11 Two issues are presented in this appeal. The first is whether a taxpayer should have been allowed to intervene in a District Court proceeding that was brought to obtain a declaratory judgment stating that certain public expenditures and financing were lawful. A portion of this first issue involves whether a gui tam action may be brought on behalf of a public trust and against its officers. The second is whether this appeal is moot because the parties proceeded to obtain a declaratory judgment in the District Court after Taxpayer was not allowed to intervene. We address the second issue first because Appellees' claim for mootness would make unnecessary a decision on the first issue if they are correct, and because the mootness issue involves the same issue for both a mootness analysis and a determination whether a gui tam plaintiff should be allowed to intervene in a gut tam proceeding.
12 Tulsa Hills, LL.C., (THL) sought to create a shopping center in Tulsa, Oklahoma. The City of Tulsa (or City) established a Tax Increment District, 62 0.8.2001 § 861, and accompanying project plan pursuant to the Local Development Act, 62 0.$.2001 §§ 850-869. This plan included the site for the Tulsa Hills Shopping Center created by THL. THL sought the City's assistance to finance "infrastructure improvements" at the Tulsa Hills Shopping Center. The improvements included drainage for rain, a public road, a sanitary sewer mainline, a water line, and road improvements in and adjacent to the property. The City Council for Tulsa authorized the Tulsa Industrial Authority (or TIA) to issue and sell tax apportionment bonds totaling 18.5 million dollars, 18.5 million of the proceeds to be transferred to THL.
13 Taxpayer argued that ad valorem and sales taxes attributed to a tax increment district would be used to pay for bonds which had been issued by a public trust to provide money to a developer building a retail outlet. Taxpayer alleged that from the $18,500,000.00 obtained from the bonds, $13,500,000.00 would be given to the developer. The developer would use those funds for: (1) on the developer's property, site leveling,
¶ 4 Several taxpayers served a written demand on the TIA and the City of Tulsa pursuant to 62 0.S.2001 §§ 372, 3783, and alleged that the money transferred to THL violated the Oklahoma Public Trust Act, 60 O.S.Supp.2007 § 178.4 and Art. 10 § 19 of the Oklahoma Constitution. Taxpayers claimed that $ 178.4 prohibited a public trust from participating in a retail outlet, and that Art. 10 § 19 prohibited tax proceeds for a purpose other than that authorized by the voters. Taxpayers demanded that TIA and the City of Tulsa bring suit to recover the money transferred to THL.
15 TIA responded to Taxpayers' demand by filing an action in the District Court for Tulsa County against the City of Tulsa and THL, requesting a declaratory judgment affirming the legality and constitutionality of the project plan. THL and City filed answers supporting TIA's claims and request for a declaratory judgment. TIA filed a motion for summary judgment seeking "a declaratory judgment confirming the validity of the creation and financing of the Tulsa Hills Increment District in all respects."
{6 Bundren, a taxpayer (Taxpayer), sought to intervene in the declaratory judgment action. TIA, THL, and City filed objections to the request to Intervene. The trial court denied Taxpayer's motion to intervene, and a few days later the court granted and memorialized TIA's request for summary judgment. A few days after granting summary judgment the trial court memorialized its denial of Taxpayer's motion to intervene. Taxpayer filed in the District Court two petitions to vacate the judgment. Taxpayer appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals, with one judge dissenting, dismissed the appeal because Taxpayer did not seek to stay the trial court proceedings during Taxpayer's appeal. Taxpayer sought certiorari for review of the appellate court's decision and the issues in the appeal left unaddressed.
I. Motions to Dismiss and Qui Tam Relief
17 THL, City of Tulsa, and TIA filed motions to dismiss Taxpayer's appeal. They argued that the summary judgment granted to the parties decided the legality of the conduct of the City of Tulsa, and that this decision made Taxpayer's claims moot. They argued that: (1) Taxpayer did not seek a stay of the trial court proceeding during the appeal; (2) The claims presented in the declaratory judgment proceeding were merged into a judgment during the appeal; and (8) Due to the judgment on all claims (or causes of action), no claim remains pending in the trial court for the Taxpayer to intervene as a party and present the Taxpayer's interest in the litigation.
18 Taxpayer asserted that the appeal is not moot because his status as a non-party to the summary judgment process denied to him the authority to appeal the order granting summary judgment, and that as a non-party the judgment is not binding on him. He also argued that if allowed to intervene he will seek vacation of the judgment, and that he has already filed a petition to vacate in the District Court.
