequitable showing sumed that all refund could claimants make injunction. assumption assessment sufficient to obtain a This federal-court highlights an ironic contrast between the indifference Court’s impact taxpayer, gross financial individual overassessments on overassessments, who no and the preventing has lawful method of such county delay temporary Court’s concern with collection adequate easily by providing revenues could avoid State remedy. prevent repeti powerless to respondent In order to conclude respondent’s necessary assessments, to consider tion of erroneous it is
notes two v. Matthews Rodgers, (1932), and Stratton v. St. Louis Southwestern Co., (1932), expressly issue, R. reaching upheld U. S. 530 without adequacy “apparently” of state remedies that did not include interest. Ante, at In light fact, however, parties n. 31. of the that none of the argued pay remedy inadequate, failure to interest rendered and the fact that pay the Court did not address the failure to interest case, authority either such cases scant proposition are for the prior equity Ap “two-edged cases are a sword.” See Brief pellants, Appellants Reargument, Appellees, Brief for on Brief for Rodgers, Supplemental Appellees Reargument Brief for in Matthews on v. 84; Supplemental O. Appellant, T. No. Brief for Additional Brief for Appellees, Authority Equity Appellees, Memoranda of on Judisdiction for Co., Rehearing and Pet. for in Stratton St. Louis Southwestern R. v. O. T. No. 178. 21 Livingston, three-judge In court stated: right illegally “It is well-settled that a taxes is not to recover collected adequate remedy right if does not include the to recover interest money period during taxpayer’s is with- reasonable rate for the which the doubt, right merely Even if existence of the held. cast substantial remedy plain adequate. is not or she not as upon “South Carolina of taxes allow interest refunds right recover If chooses. she does not make clear the existence equitable relief however, interest, necessarily such door to opens she taxpayers legal parties forecloses remission of the omitted.) provided (Footnote Supp., her statutes.” F. Department a state Revenue, States held that United the court to decide whether necessary however, case, It would render a state interest alone the failure to fully compensate the victim of Few remedies inadequate.22