T9 Appellees' analysis focused on whether Taxpayer was a party in the trial court proceeding and could thus obtain a stay of the trial court proceeding pursuant to 12 O.S$.Supp.2008 § 990.4. That section states that "... a party may obtain a stay of the enforcement of a judgment, decree or final order: ... 8. While an appeal is pending in any court in or outside of this state." Id. at 990.4(A). Appellees also argued that a stay of the trial court proceeding pending an appeal is within this Court's supervisory writ
{10 The statutory authorization for taxpayers to seek a gui tom remedy occurs after they make their gus tam demand to the public body and the public body fails to seek recovery of the money or property unlawfully paid. 62 0.98.2001 § 378.
111 When is a public body's request for declaratory judgment a justiciable controversy? We indicated that justiciability was shown by the antagonistic claims (fact and law) presented by the public body, and this justiciability also demonstrated that the gui tom taxpayer did not possess a right to intervene in a proceeding and seek § 373 relief.
$12 In the context of qui fam declaratory judgment proceedings we have explained that the declaratory judgment proceeding brought by the officials was "a justiciable case" where the issues presented "were legitimate, not feigned or collusive."
113 The term "justiciable" refers to a lively case or controversy between antagonistic demands.
114 In summary, a gui tam taxpayer's § 373 right to intervene is based upon a public body's failure to seek recovery of the public funds at issue as specified in § 378. A public body's right to prevent intervention of the gui tom taxpayer in its declaratory judgment proceeding is based upon its diligent prosecution therein of the gui tam taxpayer's claim of illegality. Diligent prosecution of the gui tam taxpayer's claim of illegality requires the public body to plead and present for adjudication the merits of the taxpayer's claim when the public body also seeks to judicially validate its expenditure of public funds. When the public body seeks to judicially validate its expenditure of public funds, its simultaneous presentation of the gui tam taxpayer's claim makes the controversy justiciable and within the jurisdiction of the Declaratory Judgments Act. If the public body seeks to validate its contested expenditures and presents only non-antagonistic claims, then its forensic conduct possesses the quality of non-justiciability by presenting feigned or collusive issues for adjudication, and a gui tam intervenor is allowed to intervene and press for gui tom relief via antagonistic claims that make the controversy justiciable.
115 Appellees filed motions to dismiss Taxpayer's appeal for mootness. The concept of mootness is most often linked to cireumstances that result in a court's inability to grant effective relief by its appellate opinion in the controversy because it would possess characteristics of a hypothetical or advisory opinion.
116 Clearly, if a public body's declaratory judgment controversy is justiciable, a gui tam taxpayer is not entitled to intervene, has no right of action pursuant to § 878,
T17 No citation to authority should be needed for the principle that it is against public policy for courts of this State to be used to create a collusive or fraudulent judgment authorizing the expenditure of public funds. In 1981, this Court declined to approve a collusive legal proceeding for an expenditure from the public purse.
II. Qui Tam Relief and Public Trusts; An Equitable Relief Claim; Mootness and Intervention
{18 The usual dispositive issue on appeal of a trial court's order denying intervention to a gui tam taxpayer is not the merits of whether the public expenditures were lawful, but whether the public body fairly presented the gui tom taxpayer's claims to the trial court as part of a justiciable controversy.
$19 TIA argued that: (1)
120 The § 373 gut tam action is not a "cause of action," but a statutory remedy for recovery of a penalty for the commission or omission by a public official of a certain act based upon particular transactions or occurrences.
121 Title 60 § 176.1 states that a public trust "created in accordance with the provisions of Section 176 et seq. of this title shall be presumed for all purposes of Oklahoma Law to: ... 2. Exist as a legal entity separate and distinct from the settlor and from the governmental entity that is its beneficiary." 60 O.S8.8upp.2008 § 176.1. In some cireumstances a public trust may be deemed to be an alter ego of the public body for which it seeks to benefit, and equity may be used to disregard the trust's legal status as a distinct legal entity.
122 While we agree with TIA that no gui tom remedy may be sought on its behalf, Taxpayer also sought intervention based upon the rule that a taxpayer may intervene in a legal proceeding brought by a public body or private individual to enforce an allegedly unlawful agreement or expenditure made by the public body. In the trial court, Taxpayer argued that he should be allowed to intervene and obtain equitable relief against the TIA. He relied upon Threadgill v. Peterson,
[T}he doctrine that an inhabitant and taxpayer of a municipal corporation may maintain a suit by injunction to prevent the misappropriating of the funds of the corporation, the creation of invalid debts, the levy of unauthorized taxes, and the perpetration of official wrongs, has met the approval of such eminent and distinguished jurists as Field, Dillon, Cooley, Elliott, Campbell, Sharswood, and others, and the courts of highest resort in the United States, and in practically all the states of the Union.
Kellogg,
Shortly after our pronouncement in Kellogg, we relied upon its holding and concluded that a taxpayer could use an injunction as a proper remedy to prevent the officers of a school district from issuing bonds in excess of the debt limit provided by the Oklahoma Constitution.
123 In Threadgill v. Peterson, supra, an action was brought against a school district after labor and material had been furnished for the repair of a school building pursuant to a written contract, and the school district declined to pay the contractually specified amount due to a lack of funds. The school district answered and stated that the sum sued upon was due and unpaid, and judgment was rendered against the school district. Taxpayers claimed that the judgment was based upon a void contract and requested
. any person may be made a party who has or claims an interest in the controversy adverse to the plaintiff; that a taxpayer who sets up that an illegal judgment about to be rendered against a political subdivision will impose an unauthorized and illegal burden upon his property is so interested in the eye of the statute that he can maintain an injunction, if necessary, to invoke relief in equity.
Threadgill,
The Court then stated that this right to seek equitable relief was found in § 4881, RL. 1910, now codified at 12 0.8.2001 § 1897.
{24 More recently, in Oklahoma Public Employees Association v. Oklahoma Department of Central Services,
125 More than a century ago we explained that the version of § 1897 then effect "did not substantially enlarge the general powers of a court of equity, and did not create any new remedy,"
$26 In Kellogg v. School Dist. No. 10 of Comanche County, supra, we noted the objection to a taxpayer seeking equitable relief because he did not possess any interest in the controversy other than a general interest shared in common with all taxpayers. We noted that some courts did not allow a taxpayer to have a legal remedy for an injury the taxpayer suffered in common with other taxpayers, and allowed an equitable remedy only if the injury was one that peculiarly affected that taxpayer. Id.
127 An analysis of the motions to dismiss based upon allegations of mootness due to Taxpayer's failure to seek a stay must be addressed in the context of Taxpayer seeking equitable relief and 12 O.S. § 1397. Equity does not require a useless act;
128 Will an appellate opinion herein be advisory in nature with respect to any equitable relief sought by Taxpayer? Taxpayer's Answer filed in the District Court as Intervenor stated that the bonds had already been issued at that time, and he did not seek to use equity for preventing the bonds to be issued. Taxpayer sought an order canceling the contractual obligations of the City and TIA, and stated that appropriate relief could be a money judgment to retire the bonds. Taxpayer thus raised several issues, including, but not limited to, the propriety of equity for canceling the issued bonds in these cireumstances, and granting relief in the form of an order compelling payment of money. Whether this requested relief is proper in equity was not addressed by appellees in the trial court or by the motions to dismiss herein. We decline to address those issues prior to their consideration and adjudication in the trial court.
129 Appellees' sole reason for mootness is the summary judgment granted by the trial court. Generally, there are four methods for attacking a judgment.
130 In the Tol cases we explained, and relied upon, the concept that the public body was representing all of its citizens by its conduct in presenting for adjudication a justiciable controversy to the trial court. The presentation of a justiciable controversy
131 Taxpayer's motion relied upon 12 0.8.8upp.2003 § 2024, which provides for intervention by right, permissive intervention, and intervention by the State of Oklahoma. Taxpayer sought both intervention by right and permissive intervention.
132 TIA filed its petition for declaratory judgment on August 17th and its motion for summary judgment two months later on October 16th The responses thereto were filed October 29th and November 2nd, and four days after the last response Taxpayer filed his motion to intervene on November 6, 2007. TIA's petition for declaratory judgment included an attached photocopy of the qui tam demand incorporated by reference in the pleading. Taxpayer's motion to intervene included a gui tom claim based upon allegations that TIA, the City, and THL were not presenting a justiciable controversy to the trial court for adjudication. In addition to the pleadings, the motion to intervene
{ 33 The objection to the intervention filed in the District Court by TIA did not address either Threadgill v. Peterson, supra, or Kellogg v. School Dist. No. 10 of Comanche County, supra, and it did not address, and therefore did not object to, the propriety of intervention based upon those opinions and the right of a taxpayer to seek equitable relief pursuant to 12 0.8. § 1897. TIA does not address this issue in its appellate brief or answer on certiorari. THL argued on appeal that Threadgill does not apply because the acts of the officials therein were unlawful, Threadgill "was based upon facts materially different than those before this court," and that in any event, Threadgill was "effectively overruled" by Tal I.
134 While on rare occasions an in-tervenor may be required to satisfy an evi-dentiary burden for intervention,
1 35 Taxpayer's claim in the District Court is based upon allegations of unlawful public expenditures. Threadgill determined that taxpayers have an interest in litigation that seeks to create funding obligations on public bodies that are unlawful. Taxpayer's claim of interest herein pursuant to Threadgill and similar opinions is, generally, "an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest." 12 0.$.2001 § 2024(A)(@2). Thus THL's and the City's objections using a merits-based argument were incorrect, and they should have been rejected by the District Court.
136 TIA's request for declaratory relief required it to present the merits of Taxpayer's claims that Taxpayer was seeking to present himself in the context of obtaining equitable relief. This is not merely an intervenor seeking to intervene in the same cause of action as defined by the transaction or occurrence,
T 37 In summary, we conclude that no gui tam claim relief could be sought on behalf of the TIA, that Taxpayer pled a claim seeking relief in equity that has been recognized by Oklahoma courts since before statehood, that the claim for equitable relief is not moot, and that the District Court erroneously denied the motion to intervene on the claim seeking equitable relief.
III Qui Tam Intervention
11 38 Whether gut tam intervention is proper requires a judicial determination that the public body has presented a justiciable controversy for the trial court to adjudicate.
139 The City responded to TIA's motion and brief for summary judgment, and agreed with the legal issues briefed by TIA. TIA's motion and brief for summary judgment identified Taxpayer's claims that: (1) public trusts may not participate in retail outlets; (2) the incremental ad valorem and sales tax revenues from the Tulsa Hills Increment District could not be used to retire the bonds without violating Article 10 §§ 14, 17 and 19 of the Oklahoma Constitution; and (8) financial assistance to THL was not approved by the voters. Taxpayer alleged that the Local Development Act may not be used to create development in an area where investment, development, and economic growth would have occurred absent application of the Act, (62 0.8. § 852), and the use of that Act by the parties was improper.
T 40 Taxpayer objected to TIA, as a public trust, participating in a retail outlet. Taxpayer relied on House of Realty, Inc. v. City of Midwest City,
A. With the approval of the governing body, a public entity, other than a city, town or county, may issue tax apportionment bonds or notes, other bonds or notes, or both, the proceeds of which may be used to pay project costs pursuant to the plan notwithstanding any other statutory provision to the contrary.
The City argued that if the funds provided to the developer were for the purpose of "project costs" as defined in the Local Development Act at § 853, then § 178.4 would have no effect; i.e., a public trust could violate § 178.4 and engage in retail activity if it were acting pursuant to the Local Development Act. The City pointed to the definition of "project costs" in § 853(14).
142 Taxpayer argued that the financing violated Okla. Const. Art. 10 §§ 14, 17, and 19, and that a vote of the people was necessary for public-funding of the project. He argued that the funds transferred to the developer for on-site infrastructure improvements were not for a public purpose. As in City of Broken Arrow: "The issue before us on the constitutional claims is whether the City presented the legal claims of the Taxpayer [as a gui tam intervenor] to the trial court."
IV. Summary
{43 Our conclusion that a justiciable controversy was presented for purposes of Tax
44 We are not called upon in this proceeding to correct any decision of the trial court on the exact nature of a taxpayer's equitable remedy in the circumstances before us, or to explain whether specific equitable relief is proper for the present circumstances according to principles of equity. The parties did not address these issues in the trial court and we decline to address them prior to the parties presenting them for trial court adjudication. Our decision on intervention requesting equitable relief concludes only that Taxpayer met his burden to plead a claim seeking equitable relief and that he satisfied 12 0.8. § 2024.
145 We affirm the trial court's order to the extent that it denied Taxpayer's motion to intervene as a gui fam plaintiff. We reverse the trial court's order to the extent that it denied Taxpayer's motion to intervene as a taxpayer seeking equitable relief, The opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals is vacated. The matter is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Notes
. 62 0.$.2001 § 373 states in pertinent part with material omitted and emphasis and explanation added:
2. "Upon the refusal, failure, or neglect of the proper officers of the state or of any county, township, city, town, or school district, ... after written demand signed, verified and served upon them by ten resident taxpayers of the state or such county, township, city, ... to institute or diligently prosecute proper proceedings at law or in equity for the recovery of any money or property belonging to the state, or such county, township, city, town, or school district, ... paid out or transferred by any officer thereof in pursuance of any unauthorized, unlawful, fraudulent, or void contract made, or attempted to be made by any of its officers ... or for the penalty provided in the preceding section [62 O.S. § 372], any resident taxpayer of the state, or such county, township, city ... may in the name of the State of Oklahoma as plaintiff, institute and maintain any proper action which the proper officers of the State, county, township, city, town, or school district might institute and maintain for the recovery of such property, or for said penalty..."
The 2001 version of § 373 was in effect at the time this controversy occurred. Section 373 was amended by 2011 Okla. Sess. Laws. Ch. 73 § 1 (eff. Nov. 1, 2011). The parties did not address the effect of the 2011 amendment, and we decline to engage in sua sponte analysis of the legal issues presented by the amendment.
. Our recent opinions involving a public body seeking a declaratory judgment to judicially validate its actions after receiving a gui tam demand include City of Broken Arrow, Oklahoma v. Bass Pro Outdoor World, LLC, et al.,
. City of Oklahoma City,
. City of Oklahoma City,
. City of Broken Arrow, Oklahoma v. Bass Pro Outdoor World, LLC, et al.,
. If wording in a statute is plain, clear and unambiguous then the plain meaning of the words used must be judicially accepted as ex
. Generally, qui tam statutes are strictly construed. State ex rel. Hettel v. Security National Bank & Trust Co. in Duncan,
. A strict construction is equated with using a literal construction or literal meaning of the words in a statute. See, e.g., State ex rel. Rucker v. Tapp,
. Tal V and the other Tal cases (see n. 2, supra) are also consistent with State, Bd. Com'rs Pontotoc Cnty. ex rel. Braly v. Ford,
. City of Oklahoma City v. Oklahoma City Urban Renewal Auth.,
. State ex rel. Wright v. Oklahoma Corporation Commission,
. State ex rel. Wright v. Oklahoma Corporation Commission,
. State ex rel. Wright v. Oklahoma Corporation Commission,
. State ex rel. Moshe Tal v. City of Oklahoma City,
. State ex rel. Oklahoma Corp. Comm. v. McPherson,
. The burden of the taxpayer on intervention is to show the inadequacy of the presentation of the controversy to the court by the public body. City of Broken Arrow, Oklahoma v. Bass Pro Outdoor World, LLC, et al.,
. House of Realty, Inc. v. City of Midwest City,
. State ex rel. Oklahoma Capitol Imp. Authority v. E.A. Cowen Const. Co.,
. In this declaratory judgment proceeding we need not analyze those opinions concerning the Court's exercise of original jurisdiction conferred by statute to hear protests to proposed public bonds or the Court's approval of such bonds by an opinion that is advisory in nature. See, e.g., In re Application of Oklahoma Department of Transportation,
. Gordon v. Followell,
. See, e.g., Arbuckle Abstract Co. v. Scott,
. Arbuckle Abstract Co. v. Scott,
. Chandler U.S.A., Inc. v. Tyree,
. In a strict sense, a "right of action" refers to a right to a remedy, usually a particular remedy, and its use to secure relief by judicial procedure, and is thus distinguished from a "cause of action." Cruse v. Bd. of Cnty. Comr's of Atoka Cnty.,
. State ex rel. Moshe Tal v. City of Oklahoma City,
. A judgment procured by fraud or collusion is not the same thing as a judgment lacking a jurisdictional component. See, e.g., Shawnee Peanut Co. v. Barkus,
. Protest of Carter Oil Company,
. An appeal is a continuation of the trial court proceeding. GRP of Texas, Inc. v. Eateries, Inc.,
. City of Broken Arrow, Oklahoma v. Bass Pro Outdoor World, LLC, et al.,
. The appellate record shows that the Tulsa Industrial Authority was created on March 7, 1969 for the use and benefit of the City of Tulsa, Oklahoma, under the authority of and pursuant to the provisions of Title 60, Sections 176 ef seq. (The Public Trust Act). Resolution of the City of Tulsa, No. 7354, O.R. at 527; City's Response to Motion for Summary Judgment, O.R. at 717 (noting date of creation of TIA, and subsequent amendments to the Trust Indenture, citing O.R. at 540 and following).
. Oklahoma City Urban Renewal Authority v. City of Oklahoma City,
. State ex rel. Wright v. Oklahoma Corporation Commission,
. 62 0.$.2001 § 372 provided:
''Every officer of the state and of any county, township, city, town or school district, who shall hereafter order or direct the payment of any money or transfer of any property belonging to the state or to such county, city, town or school district, in settlement of any claim known to such officers to be fraudulent or void; or in pursuance of any unauthorized, unlawful or fraudulent contract or agreement made or attempted to be made, for the state or any such county, city, town or school district, by any officer thereof, and every person, having notice of the facts, with whom such unauthorized, unlawful or fraudulent contract shall have been made, or to whom, or for whose benefit such money shall be paid or such transfer of property shall be made, shall be jointly and severally liable in damage to all innocent persons in any manner injured thereby, and shall be furthermore jointly and severally liable to the state, county, city, town or school district affected, for triple the amount of all such sums of money so paid, and triple the value of property so transferred, as a penalty, to be recovered at the suit of the proper officers of the state or such county, city, town or school district, or of any resident taxpayer thereof, as hereinafter provided."
The 2001 version of § 372 was in effect at the time this controversy occurred. Section 372 was amended by 2008 Okla. Sess. Laws Ch. 367, § 8 (eff. Nov. 1, 2008), and by 2011 Okla. Sess. Laws. Ch. 73 § 1 (eff. Nov. 1, 2011). The parties did not address the effect of the 2008 amendment, and we decline to engage in sua sponte analysis of the legal issues presented by the amendment.
. 2011 Okla. Sess. Law Ch. 73 (S.B. No. 331) (eff. Nov. 1, 2011), amends both § 372 and 373 of Title 62, and the amendment does not add public trusts or trustees to the list of public bodies specified therein.
. See discussion with accompanying notes 6-8 supra.
. 60 0.8.2001 § 179:
The trustee, or trustees, under such an instrument or will shall be an agency of the state and the regularly constituted authority of the beneficiary for the performance of the functions for which the trust shall have been created. No trustee or beneficiary shall be charged personally with any liability whatsoever by reason of any act or omission committed or suffered in the performance of such trust or in the operation of the trust property; but any act, liability for any omission or obligation of a trustee or trustees, in the execution of such trust, or in the operation of the trust property, shall extend to the whole of the trust estate, or so much thereof as may be necessary to discharge such liability or obligation, and not otherwise.
. See, e.g., In re Eufaula Enterprises, Inc.,
. Oklahoma City Zoological Trust v. State ex rel. Public Employees Relations Bd.,
. Marlow v. School Dist. No. 4. Murray County,
. 12 0.$.2001 § 1397 (emphasis added):
An injunction may be granted to enjoin the enforcement of a void judgment, the illegal levy of any tax, charge or assessment, or the collection of any illegal tax, charge or assessment, or any proceeding to enforce the same; and any number of persons whose property is affected by a tax or assessment so levied may unite in the petition filed to obtain such injunction. An injunction may be granted in the name of the state to enjoin and suppress the keeping and maintaining of a common nuisance. The petition therefor shall be verified by the district attorney of the proper county, or by the Attorney General, upon information and belief, and no bond shall be required, but the county shall, in all other respects, be liable as other plaintiffs.
. Thompson v. Haskell,
. Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Smith,
. See, e.g., Apache Corp. v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission,
. Wilson v. Wiggins,
. The U.S. Court of Appeals for Tenth Circuit recently explained that if a state provides adequate procedural due process to allow a taxpayer to raise any constitutional objections, then the state has done all that is required under the federal Tax Injunction Act, and as a consequence, the federal courts are foreclosed from hearing such a tax challenge; and noted that 12 ©.$.2001 § 1397 serves as a plain, speedy and efficient remedy in Oklahoma courts for those seeking to challenge its taxes. Hill v. Kemp,
. See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Harris,
. A non-Hohfeldian plaintiff sues to secure judicial relief that would benefit a public entity or the community as a whole. State ex rel. Macy v. Bd. of County Comy's of Oklahoma County,
. Farrimond v. Coalgate School District, 1910 OK. 67,
. Strong ex rel. State v. Oklahoma Police Pension and Retirement Bd.,
. Lawrence v. Cleveland County Home Loan Auth.,
. This Court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, does not make first-instance determinations of disputed issues of either law or fact. Baker v. Saint Francis Hospital,
. Morgan, Delayed Attacks on Final Judgments, 33 Okla.L.Rev. 45, 48 (1980) ( [1] statutory relief from the judgment sought by motion in the original suit, [2] statutory relief from the judgment by independent suit, [3] equitable relief by independent suit, and [4] a proceeding which challenges the effect of the judgment as a collateral but crucial issue).
. State ex rel. Moshe Tal v. City of Oklahoma City,
. See discussion at 11 36 herein.
. 12 0.8.2001 § 2024(A) & (B):
A. INTERVENTION OF RIGHT. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action:
1. When a statute confers an unconditional right to intervene; or
2. When the applicant. claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest.
B. PERMISSIVE INTERVENTION. Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action:
1. When a statute confers a conditional right to intervene; or
2. When an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common. When a party to an action relies for ground of claim or defense upon any statute or executive order administered by a federal or state governmental officer or agency or upon any regulation, order, requirement or agreement issued or made pursuant to the statute or executive order, the officer or agency upon timely application may be permitted to intervene in the action. In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.
. Brown v. Patel,
. State of Oklahoma ex rel. Edmondson v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,
. In State ex rel. Wright v. Oklahoma Corporation Commission, 2007 OK. 73,
. For example, an intervenor seeking gui tam relief must show the inadequacy of the presentation of the controversy to the court by the public body. While this may be a pleading burden which challenges the face of the public body's petition for declaratory relief, [intervenor] must show the insufficiency of the declaratory judgment petition as a condition precedent to a successful intervention in the declaratory judgment proceeding" (State ex rel. Wright,
. Morton v. Baker,
. McCrary v. McCrary,
. See, e.g., Foster v. Gueory,
. Our Pleading Code adopts a procedure for intervention based upon similar provisions in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Brown v. Patel,
. This Court has explained that a cause of action (or claim for relief) is defined using the transaction, occurrence, or wrongful act. Chandler U.S.A., Inc. v. Tyree,
. Brown v. Patel,
. See State of New Mexico v. Aamodt,
. Nuesse v. Camp,
. Jansen v. City of Cincinnati,
. Threadgill v. Peterson,
. City of Broken Arrow,
. Title 60 0.$.2001 § 178.4 provides in pertinent part:
''Trusts created under the provisions of Sections 176 through 180.55 of this title or any amendments or extensions thereof shall not include any trust purpose, function nor activity: in any wholesale outlet, unless said wholesale outlet is a direct part of the industry. Provided, however, that the distribution centers for intoxicating and nonintoxicating alcoholic beverages as defined in Title 37 of the Oklahoma Statutes shall not qualify under the provisions of this title; nor shall it include a retail outlet unless said retail outlet is operated in conjunction with and on the same premises as the industrial, manufacturing, cultural, recreational, parking, transportation or airport facility ..."
. House of Realty, Inc. v. City of Midwest City,
. 2010 Okla. Sess. Laws Ch. 195, § 1 (eff. May 4, 2010). See 60 O.S.Supp.2010 § 178.4. The parties did not brief legal issues involving the 2010 amendment and we decline to sua sponte
. 62 0.S.Supp.2004 § 853(14) provides in pertinent part:
" 'Project costs' ... include, but are not limited to: (a) public works, public improvements, ... (k) costs of construction of public works or improvements, including but not limited to highways, roads, streets, bridges, sewers, traffic control systems and devices, telecommunications systems, parks, water distribution and supply systems, curbing, sidewalks and any similar public improvements, common utility or service facilities, landscaping, parking, and water detention/retention systems, ... and (0) assistance in development financing to the extent the governing body approves such financing;... ."
. City of Broken Arrow,
. In re Application of the Oklahoma Development Finance Authority,
. We do not use legal authority or facts raised for the first time by a gui tam: plaintiff on appeal when we measure the adequacy of a public body's presentation of that plaintiff's gui fam intervention claims for a justiciable controversy and declaratory relief. House of Realty, Inc. v. City of Midwest City,
. City of Broken Arrow,
. City of Broken Arrow,